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
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**THE
HISTORY
OF
THUCYDIDES.**

VOL. III.

LONDON :
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New-Street-Square.

THE
HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES,

NEWLY TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH,

AND

ILLUSTRATED WITH VERY COPIOUS

ANNOTATIONS,

EXEGETICAL, PHILOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL, AND GEOGRAPHICAL;

ALMOST ENTIRELY ORIGINAL,

BUT PARTLY SELECTED, TRANSLATED, AND ARRANGED, FROM THE

BEST COMMENTATORS, HISTORIANS, &c.

PREFIXED, IS AN ENTIRELY NEW

LIFE OF THUCYDIDES:

WITH A MEMOIR ON THE STATE OF GREECE, CIVIL AND MILITARY,
AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.



BY THE REV. S. T. BLOOMFIELD, D.D. F.S.A.

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IN EIGHT VOLUMES 8VO.




IN THREE VOLUMES.—VOL. III.

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MDCCCXXIX.



THE

HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

BOOK VI.

I. **T**HIS same winter the Athenians decreed again to undertake an expedition to Sicily¹, with a greater force than that under Laches, or Eurymedon, and, if possible, to subdue it, though most of them were ignorant of the magnitude of the island, and the number of its inhabitants, both Greeks and barbarians, and not aware that they were undertaking a war scarcely less serious than the one against the Peloponnesians. For the compass of Sicily is, for a merchant ship, not much less than eight days' sail², and, though of such a size, it is

¹ *Decreed again to undertake, &c.*] There is no foreseeing how far their tyrannous dominion might not have been extended over Greeks and among foreign nations, but that the folly of democracy unrestrained would, of course, work its own ruin. The evident weakness in the political conduct of the only rival power, Lacedæmon, operated to the encouragement of chiefs and people. (Mitford).

² *The compass of Sicily, &c.*] In the accounts of the antients respecting the circumference of Sicily, as, indeed, of all islands, there is great diversity. Several accounts are detailed by Cluverius *Sic. Antiq.* p. 54., who concludes by giving his own calculation, formed in a pedestrian tour round the island. He makes it six hundred miles, namely, by land. Euphorus, indeed, cited by Strabo, p. 383., makes it a voyage of five days and nights; though there some would read for *ι*, *η*. But if the *nights* as well as the *days* be taken into the account, the difference will be but trifling. Plutarch *de exil.* § 10. says it is four days' sail. But there, perhaps, for *IIII*, we should read *IIII*, *ἑπτα*. Dio Chrysostom, p. 251, 41., says the island is ten thousand two hundred stadia in circumference. But there, perhaps, for *M* we should read *Μ*, i. e. five thousand. On this rough computation by *days' sail* see the note on l. 2, 97. 1. And here it may be noticed, that

separated from the continent³ by only a distance of twenty stadia⁴ of sea.

Duker well defends Thucydides from the attacks of the mathematicians, as not professing to give the real magnitude or geometrical contents of the island, but only its reputed magnitude, and that in the rude calculation of his age. Besides, it must not be forgotten that he says, "not much less than."

As to the diversity of estimates, it must be confessed to be great. But we must bear in mind that Thucydides speaks of days' sail in a merchant vessel. Some others, who speak of fewer days' sail, may mean in a trireme.

This island is usually considered the largest in the Mediterranean. Such Strabo considered it, and those who went after him, as also Diodorus. And so Cluverius maintains it to be, pronouncing Scylax to be, therefore, wrong in saying that *Sardinia* is the largest, and next to it Sicily. It has, however, turned out, on the recent accurate examination of both islands, by the scientific Captain Smyth, that *Sardinia* is the *larger*. Thus it appears, that the very antient geographer just mentioned had, in this respect (as, indeed, in some others), more knowledge than those that came after him. And, certainly, the square form of *Sardinia* is more favourable to magnitude than the triangular one of Sicily.

³ *Separated from the continent.*] And (as is also implied in the phraseology) thereby prevented from forming part of it. For there is, as Bauer has seen, a mixture of two phrases. The passage is imitated by Plutarch Anton. 69. τοῦ γὰρ ἐργοντος ἰσθμοῦ. Procop. 166, 4. δυοῖν σταδίων διειργομένη μίτρω τὸ μὴ ἐπιθαλάσσιος εἶναι. and 205, 20. μίτρω γὰρ τοσούτῃ τὸ μὴ ἐπιθαλάσσια εἶναι διείργεται Ῥώμη. and de Ædif. 43, 26. χεῖρόνῃσος γὰρ — ἰσθμῷ διειργομένη βραχεῖ μὴ νήσος εἶναι. Hence may be emended Pausan. l. 10, 17, 6. εἰ δὲ τὴν κέρνον σταδίουσ φασὶν οὐ πλείονας ἀπὸ τῆς Σαρδοῦς ἢ ὅτῳ τῇ θαλάσῃ διειργίσθαι. where I conjecture τῆς θαλάσσης. In the same way the Latin writers use *dissociare*. So Sil. Ital. l. 14., with reference to this separation, says: "Sed spatium quod dissociat consortia terræ."

Perhaps this may be a proper place to advert to the notion that Sicily was, by a violent convulsion, torn from Italy (of which, indeed, in the very earliest ages, it was esteemed a part). Cluverius, l. 1, 1. refers to many passages of Virgil, Sil. Ital., Ovid, Claudian, Statius, and Dionysius. This, he says, was endeavoured to be proved by Fazelli, whom he cites, and solidly refutes; referring also to the opinions of Herodotus and other authors. He truly remarks, that the opinion that islands, adjacent to continents, once formed a part of them, and were torn from them, was common. Hence Eubœa was thought to have been torn from Bœotia, Britain from France, Ceylon from Hindostan, Japan from China, &c. &c. Finally, he refers to some able remarks in refutation of the common notion, by Marian Valguarnara, who, among other objections, shows that Italy and Sicily, though they approach very near in one place, yet it is only in one place; in the rest they are too far asunder to suppose any such rent. Why, too, he asks, should not many equally narrow isthmuses have been torn asunder as well as this? He also observes, that the Sicilian coast presents appearances the farthest removed from such a supposition, by the view of so many beautiful *natural ports*, and peninsulas, all *turned* with exquisite exactness by the great Architect.

⁴ *Twenty stadia.*] Cluverius Sic. Antiq. 1, 5., thinks that Thucydides is mistaken in this measurement; as most make it only twelve or thirteen. But Poppo Proleg. 2, 498. observes, that the geographers of our day make it

II. The mode in which it was of old colonised¹, and the nations which then occupied it were as follows:

The most antient inhabitants, as occupants of a *part* of the country, are said to have been the Cyclops and Læstrygons, of whom I am not able to tell the race, neither from whence they went thither, nor whither they afterwards retired.² What

half a German mile; which will raise it above the extent assigned by Thucydides. Arrowsmith's map makes it yet more. See also Dorville's *Sicula*, p. 7. and also Brydone, 1, 85. Munter, p. 492. and Hoare, 2, 209., cited by Poppo. Certain it is that measurements at sea are vague, and judgment by the eye deceiving.

¹ *Colonised.*] Or settled; not inhabited, as Hobbes and Smith render. On the subject of the early settling and antient inhabitants of Sicily, the reader will do well to consult Cluver. *Sic. Antiq.* 1, 2.

² *Cyclops and Læstrygons, &c.*] Our historian professes to know nothing about their descent, and only that they went to Sicily, and, in after times, gradually disappeared. What he was not able to learn, it is not probable that modern enquirers should be able to ascertain; and yet such has been attempted. Goeller de *Situ Syr.*, p. 4., observes that Mannert *Geogr. Gr. and Rom.* 4., p. 5., places them far north, about the latitude of the Danube. Ukert and Zeune place them on the north coast of the Mediterranean sea. Gossilin assigns them *Latium*; and this last was the opinion of Cluverius.

As to the part occupied by the Læstrygons in Sicily, Spanheim thinks it was the plain of Leontini. Dorville assents to the opinion of Cluverius; yet he maintains that the Homeric Læstrygons are not to be sought for in Sicily. "The tract (Goeller continues) occupied by the Cyclops in Sicily, is generally agreed, by antients and moderns, to have been on the east coast of Sicily, and near Ætna; at least, if we put aside the *Homeric Cyclops*, whose situation is doubtful." He concludes by referring to Creuzer *Ant. Hist. Gr.*, p. 47. seq. 62. sqq. 55—59. Ukert *Geogr.*, vol. 1. p. 2. p. 13. seq., and adverts, with a reference to Creuzer, to the cautious language employed by Thucydides whenever he relates any thing on the authority of poets. On the present geographical or genealogical digression, Goeller refers to Valckn. on *Herod.* 5, 71., and cites *Livy*, 9, 17. *Nihil minus quæsitum a principio hujus operis videri potest, quam ut plus justo ab rerum ordine declinare, varietatibusque distinguendo opere et legentibus velut deverticula amœna et requiem animo meo quærerem.* To me it appears that Thucydides borrowed much of the information to be found in this digression from Antiochus and other antient historians.

Fazelli *Sicul.* 1, 6., adduces, as a proof, the former inhabitation of the Cyclops, the gigantic bones and monstrous caves found up and down in the island. That antiquary, however, might be deceived as to the nature of these bones. Certainly, he was a most credulous person; and it is remarkable that the same should be the popular belief in every country, namely, that bones of giants are to be met with, the aboriginal inhabitants of the country. All this is a faint remnant of venerable traditions, which took their origin from a period when, as we learn from holy writ, "there were giants in the earth." But that any bones of that race should still be found is little credible, and has never been established by any certain proof. That the gigantic race was confined to the very first generations of men, has been the opinion of the most judicious enquirers.

the poets have spoken of them, or what information any one may have gathered of them, must here suffice. The Sicanians³ appear to have been after them, the first settlers, nay, as they themselves say, were even prior to them, as being the indigenous, or aboriginal, inhabitants: but, as has been ascertained to be the truth, they were Iberians, and from the river Sicanus in Iberia⁴, being expelled thence by the Ligians. From them the island then received the name of Sicania, though formerly called Trinacria.⁵ These Sicanians even now inhabit those parts of Sicily towards the west.

After the taking of Ilium some of the Trojans, escaping the hands of the Achæans, went in vessels to Sicily, and inhabiting the country bordering on the Sicani, they both toge-

³ *Sicanians.*] Of these was the antient King Cocalus, spoken of by Diod. Sic. t. 3. 221., who says that Dædalus lived at his court. That king is supposed to have resided at Agrigentum. On the early migrations of the Sicanians, there is some interesting information in Dionys. Hal. Ant., p. 17 and 18., who refers to Hellenicus Lesb., Philistus, Antiochus, and Thucydides.

⁴ *They were Iberians, and from the river Sicanus in Iberia.*] Such, too, as Cluverius remarks, was the opinion of Philistus, Ephorus, and Dionysius.

On the river Sicanus here spoken of, Cluverius says it is nowhere mentioned except in Steph. Byz.; and he supposes it to be the river Segreæ, which flows from the Pyrenean mountains, and runs into the Iberus. Ukert, referred to by Goeller, thinks it the river *Xucar*.

⁵ *Sicania, though formerly called Trinacria.*] Some MSS. have Trinacia, which is often elsewhere found, as is not unfrequently Thrinacia, and even sometimes Thinacia; which last, however, seems to be a corruption. As to the others, it is sometimes difficult to decide between them; as in Timæus ap. Goeller de Situ Syr., p. 290.

Dorville Sic., p. 162. seqq., thinks that Sicily was called Thrinacia, or Trinacia, from an antient city of that name, which was of barbarian and Sicilian origin. This, however, seems to be a wholly unfounded fancy, especially as we can so much better account for the name on another principle. The ratio significationis in either case is essentially the same. Trinacria (for which Trinacris, only another form, occurs in Ptolemy, Appian Halient. 624., Ovid Fast. 4.) is the more usual name, and denotes the *three-angled* island. Trinacia (which is, I conceive, the earlier name, as found in Homer, and appears in many later writers) signifies the triangular, or three-cornered, island. Nay, Orpheus calls Sicily the *τριγώνωνα νήσον*, i. e. the *three-tined* (and Lycophron Cass. 966. says, 'Ἄξει πρόδειρον νήσον εἰς Ἀγκυραῖον'). And so the Romans called it Triquetra. Hence, in Strabo, p. 382. *ἰστί δ' ἡ Σικελία τριγώνος τῷ σχήματι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Τρινακρία μὲν πρότερον, Τρινακίς δ' ὕστερον προσηγορεύθη μετονομασθεῖσα εὐφρονέτερον*. I am surprised the editors should not have seen that *Τρινακία* is the true reading, or, perhaps, *Θρινακία*, and then *Τρινακία* is for *Τρινακίς*. The form *Θρινακία* is only a rougher pronunciation of the word, and, perhaps, a yet more antient one. So Eustathius on Dionys. Perieg. (*Τρινακίας*) says, the island was so called *διὰ τὸ ἰστέναι ἐπιδάκναι*, where it is strange the editors should not have seen that the true reading is ΘΡΙΝΑΚΙ, the Δ and Ν being

ther obtained the name of Elymians⁶, and their cities were Eryx⁷ and Egesta.⁸ There were also with them some

often confounded. This emendation is, indeed, placed beyond doubt by Steph. Byz., who says ἐκλήθη δ' οὕτως ὅτι σπινάκι ἵστιν ὁμοία. Now this will be better understood, on remembering that σπινάξ signified a *three-tined fork*, and also, in a general way, any triangular figure; as is plain from its being a name given to the πρίον, or winnowing-fan, which was of the form of a Δ. Perhaps this σπινάξ is the only evidence that τριπύος (whence the Latin *trinus*) was used by the Greeks. The name *Trinacria*, it may be observed, was not confined to Sicily. Thus it was (as appears from Pliny H. N. 5, 31.) sometimes given to Rhodes; perhaps, however, rather as an epithet than a regular appellation.

Cluverius Sic. Ant. p. 48. says, the antients called the island πρόσκελος. And he gives a whimsical representation.

⁶ *Elymians.*] So called (as appears by Dionys. Hal. p. 41, 42.) from Elymus, who, together with Ægestus, or Egistus, was the leader of the colony from Troy. Thus it was that the two chiefs founded two cities, the latter Egesta, and the former Eryx; though his people were called Elymians, which soon became a name common to the inhabitants of *both* cities. Ægistus had been born in Sicily; and, by his early knowledge and subsequent connection with the inhabitants of that island, was, no doubt, induced to there seek a refuge for himself and such of his countrymen as would join in the expedition. The story is told by Dionysius Halicarnassus, Servius on Virg., Lycophron, and Tzetzes his Scholiast, besides other writers mentioned by Cluverius.

⁷ *Eryx.*] The situation of this place (as well as of Egesta) was admirably selected; being, indeed, one of the strongest in all Sicily. Its site is accurately described by Polybius as a flat piece of ground on the top of a very lofty hill. The place was said by some to have been named after its founder Eryx, son of Butes and Venus. Perhaps, however, this was a fiction, to do honour to the celebrated temple of Venus at Eryx, others representing it as founded by Ægistus.

The place is now called St. Julianò, and is occupied by a well-peopled town and a castle. The situation is commanding, being on one side on the edge of a perpendicular precipice.

⁸ *Egesta.*] The orthography Egista, though also found in Lycophron, Diodorus, and Strabo, is, by Cluverius, reckoned not so antient as Egesta (whence the Roman Segesta), as found not only in so antient a writer as Thucydides, but also in Pliny, Steph. Byz., and coins and inscriptions.

Now *s* was often prefixed to names beginning with a vowel. Ægistus, the founder of this city, is called by Virgil *Acestes*. So at l. 1, Sunt et Siculis regionibus urbes, Armaque, Trojanoque a sanguine clarus *Acestes*.

The situation of Egesta was a very fertile one, bearing some resemblance to that of Troy, for which reason the settlers called the two rivers near it, the Scammander and the Simois. From the river Himera to Panormus Strabo reckons μῶλια λί⁶: thence to the emporium of the Segestans βλ: thence to Lilybæum λγ. That emporium is said to have been at the present Castel à Mare; and Egesta, at St. Barbara. The ruins of this town present several buildings of the grandest kind, especially the temple at Egesta, which Duppa says is one hundred and sixty-two feet long, sixty-six wide, with six columns in front, and fourteen on each side.

* Poppo conjectures κδ, referring to Hoare; probably the true reading is κε.

Phocians⁹, who in their way from Troy, were then¹⁰ driven by a storm first to Libya, and afterwards from thence to Sicily.

As to the Siculi (Sicilians), they passed over from Italy (for there they had inhabited), flying before the Opicians¹¹, having (as it is said, and seems probable) watched the opportunity afforded by a brisk and favourable wind to cross over¹² on rafts¹³, and probably making the voyage by other methods.¹⁴ Nay, there are yet Siculi in Italy: and the country was called Italy from Italus, a certain king of the Siculi¹⁵ so called. These having passed over in great force

⁹ *Phocians.*] Here Bochart, Geograph. Sacr. p. 630., thinks our author under a mistake.

¹⁰ *Then.*] Τότε, i. e. about the same time with the Trojans. Not "afterwards," as Smith renders. The word was omitted in some MSS., probably from ignorance of its sense.

¹¹ *Opicians.*] That these were the same with the Ausonians is shown, from the historian Antiochus, by Strabo, p. 371. A. See Niebuhr, Hist. Rom. t. 1. p. 51., and especially p. 25, 33, 48. Also sit. et orig. Syr. p. 13, not. Wachsmuth Hist. Rom. p. 24. (Goeller). The Antiochus here mentioned by Goeller was the most antient of all writers on Sicily, being somewhat prior to Thucydides. He wrote a history of Sicily, from the time of Coecalus down to the second year of the eighty-ninth Olympiad, in nine books; the same number as that adopted by Herodotus, probably from imitation. There is little doubt but that Thucydides made use of the history of Antiochus in his own work; but how far we are not enabled to say, the fragments of Antiochus being very few and short.

¹² *Watched the opportunity, &c.*] πορδμὸν is not correctly rendered by the commentators, *strait*. The word here signifies *trajectio*, *passage* or *ferry*; or rather the *opportunity* of making it. So Polyb. 5, 94, 3. τηρεῖν τὴν σύνορον, observare tempus concilii.

¹³ *Rafts.*] So Hesych. ξύλα. ἃ συνδέουσι καὶ οὕτω πλίουσιν. The word properly signifies *ναῦς σχεῖα*, a bark, or any thing on which to float, made for the occasion, and not regularly formed.

¹⁴ *Other methods.*] Namely, by means of swimming, either with or without the assistance of casks, bladders, and such other helps, including that of hanging by the tails of horses. That the distance was not too great to be swam over, is certain by the testimony of historians, that, at the storming of Messena by the Carthaginians, many of the inhabitants swam across to the Italian shore.

The expression ἀνέμου κατεόντος denotes a brisk wind, and is, by custom, used only of a *favourable* one.

¹⁵ *King of the Siculi.*] I have here followed the reading adopted, with reason, by the recent editors, *Siculi* for *Arcades*. That Italus was king of the *Siculi*, is certain from Antiochus, cited by Dionys. Hal. p. 10, 33. However, as the Siculi are by Antiochus and Dionysius said to have been *Ænotri*; and as Dionysius himself, at p. 255, 10, narrates, that the *Ænotri* came originally from *Arcadia*, so Goeller thinks either Ἀρκάδων is a *gloss* on Σικελῶν, or Thucydides so wrote, as knowing that the *Ænotri* were from *Arcadia*; and the same with the *Siculi*. The latter supposition, however,

to Sicily, and defeated in battle the Sicani, drove and confined them to¹⁶ the southern and western parts of it, and made the island be called instead of Sicania, Sicilia, and having possessed themselves of the best parts of the country, they inhabited there for nearly three hundred years after they had crossed over, up to the arrival of the Grecians in Sicily. And even yet they occupy the midland and northerly parts of the island. The Phœnicians, too, formed settlements around the whole of Sicily, taking in the promontories near the sea, and little islands adjacent, and that for the sake of traffic with the Siculi.¹⁷

After, however, the Greeks had come over in great num-

is very groundless. Not to say that we nowhere read of *kings* of Arcadia, it is very unlikely that a king of Arcadia should have gone to settle a colony in Italy. Besides, the very name given to the new colonists (*Ænotri*) seems to point at *Ænotrus* (one of the twenty sons of Lycaon, as we find from Phocylides), and not *Italus*, as the leader and founder of the colony. Whereas it was likely that when, in after times, the colony grew populous and powerful, it should give name to the whole country, at least the south part of it, and this be called *Ænotria* or *Italia*. Besides, Antiochus, referred to by Goeller, calls *Italus*, not an Arcadian, but an *Ænotrian*. And as *Ἀρκάδων* cannot have come from Thucydides, neither is it, I conceive, as Goeller fancies, a *gloss*. It seems rather to have been a marginal remark, not intended to supersede the textual reading, though it had in some MSS. that effect, but to denote the Grecian origin of one of the most antient nations of Italy.

On the origin of the name *Italia* Goeller refers to Heyne's twenty-first Exc. on Virg. *Æn.* 1. Aristot. *Polit.* 7, 10. Paul Diacon. *Hist. Langobard* 2, 23. And (after Niebuhr) referring to Thucyd. 7, 33. he remarks, "that the name of Italy, in the time of Thucydides, only comprehended that part of the peninsula from the river Laus and the city of Metapontum to the Sicilian strait; all *beyond* belonging to Japygia, Opicia," &c. If so, the antient name of Italy was indeed very limited, only comprehending Calabria; namely, the toe of the boot. But as Niebuhr himself admits that *Ænotria* comprehended *Bruttii* and *Lucania*, there is no reason to think that *Italia* was, at the time in question, at all *less* extensive.

On the name *Italus* may be consulted a learned note of Fabricius on Dio Cass. p. 2, 32.

¹⁶ *Drove and confined to.*] Here I read, on the conjecture of Bekker, for *ἀπίστευαν*, *ἀνίστευαν*. I had myself conjectured *ὑπίστευαν*.

¹⁷ *The Phœnicians, too, formed settlements, &c.*] It seems that these were not meant as colonies, but only commercial stations, like the factories, or petty settlements, formed by the Portuguese, Dutch, English, &c. on the coast of Hindostan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some of them, however, it seems, became colonies, as serving to carry off the excess of population from Phœnicia, and, what might be called New Phœnicia, the Carthaginian territories. Now islands and peninsular promontories are situations in all ages chosen for such settlements.

The islands here mentioned were probably the *Ægades*, &c. on the west coast off the Lilybæum.

bers, they abandoned the greater part of their settlements, and drew together the rest, occupying Motya¹⁸, Soloeis¹⁹, and Panormus, near the Elymians, both in reliance on their assistance, and because from this part of Sicily it is the shortest passage to Carthage.

Such were the barbarians who settled Sicily, and this their situation.

III. As to the *Greeks*, the first who formed settlements

¹⁸ *Motya.*] On the situation of this place there is some doubt. Cluverius remarks that by most geographers it is placed at Portus Galli, nine miles from Panormus. Yet from Diodor. Sic. l. 13, 14. and 54. 14, 47-55. it is plain that it was not on the continent, but on an island distant from it, as Diodor. says, six stadia. Those passages, too, prove that it was not near Panormus, but between Lilybæum and Eryx. Cluverius, moreover, remarks, "that there is at this time a low islet, about six stadia from the continent, two miles from the promontory Ægithallus, and seven from Lilybæum, called *Isola di Santo Pantaleon*, which so coincides with the historical narrations that there can be no doubt but that it was Motya." And here Cluverius has been followed by Arrowsmith. But the island he mentions as corresponding to Motya is Trinas, which is too far from the continent. For my own part, as I find in Captain Smyth's map no less than six islets between Lilybæum and Ægithallus, to *three* of which the distance mentioned by Diodorus will apply, it seems to me impossible to determine which of these was the antient Motya, *one*, it may be supposed, of the *insular* settlements before adverted to. Now the situation was peculiarly convenient, from the shortness of its distance from Africa, which, according to Cluverius, was about 180 miles; though, according to Arrowsmith's map, it is but 100 miles to the nearest point, the Hermæa Acra. The name *Motya* is probably of Phœnician origin; though there are two or three glosses in Hesych. which possibly have some connection with it.

¹⁹ *Soloeis.*] This was on the east promontory of the bay of Panormus (Monte Gerbino), and about twelve miles from Panormus. It was called by the Romans (by contraction) Solus and Soluntum, and is now (as Cluverius testifies) called Solunti. In the time of Fazelli there was yet a castle, and a port for corn vessels. Its situation is thus graphically depicted by Fazelli ap. Cluver. p. 278. "Mons Gerbinus, a Panormo passuum millia xii distans, sequitur, quem mare adlambit: et mons alius, undique præcisus, ei contiguus, ad cujus verticem Soloentum, urbs vetustissima, hodie prorsus jacens cernitur. Cujus mœnia, circumquaque jacentia, ac templorum ædiumque privatorum vestigia, columnæ præterea prostratæ, ac cisternæ, quæ hucusque visuntur, ejus præteritam ostendunt claritatem. Erat autem ambitus passuum supra mille, et naturali situ communita, unicum habens aditum et adscensum perdifficilem." Cluverius thinks that the foundation of Soloeis must have been about the fiftieth Olympiad, since it is mentioned by Hecætæus in his "Europe."

It is obvious how judiciously selected were the situations of these three places: Motya being on an island, Soloeis exceedingly strong by nature, and Panormus one of the best ports in Europe, occupying the same site as the present Palermo.

therein were some Chalcidæans from Eubœa under the direction of Thucles, who settled Naxos¹, and erected the altar of Apollo Archegetes², which is now standing outside of the city, at which the Theori (or those publicly sent to consult the oracle) offer sacrifices previous to their departure. In the following year, Archias³, one of the Heraclidæ, leading a colony from Corinth⁴, founded Syracuse; having first expelled the Siculi from the island, in which (now no longer surrounded with water⁵) is situated the inner city. In process of time the outer city, too, was added, by a wall, and became populous⁶. Thucles also, and the Chalcidæans, pro-

¹ *Naxos.*] So called, it should seem, from the island Naxus. It is supposed to have been founded B. C. 733, and was destroyed by Dionysius. With respect to its situation, Cluverius thinks "there is no reason to doubt but that it was near Mount Taurus, where Tauromenium was afterwards founded; namely, on that side of the mountain which looks towards Catana and Syracuse. He shows that from the Itinerary of Antonine we may ascertain that it was five miles from Tauromenium; namely, at what is now called *Fiume freddo*," or, as Poppo calls it, the Acesines, which, indeed, seems to be what Cluverius means by the *Fiume freddo*, and that corresponds best with the distance in the Itinerary. Arrowsmith calls it the Alcantara.

² *Archegetes.*] Or chief leader. This title they gave him as the patron of their undertaking. The appellation was, indeed, elsewhere applied to Apollo; on which Duker refers to Spanheim on Callimachus.

³ *Archias.*] To the passages cited by Cluverius and Duker may be added the following interesting one of Pausan. 5, 7, 2. δς (scil. θεός ἐν Δελφοῖς) Ἀρχίαν τὸν Κορίνθιον ἐς τὸν Συρακουσῶν ἀποστέλλον ὁκισμὸν, καὶ τότε εἶπε τὰ ἔκρη.

Ὀρτυγίη τις καίται ἐν ἡεροιδεῖ πόντῳ, Θρινακίης καθύπερθεν, ἐν Ἀλφειοῦ στόμα βλύξει, Μισγόμενον πηγαῖς ἐθριπέης Ἀρεθούσης. The oracle was, as usual, consulted; and it may be observed that the spelling *Θρινακίης* in that passage confirms what I have above said, that this is the most antient form.

⁴ *Leading a colony from Corinth.*] Such is plainly the sense of ἐκ Κορίνθου, and not "of Corinth," as Smith renders, though that Archias was a Corinthian there is no reason to doubt.

⁵ *Now no longer, &c.*] It was at first an island, and the site of the old city founded by Archias. Afterwards, when the city was so far extended to the continent that there was, as it were, a new city there, the insular city was the inner, and the other the outer city. By the time of Thucydides, however, the channel which separated the two had been filled up; as in the case of Mantinæa.

The name of the island was Ortygia; on which see Cluver. p. 154. seqq. Goeller de situ Syr. p. 44. sq. It is strange that none of the authors cited should have adverted to the *ratio appellationis*, which undoubtedly had reference to the abundance of quails. It contained the far-famed fountain of Arethusa.

⁶ *The outer city, too, was, &c.*] Such seems to be the true sense, and not that assigned by Hobbes and Smith: for Thucydides could hardly

ceeding from Naxos (in the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse), settled Leontini⁷, (driving out the Siculi by force of arms,) and after that Catana. But those that settled Catana made Euarchus the leader of the colony.⁸

IV. About the same time also Lamis arrived in Sicily, with a colony from Megara, and having founded a town called Trotilus¹, upon the river Pantacias, and afterwards having

mean to say that the city became populous in consequence of being walled. Προστυχιζέειν signifies, to add and wall in a piece of ground to one already walled in. It is a very rare word, and, I believe, met with nowhere else, except in Dionys. Hal. Ant. p. 137, 19. (perhaps with a view to the present passage) προστείχισε τῇ πόλει.

With respect to the name of the place itself, *Syracuse*, there is no reason to doubt but that it was so called from a lake or marsh, denominated *Syraco*. Whether that was the same with the *Lysimelia*, authors are not agreed. Latronne thinks they were the same; Cluverius and Poppo, that they were different ones: but they are so puzzled to fix the situation of Syracuse, that probably the former opinion is the better founded, though it is not without its difficulties. Mr. Hughes testifies that much of the fertile land of Syracuse is again become a bog.

⁷ *Leontini*.] Not Leontium, as Hobbes and Smith write; for that is not only a deviation from Thucydides, but, in fact, no author uses that name, except Ptolemy; and Cluverius there suspects the reading to be a corruption for Λεοντίων. To me it appears that Λεοντίωνι was the original reading, corrupted first to Λεοντίων, and then to Λεόντιον. As I have before treated on this city, it may be sufficient to add, that Cluverius has, with great probability, derived the appellation from Λίων, all the antient coins of this city having the impress of a lion. I suspect, however, that it derived it from its founder, as the leader of the original colony, whose name Thucydides does not mention. The appellation Λίων, it may be observed, was a common one.

That they should have settled Leontini only six years after their own colonisation may, indeed, seem strange; but it may be accounted for from the superior fertility of the plain of Leontini, which has ever been accounted the richest tract in Sicily: for the very same reason they soon afterwards settled Catana.

⁸ *But those that settled, &c.*] By this it is meant that the new colonists did not, as was usual, take a leader appointed by the mother country, but appointed one of themselves. Hence it would appear that the colony was made by a party, out of dissatisfaction.

¹ *Trotilus*.] From the resemblance of this name to Trogilus, Pinedo and Duker would here read Τρωγιλον: but we cannot here suppose the Trogilus near Syracuse; and that there should have been any other place of the same name within so short a distance, is extremely improbable; and though Trotilus may not, as Duker says, be mentioned elsewhere^{*}, yet that

* I can, however, I think, point out another place where it is mentioned. Polyænus, 5, 5, 2. writes thus — Μεγαρεῖς τῶν Λεοντίων ἐκπεσόντες Τρότιλον κατήκησαν μέχρι ἐνὸς χειμῶνος μέχρι γὰρ τοσούτου συνειρήσαν οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς; where Masvic rightly conjectures Τρότιλον. This account of Polyænus is, however, at

gone from thence, and for a short time lived under the same government with the Leontines, being expelled by them, and having founded Thapsus², he himself is slain. As to the rest, they, after being dislodged³ from Thapsus, went and founded what is called the Hyblæan Megara, under the auspices of Hyblon, a Sicilian king, who assigned them that situation.⁴

is no reason why it may not be the true reading; for the manner in which Thucydides speaks of it (*Τρώτιλον, τι ὄνομα χωρίου*), shows that it was a very obscure place. Indeed, it should seem to have been soon, in a manner, abandoned; the colonists being attracted by the superior advantages of the neighbouring Leontini.

The name (by what allusion is uncertain) seems a derivative adjective from *τρωτός* (which occurs in Homer), as *ὀππίλος* from *ὀπρός*. Indeed, almost all the few polysyllables in — *ωος* are derivatives from simpler forms in *ος* or *η*.

With respect to the situation of the place, the Pantacias (not Pantacius; for all authorities defend the *ας*) is proved by Cluverius (with a reference to Virg. *Æn.* 3, 689.) to be what is now called the Porcari; and Trotilus is thought by Cluverius to have been on the right bank, and at the mouth of the river, where there is now a sort of port or dock called Bruca. I agree with Cluverius that it was probably on the right bank. And this the *ὑπὲρ*, taken with a reference to the last-mentioned place Catana, seems to prove. So the Scholiast explains it *ὑπὲρ ἄνω*. That it was at the river is, indeed, most probable, though far from being certain.

² *Thapsus*.] Situated in a peninsula which was sometimes called an island, and now bears the name Macronesi. See Cluver. The place is seldom mentioned; and it would not be certain that there was any town, but that Steph. Byz. calls it *πόλις*. The place, probably, obtained its name from the peninsula producing the *θάψος*, a sort of plant or shrub used for dyeing yellow. See Hesych. in *θάψινον*, and the commentators there.

³ *Dislodged*.] Namely, as I suspect, by the Syracusans, to whom the occupation of the place would be of importance.

⁴ *Under the auspices of, &c.*] Such is clearly the sense; though the versions of Portus and Smith represent that the place was *betrayed* to them by Hyblon. But *προδίδωμι* often signifies to *put into the hands of*; as Polyb. l. 36, 1, 1. 32, 13, 5., where see Schweighausen. The true sense has been seen by Goeller, who renders *καθηγησαμένον*, “eodemque duce,” as if they took the king for the leader of the colony; which may be the sense intended; but I prefer the figurative one above adopted.

It may seem strange that a Sicilian king should patronise and settle Greek colonists; but, in truth, these Megaræans had been so tossed about and miserably handled by the Greeks, that they were doubtless ready to take the side of the Siculi against them. And, probably, Hyblon regarded them as an accession of strength; and in that view he planted them very skilfully, since their territory was interposed between the two powerful Greek colonies at Syracuse and Leontini.

It appears, Goeller remarks, from Ephorus ap. Strabo, that the city was at first called *Hybla*. And, on this mode of colonisation, he refers to

variance with Thucydides. I should be inclined to think that what he says of Trotilus might be true of *Thapsus*, but that that place must have been in the territory of Syracuse.

And having inhabited the place two hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled from the city and territory by Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse. But before their expulsion they had, an hundred years after their own foundation, settled Selinus⁵, sending Pammilus as the leader of the colony; who had come to them from the parent city, and co-operated in the establishment of the colony.

Gela⁶ was colonised by Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Eutimus from Crete, who brought settlers in common, and founded it in the forty-fifth year after the colonisation of Syracuse. The name of the city was given it from the river Gela; but the place where *the city* now is, and which⁷ was first

Heyne's Opusc. Acad. t. 2. p. 252. Now, there were *three* Hyblas in Sicily, the Megara Hyblæa, the Hybla Galeatis, or Geleatis, also called Major, near *Ætna*, and the Hybla Heræa, near Pachyna.

⁵ *Selinus*.] Situated at the mouth of the river Hypsa, on the south-west part of the island, and about 28 miles S. E. from Lilybæum. The place is supposed to have derived its name from the *wild parsley* which grew in its neighbourhood, on the banks of the river Selinus, and which is still found there. Thus its coins had a leaf of the *σίλινον* represented. Many other rivers and lakes, too, had this name.

Its ruins (now called *Polieri del Castel vetrano*, or *Torre delli Pulci*, see Hoare 2. p. 78. seqq.) attest its antient magnificence. The best account of them has been given by Hoare (whom see), and recently by Duppa. "The ruins (he says) are on the coast, occupying the tops of two opposite hills not very high, but rising rather abruptly from the sea, and divided by a narrow valley, conjectured to have been the antient *port*, where a few vestiges are still discoverable among the heaps of accumulated sand. The western hill is supposed to have been the *Acropolis*, and the spot where the colony was first established; and there are still the remains of a wall nearly a mile in circuit. On the opposite hill are the ruins, which first attract the attention, and originally consisted of three temples; the larger 367 feet 6 inches long, and 160 feet 11 inches broad; the columns were 56 feet high, and their diameter 10 feet 6 inches: which dimensions may serve to give an idea of the colossal size of the largest temple. This temple was not finished at the time of its destruction; for some columns are fluted, others are prepared for fluting, and some are quite plain. The whole now presents a pile of ruins not surpassed in grandeur by any other remains of antiquity."

⁶ *Gela*.] Situated on the south part of the island, at the mouth of the right bank of the river of the same name, and now called *Terra nova*, as also is the place itself (though, according to Hoare, Alicata). The former, however, is found in the recent map of Captain Smyth.

Our author's derivation of the name of the place, from that of the river, might have prevented the trifling of those who derive it from *γελᾶν*. As to the name of the river, it seems derived from some old Greek word cognate with the Latin *gelu*; by which it will signify *Cold River*, a not uncommon appellation.

⁷ *Where the city now is, and which, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense, which has been missed by Hobbes and others. By *the city* is meant the *city proper*, as at Athens the *Acropolis* was so called; and the same manner of

enclosed by a wall, is called Lindii. The institutions established by them were Doric.⁸

About an hundred and eight years after their own colonisation, the Geloans settled Acragas⁹ (naming the city from

speaking is now used with respect to London and Paris. The place, it seems, was originally called *Lindii*; a name, doubtless, given in compliment to Antiphemus, the leader of the Rhodian colonists, who came, it should seem, mostly from Lindus in Rhodes. The old town, in the time of Thucydides, yet bore the name of Lindii.

On the name Antiphemus see Athen. p. 297. F.

⁸ *The institutions established by them were Doric.*] As might be expected; for the Rhodians were of Doric origin, and the institutions here meant were nearly the same with those of the Cretans. It is here remarked by Goeller: "Patrium nimirum fuit Doribus inde a prima gentis stirpe et ab Hyllo Heraclidarumque, ut libertatem populus, magistratum honore principibus viris relicto, coleret aristocratiamque adeo amplecteretur. Heyn. Opusc. Acad. t. 2. p. 217. et ad Pindar. Pyth. 1, 118. Add. Odofr. Mueller d. Dorer. t. 1, p. 111. t. 2. p. 163. ante omnia antem Boeckh. explicat. Pind. p. 234."

⁹ *Acragas.*] Afterwards called Agrigentum, now Girgenti; also on the south coast, and about forty-five miles west of Gela. This was at one time (after Syracuse) the largest and wealthiest city of Sicily, and, perhaps, of greater magnificence than Syracuse, if at least we may judge by the ruins, which are the noblest and most perfect of the whole island. Its antient state is well described by Polyb. 9, 27. and Diodor. 13, 81. seqq., its modern by Swinburne, Bartels, Munter, Hoare, and Duppa. The temples, of which there are yet remains, are nine in number, namely, of Juno Lucina, of Concord, Jupiter Olympus, Ceres and Proserpine, Venus, Hercules. Of these the most antient is that of Ceres and Proserpine; that of Concord is the most perfect; of that of Venus about half remains; that of Hercules was much larger than the preceding, and had the famous statue of Hercules by Zeuxis, mentioned by Cicero. That of Juno was famous for the statue of the goddess, the chef-d'œuvre of Zeuxis. The temple of Jupiter Olympus was the largest. The length, Duppa says, was three hundred and fifty-nine feet, the width one hundred and seventy-four; the diameter of the fluted semicolumns twelve feet nine inches, height sixty-three feet nine. The side was composed of fourteen semi-columns, the ends of seven.

The situation was excellently selected, both for strength and commerce; the place having an abrupt rock as a wall, out of which, indeed, most part of the walls were cut. The whole is one thousand three hundred feet above the sea, and therefore well answers to Virgil's words, "sese ostentat maxime longe." Indeed, had not Thucydides informed us that it was called from the *river*, we might have supposed the name had reference to its rocky site. The word may, however, apply to the *river*; for Hesychius explains ἀκραγίς by σκληρόν.

When it is said that Acragas was founded by the Geloans, we are only, I conceive, to understand *repeopled*; for the site of the acropolis is, with reason, supposed to have been the citadel and residence of Cocalus, king of the Sicani. The old city of Cocalus I suspect to be what Herodotus, 7, 170., calls *Camicus*, which he says the Agrigentines, in his time, inhabited. Indeed, that Camicus was old Agrigentum, is plain from Duris ap. Steph. Byz. Ἰμυρά.

the river Acragas), and sent as leaders of the colony Aristonous and Pustolus, appointing them the same form of polity as that at Gela.

Zancle¹⁰ was at first colonised by some pirates from Cyme, the Chalcidic city in Opicia; but afterwards, a considerable body coming from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa, participated in the distribution of the lands. Its founders were Perieres and Cratæmenes, one from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. The name at first given it was Zancle, as it had been called by the Siculi; for the place in form is like a hook or sickle, which the Siculi express by Zanclos. Afterwards, however, they were expelled by some Samians¹¹, and other Ionians, who, fleeing before the Medes, attempted to settle in Sicily.

V. The Samians, however, were not long after driven out by Anaxilas, tyrant of the Rhegini, who also himself founded the city out of a mixed race, calling it Messena¹, from the country whence he was antiently descended.

Himera² was colonised from Zancle by Euclidas, Simus, and Saco; and most of those who went on the colony were Chalcidæans, with whom took part in the settlement certain Syracusans, a beaten party from that city, who were called the Myletidæ.³ Their language was a mixture of the Chalcidic and Doric, but the Chalcidic institutions prevailed.

¹⁰ *Zancle.*] To the hooked form of the promontory which forms the port of Messena, all travellers bear testimony. The term Zanclos is, if I mistake not, of Hebrew, or, at least, Oriental origin.

¹¹ *By some Samians, &c.*] Among these was Cadmus Coos, as appears from Herod. 7, 164, 5. οἶχετο εἰς Σικελίην ἐνθαμετὰ Σαμίων ἔσχε τε καὶ κατοικησεὶ Ζαγελὴν τὴν εἰς Μεσσήνην μεταβαλοῦσαν τὸ οὐνομα.

¹ *Messena.*] A city at all times of celebrity, and now the second in the island. The former colonisers had, it seems, retained the antient name; while Mess. was, it seems, the new one.

² *Himera.*] On the north coast of the island, about twenty miles north-east of Soloeis, and at the mouth of the river Himera, from which Doris ap. Steph. Thes. observes that it was named. Perhaps, the river obtained that name from its pleasantness. The city was one of considerable consequence. On the right bank of the river is situated the modern *Termini*, one of the principal cities of the island.

The period of the colonisation of this city is said, by Diodorus, to have been the fourth year of the thirty-second Olympiad.

³ *Myletidæ.*] A powerful family so called.

Acræ⁴ and Casmenæ⁵ were founded by the Syracusans, Acræ seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenæ nearly twenty years after Acræ.

Camarina⁶ was first settled by the Syracusans, nearly an hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse; and the leaders of the colony were Dasco and Menecolos. The citizens being, however, expelled by the Syracusans in a war which arose from revolt, in process of time Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, having received the territory as the price of redemption for some Syracusan prisoners, again settled Camarina, becoming himself the leader of the colony. And on being again destroyed by Gelon, it was settled, for the third time, by Gelon.⁷

VI. By so many nations, Grecians and barbarians, was Sicily inhabited; and upon so considerable a country were the Athenians bent on making an expedition, aiming (for that was the true and real motive) at its total reduction, and willing to make a specious pretext for the attempt, by affording assistance to those who were related by affinity, or connected by previous alliance. They had been especially incited to the undertaking by some ambassadors of the Egestæans, who

⁴ *Acræ.*] Situated somewhat in the interior, and upon a high ridge, and about twenty-four miles west of Syracuse. Its name is derived from its situation, which is alluded to by Sil. Ital. ap. Cluver.: "e tumulis glacialibus Acræ."

⁵ *Casmenæ.*] This city was situated about nine miles from the sea, on the river Motycannus, which is about twenty-five miles west of Pachynum.

As to its situation, Cluverius supposes it to have been where is the modern town *Scitoli*. I find no such place in the recent maps; but the situation of Acræ has lately been exactly ascertained by the Sicilian antiquaries, as appears from Duppa's travels. The place, he tells us, is a mile from Pelazzolo; and a museum of antiquities has been formed by the owners of the site, from excavations.

The name (which is found in the *singular* in Herodotus and Steph. Byz.) seems to have been derived from the participle past of κάζω, *adorno*, *instruo*.

⁶ *Camarina.*] One of the latest of the Greek colonies, and which was almost ruined when it had advanced to a considerable height of prosperity; yet by the time of the Peloponnesian war it had arrived at a high degree of wealth and power. The name yet remains, though dwindled to a village called *Camarana*, on which Poppo refers to Munter, p. 307. seqq. The origin of the appellation is uncertain.

⁷ *By Gelon.*] Or rather by the Geloans; for I cannot but embrace the conjecture of Dodwell and Wesseling, Γελωσίν.

were then present, and earnestly entreated their assistance. For being borderers on the territory of the Selinuntians, they had been engaged in a war with them, about certain contracts respecting marriages¹, and a tract of debatable border-land²; wherein the Selinuntians calling in the assistance of the Syracusans, pressed them hard³, assailing them both by land and sea. Insomuch that the Egestæans, reminding the Athenians of the alliance in the former war made by Laches with the Leontines, entreated them to send a fleet to their aid, urging many other arguments for persuasion, and this as the sum of the whole: — That if the Syracusans should, after expelling the Leontines, go unpunished, and, destroying such as remained of the Athenian allies, should get into their hands the dominion of all Sicily, there would be danger lest, being Dorians, they should, because of kindred, send powerful assistance to the Peloponnesians, as Dorians, and moreover as colonies, to those who had planted them, and co-operate in bringing down the Athenian power. It was prudent, therefore, for them, in conjunction with the remaining allies, to make a stand against the Syracusans, especially as they *themselves* (they said) would furnish ample funds for the war.

On hearing these arguments often urged in the assemblies by the Egestæans, and those who promoted their cause, the

On the *second* establishment of Camarina by Hippocrates, see Herod. 7, 155. and the notes of the editors.

¹ *Certain contracts respecting marriages.*] Such is the sense, if the Scholiast's subaudition, *συναλλαγμάτων*, may be admitted. These were, it seems, certain agreements regulating the intermarriages of the inhabitants of the two colonies.

Dionysius, 12, 82. omits this cause of disagreement; only mentioning the *other* respecting the tract of debatable border-land. May we ascribe this to his not understanding the expression? Formerly, indeed, I conjectured for *γαμικῶν*, *γυμνικῶν*, scil. *αγωνῶν*: and I have elsewhere observed the two words to be confounded.

² *A tract of debatable border-land.*] On this cause of dissension Diodorus is more explicit than Thucydides. He tells us, "that though there was a river which separated the respective territory of the two states, yet the Selinuntians would pass it, and claimed the occupation first of the opposite bank, and then of some adjoining territory." What river this was, it is not easy to say. Poppeo thinks it was the Acithius. Or, perhaps, it was the Halys.

³ *Pressed them hard.*] *Κατείρω* is here used as at 4, 98. Goeller refers to Wesseling on Herod. 6, 102.

Athenians decreed first to send ambassadors to Egesta in order to make examination concerning the money, whether the sums they spoke of were deposited in the treasury and the temples⁴, and moreover to know the state of things as to the war with the Selinuntians.

VII. Thus the Athenian ambassadors were sent to Sicily. And during the same winter the Lacedæmonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, making an expedition into the Argive territory, ravaged some not very considerable part of the country, and carried off the corn in some waggons⁵ which they had brought. They also settled some Argive exiles at Orneæ, leaving with them a few of the rest of the army.⁶ And having concluded a treaty for a certain time, during which the Orneates and Argives should not molest each other's lands, they returned home with the army.

And not long after, the Athenians having arrived⁷ with thirty ships, and six thousand heavy infantry, the Argives, in conjunction with the Athenians, went on an expedition with their whole force, and for one day besieged those in Orneæ. But as the army was encamped at some distance, the Orneates, under cover of the night, effect their escape from the place. On the following day the Argives, on perceiving this, razed Orneæ to the ground, and departed, as also did the Athenians soon after with their fleet.

And now the Athenians having transported by sea to Methone (which is bordering on Macedonia) some horsemen⁸

⁴ *The treasury and the temples.*] Here we have another proof that money or valuables laid up in the temples were regarded as a resource in great emergencies. Thus, in some respects, the temples were the national banks. See l. 2, 13, and the notes.

⁵ *In some waggons.*] The only instance I remember of such being done. In the irruptions into *Attica* this was impracticable, from the distance and the difficulty of crossing Geranea and other mountains.

⁶ *The rest of the army.*] By this it is plain that the Argive exiles had carried arms with them in the expedition.

⁷ *The Athenians having arrived, &c.*] This expedition is thus alluded to by Aristoph. Av. 399. Φήσομεν — μαχομένη τοῖς πολέμοισιν Ἀποθανεῖν ἐς Ὀρνειαίς.

⁸ *Horsemen.*] I have not rendered *horse*, for that implies *horses* as well as men; whereas in the present case I apprehend only the *men* were conveyed, the horses being procured in Macedonia or Thrace.

of themselves, and some exiles of the Macedonians, ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. The Lacedæmonians, on their part, sent to the Chalcidæans in Thrace, who were at truces of ten days' ⁹ continuance with the Athenians, and urged them to join arms with Perdiccas; but they refused. And thus terminated the winter, and the sixteenth year of the war which Thucydides hath narrated.

YEAR XVII. B. C. 415.

VIII. Early in the spring of the subsequent summer, ¹ the Athenian ambassadors came from Sicily, accompanied by the Egestæans, who were charged with sixty talents of uncoined silver, as being a month's pay for sixty ships ², which they were about to entreat might be sent them. And the Athenians having convoked an assembly, and heard both from the Egestæans, and from their own ambassadors, besides other alluring but untrue representations, especially concerning the money, that large sums were laid up both in the temples and the common treasury ³, they decreed to send sixty ships to

⁹ *Ten days.*] Of the same length as those which were made with the Bœotians; and we may suppose it a usual term.

¹ *The spring of the subsequent summer.*] The English reader may stumble at this expression, unless he has learnt that the Greeks divided the year into two parts, summer and winter, the former of which comprehended the spring.

² *As being a month's pay for sixty ships.*] Or, as Goeller renders, "in order to afford pay for." This passage is of importance in assisting to determine the pay and the number of men on board the Athenian triremes. On calculation it will appear that the Egestæans reckoned for two hundred men on board each ship, and the pay at one drachma per diem.

³ *Treasury.*] Notwithstanding that the far greater part of the MSS. have *ἐκ τοῖς κοινῶς*, I have followed the common reading, as being supported by all the MSS. at the parallel passage, *supra*, c. 6.; not to mention the improbability of supposing more than *one* common treasury at a small city. Indeed, we scarcely any where read of more. Goeller, indeed, maintains that nothing is decided by passages which have the singular. That, however, would only hold good if the plural were as frequent as the singular. The preceding passage, at least, *must* affect the question. Besides, we can easily account for the *plural* immediately after a preceding plural, but not vice versa. Finally, the common reading is defended by Pausan. 10, 19, 5. (a very similar passage), *ὥς χρήματα πολλὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ πλείονα ἐν ἐποῖς τὰ τε ἀναθήματα, καὶ ἀργυρὸς καὶ χρυσὸς ἐστὶν ἐπίσημος. where for χρυσὸς ἐστὶν ἐπίσημος, I would read χρυσὸς ἐστὶ ἀσημος, adhuc non signata.*

Sicily, appointing as commanders Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus⁴, to be invested with full powers to act according to the emergency⁵, with instructions to aid the Egestæans against the Selinuntians, and also, if there were time left them in the war, to establish the Leontines in their former seats, and to transact such other business as might occur in Sicily, as they should judge most for the advantage of the Athenians.

On the fifth day⁶ after this, an assembly was again held, on the best methods for expediting the equipment⁷ of the fleet, and in order to vote whatever the commanders might think necessary for setting forth the armament. And now Nicias,

⁴ *Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus.*] Mitford, by a strange inadvertence, narrates that Nicias was the *first* in command. And as the whole measure was carried by the party of Alcibiades, he attributes it to deep policy; namely, that he might not appear the opponent of Nicias, but use the weight and influence of Nicias against Nicias himself. This, however, as well as his other speculations on the policy of Alcibiades, must be considered unfounded. In truth, there seems to have been very little policy at all in the case. Alcibiades had the support of the whole of the democratical party, and even such of the aristocratical as were young men, restless and wanting employment. By means of which predominant influence he was named first in command; and probably Lamachus was brought in by the contrivance of Alcibiades, in order that he himself might have the predominance in counsel; for, notwithstanding the merit and worth of Lamachus, he was, by his poverty and dissipated turn, not only disqualified from having much weight, but would be peculiarly obnoxious to corruption on the part of Alcibiades. As to Nicias, he was brought in by the aristocratical party as a check on Alcibiades.

⁵ *To be invested with, &c.*] Such appears to be the full sense of *ἀποκράτορας*, which is not well rendered by Hobbes, “with authority absolute.” Commanders of armaments always had authority absolute over their troops. But that is not here meant. The term seems to refer to the *use* of the armament; namely, when and how to employ it; to withdraw it, if necessary, to act for the Athenian people in negotiations with any Sicilian or Italian states.

Of these *στρατηγοὶ ἀποκράτορες* we read in Aristoph. Av. 1495. So also in Æschin. p. 62, 35. *πρώτους ἀποκράτορες*, and *στρατηγὸν ἀποκράτορα* in Pausan. l. 4. p. 241. Spanheim on Julian, p. 76. has a learned dissertation on them.

⁶ *On the fifth day.*] Mitford thinks “that this early period was fixed on for the second assembly by Alcibiades, in order that the popular passions might not have time to cool.” Perhaps, too, this measure of a second assembly came from the party of Nicias, who thought that thus the thing might be got rid of.

⁷ *On the best methods for, &c.*] i. e. (as Mitford expresses it) “to decide upon the details of the armament, and to grant any requisitions of the general for which a vote of the people might be necessary.”

having been appointed to the command against his will⁸, and conceiving that the state had wrongly decided — nay, that on a slender, though specious pretext, they were aiming at an arduous undertaking, even the conquest of all Sicily — wished to divert them from their purpose, and, stepping forward, he addressed to them the following admonition.

IX. “This assembly has indeed been called together for the purpose of determining the forces and equipments, and settling the mode of expediting the armament for Sicily. To me, however, it seems that we should, even yet, deliberate on the *measure itself*, and consider whether it be advisable to send the fleet at all; and whether we should, with so superficial a deliberation on affairs of vast moment, undertake, at the persuasion of foreigners, a war in which we have no concern. And yet I, for my part, derive honour from the measure, and as for personal danger, I care as little for it as any man¹; though I must think that he is an equally good citizen who takes some provident thought for his person and property²;

⁸ *Having been appointed against his will.*] I have here followed the reading of the late editions, ἀκούσας, which was proved by Duker to be the true one.

¹ *I care as little for it as any man.*] Hobbes renders, “I esteem it the least of all men;” and Smith expresses the very same sense. But though that may seem agreeable to the words of the original, yet I cannot think it the true one. Could so peculiarly modest a man as Nicias intend so vain-glorious a speech? Unless, therefore, we suppose (as Goeller does) that he *here* only meant *Alcibiades*, we must recognise one of those *idioms* which are not to be too rigorously interpreted.

² *Though I must think, &c.*] In expressing the sense of the obscure words ὁμοίως — *πρόνοιαν*, I have seen reason to deviate from the recent interpreters, and to take the same view of the passage as did the antient commentators. See the Schol. Such, however, Goeller maintains is *not* the sense. “At non hoc dicit (writes he) æque bonum civem esse, qui rei suæ et vitæ parcat, atque qui vitæ suæ non timet, sed hoc: se minus quam alios (Alcibiadem oblique carpit) vitæ suæ metuere et pariter existimare tamen, bonum civem et illum esse, qui rei familiari et sibi, ubi officium majus non obstat, prospicere soleat.” That sense, however, is so harsh and frigid, that few will hesitate to prefer the more natural interpretation of the Scholiast, which is, moreover, confirmed by an imitation of the passage in Dio Cass. 432, 98. νομίζω γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὁμοίως ἔργον εἶναι τοῖς τε τῆς πατρίδος συμφέρουσι τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸν, φυλαττόμενον μὴ μάτην ἀπολιγῆται· καί, κ. τ. λ. and another in Dionys. Hal. Ant. 454, 10. ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶσμαι δεῖν τῆς οἰκείας ἀσφαλείας πλείω ποιῆσθαι πρόνοιαν ἢ τῆς κοινῆς ἀφελείας.

At νομίζων (for which I formerly conjectured νομιζω γ’, scilicet) we must supply *καίπερ*. Or the participle may be resolved into the verb and conjunction.

for such a one would wish that the affairs of the city should go right, for his own sake.³ However⁴, neither aforetime have I spoken aught contrary to my opinion, in order to acquire preeminence of honour⁵, nor will I now do so; but the counsel which I esteem the best, that I shall offer. And now were I to advise you to preserve what you hold, and not to put to hazard what is already in your possession, for what is uncertain and contingent, my words would, I know, be too weak to prevail over your tempers⁶; — but that your eagerness is unseasonable, and the objects you are so bent on are not easy of attainment, this I may and shall show you.

X. “I affirm, then¹, that by going thither you will be leaving behind many enemies here, and acting as if you desired² to go and bring others from thence. You think, pro-

The passage is well paraphrased by Mitford, thus: — “For myself, at my years, and after the long course of services in which my fellow-citizens have been witnesses of my conduct, I may venture to say that no man is less anxious for his personal safety. I have large property, through which my welfare is intimately connected with that of the commonwealth. But we owe both life and fortune to our country; and I hold that man to be a good citizen who is duly careful of both.”

On the *sentiment*, I would compare Soph. *Ced. Col.* 309. *τις γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος*: where the Scholiast remarks: *ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς αὐτῷ τε καὶ φίλοις ἰστί χρησίμος*. Eurip. *Antip.* frag. 11. *Æschyl. Theb.* 695. *κακὸς οὐ κεκλήσκει* (*ignavus*) *βίον εἰς κερήσας*.

³ *Such a one would, &c.*] There is a similar sentiment at *l. 2, 60*. “I, for my part, am persuaded that a state which enjoys public prosperity is more promotive of the welfare of private persons than one in prosperity, indeed, individually, but collectively brought to ruin.”

⁴ *However.*] Literally, though (I receive honour from the appointment) yet, &c.

⁵ *Have I spoken aught, &c.*] Here he seems to glance at Alcibiades, who was doing so; for his understanding was too good to allow us to suppose that he could really approve of the measure.

⁶ *Tempers.*] Or humours. So, in his *Epistle*, 7, 9; Nicias says: *ἐπιστάμαι τὰς φύσεσις ὑμῶν*. There is the same use of *τρόπος* at Soph. *Elect.* 397 and 1051. Nicias, it seems, thought it hopeless to urge on the mercurial tempers of the Athenians that kind of homely counsel which is comprehended in a well-known English proverb.

This passage was doubtless in the mind of Plutarch *Cat.* 8. *μέλλων δῆμον ὠρμημένον ἀκαίρως — ἀποτρέπειν*.

¹ *Then.*] *Γὰρ* has here the *inchoative* force, on which see Hoogew. de Part.

² *And acting as if you desired.*] Such is here the sense of *ἐπιθυμῶν*, though it has been unperceived by the translators. It was, perhaps, for want of seeing this that the scribes, or librarii, wrote *δεύτερον*, which, strongly as it is supported by MSS., is justly rejected by Bekker and Goeller.

bably, that the treaty you at present have is something secure and stable; a treaty which, as long as you keep quiet, may be nominally such (for such alone certain persons both here and of the enemy have contributed to make it³); but should any disaster befall a considerable part of our forces⁴, our enemies will speedily make their attack upon us; inasmuch as they⁵ first entered into the treaty from misfortunes, and it was to them more a matter of compulsion, and was concluded under terms less creditable to them than to us. Then, again, we have in the treaty itself many points which are controverted; nor are there wanting some states, and those not the weakest⁶, who have not even acceded to this accommodation.⁷ Nay, part are at open war with us⁸, and the rest, only because the Lacedæmonians are as yet quiet, are themselves restrained by ten-day truces.⁹

³ *For such alone certain, &c.*] This seems to be the true sense of the obscure words οὕτω γὰρ — ἐναντίων, which have been well explained by the Scholiast and Duker, though ill rendered by Hobbes and Smith. The persons meant are, as the Scholiast says, Alcibiades and his party on the one hand, and Cleobulus and Xenares, &c. on the other. See l. 5, 36. As to Alcibiades, he is said to have urged the measure of attacking Melos, in order to provoke the Lacedæmonians to break the treaty.

⁴ *But should any disaster, &c.*] The whole passage is well paraphrased by Mitford, thus: "In short, it is not a peace, but merely a dubious suspension of hostilities, prolonged by ten-day truces, which will hold only till some misfortune befall us, or till Lacedæmon give the word for war."

⁵ *Inasmuch as they.*] The relative must here, as a little before at αἱ, be resolved into its constituent parts, a pronoun demonstrative and a participle.

⁶ *And those not the weakest.*] i. e. (by meiosis) some of the strongest; as the Bœotians, Corinthians, Thracians, Eleans, Megareans. The passage is imitated by Dionys. Hal. Ant. 381, 13. πολλοὶ καὶ, μὰ Δι' ὥς (ita), οὐχὶ φανλότατοι, where I would read φανλότατοι, which emendation is confirmed by a kindred passage at 629, 32. ἦσαν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ φανλότατοι, κ. τ. λ.

⁷ *Accommodation.*] Hobbes has done wrong in omitting to render this word, which has much meaning. Ὁμολογία, it may be observed, is a term here designedly chosen, as far less significant than σπονδαί, denoting not a treaty, but a slight composition, or armistice.

⁸ *Nay, part are at open war with us.*] As the Corinthians.

⁹ *Restrained by ten-day truces.*] One can hardly, however, imagine that the parties would take the trouble to conclude a fresh truce every ten days. I am therefore inclined to suspect that this sort of *armistice*, though nominally for ten days, yet, in fact, was very like our modern *armistices*, and only required *ten days' notice* on either side, previous to the recommencement of hostilities. Nor is there any thing in the plural σπονδαί to contradict this, since that is one of those words which, with a plural form, have a singular sense.

The above view of δεχημένοις σπονδαίς (which I formed many years ago) is, I find, supported by the opinion of Goeller. I cannot, however, agree with that commentator that for this reason the armistice is at δ, 32. called

Whereas, should they find our forces divided (which we are now bent on bringing about), they would in all likelihood quickly attack us in conjunction with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would heretofore have purchased at any price.¹⁰ On these things, then, it behoves us¹¹ to ponder, and not to think of putting matters to hazard, while the state is in so fluctuating and dubious a condition¹², nor to grasp after other dominion before we have secured what we already hold. For the Chalcidæans in Thrace, after so many years of revolt from us, are yet unsubdued, and some others on the continent¹³ yield us but a precarious obedience. But the Egestæans, our allies forsooth,¹⁴ (it seems) we must succour, while on those by whom (so long in revolt) we are wronged, we must defer avenging ourselves.

XI. "And yet, after reducing these last, we may also hold them in subjection, while the others, if even we should subdue them, are yet so distant and numerous, that we should with difficulty be able to govern them. Now surely it were arrant folly to invade those whom, after conquering, we cannot keep in subjection; and when, if we fail, we shall not be in the same condition as before the attack.¹ As to the Siceliots, it seems

ἐπισκονδαί: for that word is found nowhere else; and has so little force (certainly not that which he supposes), that I suspect the true reading is *ἐπὶ σπονδαῖς*.

¹⁰ *Whose alliance they would, &c.*] The sense here (which has been misapprehended by Hobbes) is clear, from a kindred, but more fully-expressed, passage at I, 33. *ὁμῆς δὲν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημάτων ἐτιμήσασθε*. where see the note.

¹¹ *Us.*] Literally, *one*; by which, I agree with Goeller, seems to be meant *Alcibiades*.

¹² *While the state is in so fluctuating and dubious a condition.*] The Scholiast rightly remarks, that there is here a metaphor derived from a ship in a tempestuous sea. The passage is imitated by Dio Cass. 254, 19. *μετέωρον τῆς πόλεως οὐσης*. And probably the speaker, or writer, here might have in mind that fine passage of Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 22. *Πόλις γὰρ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸς ἐλ-σորῆς, ἄγαν ἤδη σαλεύει*.

¹³ *Continent.*] Literally, continents; namely, I imagine, those both of Europe and Asia Minor.

¹⁴ *Forsooth.*] Such is the sense of *δη*, which is found in the best writers, and on which I have before treated. Thus there was no reason for Bauer, Benedict, and Gail to have read, from some MSS., *δηθεν*.

¹ *Shall not be in the same condition as before the attack.*] Such seems to be the sense of the words *καὶ μὴ κατορθώσας — ἵσται*, which have been misunderstood by Hobbes and Smith. The Athenians would not be in the same condition as before, as regarded the Siceliots, because they would

to me, that in their present state they are not objects of apprehension, and that, should they fall under the dominion of the Syracusans (with which the Egestæans especially seek to alarm us), they would be even less so². For now, perhaps, they might singly (in order to oblige the Lacedæmonians) be induced to attack us; but in the other case it is not likely that they would undertake the expedition, as one dominant state against another³: for by the very mode by which they should, with the Peloponnesians, reduce our country, by the same would their own be brought down by them. As to ourselves, the Greeks there would stand *most* in awe of us if we should not go at all, and next, if, after displaying our power, we should speedily depart. (For if any defeat were to befall us, they would utterly condemn us, and join our enemies here in attacking us.⁴) For such things as are at a distance, and offer the least opportunity of the opinion which has been formed of them being put to proof⁵, are, we all know, most admired. This, indeed, is the very feeling, Athenians, which you now entertain towards the Lacedæmonians and their allies; because, having, contrary to your opinion, (as to what you first feared) attained the mastery, ye now held them cheap, and extend your views to Sicily.⁶

have them as *enemies* instead of friends, or neutrals — and enemies at once provoked by unjust, and encouraged by unsuccessful, attack.

² *It seems to me that in their present, &c.*] Such is plainly the sense, which has been missed by Hobbes and Smith, though they might have learnt it from the Latin version of Portus.

³ *As one dominant state against another.*] The meaning (which is somewhat obscure, and has been misapprehended by the translators) seems to be, that "their interest, as a great state or empire, will then be different from what it now is." For, at present, their private interest makes it necessary to court the alliance of Lacedæmon; in the other case, it must be their interest to preserve the balance of power, by preventing the Lacedæmonians from subduing the Athenians, and thus becoming too powerful for the Siceliots.

⁴ *The Greeks there will stand the most in awe of us, &c.*] This was the very principle on which Nicias himself sought to act with the armament committed to him. See *infra*, c. 49. But as it was not a force sent for display, but for service, he judged wrongly.

⁵ *Such things as are, &c.*] This I conceive to be the sense of the somewhat obscure words *καὶ τὰ — δύντα*, with which may be compared Plutarch Vit. Cat. Min. *πίστεως πύραν δούς*. As to the *sentiment*, it is similar to a well-known dict of Tacitus.

⁶ *This, indeed, is the very feeling, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the real sense of the difficult sentence *ὅπερ νῦν — ἐπίστανται*, which foiled both Hobbes and Smith; though the Scholiast might have given them a tole-

Whereas it behoves you not to be elevated at such disasters as may by chance befall the enemy, but to feel confidence only in accomplishing the designs you meditate⁷. Nor should we imagine that the Lacedæmonians consider aught else but how they may yet even now, if possible by foiling us, mitigate the disgrace⁸ they sustained, inasmuch as there is nothing they so highly prize, or so perpetually apply to, as obtaining the fame of valour. So that the thing to be laboured at by us is (if we be wise) not the supporting of barbarians (such as the Egestæans in Sicily), but how we may most studiously guard⁹

able insight into the meaning. The sense has been best illustrated by Goeller, who, after observing that *ὑπερ* is to be referred to the *whole* of the preceding; also that *παρά γνώμην* (for *παρ' ἑλπίδα*) belongs to the *Athenians*, and *αὐτῶν*, governed of *περιγεγενῆσθαι*, to the *Siceliots*, and that *πρὸς* denotes *compared with*, gives the following paraphrase of the whole context:—"Quæ a nobis longissime distant, omnes admiramur, quamdiu opinionis, quam homines de illorum virtute conceperunt, nullum specimen dederunt. Id quod et in Syracusanis eveniet, at vero jam in vobis evenit. Nam initio quidem Spartanos timuistis, desperantes victoriam, posthac præter opinionem vestram victores facti elati victoria ampliora concupiscere cœpisse vos jam videmus. Itidem Syracusani nunc vos expavescunt; posthac si opum vestrarum specimen dederitis, victique fueritis, ut ab expeditione tam temeraria expectari debet, non satis habentes, vos ab insula sua propulsasse, ultro etiam in vestris terris, potentia sua cum Peloponnesiorum præsiidiis juncta, aggredientur."

⁷ *To feel confidence only in, &c.*] Almost all translators refer *τὰς διανοίας* to the Peloponnesians; but on the sense to be assigned they differ. I have always thought that they should be referred to the *Athenians*; and my opinion is supported by that of Goeller, who, however, translates, "*animi potentem*," i. e. neque nimis fortuna secunda elatum, neque adversa animo nimis demisso. If such be the true view, the form is nearly the same as that of Horace Od. 2, 10, concluding with, "Rebus angustis animosus atque Fortis appare; sapienter idem Contrahes vento nimium secundo Turgida vela." And such *may* probably be the sense; but there seems to be reference not so much to *ἐπαίρεσθαι* as to *τὰς τύχας*: and the scope of the passage seems to be, to point out whence a justly-founded confidence should arise, namely, on obtaining success by mastering and accomplishing well-planned measures, not from the folly and bad counsel of the enemy. So 1, 84. (*χρή*) νομίζειν τὰς τε διανοίας τῶν πύλας παραπλησίους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαφεράς. 'Αεὶ δὲ ὡς πρὸς εὖ βουλευομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔργῳ παρασκευαζόμεθα· καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐκείνων ὡς ἀμαρτησομένων ἔχειν δεῖ τὰς ἑλπίδας, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς προνοουμένων.

Κρατεῖν, in the sense of *mastering*, has often the accusative; as Aristoph. Av. 419. κρατεῖν τὸν ἐχθρόν.

⁸ *Mitigate the disgrace.*] Literally, "well dispose;" for there seems to be a metaphor taken from adjusting an inconvenient burden on the back. Examples I shall adduce in my edition.

⁹ *But how we may, &c.*] Such is clearly the sense, which has been missed by Hobbes and Smith. The one they assign is not permitted either by the *verb* (which is in the middle voice) or the *noun*, which would require the

ourselves against a state which plots our ruin by means of an oligarchical party.

XII. "It behoves us also to remember that we have but lately had some breathing time to recover from the ravages of pestilence and war, so as to be somewhat recruited¹ in our persons and purses². But *these* it is surely but just³ that we should expend *here*, for ourselves, and not upon a set of helpless fugitives⁴, whose advantage it is to tell specious falsehoods, and who, while their friends bear the danger (themselves contributing naught but words), are found either if they should succeed, to show no gratitude, or if they any where suffer defeat, involve their friends in the same ruin.⁵

article. Besides, the context strongly confirms the sense above assigned, which is supported both by Portus and Goeller. The *state* in question is *Lacedæmon*; and by the *oligarchy* is meant an *oligarchical party*, with reference to Alcibiades and his partisans, who were chiefly persons of the higher ranks, who were always suspected of hankering after oligarchy. The connection Alcibiades had been anxious to form with Lacedæmon strengthened the suspicion. And that the imputation of Nicias was not groundless appeared from subsequent events.

This view of the sense is well supported and illustrated by Valcknaer on Herod. 8, 17. and the notes of Heilmann and Goeller in loc.

¹ *Recruited.*] On this sense of *λωφάω* I have treated at 2, 49., and I would here add the following illustrations: — Soph. Philoct. frag. 2. *καὶ τὸ πολὺ δὴ τῆς νόσου λωφῆτε μοί.* Soph. Aj. 61. *ἐπιιδὴ τοῦδε ἐλώφησεν πόνον.* The present passage is imitated by Pausan. 7, 17, 1.

² *Persons and property.*] i. e. men and money.

³ *Surely but just.*] With the *εἶναι* commentators are not a little perplexed. Some MSS. omit it, and some editors *cancel* it. But as it is defended by almost every good MS. and by the Scholiast, that is certainly uncritical. Goeller rightly retains it, regarding its use as similar to that of *εἶναι*; and Herman compares a similar passage of Demosthenes. For my own part, I have long been persuaded that the true reading is *οἶμαι, sane, utique*, used parenthetically, as at 4, 64. *πολεμήσομεν, οἶμαι, ὅταν ξυμῶ.* In my edition I shall adduce many examples of a similar corruption. For the present, the following may suffice. Origen C. Cels. p. 25. Spence. *εἰκὸς γὰρ εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι.* where should be read *οἶμαι*. Stob. Serm. 542. init. *ὅταν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφικέται (scil. τις) σπανίως εἶναι χρησιῶν τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις.*

⁴ *Helpless fugitives.*] Such seems to be the real, though not the literal, sense of *ἀνδρῶν φυγάδων ἐπικουρίας δεομένων*, where the translators do not well render *δεομένων* "imploring our assistance." The argument (which is, that these persons *need* assistance, but *can return* none) seems to require the sense above adopted, which is quite as agreeable to the *usus loquendi*.

⁵ *And who, while their friends, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense of the difficult passage *καὶ τῷ τοῦ πύλας κινδύνῳ — ἐναπολίσαι*, which the commentators in vain attempt to reduce to any rules of regular construction. See Goeller.

"And if there be a certain person⁶ who, delighted at his appointment to command (though yet too young for supreme rule), and with a view to his own private interest, counsels the expedition, that he may be admired for his sumptuousness in horse-keeping⁷, and (considering his expensive mode of living⁸), may make some profit by his office; suffer not such a one to display his private magnificence at the danger of the state; but be assured that such persons at once injure the public interests, and consume their private fortune; and in short that the business is a most arduous one⁹, and not such a one as is fit for a younker¹⁰ to plan, and precipitately execute.

Lindau, Dindorf, and Goeffler edit *ξυναπολέσαι*, which I have followed in the version. Yet, as the word is supported by no one MS., I am inclined to think that *ξυναπόλεισαι*, the old reading, is the true one; and it may be tolerated, if for *τοὺς φίλους* we read *τοῖς φίλοις*, a milder emendation than which cannot be imagined. Certainly such a reading is more Thucydidean.

⁶ *And if there be a certain person, &c.*] Meaning Alcibiades: a most delicate and dignified way of avoiding personality, at least in words, and which is imitated by Appian, 1, 380, 71. *εἰ δὲ ἄρα τις*, &c. meaning C. Lentulus.

⁷ *That he may be admired for, &c.*] So expensive was the keeping of horses in Athens, and indeed most parts of Greece, that it was a proof of riches, and was thought to show the wealth, and therefore gentility, of any one's ancestors. See Pind. Isthm. 4, 21-23. Thus Herodotus 6, 35., to show the nobility of the ancestry of Miltiades, says he was descended *οἰκίας ἀπὸ ἵπποτρόφου*, which passage is imitated by Philostratus Vit. Apoll. p. 244. *ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἵπποτρόφου καὶ στρατηγικοῦ πατὴρ*. How expensive this was, appears from Pind. Isthm. 4, 49. where see the Schol.; as also from Suidas in *δακνόμενος*, and especially Æschyl. Prom. 475. *ὕψ' ἄρμαρ' ἤγαγον φιληνίουσ' Ἴππους, ἀγάλμα τῆς ὑπερπλοῦτου χλιδῆς*, where see Dr. Blomfield. Aristot. Polit. 6, 7. *αἱ δὲ ἵπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρᾶς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσὶν*. Demosth. de Coron. § 40. *μεγὰς καὶ λαμπρὸς ἵπποτρόφος*. See also Pausan. 6, 10, 2. and 11, 3, 3, 8, 1. Isæus, p. 55. Lycurg. C. Leocr. p. 167. Hence may be explained the latent sense of the mythological fiction of Diomedes's *men-eating* horses. Indeed, the very same metaphor is common with us. Hence, too, may be understood the force of *οἱ ἵπποβοῦνται* in Herod. 5, 77, 12. a name given, he says, to the opulent Chalcidæans, but which is also applied to Atreus (famed for his riches. See Thucyd. 1, 9.) by Eurip. Orest. 995. From Herodotus is illustrated an ill-understood passage of Plutarch Per. 23. where these Chalcidæan *ἵπποβοῦνται* are mentioned.

⁸ *Expensive mode of living.*] The most ample illustration of this will be found in a highly curious passage, Athen. p. 534., too long for me to insert.

⁹ *That the business is a most arduous one.*] So Dionys. Hal. Ant. 409, 21. *τὸ μὲν πρᾶγμα μέγα*. Æschyl. Eum. 473. *τὸ πρᾶγμα μείζον, εἰ τις οἴεται τὸδε βροτὸς δικάζειν*.

¹⁰ *A younker.*] Such is the most exact sense of *νεωτέρω*: for in either word the comparative sense is lost, and as the English adjective has become a substantive, so the Greek one is very little different from it.

The whole passage is well paraphrased by Mitford thus: "If there is among you a young man, born to great wealth and splendid situation,

XIII. "I cannot, however, but fear the persons¹ whom I now see there sitting as advocates and abettors² to this man; and I do, on the other hand, exhort the elderly (if any sit by such), not to be ashamed to speak their minds freely, nor to suppose that they will be accounted cowards, if they vote against the war; I exhort them (I say) not (as *those* do) to be so extravagantly enamoured of what is absent and foreign³; knowing, as they must, that very few affairs prosper by passionate or sanguine counsels; by forethought very many; but rather, in behalf of their country (which is now hazarding the greatest danger it hath yet encountered⁴), to give their vote on the opposite side, and decree 'that the Siceliots, keeping to their present limits (by us not objected to), with free navigation along the shores of the Ionian gulf, and across the Sicilian sea, as they enjoy their own territories, so may they settle their differences⁵ amongst themselves.' To the Egestæans in particular to return this answer: 'That since they at first⁶ engaged in a war with the Selinuntians without communication

whose passion for distinction has, nevertheless, led him far to exceed in magnificence, both what suited his means and what became his situation; if he is now appointed to a command above his years, but with which, at his years especially, a man is likely to be delighted; above all, if repairs are wanting to a wasted fortune, which may make such a command desirable to him, though ruinous to his country, it behoves you to beware how you accede to the advice of such a counsellor."

¹ *I cannot, however, but fear the persons, &c.*] The passage is closely imitated by Æschin. p. 16, 33. ὁρῶ δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν νεωτέρων προσεστηκότας πρὸς τῇ δικαστηρίῳ, κ. τ. λ. See also Plutarch Nic. 11. and Liban. Orat. 355. B.

² *Advocates and abettors.*] Such is the full sense of παρακλευστοδς (rendered by Goeller "*creatures*"), a word which I have nowhere else met with, except in Dio Cass. p. 195.

³ *Extravagantly enamoured of, &c.*] Goeller aptly compares Pind. Pyth. 3, 35, 19. ἀλλὰ τοι ἦρατο τῶν ἀπιόντων, οἷα καὶ πολλοὶ πάθον. and Eurip. Hippol. 184. To which may be added Pind. Nem. 3, 52. and Theopompus ap. Ælian 261. A. Plutarch Pericl. 20. Σικελίας ὁ δυσίρωσ ἔκεινος καὶ δύσπορμος ἔρωσ. The word δυσίρωσ is also used by Xenophon, Lucian, Dio Cass., and especially Theocritus.

⁴ *Hazarding the greatest, &c.*] So Dionys. Hal. Ant. 398. 37. μέγιστον ἢδὲ κίνδυνον ἀναρρίψαντες.

⁵ *Settle their differences.*] A rare use of συμφέρειν, but occurring in Dio Cass.

⁶ *At first.*] Here I read, with Levesque and Bekker, τὸ πρῶτον. Indeed, I had myself fallen upon the same conjecture very many years ago; and I can confirm it from Livy 4, 24. Negata Vegetibus auxilia, jussosque suo consilio bellum initum suis viribus exequi.

with the Athenians, so may they without their interference bring it to a conclusion.' Also to decree for the future to make no alliances (as we have been accustomed to do) with such as, when suffering adversity, we are bound to assist, but from whom we can derive no benefit, when we ourselves stand in need of it.

XIV. "And you, O President¹ (if you think it your duty to take care of the state, and would be a good citizen), put the matter to vote, and let the Athenians again speak their minds. And consider, (if you feel loth to put the question again to vote) that to go counter to² the law, can incur no censure, when done with so many witnesses and approvers, but that you may thus act the part of a physician to your country, suffering under evil counsel³; ever remembering that the duty of a good governor is this, to benefit his country to the utmost extent, or, at least, not (as far as in him lies) to be the means of injuring it."⁴

XV. Thus spoke Nicias: as to the Athenians that then came forward, the greater part counselled that the expedition should proceed, and that the decree should not be recalled, though some were of the contrary opinion. But he who most earnestly pressed the expedition was Alcibiades son of Clinias, and that both from a wish to oppose Nicias, being otherwise

¹ *President.*] i. e. the Prytanis Epistates.

² *Go counter, &c.*] And yet by 3, 36. it appears that the Prytanis had that power.

³ *Act the part of a physician, &c.*] A metaphor taken from a physician called in to a person who has suffered from some deleterious food or drink. I would compare Eurip. Orest. 903. Onosand. 96. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἱατρὸν, κ. τ. λ. Eurip. Suppl. 253. οὗτοι δικαστὴν σ' εἰλόμην ἱμῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἱατρὸν τῶνδ', ἀναξ, ἀφίγμεθα. Pind. Pyth. 4, 480. Ἔσσι δ' ἱατὴρ ἐπικαιρότατος, Πάϊν τί σοι τιμὰ φάος. Χρὴ μαλακὰν χεῖρα προσέλλοντα τρώμον ἄλκιος ἀμφιπολεῖν. Ῥάδιον μὲν γὰρ πόλιν σῆσαι καὶ ἀφανροτέρους· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ χῶρας αὐθις ἴσσαι δυσκαλὲς Δὴ γίνεται, ἐξαπίνης Εἰ μὴ θεὸς ἀγεμόνεσσι κυβερνατὴρ γίνηται. Eurip. Phœn. 907. πόλει παρασχέιν φάρμακον σωτηρίας.

⁴ *To benefit, &c.*] Coray thinks there is here another medical metaphor taken from a medical adage; as in Hippocrates Epidem. 1. sect. 2. p. 662. ἀσκίειν περὶ τὰ νοσήματα δύο, ὠφελεῖν ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν. I would compare Eurip. ap. Aristoph. Ran. 1428. μισῶ πολίτην, ὅστις ὠφελεῖν πάτρην Βραδὺς πέφυκε, μάλα δὲ γὰρ βλάπτειν ταχύς

of a different political party, and being calumniously glanced at by him, and especially from his desire of the command, and his hope thereby to subdue Sicily and Carthage, and also, if successful, to promote his private advantage, both in fortune and fame. For being held in honour by the citizens, he lived at a greater expense than his means would afford⁵, both in respect of horsekeeping, and other expensive modes of life⁶; which, indeed, afterwards contributed not a little to the downfall of the Athenian state. For the bulk of the people, alarmed at his greatness, and his deviation from custom, in respect to his personal habits, and the disposition he evinced in every thing which he undertook, became hostile to him, as aiming at tyranny; and though he conducted public affairs with sufficient ability, yet each privately displeased at his habits of life, and therefore committing the conduct of affairs to others, not long after brought the state to ruin.

However, on this occasion, he advanced, and counselled the Athenians to the following effect.

XVI. "Yes — Athenians, to me rather than to others the command, of right, belongs¹; (for with this point I must needs commence, since here² I have been especially assailed by Nicias) and withal I think myself worthy of the trust.³ For as to the matters concerning which I am so loudly censured⁴,

⁵ *He lived at a greater expense than, &c.*] Or, "he had more wants than ability to satisfy them." Κατὰ here denotes *comparison*.

⁶ *Other expensive modes.*] What these were will abundantly appear from the interesting passage of Athenæus referred to supra, c. 12., which passage also is the best commentary on the *παρὰ νομίᾳ* just after.

¹ *To me, &c. of right belongs.*] This passage, Goeller remarks, is imitated by Aristid. 3, 651. To which may be added Dio Cass. 452, 16.

² *Here.*] Τῷδε must be supplied, which is expressed in a kindred passage of Herod. 6, 69. τῷδε σὺν μέλυσσιν κατὰ πτόνους οἱ ἰχθύες.

³ *I think myself worthy of the trust.*] This passage seems to have been in the mind of Plato Alcib. 1. p. 7. ἡ γὰρ, τὴν θάρσυν εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παρὲλθης — παρελθὼν ἐνδείξασθαι Ἀθηναίους ὅτι αἱεὶς εἰ τιμᾶσθαι.

⁴ *Censured.*] I entirely agree with Duker and others that ἐπιβόητος is the true reading, and the sense *male audio*. Yet ἐπιβόητος is so very rare a word that some examples are necessary, which, as the commentators have not adduced, the following may be acceptable: — Dio Cass. p. 375, 15. 450, 77. 965, 5. There is no doubt that Dio Cass. here so read. Hence may be emended Hesych. Ἐπιβόητος. λέος ὁμαλός. where I would read Ἐπίβωτος, ἐπιβόητος. the word, it should seem, being omitted per homote-

they are an occasion of glory both to my ancestors and to myself, and are, moreover, advantageous to my country. For by the magnificence of my visits to the solemnities⁵ of Olympia, the Greeks have rated our state⁶ beyond its power, and imagined it greater than it was; though they had before expected it had been warred down.⁷ Wherefore⁸ I sent⁹ into the stadium *seven* chariots (such as no private person¹⁰ had before done), and I obtained the *first, second, and fourth* prizes, and in all other respects the figure I maintained was such as not to disparage the splendour of my victory.¹¹ Now, as things of this kind, by the laws and customs of Greece, reflect honour¹², so

leuton. That *ἐπιβωρος* was used for *ἐπιβόητος* by the Ionic and antient writers, is plain from a passage of Anacreon ap. Eustath. cited by Duker.

Bauer here aptly compares Terent. Adelph. Proleg.: "Quod *maledictum* vehemens Illi existimant, Eam ille *laudem* sibi maximam putat."

⁵ *Visits to the solemnities.*] Such seems to be the best representation of *θεωρία*, which denotes the action of a *θεωρῶς*: a name given to one who was sent to consult an oracle, or, in a general way, one who attended at any of the great solemn festivals of Greece, as sent from some state. Now, I believe, none were allowed to offer themselves as candidates for any of the prizes, without the consent of their own state; on obtaining which, they were, in some measure, sent out by it, and therefore *θεωροί*.

⁶ *Rated our state, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the full sense of the words *ὑπὲρ δύναμιν* — *ἐνόμισαν*, in which there is a blending of two phrases. Much to the present purpose is the following passage of Dio Chrys. Orat. 31. ταῦτα πλοῦτον ἐμφαίνει καὶ μεγαλοφυχίαν, οὐ γὰρ μόνον κόσμον φέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν τῆς πολέως ἐπιδείκνυσσι καὶ τὸ ἥθος. See also Isocr. de Bigis, § 14. p. 615.

⁷ *Had been warred down.*] Hobbes and Smith, without any reason or authority, assign an *active* sense to *καταπεπολεμῆσθαι*.

⁸ *Wherefore.*] i. e. to the end that they may suppose it to be greater than it is.

⁹ *Sent.*] Literally, *sent down*; for the stadium was somewhat lower than the level of the adjacent country, in order to give the spectators in the raised seats a better view. So Dio Cass. 98.5, 71. ἡνίοχοι τὰ ἄρματα εὐδὺς καθῆκαν. Pausan. 6, 2, καθῆκεν ἐπὶ δνόματι τοῦ Θεδαίων δήμου τὸ ἄρμα. Herod. 5, 22, 7. καταβάντος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο (scil. ἀθλεύεον ἐν Ὀλυμπίῳ. Hom. Il. φ. 132. Ζῶους δ' ἐν δίνῃσι καθίετε μυνόχους ἵππους.

¹⁰ *No private person.*] *Kings*, such as Gelo, Hiero, and some Macedonian monarchs, had possibly sent more. Mitford, therefore, is wrong in making Alcibiades say: "I have shown that an individual of Athens could yet outdo what any prince or state had ever done."

¹¹ *The figure I maintained was, &c.*] Among other instances of his magnificence on that occasion, Athenæus (cited by Duker) tells us that he sacrificed to the Olympian Jove, and feasted the whole assemblage.

¹² *Things of this kind, by the laws, &c.*] So Herod. 6, 70. ἀλλὰ τε Λακεδαιμονίοισι συχνὰ ἔργοισι τε καὶ γνώμῃσι ἀπολαμπρυνθεῖς, ἐν δὲ δὴ καὶ Ὀλυμπίαδῃ σφι ἀνελόμενος τεθρίπῳ προσέβαλε. Pind. Pyth. 2, 55. Ἰπποτροφίας τε νομίζων, Ἐν Πανελλάνων νόμῳ.

also by the thing done there is created a notion of power¹³ in the country of the doer. And again, as to such other things in the city wherein I display magnificence, whether by the exhibition of spectacles¹⁴, or in any other respect, these may (as it is natural) excite envy in the citizens, but to foreigners they suggest a notion of power.

“And surely not unuseful is this ‘wild folly’¹⁵ and extravagance, for a person, at his own expense, to benefit not himself only, but also the state. Nor, truly, is it unjust that such a one, carrying himself loftily on his own merit, should *not* put himself on a level with others¹⁶, since likewise, should he fall into *adversity*, he will communicate none of his misfortunes to any one.¹⁷ But as, when in calamity, we are not even civilly

¹³ *By the thing done there is, &c.*] So Pind. Pyth. 9, 25—30. *Τοῦράκις ἦν βασιλεὺς, Ἐξ Ὀκεανοῦ γένος ἦρως Δεύτερος ὃν πότε Πίνδου κλεινναῖς ἐν πτυχαῖς, Ναῖς εὐφρανθεῖσα Πηνειοῦ λέγει Κρείοισ’ ἔτικτεν.* Hence may be emended Liban. Orat. 675. *Α. καὶ ἐγὼ λέγειν ἀρμάτων πλῆθος, καὶ μεγάλας ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν Ὀλυμπιαίς δαπάνας, ἀφ’ ὧν δόξαν ὑμεῖς εἰς τόνον ἰσχύος ἰσχύκατε.* where, for *εἰς τόνον*, I conjecture *πόνον*, which will thus answer to the *ἐκ τοῦ δρωμένου* of the present passage. The *εἰς* arose from the *εἰς* preceding.

¹⁴ *Exhibition of spectacles.*] Or, “by the voluntary supply of expenses to the spectacles at public festivals.” The person who supplied the expense was called the *χορηγός*. See Boeckh. *Staatsb. d. Ath.* t. 1. p. 484., referred to by Goeller. To such a degree, it may be added, was this carried, that sometimes the Chorus reduced himself to utter poverty. So Antipho ap. Athen. 103. *Φ. χορηγός δ’ αἰρεθεὶς ἱμάτια καὶ κρυσαῖα παρασχὼν τῷ χορῷ, ῥάκος φορεῖ.*

¹⁵ *Not unuseful is this wild folly.*] i. e. what you call folly; here glancing at Nicias.

As the reading *ἡδ’ ἀνοία*, though the true one, is very defective in MS. authority, it may be worthy of remark that such was read by Procopius, who at 537, 20. has (by imitation) *ἀχρηστος ἀνοία καὶ προπετής*.

¹⁶ *Nor is it unjust that such a one should not put himself.*] But rather claim superiority. On this sense of *μητὸς εἶναι*, see note on 1, 132. On the *sentiment* I would compare a passage in Alexis ap. Athen. 224. F.

¹⁷ *Since, likewise, should he fall, &c.*] Hobbes renders: “he should not find any man that would share with him in his calamity.” But that version is neither agreeable to the words of the original, nor, indeed, to the sense of the author. The argument is, that “as he does not communicate to others any portion of his calamity, they have no right to share in his prosperity;” and the *envy* (just before mentioned) implies a wish to have some portion of the good of the envied.

With respect to the phraseology, it would seem that the *ὁ* at *ὁ κακῶς πρόσσων* has no place: but, in fact, this is only substituting a *gnome generalis* in place of the particular position here meant. *Πρὸς οὐδὲνα* is for *οὐδενί*, which is the usual syntax.

saluted¹⁸, let men in like manner endure to be looked down upon by the prosperous; or else, after *giving* what is just and equal, let them claim the like in return.¹⁹ Well, indeed, I know that such persons, and all who in the lustre of any endowment surpass others, must, during their lives, be objects of spleen, especially to their equals, and in the next place those with whom they hold intercourse, but to after generations they leave an ambition of claiming kindred, even where none existed; and to the *country* they have belonged to, a glorying in them as no aliens or offenders, but as their own countrymen, and such as achieved what was glorious and honourable.²⁰

"Such, then, being the objects of my ambition, and for which, in my private capacity, I am celebrated; consider now whether I am inferior to any one²¹ in managing public affairs. Thus, for instance²², having brought together²³, without any

¹⁸ *But as when in calamity, &c.*] Here may be adduced a passage of Herodian, of equal truth and felicity of expression, 7, 3, 11. τὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐδαιμονεῖν δοκούντων ἢ πλουσίων παίσματα πρὸς τῶν ὀχλῶν οὐ μόνον ἀμελεῖται, ἀλλὰ τινὰς τῶν κακοήθων καὶ φαύλων ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ ἐθραῖναι, φθόνην τῶν κρείττονων καὶ εὐτυχούντων.

¹⁹ *Or else, after giving what is, &c.*] The argument (which is well pointed out by the Scholiast) is of the same sort as at 2, 64. "but most unjustly, unless, too, when you chance to attain any unlooked-for prosperity, you likewise ascribe it to me."

²⁰ *Well, indeed, I know that such persons, &c.*] This is one among the many *eternal*, but mournful, truths in this κτήμα εἰς αἶν, such as the historian experienced in his own case, and, perhaps, wrote with a sigh. The disgraced exile of twenty years was afterwards one of the very greatest boasts of that country which had cast him forth "as a broken vessel."

²¹ *Consider now whether I am inferior to any one.*] Hobbes renders, "consider whether I administer the public the worse for it or not." But sense would require χεῖρον τι: whereas τοῦ (for τινος) yields a better sense. Here, of course, he means *Nicias*. Now, it was of consequence to establish this point (namely, that he was *not inferior* to Nicias), in order to justify his appointment to the command.

²² *Thus, for instance.*] On this sense of γὰρ see Hoogev. de Partic.

²³ *Having brought together.*] The translators and commentators take ξυστῆσαι to mean "having reconciled." But *that*, besides being a rare sense of the word, is so far from being here *required*, as Bauer says, that it is *inapposite*; for what could danger and expense have to do with *reconciling*? Besides, Argos, the principal state of Peloponnesus, never was at war with Athens, so that there could be no *reconciliation*. The word has reference partly to the bringing together the states in question, in one common alliance, and partly to the bringing together their military quotas. This view of the subject is confirmed by Isocrates de Bigis, § 6. p. 608. τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἀπίστησεν, ὑμῶν δὲ συμμάχους ἐποίησεν. Herod. 6, 74. ἀπικόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίην, νεώτερόν ἐκρησσε πράγματα, συνίστας τοὺς Ἀρκάδας ἐπὶ τῇ Σπάρτῃ. The whole pas-

great danger or expense to you, some of the most potent states of Peloponnesus, I, in one day at Mantinæa, brought the Lacedæmonians to the necessity of fighting for their all. Whence it has arisen that, though victorious in the contest, they do not to this day feel entire confidence in themselves.

XVII. "Now these affairs 'my youth and mad folly' (which is thought to aim at what is naturally unsuitable to my years) transacted with the most powerful states of Peloponnesus, by the use of suitable arguments, and persuasions which conciliated confidence to my 'frantic impetuosity.'¹ Fear it not, then, on the present occasion — but, while I am in the flower of youth and folly², and Nicias continues to be esteemed for-

sage is imitated by Plutarch Demosth. 20. ἐν μέρει μικρῷ μίας ἡμέρας τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναρρίψαι κίνδυνον ἀναγκασθεῖς, κ. τ. λ.

¹ *My youth and mad folly, &c.*] Such seems the best representation of the very obscure and difficult words of the original, on which it is impossible to speak positively. See the Scholiast. The words "my youth and mad folly" are ironical; q. d. what you call youth and madness. So Soph. Antiq. 95. 'ἄλλ' ἐὰ με καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἐμοῦ δυσβολίαν. Œd. Tyr. 397. ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μολῶν, ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς, Οἰδίπους, ἔπανσά νιν. 1 Corinth. 1, 24. διὰ τῆς μορίας ποῦ κηρύγματος ἀνεχέσθαι μου τῆς ἀφροσύνης.

In the interpretation of the words παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦντα εἶναι, I have been guided by the opinion of Goeller, who has here an elaborate annotation. Yet I am inclined to doubt whether the interpretation of the Scholiast be not truer, as it is certainly more simple and natural; q. d. "this my youthful folly which is thought, forsooth, by Nicias, so unnatural!" Thus there will be *irony* in the words, a weapon often employed in the course of this oration. Goeller has rightly remarked that ὠμίησε is for ὠμιλήσασα ἔπραξα.

Of the words ὁργῇ πίστιν παρασχομένη (which are, strangely enough, omitted by Goeller in his version of the passage) it is difficult to determine the sense, so diverse are the significations of the terms. That above assigned seems the most probable. As to the versions of Hobbes and Smith, they are alike inconsistent with the words of the original. The meaning of the passage seems to be this, that "by the use of the aptest arguments, and the most subtle persuasions, he gained confidence to his representations, and thus showed (what *some* would not believe) that there was "method in his madness." Thus ὁργῇ will be ironical, as *ανοία*, just before.

As to the words καὶ νῦν — αὐτὴν, I have (after Goeller) adopted the masterly conjecture of Bekker, who, by the slight alteration of πεφοβήσθαι, and the substitution of a period for a comma, has restored the true sense of the passage.

² *While I am in the flower of youth and folly.*] Such is, I conceive, the true sense of ἄλλ' ἔως ἐγὼ τε ἐτι ἀκμάζω μετ' αὐτῆς, of which Goeller has mistaken the meaning. 'Ἀκμάζω μετ' αὐτῆς is a sort of Hendiadys; ἀκμάζω having reference to the preceding νεότης, and μετ' αὐτῆς to ἀνοία, which is the same as ὁργῇ. The whole of this and the preceding sentence is well

tunate³, make free use of⁴ what is serviceable in either of us.

“And as to this expedition to Sicily; alter not your determination, as if it were going against a formidable power. For the cities there indeed swarm⁵ with a multitudinous, but heterogeneous⁶, population, and thus easily admit changes of polity, and readily adopt new forms of government.⁷ And on

paraphrased by Mitford thus:—“Glory, I will own, I ardently desire; but how have I sought to acquire it, and what has been my success? Have I promoted rash enterprise? Have I been forward, as it is said youth is apt to be, to engage the commonwealth, wildly and without foresight, in hazardous war? Or was it I who, by negotiation, without either danger or expense to yourselves, brought all Peloponnesus to fight your battles for you against Lacedæmon, and reduced that long dreaded rival state to risk its existence at Mantinæa, in arms against its own antient allies? If such have been my services, on first entering upon public business, you need not, I hope, fear but my greater experience will now be advantageous to you.”

³ *And Nicias continues to be esteemed fortunate.*] Here we have sarcasm. Nicias had, indeed, been *successful*; but Alcibiades will only allow him to be *lucky*. In this respect, therefore, Mitford has fallen into a great error, in his paraphrase of part of this speech, by making Alcibiades frankly and amply acknowledge the merits of Nicias.

On this passage I would compare Max. Tyr. Diss. 5, 4. Ἐγὼ καὶ στρατηγῷ διαπιστῶ πάντα εὐτυχῆσαντι, οἷος ἂν ᾦν Ἀθηναίους στρατηγὸς Νικίας, σωθεὶς ἐκ Σικελίας· ἢ οἷος ἂν ᾦν σωφρονέστερος δημαγωγὸς Κλέων, ἱπανελθὼν ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως.

⁴ *Make free use of.*] The ἀπο in ἀποχρήσασθαι is intensive. So Joseph. 672, 19. τῇ προθυμίᾳ τοῦ πλήθους ἀποχρήσασθαι. Appian, 2, 69. κελυθόντων νῦν μὲν ἀποχρήσασθαι τοῦ στρατοῦ τῇ προθυμίᾳ.

⁵ *Swarm.*] This seems to be the closest version of πολυανδροῦσιν. The verb is of very rare occurrence; though I have met with it in Dio Cass. 752, 29. and Joseph. 829.

⁶ *Heterogeneous.*] Ἑυμμίκτοις has the sense of *μιάσι*: as Eurip. Bacch. 18. μιάσιν Ἑλλῆσι βαρβάρους ὁμοῦ. The present passage is imitated by Aristides, 2, 7. Δ. τὰ τε *εὐμμίκτους* εἶναι τοὺς *ἐχόντας* αὐτήν, καὶ ταῦτὸ *φρονεῖν* πρὸς ἡμῶν *ιστίν*.

⁷ *Readily adopt new forms of government.*] The Scholiast and most commentators interpret, “readily admit new citizens.” But that would involve so much harshness, and offer so inapt a sense, that I prefer the version above adopted, which is supported by the opinion of Goeller. By *πολιτείας* must, perhaps, be understood not only *polity* and *government*, but *institutions* and *customs*. The best commentary on which may be found in chapters 4 and 5. Alcibiades seems to mean by the former part of the sentence, that, “though populous, yet the cities are of mixed races, who will hardly combine together for *defence*, and are, therefore, not formidable.” By the latter, that “from their proneness to innovation in polity, they would readily receive the democratical form of Athens.”

This and the next sentence are thus paraphrased by Mitford: “The power of the Sicilians, which some would teach you to fear, has been much exaggerated. They are a mixed people, little attached to one another, little attached to a country which they consider as scarcely theirs, and little dis-

this account, the people do not, as if in behalf of their own country, either furnish themselves with weapons and armour for the defence of the body, nor attend to the affairs of the country, by providing it with any regular means for defence⁸; but what each thinks he may get, either by swaying the public in set speech, or by factious opposition to it (with intent, should he fail, to seek another country), that alone he seeks to acquire.⁹

"It is not likely, then, that such a rabble will either be guided by any general plans for defence, or set themselves about the execution of them by common exertion; but that, if any

posed to risk either person or fortune for it; but always ready for any change, whether of political connection, or of local establishment, that may offer any advantage, or relieve from any distress."

⁸ *The people do not as, &c.*] Such appears to be the true sense of the difficult and ill understood words of the original. What Alcibiades means by this shrewd remark is, that, "from the little patriotism felt by the people, and from the want of mutual reliance, the defence of the country was little attended to, either by the providing of weapons and armour for individuals, or of military stores in general, and the raising of such works or fortifications as are necessary for putting any country in a posture of defence."

A complete illustration of this may be found in the case of Amphipolis, and other Athenian colonies in Thrace.

Κατασκευαῖς refers to the formation of the *works* above mentioned; and *νόμιμος* to the doing of them by public authority, at the common and sustained expense of the state, and not left to be done just when wanted, suddenly, *opere tumultuario*. The epithet is applicable to *persons* as well as things. Thus in Pollux, 1, 130. *ὀπλίται ἀκριβεῖς νόμιμοι*. I conjecture *νόμιμοι*. To the examples of the above sense of *νόμιμος*, given by the Schol., may be added Diod. Sic. 1, 82. *οἱ νόμιμοι τῶν συγγραφῶν*. and 1, 22. *οἱ νόμιμοι τῶν φυσιολόγων*. Athenæus, 1. 4. sub. fin. *στρατηγὸς νόμιμος*.

⁹ *But what each thinks, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense of the enigmatical passage *ὃ, τι δὲ ἕκαστος — ἐτοιμάζεται*, which the commentators in vain seek to reduce to any sort of regular construction. Some nearer approach to it might be made by throwing the words *λαβὼν — οἰκήσειν* into a parenthesis; where *λαβὼν* is for *οἰόμενος λαβεῖν*, and at *οἰκήσειν* must be supplied *ἔσται*. But then it is necessary to subaud *λίψεσθαι* from *λαβὼν*: a most harsh subaudition. The *ἐκ τοῦ λέγων πείθειν* is for *ἐκ τοῦ πιθανῶς λέγειν*: and *σπασιάζων* is, by a variation of construction, for *ἐκ τοῦ σπασιάζειν*. The passage may be regarded as exegetical of the preceding, namely, that, "no one cares for it as for his country." The sense is so admirably laid down by the Scholiast, that there is the less excuse for the error of Hobbes in rendering the above words "to ruin the country."

Upon the whole, this is, perhaps, the best description that ever was drawn of a factious babbling demagogue and mere political adventurer, aiming at naught but private gain, and unscrupulous in his means of acquiring it: it is equally applicable to every age and country. It is, indeed, but a sketch; yet it is so graphic, as to be superior to some of Butler's whole-lengths.

thing be said to tickle their ears, they will be quickly inclined to come over to terms of submission¹⁰; especially if (as we understand) they are divided by factions. The truth, indeed, is that neither are they in possession of such numbers of heavy-armed as exaggeration ascribes to them; nor, indeed, have the rest of the Greeks ever brought into the field any such numbers as the reckoning of each state would lead us to suppose.¹¹ Nay Greece itself, notwithstanding the false estimates of such which prevailed, was scarcely in the *present* war adequately furnished with heavy-armed.¹²

"The state of affairs, then, in Sicily, is what I have said, and will be found yet more favourable to its reduction; for we shall have the aid of numerous barbarians, who, from their hatred to the Syracusans, will cooperate with us in attacking them. And the powers here, if you consider aright, will not be likely to frustrate¹³ our plan. For our fathers, though

¹⁰ *But that, if, &c.*] The sense here assigned by Smith is, indeed, specious, but is neither agreeable to the words themselves, nor suitable to what follows.

¹¹ *Nor, indeed, have the rest, &c.*] Such is plainly the sense, which is what Portus has expressed. It is therefore strange that Hobbes and Smith should have devised *another*, equally at variance with the words and the context. *Διφάνησαν* — *δντες* signifies "have shown themselves to be."

As to the reading *ὅσοι περ κομπούνται* (edited by Bekker and Goeller), it may be the true one; but as to what Bekker affirms, that there is no such verb as *περικομπῶ*, it is false. It is found in a book which critics might, with advantage, study, were it only for *their craft*, occurring in the *Sapient*. Salom. c. 17, 4. *ήχῳ δὲ καταράσσοντας αὐτοὺς περικόμπουν*. where I conjecture for *αὐτοὺς*, *αὐτοῖς*. Nay, it occurs also in Joseph. 1020, 16. *τούτοις περικομπήσας*. Considering, therefore, the perpetual imitation of Thucydides in that historian, there is little doubt but that he had *περικομπούνται*.

¹² *Nay, Greece itself, &c.*] Such is, I apprehend, the real sense, which is very inadequately represented by Hobbes and Smith. The orator means "that Greece had, aforetime, much belied itself in such estimates of heavy-armed, for it was scarcely in the present war tolerably provided with them." That there had been much exaggeration of the forces in general, of the times preceding this war, we learn from Thucydides in his Preface; c. gr. c. 11. fin. and 21. fin.

The *ἐπεσμένη ἡ Ἑλλάς* seems to refer to the historians and poets; and we may compare the "*Quicquid Græcia mendax Audet in historia*" of Juvenal.

The subject of this whole assertion is not, as Levesque and Goeller understand, *soldiers generally*, but *heavy-armed*. This sense of *ὀπλίζειν* is frequent in Thucydides. Why it should have been late before Greece was sufficiently provided with this kind of force, it is easy to imagine.

¹³ *Will present no hindrance.*] *Ἐπικωλύσει* is for *ἐπικώλυμα ἴσονται*. The word is rare, but it occurs in Xen. *Oecon.* 8, 4. and Soph. *Phil.* 1242. *τις ἴσται μ' οὐπικωλύσων τάδε*.

having the very same enemies whom they tell us we shall leave behind in going on this expedition, and the Medes besides, yet acquired this empire by no other means than by superiority of strength at sea. And as for the present, the Pelopnnesians were never less in hope of prevailing against us, whatever may be their power. To make irruptions into our territory they are able, even if we go not on the expedition; but by sea they can never hurt us, when gone, for our remaining force will be sufficient to make head against them.

XVIII. "Such being the case, what reasons can we, with any probability, allege to ourselves for hanging back, or what tolerable excuses offer to our allies for not affording them help, whom we are bound to defend, by every obligation of common oaths¹, and not make it as an objection 'that they have never assisted us.' For we did not receive them into our confederacy, that they might render us assistance *here*, but that, by finding employment to² our enemies there, they might hinder them from coming hither. This, too, is the method whereby we have acquired *our* empire, and by which, indeed, *all* empire has been acquired³, namely, by promptly going to the assistance of all those, whether Barbarians or Greeks, who have, at any time, sought aid⁴; whereas, if we should sit still, or stop to choose which race of men we should succour⁵, we should make

¹ *By every obligation of common oaths.*] Literally, "inasmuch as we have interchanged oaths with them."

² *Finding employment to.*] Literally, "being troublesome to," as it were, thorns in their sides.

³ *And, indeed, all empire has been acquired.*] Literally, "and whoever have had empire." This may be supposed only to extend to *Greeks*.

⁴ *By promptly going to, &c.*] This, indeed, was the general custom of Athens, though not without several exceptions. Of course, those who accepted her aid had to purchase it at the expense of their liberty, which, sooner or later, they were sure to lose.

Alcibiades here mentions *barbarians* with respect to the *Egestæans*, who, by extraction, were such, and who are so called by Nicias.

⁵ *Choose which race of men we should succour.*] I have here followed the reading of Bekker and Goeller *φυλοκρίνουεν*, both as found in most MSS., and seemingly supported by what precedes. And the word, though rare, is yet found in Pollux, Suidas, Basil, Liban., &c., ap. Steph. Thes. Nov. Ed., though not all exactly in the same sense. Suidas, however, (appositely to our purpose) explains *φυλοκρίνει* by *διακρίνει*, *καταδοκιμάζει περίεργως*. At the same time, I suspect that Dio Cass. read *φιλοκρίν*, since he has not *φυλοκρίνειν*, but uses *φιλοκρίνειν* at 674, 13. Goeller aptly adduces Anecd.

few or no acquisitions of territory, nay, should rather be in danger of losing what we have. Indeed, men defend themselves against a superior power not when actually assailable, but anticipate his attack, in order that he may never invade them at all. Moreover, it is not in our *power* to determine how far we will carry our rule⁶; but we are compelled, circumstanced as we are, to plan for the reduction of some, and hold tight the reins⁷ of dominion over others; because we are ourselves in danger of being subjected by others, unless we will ourselves govern others. Nor is it possible for *you*, in the same degree as others, to make quietness your object, unless you will in an equal degree change your habits and manners.

“Reckoning, therefore, that we may rather *increase* our state *here*, by enterprise *there*, let us undertake the expedition, that we may thereby lay prostrate⁸ the haughtiness of Lace-

Bekk.; but as to the Etym. Mag. also adduced by him, that has only a false reading of Suidas.

The term has reference to the difference of *race*, as Ionic and Doric, or *nation*, as Greeks and Barbarians.

⁶ To determine how far we will carry our rule.] Ταμείεσθαι signifies, properly, “to act the part of a dispenser;” and, in a general sense, “to act at one’s pleasure.” Of this signification (which is neglected by the commentators) the following examples may be not unacceptable. Xen. Cyr. 3, 3, 47. παραδόντες ἑαυτοὺς ἡμῖν ταμείεσθαι, ὥσθ’ ὁπόσοις ἂν βουλώμεθα αὐτῶν μάχεσθαι. where Schneider cites the Anab. 2, 5, 3. and Hipp. 7, 11. So also Cyr. 4, 1, 18. πάρεσχον ἡμῖν ταμείεσθαι, ὥσθ’ ὁπόσοις ἐβουλώμεθα αὐτῶν μάχεσθαι. Dionys. Hal. 519, 9.

⁷ Hold tight the reins.] Literally, “not slacken them, or not loosen our hold over.” So 7, 41. ἀνίσσθαι τὸν πόλεμον. Mitford paraphrases thus: “Nor is it now in our choice how far we will stretch our command; for, possessing empire, we must maintain it, and rather extend than permit any diminution of it; or we shall, more even than weaker states, risk our own subjection to a foreign dominion.”

In this and the former observation there is much of speciousness, if not of truth; and it is remarkable how exactly all this corresponds to the state of our empire in India.

⁸ Lay prostrate.] Goeller here remarks on the στροπώμεν: “Proprie dicitur de stragulis, transfertur ad ventos et fluctus, ut apud Latinos sterno. Hinc facile ad animi procillas detortum est.” A remark derived almost verbatim from Dr. Blomfield’s Gloss. on Æschyl. Prom. Vinct. 198. I had myself, many years ago, made nearly the same observation, in the following words: “Proprie significat hoc verbum *expando exæquo* (to smoothen), adeoque de omni re; e.g. delecto. Homerus sæpe de lapidibus, foliis, &c. aliquando tamen, sed raro, de mari adhibetur, ut in Herod. 7, 193. τὸ κύμα ἱστροῦτο. quod imitatum videtur ex Homero Od. 3, 158. ἱστροῦσεν δὲ θεὸς μεγαλήτεα πόντον. quem locum expressit Virgilius Æn. 8, 89. ‘sterneret æquor,’” citing also the following imitations of our author’s phrase. Liban. Epist. 125. ἱστροῦσε τὸ φρόνημα τῶν Σκυθῶν. Suid. in Diog. τὸν

dæmon, if we shall seem to slight⁹ present tranquillity by making an expedition to Sicily. And moreover, we shall, with the accession of those territories, in all likelihood govern all Greece, or at the least shall humble the Syracusans; by which both ourselves and our allies will be benefited.

“Our fleet, too, will¹⁰ secure us the power either to remain, should any states come over to us, or to depart, for we shall be masters at sea¹¹ over the whole of the Siceliot.

“And let not the counsels of Nicias, tending but to inertness and the setting the young at variance with the elder¹²,

Συμὸν κατεστόρεσεν. Hence, it may be observed, is shown the true reading in Plutarch 2, 856. A. (of Pericles) *στορίσαι τὸ φρόνημα Πελοποννησίων*, where the MSS. and early editions have *ιστορήσαι*: the later editions *εἰς τὸ ῥήξαι*. Here, also, may be compared Plutarch Lucull. 5. *κατεστόρεσε τὴν φιλοτιμίαν*, and Cæsar 25. *τὰς πολλὰς ἀποστάσεις κατεστόρεσε*.

From this sense the transition is easy to that of *defeating* an enemy. So in the epitaph on the Athenians at Marathon: *Ἀθηναῖοι χρυσοφόρων Μηδῶν ἱστώρεσαν δύναμιν*. And this sense has been adopted in the correspondent Latin term; as Virgil *Æn.* 2, 602. *sternitque a culmine Trojam*. and 6, 858. *sternet Pænos Gallumque rebellem*. This may suffice to refute the criticism of the Scholiast (so lauded by Hack), that this is the harshest metaphor in Thucydides, and to be ascribed to the *speaker* rather than the *author*. It would have been nearer the truth, had he said that the orations of Alcibiades, perhaps, abound more in contort constructions and daring metaphors than any others in Thucydides; and that such may be attributed to the historian's desire to imitate the *manner* of this extraordinary person.

⁹ *Slight.*] Or, “look down upon, set lightly by.” I have not retained the words *καὶ οὐκ ἀγέπησαντες*, since they are omitted in most MSS., and cancelled by all the recent editors. Yet they admit of defence. For, in the first place, they might be omitted *per homoteleuton*. Secondly, *ἀγαπᾶν* seems too elegant a word for a *gloss*, and is used elsewhere by our author. Then, although there be a redundancy in the words as they stand, yet such instances are not unfrequent. So in Dio Cass. 622, 18. *ὑπεριδὼν αὐτὰ καὶ καταφρονήσας*, which seems imitated from the passage of our author. Besides, there is another passage of Dio Cass. apparently imitated from this, which proves that that writer read also the *above* words in his copy. It is 219, 46. *ἀγαπᾶν τὴν ἡσυχίαν*.

¹⁰ *Our fleet, too, will, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases thus: “The command which we possess of the sea and the party of which we are assured in Sicily will sufficiently enable us to keep what we may acquire, and sufficiently ensure means of retreat if we should fail of our purpose; so that, with much to hope, we have, from any event of the proposed expedition, little to fear.”

¹¹ *Masters at sea.*] Literally, “superior in shipping.” I have here followed the conjecture of Valcknaer, which has been adopted by all the recent editors.

¹² *Setting the young at variance with the elder.*] *Διάστασις* must here be taken in the *active* sense, *separating* and *disuniting*; as in Greg. Naz. 1, 197. D., and *στάσις* in Eurip. *Androm.* 475. where tyrannies are called *ἄχθος ἐπ’ ἀχθεὶ καὶ στάσις πολίταις*. So also Dionys. Hal. 1, 636, 4. *ὅν ἐπὶ διαστάσει τῆς πόλεως ἐξέλεγχθέντα*. The passage is imitated by Plutarch

divert you from your purpose; but with the accustomed decorous regularity of our fathers (who, consulting the young with the elder, brought the state to what it is), now endeavour by the same methods to advance the welfare of your country. And be assured that youth and age, apart from each other, avail nothing¹³, but that the inferior, the middling, and the prime judgments¹⁴ tempered together¹⁵ produce the most good; also that the state will, if it stagnates in quietude, like any other thing else, wear out of itself¹⁶; and that science in general will grow old and rusty¹⁷ in desuetude, but if kept in

Coriol. 16. ἀφαιρησόμεθα τὴν δημαρχίαν αὐτῶν, ἀναιρεῖσιν οὖσαν ὑπατείας, καὶ διάστασιν τῆς πόλεως.

¹³ Youth and age apart, &c.] So Philostr. Vit. Ap. 6, 30. νεότητος δὲ γῆρα ἕμα ἐς τὸ ἀρχεῖν ἰούσης, τίς μὲν λύρα, τίς δὲ αὐλὸς ἡδεῖαν ὥδε ἁρμονίαν καὶ ἐνγκεκραμένην αἰεῖται; πρεσβύτερα γὰρ ἐνμύθεται νεοῖς, ἐξ ὧν καὶ γῆρας ἰσχύσει, καὶ νεότης οὐκ ἀτακτήσει. See also an interesting passage in Orosius, § 13 and 18. where see the notes of Schwebel.

¹⁴ But that the inferior, the middling, and the prime judgments.] Hobbes renders, "the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactest judgments." And if that were the meaning, one might compare a passage in Theocr. Idyll. 14, 57. Πλεουσούμαι κήγῶν διαπάντιος οὔτε κάκιστος, οὔτε πρῶτος ἴσως, ὁμαλὸς δὲ τις ὁ στρατιώτης. But considering what preceded, I am inclined to think that the orator intended, at least, also an *allusion* to the *three ages* into which human life has been distributed, meaning by this indirect compliment to gratify his elderly auditors.* If any authority be necessary to confirm this view, it may be found in Dio Cass. 616, 25. (where the writer has evidently this passage in view), καὶ μῆτε τῇ τῆς νεότητος προπετείᾳ, μῆτε τῇ τοῦ γήρους ἐκλῦσει κακύνονται, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρωθ' ἔχοντες ἰρῶνται ταμάλιστα. and Philostr. Vit. Ap. 2, 30. fm. just cited.

In this view I cannot but commend, as a *paraphrase*, the version of Hobbes, "that from the wildness [or rather rawness] of youth, the moderation [or rather mature judgment] of the middle-aged, and the consummate prudence of the old," &c.

¹⁵ Tempered together.] So in an elegant passage of Eurip. Æol. Frag. 6. there is a similar mention of the rich and poor: Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἰσθλῶ καὶ κακῶ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχιν καλῶς. See my note on 1 Cor. 12, 24.

¹⁶ If it stagnates in quietude, &c.] So Plutarch Fab. Max. c. 2. αὐτὴν ἵπν περι αὐτῇ, μαραινέσθαι τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ Ἀντίκου.

¹⁷ Science in general will grow old and rusty.] So Menander ap. Sto-

* Hence may be illustrated Æschyl. Sept. c. Theb. 10—13. ἤμας δὲ χρὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἑλλείποντ' ἐπὶ ἡβῆς ἀκμαίας. καὶ τὸν ἐξῆβον χρόνον, βλαστημὸν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολλὸν, ὅταν τ' ἔχοντ' ἑκάστον, ὥστε συμπρεπὲς, πόλει τ' ἀρήγειν, where a comma should be placed before ἑκάστον, which is to be referred not only to ὅταν ἔχοντα, but also to the preceding τὸν ἑλλείποντ' and ἐξῆβον: and 663. Ἄλλ' οὔτε ἵν' φανέοντα μητρὶ δὲ σκότον, οὐτ' τροφαῖσι, οὐτ' ἐφηβήσαντά περ οὐτ' ἐν γαστρὶ ἐλλογῇ τριχόματος, where the words οὐτ' ἐν γαστρὶ ἐλλογῇ τριχόματος designate τὸν οὕτω ἐξηβήσαντα.

active exercise¹⁸, it will perpetually acquire fresh skill, and will have its power of defence accustomed and familiar, not resting in words, but in deeds.

Upon the whole, I am entirely of opinion that a state which is accustomed to activity will very soon be ruined by inactivity, and that those people have the best chance of living in security, who are governed with the least deviation from their present laws and customs, even be they not the best.”¹⁹

XIX. Thus spoke Alcibiades. And the Athenians after having heard both him, the Egestæans, and the Leontine exiles, who came forward, entreating them to be mindful of their oaths, and suppliantly beseeching¹ succour; they were more earnestly bent on the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that no arguments of his would any longer avail to dissuade them from their purpose, but thinking that he might, perhaps,

bæum Serm. 1, 19. p. 382. Οὐ πάνυ τοι (read *τι*) γηράσκουσιν αἱ τίχναί καλῶς ἔαν (read *ἀν*) μὴ λάβωσι προστάτην φιλάργυρον. The present passage is borrowed almost verbatim by Max. Tyr. Diss. 30. p. 320. Davand. Philostr. Vit. Soph. p. 543. γηράσκουσα ἥδη ἡ ἐπιστήμη σοφίαν ἀρνύει. Indeed the best Greek writers use this word, as do the Latins *senescere*, of a state.

Nearly the same sentiment is found in Procop. 334, 35.

¹⁸ *If kept in active exercise.*] Such, I apprehend, is the sense here of ἀγωνίζεσθαι.

¹⁹ *Those people have the, &c.*] This passage is imitated by Dio Cass. 702, 93. τὰ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ μενόντα, καὶν χεῖρῳ ἢ, συμφορωτέρῳ τῶν ἀεὶ καινοτομουμένων, καὶν βελτίῳ εἶναι δόκει, ἰστίν. There is a similar sentiment in Soph. Antig. 1110. δίδωκα γάρ, μὴ τοὺς καθιστώτας νόμους Ἄριστον ᾧ σώζοντα τὸν βίον τελεῖν. So Jambl. de Vit. Pythag. 176. τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς πατρίοις ἐστὶ καὶ νομίμοις, ἰδοκίμαζον οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκείνοι, καὶ ἡ μικρῇ χεῖρῳ ἐτέρων. which is plainly imitated from our author. Herod. 3, 82. πατρίους νόμους μὴ λθεῖν, ἔχοντας εὖ, οὐ γὰρ ἄμυνον. Livy, l. 34, 54. “Adeo nihil motum ex antiquo, probabile est; Veteribus, nisi quæ usus evidenter arguit, stari malunt.” There are similar sentiments in Athen. 273. E. 661. A. Æschyl. Eum. 690. Sch. σέβας—αὐτῶν πολιτῶν μὴ ᾗτικαυόντων νόμους κακαῖς ἐπιφροαίσι. Hence may be illustrated a most magnificent, but obscure, passage of Æschyl. Agam. 820. which I must take some other opportunity of explaining. I cannot conclude without advancing the sage counsel of Lord Bacon, in his Essays, vol. 1, 60. “Ask counsel of both times; of the antient time, that you may know what is best; and of the latter time, that you may understand what is fittest.”

¹ *Suppliantly beseeching.*] Nay, if we may credit Justin, l. 3., they appeared in the garb and character of suppliants. His words are these: “sordida veste, capillo barbaque promissis, et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam acquisito, concionem deformes adeunt.”

withdraw them from it by the magnitude of the preparations requisite, if he should rate it high, advanced, and again addressed them to the following purport :

XX. " Well, then, Athenians, since I perceive you altogether¹ bent² on the expedition, I will only say, ' may the thing prosper³ according to our wishes,' and communicate my sentiments on the present business.

" The cities, then, against which we are proceeding are, according to the best intelligence I can gain, powerful, and neither subject one to another⁴, nor standing in need of change of polity⁵, such as any might gladly resort to in order to exchange harsh and oppressive servitude for an easier condition⁶; nor would be likely to embrace our dominion instead of freedom. The Grecian states, also, are, for one island, many in number.⁷ For, besides Naxos and Catana, which, I hope, will

¹ *Altogether.*] Or, " wholly." Some good MSS. have *πάντας*. But the common reading is defended by an imitation in Dionys. Hal. Ant. 466. where he makes Minucius thus commence an oration: ' *Ἐπειδὴ πάντων προθυμείτε*, κ. τ. λ. See note on 2, 67, 11.

² *Bent.*] As a proof how completely the minds of the Athenians were set on the expedition to Sicily, Plutarch, in his life of Nicias, c. 13., says " that the young men in the gymnasia, and the old men in the workshops, and the semicircular seat for the public assemblies, were chalking the outline of the form of Sicily." To which, it may be observed, the three-caped island would be favourable, as a strongly-marked visage is to a portrait-painter.

³ *May the thing prosper.*] So in a not dissimilar passage of Eurip. Iph. Ant. 724. *καὶ ὡς γ' ἀναγκαίως τε — συνένεγκοι δ' ὅμως*. for so I read that controverted passage. Hence also may be emended Dionys. Hal. Ant. 462, 40. *ἔπει δὲ Ὁ. γνώμη νικῇ, καὶ συνένεγκῃ μὲν ταῦτα ὅμιν*. where read *ἔπειδῃ*, and for *συνένεγκῃ*, *ξυνένεγκοι*. See more in the note on l. 5, 8, 5.

⁴ *Subject one to another.*] Namely, so as to render any willing to receive the Athenians in order to throw off the yoke of servitude.

⁵ *Standing in need of change of polity.*] As the preceding clause regarded national, so the present has respect to political subjection; namely, that of law and government. There was, it is meant, no state so oppressed by the rule of the few as to desire democracy, which had, in so many other cases, facilitated the designs of the Athenians upon other nations.

⁶ *Such as any might, &c.*] Literally, " whereby any would gladly pass from harsh subjection to a change for the better."

⁷ *The Grecian states, also, are, &c.*] Hobbes and Smith render the clause *τότε πλήθος* — ' *Ἑλληνίδας*, as if it were meant to assign a reason why the cities would not choose subjection for freedom. But, in fact, the *πολλὰς* seems meant to correspond to the *μεγάλας* before; q. d. " they are large, and many in number." The words *ἢ ἂν ἐκ βαιῶν* — *προσδεχομένας* are parenthetical.

be on our side, by their consanguinity with the Leontines⁸, there are seven others⁹, and provided with all the requisites¹⁰ for offence and defence, very much in the manner of our own armies, and especially those against which we are proceeding, Selinus and Syracuse. For their heavy-armed are numerous, as are also their archers and lancers, they have many triremes and a multitude of people wherewith to man them.¹¹ Wealth, too, they possess, partly stored in private coffers, partly, as in the case of the Selinuntians, laid up in the temples.¹² The¹³

⁸ *Consanguinity with, &c.*] Catana and Leontini being, as it were, children of one common parent; namely, Naxos.

⁹ *Seven others.*] Namely, on whose opposition we may calculate; Syracuse, Selinus, Gela, Agrigentum, Messene, Himera, Camarina.

¹⁰ *Provided with all the requisites.*] Such as armour and weapons, military stores, and perhaps funds for war. So Mitford, who paraphrases: "all of them possessing regular forces of land and sea, with funds to maintain them."

The word *ὁμοιοτρόπως* is very rare; but it occurs not only in Philo Jud. ap. Steph. Thes., but also in Dio Cass. 626, 14. Appian 2, 285. *ὁμ. ἰσκεινασμένων.* Nymphodor. ap. Schol. in Soph. CEd. Col. 337. *τὸ μὲν γὰρ — ὁμοιότροπως καὶ ἡμῖν διοικοῦσι.*

¹¹ *Multitude of people wherewith to man them.*] So Eurip. Androm. 758. *ἰππικοῦ τ' ὅχλου πολλῶν δ' ὀπλιτῶν ἄρχομεν.*

¹² *Partly stored, &c.*] Smith renders, "they possess a large quantity of wealth, not only in private purses but in their public treasuries." But though that sense may seem somewhat countenanced by l. 1, 141. *καὶ οὐτε λίγαι, οὐτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς*, yet it is more than I can venture to say exists in the words. There is here no mention of a *public treasury*, though that may be faintly implied in *ἐν τοῖς ἰδιοῖς ἐστὶ Σελινουντίοις*. Yet it is plain that there was no great sum at Syracuse in the public coffers, though, from the wealth in private purses, the former could easily be recruited.

¹³ *The Syracusans, too, have revenue, &c.*] I have here followed the old reading *ἀπαρχὴ εἰσφέρειται*: for though the var. lect. are many, yet they seem to point at this. As to the reading of many MSS., *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φέρεται* (proposed by Duker, and edited by Hack), it cannot be tolerated; for what sense could *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* have? not surely, "*ex imperio*," as Benedict renders; nor, "from the beginning," as Hack; for though we should admit it to mean "the beginning of the Syracusan state," yet such would not be borne out by facts; for it was not until long after that period that Syracuse acquired such power as to reduce the barbarians to pay tribute. Nor if that had been true, would it have been at all relevant.* Besides, the ellipsis of *χρήματα* would be very harsh. As such I have been ever of opinion that the old reading is alone the true one. And this is confirmed by Bekker, Dindorf, and Goeller, who restore it.

* Otherwise I could have tolerated *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, in the sense *antiquitas*, of old, as in Herod. 2, 104. & 113. Aristoph. Ran. 1031. *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς — ὡς ἀφ' ἐλπίου γεγένηται*: where Brunck wrongly renders "ab initio." It should be "jam inde antiquitas," to use the words of Livy, 9, 29. See also my note on Matt. 19, 8.

Syracusans, moreover, possess a revenue from the tributary contributions of some of the Barbarians.¹⁴

"But the points in which they are especially superior to us are, that they have an abundance of horses¹⁵, and are subsisted on corn of their own growth, and not imported.¹⁶

XXI. "To cope with such a power, there will be need not of a naval or slight¹ armament only, but that a considerable land force should accompany the expedition, if we would indeed accomplish any thing worthy of our designs, and not have

Duker was evidently induced to make the change from not understanding what force *ἀπαρχή* could have. I have always taken it to denote *tribute in produce*, like *tythes in kind*; and my opinion has been confirmed by that of Levêque. The term in question seems to have been that employed by the Syracusans to denote this revenue, which was so called because *at first* (as would be likely) it was only a certain proportion of the produce of the land, though *perhaps* at this time it was a *sum of money* paid in *commutation*. This subject I have illustrated in my note on Matt. 21, 41. *οἱ τινας ἀποδώσουσιν αὐτῷ τοὺς καρποὺς ἐν τοῖς καιροῖς αὐτῶν*. where I have remarked, "It is worth while to notice this most antient mode of paying *rent* (which, by the way, signifies what is *rendered* or paid), namely, in *produce*: of which I have met with vestiges in several passages of the classical writers: ex. gr. Plato de Legg. 8. γεωργίαι δὲ ἐκδομέναι δούλοις, ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀποτελοῦσιν. Dionys. Hal. 616, 36. γεωργοῦντες ἐπὶ ῥηταῖς τισι τεταγμέναις μοίραις, ἃς ἐκ τῶν καρπῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτέλουν. Xenoph. Œcon. 15, 1. ἐπίτροπον σοι τὰ τῆς γῆς ὥραϊα ἀποδεικνύοντα ὄντι πλείστα. After these payments in produce had come in process of time to be commuted for money payments, the word which denoted them (*ἀπαρχή*) came merely to signify *rent, tribute, revenue*. (And this suggests the best definition of *rent*). So we find it in Thucydides 6, 20. Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπαρχὴν ἰσχυρόταται. I will take this opportunity of emending a corrupt passage of Josephus, in which the word occurs in this sense, p. 329, 9. Hudson. καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς διακοσμία τάλαντα. I read ἀπαρχῆς, where there is an ellipsis of *ἐκ* or *ἀπὸ*: the sense is, "of his own private revenue, reserved to himself, on giving up the crown to his son Solomon."

¹⁴ *Some of the barbarians.*] Not, "the barbarians," as Mitford renders; for it is probable that only a *few* of the Siculi, such as bordered on the Syracusan territory, were tributary.

¹⁵ *Have an abundance of horses.*] All parts of Greece Proper, except Bœotia, were unfavourable to the breeding of horses, which, therefore, had to be imported by Athens at a high price from Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, &c.; whereas Sicily, like Spain, was always celebrated for its horses.

The version of Smith, "*cavalry*," is incorrect; for though ἵππος has sometimes that sense, yet it is only in the *singular*.

¹⁶ *Corn of their own growth, and not imported.*] Whereas a great part of the corn consumed in Attica came from various foreign countries, Nicias, however, here means to suggest, that while the Sicilians would be in possession of the stores that a fruitful country afforded, the Athenians must depend upon receiving supplies by sea.

¹ *Slight.*] Literally, "paltry." So Xen. Hist. 5, 3, 8. βουλευομένοις ἰδόσκειν οὐ φαύλην πεμπτήριον δύναμιν εἶναι.

our debarkation hindered ² by the multitude of their cavalry, especially if the cities, through alarm, combine together, and no others prove our friends but the Egæstæans, and furnish us with cavalry to hold them in check. And disgraceful were it to either abandon our allies through utter compulsion, or to have to send for fresh forces, by having so ill arranged our plans at first.

“Hence we must make the enterprise with a force to be provided competent to ³ its accomplishment, considering that we shall be going far from our country, and not making an expedition on a like footing, as if in countries subject to our own, we were carrying on war as allies ⁴, from whom supplies of necessities could easily have been brought from a friendly country; but that we must be dependent on an entirely strange country ⁵, from which, for four winter months ⁶, scarcely even a messenger can reach you.” ⁷

² *Have our debarkation hindered.*] *Εἰργασθαι* being used as *εἰρῶναι* at 4, 9. Such is the view of the passage taken by all the translators. Yet as a *landing* would easily be effected at *some* point of so extensive an island, or at least at Egæta, I am inclined to think that *εἰργασθαι* signifies “would be hindered from stirring.” And this was in some measure the case; for Nicias in his Epistle 7, 13. mentions that the men who went out for forage, fuel, and water were cut down by the enemy’s horse.

³ *Competent to.*] *Ἀξιώχρεως* has the same sense at l. 5, 15.

⁴ *And not making an expedition, &c.*] I have here followed the conjecture of Herman and Goeller, who cancel the *οὐκ* before *εἰ*, which Goeller justly supposes to have arisen from the *καὶ οὐκ*, just before. And he aptly compares a similar use of *ὁμοίως* — *καὶ εἰ* at 6, 64. And he renders “Non eadem conditione bellum geremus, qua in terris nobis subjectis auxilio venimus contra aliquem.”

⁵ *Must be dependent on an entirely strange country.*] *Ἀπαρήσονται* is to be taken for *ἀπαρηθύνει*, in the sense of *ἀπαρηθύνει*, *suspensi in*; as in Plato ap Steph. Thes. *εἰς τὸ αὐτὸν ἀπαρηθύνει πάντα*. Dio Cass. 701, 46. *εἰς ἕνα τινα Ἀπαρηθύνει*. et 832, 69. *τὰ κοινὰ εἰς μηδὲνα ἀπαρῶν*. Eurip. Phœn. 712. *εἰς Θεοὺς χρή ταῦτ’ ἀπαρηθύνει* ἔχουσιν.

The sense above assigned is confirmed by Dio Cass. 234, 14. (who has reference to this passage. *εἰς ἀλλοτρωτάτην σφίσι τῆς γῆς, καὶ τοῦ ἀβρανοῦ κατὰστασιν ἀπαρῶντας*, *dependent upon*.)

⁶ *Four winter months.*] Smith and Mitford render “the four winter months.” Here, however, there is no article; and, therefore, this will not prove that the Greeks reckoned four months for winter; since we find by Thucydides that they divided the year between summer and winter.* Hobbes strangely mistakes the sense of the whole passage, as if Nicias meant to say that a packet-boat would be four months on the voyage.

⁷ *From which, &c., scarcely even a messenger can reach you.*] Much less,

* Though, indeed, Euripides, frag. incert. 143. says: *Θροὺς τε χεῖμ ὥδς τε μέγας τίσασσας, Φίλης τ’ ἀπώρας διπυλούς, ἡρώς τ’ Ἴσους*.

XXII. "I am therefore of opinion, that we must take a considerable body of heavy-armed both of our own people¹ and of our allies and subjects, and whatever force we may be able to procure from Peloponnesus, whether by persuasion, or taken on hire²; also plenty of archers and slingers, in order to keep in check their cavalry.

"We must, moreover, have a decided superiority of naval force³, in order that we may the more easily bring over all necessaries. Corn we must convey from home in ships of burden, both wheat and parched barley, and bread-makers impressed, under pay, from the bakers' shops⁴, according to their

any supplies, which will be at all times precarious. The expression seems, too, to have been in some measure proverbial. So Plutarch Cæs. 26. *ἅπου γὰρ ἄγγελον, ἢ γραμματοφόρον διαδύναι, παρ' αὐτοῦ χρόνῳ πολλῷ ἦν ἀπιστον.*

¹ *Of our own people.*] This was probably meant to alarm the Athenians, since the land-force usually sent on board a fleet was chiefly of the allies.

² *Whatever force we may be able, &c.*] Hobbes renders, "as many as we can get for love or money;" a homely, but not unfaithful version.

³ *Superiority of naval force.*] Not, "much spare shipping," as Hobbes renders. The fleet was to guard the ships of burden from the attacks of the Syracusan triremes.

⁴ *Bread-makers impressed under pay from the bakers' shops.*] Such I have long considered to be the sense of the passage; and I have since found my view supported by the authority of Hack and Goeller. As to Bauer's objection with respect to *ἡναγκασμένους* and *ἐμπίσθους*, it is most groundless; for we have the very same kind of phrase at 7, 57. *συνίει τοὺς Κρήτας ἄκοντας μετὰ μίσθον ἰλθεῖν.** An example of this exists in our impressed sailors, and in the impress which in all countries accompanies the motion of armies. The expression, therefore, signifies not so much *coactus* as *comprehensus*. So *comprehendere vehicula vel jumenta*, in Sueton. J. Cæs. 31. et Tiber. 40., whence also it appears that many persons were impressed from the Pistrina, where great numbers were kept to grind or pound corn by hand-mills.

† This measure, though a violent one †, was necessary, from the great number required to grind or pound for so considerable an armament, according to the slow and inartificial process of antient times. Indeed, at all times, even the number required by one trireme was considerable. Thus Cephisodotus ap. Aristot. Rhet. 206. calls triremes *μύλυνας ποικίλους*.

* For *ἐμπίσθους* might, indeed, be conjectured *ἐμπίσθως*: but the common reading may very well be defended, being of the same nature with *ἀκούσιος ἡρμηνος ἄρχεῖν*, at 6, 8, where I shall adduce other examples in my edition.

† It might, indeed, be supposed that it would not have been difficult to procure men who would *voluntarily* have done this work for a stated recompense. But it must be recollected, that the process of pounding corn into meal, effected as it then was, wholly with unwieldy pestles and mortars, was, of necessity, extremely laborious, and even thought disgraceful; since many of those in the bakers' shops were malefactors: insomuch that *pistrinum* came in time to mean a *bridewell*.

size⁵, in order that, if we be anywhere detained, or weather-bound, the armament may have supplies; for great as it must be, it will not be in the power of every city to receive it.⁶ Finally, we must prepare, as far as possible, every other necessary, and not be thrown dependent upon others; but, above all, we must go hence with as ample funds⁷ as can be raised; for as to what is to come from the Egæstæans (which is said to be ready there), be assured that its readiness will be found mostly in words.

XXIII. "All this will be no more than necessary¹; for if we go thither provided with a force, I will not say on an *equal* match only (especially against their warlike heavy-armed), but in all points with the *superiority*², even thus we shall with difficulty be able to subdue their country, and preserve our own. It behoves us, in fact, to reflect that we shall be like persons planting a colony³ among strangers and enemies, who

⁵ According to their size.] In the interpretation of πρὸς μέρος there is no little difficulty. The translators seem all to have missed the sense. Duker explains it "pro rata portione." But of *what*, is the question. Abresch and Bauer say οἶρον. That, however, is too harsh a subaudition; still more, that of Duker, "the men put on board." The learned commentator seems right in his explanation "pro rata portione;" but the subaudition should, I think, be *hominum in pistrinis*, the number of workmen employed there. In the same sense πρὸς μέρος is used by Aristoph. ap. Steph. Thes.

⁶ It will not be in the power, &c.] The genitive has here a sense of power. See the examples in Matt. Gr. Gr. § 372, 6. To which may be added a very similar passage of Herod., l. 7, 49. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐστὶ λαὸν. — ὅστις — φερέγγυος ἐστὶ διασῶσαι τὰς ναῦς.

⁷ Funds.] How much money was pressed for, appears from Aristoph. Lysist. 422. ὅπως κατὰς ἔσονται, τὰργυρίον νυνὶ δέον.

¹ All this will be no more than necessary.] To these words there is nothing correspondent in the original. But the sense is inherent in the sup-pressed clause to which the γὰρ refers.

² If we go thither provided with, &c.] Such seems to be the true sense of the passage, which has, I conceive, been missed both by the translators and the commentators, chiefly for want of seeing that πλὴν γε — ὁπλιτωδὺν is a parenthetical clause, and that πλὴν γε has not here its *exceptive* sense, but signifies *praeterim, saltem*. The *exceptive* sense, indeed, cannot be admitted, since it would involve something like an absurdity. For Nicias could never seriously mean to say that the Athenian heavy-armed were no match for the Sicilian; and, in fact, those turned to be greatly inferior to them. Nay, had such been the case, the *exception* would destroy the following as-assertion.

³ We shall be like persons planting a colony, &c.] I here follow the reading of Bekker and Goeller οἰκιστρὰς, which has long appeared to me to be the true one.

must, on the first day that they debark, immediately be masters of the field, or they may be assured that, should they miscarry, they will find every thing in arms against them.⁴ Fearing, then, to be thrown into such a situation, and knowing that we have much need of prudent counsel, and yet more of good fortune (which is hard for human beings to attain⁵), I would wish to make this expedition with as little dependence as possible on fortune, and to set forward, as far as probability reaches, secure in my preparations. This I conceive to be the surest course for the state at large, and the safest for us who go on the expedition. Should, however, any man be of another opinion, I readily yield him up my command.⁶

XXIV. Thus spoke Nicias, who had been induced to say what he had, as supposing that he should either divert the Athenians from their purpose by the multitude of the requisites for its accomplishment, or, if he were compelled to go on the expedition, that he should thus set forth with some security. But the people did not abandon their desire for the expedition by the vastness of the required armament; but were so much the more earnestly bent upon it, and thus the affair took a contrary turn to what he expected¹; for they only decided "that his counsel was judicious², and that with these preparations the measure would be abundantly safe." Indeed, all

⁴ *Or they may be sure should, &c.*] Thus it is truly said by Xenophon Anab. 3, 2, 28. κρατούμενων μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστάσθαι ὅτι πάντα ἀλλότρια ἐσιν.

⁵ *Which is hard for human beings to attain.*] Literally, "for us to attain as human beings." So Lucian de Lapsu: χαλεπὸν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ὄντα. This idiom in the accusative, both singular and plural, is not uncommon in the Attic writers.

⁶ *Should, however, any man, &c.*] This, of course, is meant for Alcibiades. And Nicias here acted exactly as in the case of Cleon. See 4, 29. In the present case it was as much as saying that he would not go without such a force as he considered competent to the business.

The passage is imitated by Procop. p. 221, 8. αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλλοῦ τυχεῖν βούλεσθαι λέγειν, ἀφίημι.

¹ *The affair took a contrary turn to what he expected.*] It is well observed by Mitford, "that the simple prudence of the experienced Nicias was no match for the versatile sagacity of the young politician with whom he had to contend."

² *They only decided "that, &c."*] The friends of Alcibiades received this speech with the highest approbation; affecting to consider it not at all as dissuading or discouraging the undertaking; but, on the contrary, wisely and providently recommending what would insure success. (Mitford.)

orders of men were alike seized with a love for the enterprise. The elderly, as thinking that either the conquest aimed at would be accomplished, or at least that a powerful force could scarcely utterly miscarry. Those in the flower of their age were seduced by the desire of seeing and becoming acquainted with remote countries³, being, withal, full of hope to return in safety. As to the great multitude, and the soldiery, their chief object was the obtaining of money for the present, especially as they supposed that the measure would produce an accession of dominion, from whence they should have constant employ and pay. Insomuch that, from the excessive desire of the bulk of the people, such as did not approve of the measure, fearing, by giving a contrary vote, they should be thought disaffected to the state, silently acquiesced.

XXV. At length a certain Athenian¹ stepping forward, called out to Nicias, and told him "he ought not to make excuses or delay business, but say now before all what force the Athenians should decree him." He, unwillingly however, said, that indeed he would rather consult on the matter at leisure with his colleagues: so far, however, as he could at present judge, they ought not to sail with less than a hundred triremes, and that such of the Athenian ships as might be thought sufficient should be transports for the conveyance of the heavy infantry², and others should be sent for from the allies. As to heavy-armed, they should, in all, of Athenians and allies, be not less than five thousand, or, if possible, even more. That the rest of the armament should be in proportion, both archers from home, and from Crete, and slingers, and

³ *Desire of seeing and becoming acquainted with remote countries.*] It is truly observed by Max. Tyr. Diss. 10, 5. 1, 176. Θρασκία γὰρ οὐσα ἡ ἀνδρωπίνη ψυχὴ, τὰ μὲν ἐν ποσὶν ἦσσαν τιμᾷ, τοῦ δὲ ἀπόντος θαυμαστικῶς ἐχει. And Libanius Orat. 622. E. τὴν οὖσαν πολιτείαν κινεῖσι καὶ τῆς ἀπουσίας ἐκωδυνούσιν.

¹ *A certain Athenian.*] This, as appears from Plutarch in Nic. c. 12., was Demostratus, one of the orators. The same person (as we are informed by Plutarch Nic. 18.) was the author of the motion that Alcibiades and Nicias should have full power.

² *Such of the Athenian ships, &c.*] Perhaps because, as the lading would be much heavier, the ships were required to be stronger, and, perhaps, larger; and we may presume the Athenian ships to have been, in both these respects, superior to those of the allies.

whatever other force might seem suitable, shall be provided and taken on board.

XXVI. On hearing this, the Athenians immediately decreed "that the commanders should be invested with complete powers concerning the voyage in general, and the amount of the force, to manage as seemed to them best for the Athenian people." After this the preparations were immediately set about, and summonses were sent to the allies, and levies made therefrom. Indeed, by this time the city had recovered itself¹ from the pestilence, and the perpetual war, both in respect of the multitude of young men who had since arrived at manhood², and in the accumulation of money, by means of the suspension of hostilities, so that all needful supplies were easily provided. Thus intent on preparation for the voyage were the Athenians.

XXVII. In the meantime, the stone Mercuries in the city of Athens (according to the custom of the country, of the square kind of form³), of which there are many

¹ *By this time the city had recovered itself, &c.*] Mitford accounts for it by observing that "the loss in battle had never been great, and the revenue far exceeded the ordinary expenses of the commonwealth."

² *Young men who had since arrived at manhood.*] Ἐπικυρίαται is here used as at 2, 44. οἱ ἐπικυρίαται.

³ *The stone Mercuries, &c.*] Smith here remarks: "I have omitted two words in the original, ἡ τετραγώνος ἱστία, because I cannot translate them with any precision or clearness." A very insufficient reason surely: as a translator is not, *as such*, an interpreter, and if, in a case like this, he renders word for word, he deserves no blame. Besides, at that rate, Smith might have omitted a great many other words and phrases, and many whole clauses which he, at least, *did not translate* with any precision.

But with respect to these Hermæ, Smith thinks it hard to discover what *squareness* had to do with a statue: yet, in fact, there is no difficulty. Of the conjectures he propounds two out of the three are most absurd: and the third, which adverts to the form of the *pedestals*, shows that he was utterly unacquainted with the form of the Hermæ, which had no *pedestals*, being only *busts*, or sometimes half-length figures, with the lower parts squared off, so as to admit of being placed upright on a level surface; the chief peculiarities being, that they had neither hands nor feet; though in other respects decency was sometimes violated, as we find from Herodotus and Plutarch, cited by Menage on Diog. Laert. 5, 82. Their form is well represented by Wincklemann in his "History of the Arts among the Antients," vol. 1. p. 6. Themistius, cited by Duker, says that before the time of Dædalus, not only the statues of Mercury were of this form, but those of the rest of the gods: which may be confirmed from Pausan. 2, 10, 6. 8, 40, 1.,

both in the porches ⁴ of private houses, and in the temples, were in one night most of them ⁵ mutilated in their

&c. who frequently mentions these Hermæ, and mostly with the epithet *τετράγωνος*. See 1, 17, 2. and 24, 3. 7, 22, 2. 8, 32, 1. He also says at 4, 33, 11. that this square formation was invented by the Athenians, from whom the rest of the Greeks learned it. But as he, at 8, 48, 4. and 10, 12, 3., tells us that the Arcadians (the most antient of the Greeks) were exceedingly attached to this form, it may, therefore, be doubted whether they were not the inventors, or, perhaps, first introducers; for I suspect that it was of Oriental origin, and I seem to remember having read of such in the descriptions of travellers. The Scholiast seeks a *mystical* reason for the form; whether well founded or not, I cannot say. Be that as it may, it was, as Mitford observes, "a custom among the Athenians, derived from very early times when art was rude, to place an imperfect statue of Mercury, the head completely carved, the rest generally a block merely squared, in front of every residence, whether of gods or men.

To the information supplied by Pausanias, it may be added that Artemidorus 2, 37. p. 207. speaks of a Ἑρμᾶς τετράγμενος ὁ σφηνοπῶγων, and just after of ὁ ἀγένειος, or *beardless*. I find, too, from Clemens Alex. Admon. p. 35. D. that these Hermæ at Athens had visages made to resemble that of Alcibiades. Considering the youth of Alcibiades at this time, such must have been the οἱ ἀγένειοι of Artemidorus.

To turn to the phraseology, Bauer, Hack, and others maintain that the words εἰσι δὲ — ἰργασία are glossematical; and I was myself formerly of the same opinion. But as they are found in every MS., and are confirmed by the Scholiast and Suidas, there is little doubt but they are genuine. They are, indeed, awkwardly, interposed; but not more so than many other similar clauses in Thucydides. The difficulty, too, may be diminished by pointing thus: εἰσι δὲ (κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώριον ἢ τετράγωνος ἰργασία scil. ἐστὶ) πολλοὶ καὶ, &c. It is strange the translators and commentators should not have seen that κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώριον *cannot* belong to πολλοὶ εἰσι, but must be referred to ἢ τετράγωνος ἰργασία: which is placed beyond doubt by Pausan. 4, 33, 11. Ἀθηναίων γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τετράγωνον ἐστὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἑρμαῖς. And as to the article ἢ, on which Bauer and Bredow "*maxime suspicionem movent*," it has exactly the same force as the τὸ at τὸ σχῆμα in Pausanias, and that is one of the commonest uses of the article. See Middleton. I must not omit to observe that Goeller has aptly noticed ἰργασία and ἰργάσασθαι *θεῖον*, as inserted in Pollux 1, 11, 15. among the phrases appropriate to the manufacturing of statues of the gods.

⁴ *In the porches.*] Why they were put there, Duker says, we are told by Heraldus Adv. 2, 1. We may, I think, imagine it was from the fancied protection afforded by those (as Mitford says) "formless guardians."

On the *situation* of these Hermæ there is a very important passage in the Etym. Mag. p. 147. init (though omitted by all the commentators), where, after saying that they had neither hands nor feet, he adds: ἐποίησαν δὲ αὐτοὺς διακένους, θύρας ἔχοντας καθάπερ τοιχοπυργίους καὶ ἔσωθεν αὐτῶν ἐτίθουν ἀγάλματα ὧν ἔειδον θεῶν ἔξωθεν δὲ ἀπέκλειον τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς.

The porches, however, were not the *only* places where they were set; for it appears from Philostratus Vit. Ap. 6, 4. that they were also put in the *market places*: φασὶ μὲν προστοίκεναι ἀγορᾷ ἀρχαῖα — Ἑρμῶν τὰ ἀγάλματα.

⁵ *Most of them.*] The expression οἱ πλεῖστοι is sometimes used when *nearly all* is meant: and so it must be taken here; for it appears from Anodocides, p. 9, 13. that they were all so treated *except one*, that opposite to

faces.⁶ The perpetrators of this act no one could tell, though their detection was sought after by great rewards⁷ publicly offered for the discovery; and the people likewise decreed that if any knew of any other impiety that had been perpetrated, they might, all who chose, fearlessly reveal it, whether they were citizens, or foreigners, or slaves. Indeed, they treated the offence as a very serious matter⁸, regarding it as of bad omen⁹ with respect to the expedition, and as having been per-

his own house. And so Plutarch, in his *Nicias*, c. 13. Cornelius Nepos *Alcib.* 3., indeed, says: "*omnes Hermæ deicerentur.*" But as that writer almost translates Thucydides, the word *deicerentur* must be corrupt, and the reading of the MSS. *deicerentur* is probably an approximation to the truth, which I leave to others to discover.

⁶ *In their faces.*] And also (as we are told by Pausanias ap. Schol. and Aristoph. *Lysist.* 1095.) in their private parts, which were represented (as in the present Hindoo idols and symbols) in the most disgustingly indecent manner. Duker, indeed, seems to *disbelieve* this, as not related in *history*. But the account of Pausanias must have been *founded* on history. Besides, such seems *implied* in the expression of Plutarch, *ἀπορησιασθέντων*. And nothing was more probable, especially as Plutarch *Nic.* 13. mentions the same enormity as perpetrated at the altar of the twelve gods.

⁷ *Great rewards.*] Namely, as we find from Andocides de *Myst.* 100 minæ.

⁸ *Treated the offence as a very serious matter.*] Such seems to be the true sense of τὸ πρᾶγμα μείζονως ἐλάμβανον, with which may be compared a kindred one in St. Chrysostom, t. 4. p. 891. μείζονως ἐποιούντο τὰς κατηγορίας.

⁹ *Regarding it as of bad omen, &c.*] Indeed, Plutarch *Nic.* mentions many other things which were thought ominous. And it is clear that the secret disapprobation of many wise men in the assembly of the people, though there suppressed, yet burst out afterwards; and as it could not be displayed in its proper form, sought the shelter of pretended omens, prophecies, and oracular responses. It appears that the priests, soothsayers, and oracles were tampered with by both parties, and each accused the other (truly enough) of imposture. The most really ominous part of the business was that the very wisest of men, Socrates and Meton, thought the expedition could end in nothing but destruction; the latter of whom avoided going by feigning madness.

With respect to the outrage in question, it was, probably, the act of some drunken and wanton youths, and wholly unconnected with any plans for political innovation. That *Alcibiades*, at least, should have had any hand in it, is exceedingly improbable. He was not only without any temptation to commit it, but had the strongest reasons to prevent its commission, if he had even known of it; since, from his irregular mode of life, he would be especially liable to suspicions. Mitford even says, "that considering the known circumstances of the times, the temper of party at Athens, and events preceding and following, we find strong reason to suspect, though we cannot be certain, that not Alcibiades but the enemies of Alcibiades were the authors of the profanation whence the disturbance arose." The latter is certainly far more probable than the former; though the act might very possibly be committed by dissolute youths unconnected with *any* party.

petrated by those who were plotting an innovation in government, and the abolition of democracy.

XXVIII. Hereupon some sojourners in the city and servants made a discovery, not indeed respecting the Hermæ, but that some defacements of other statues had aforetime been committed by the younger men in wanton and drunken moods; and, moreover, that there had been much celebrations of the mysteries in private houses.¹ Of these offences they accused Alcibiades. And now those who were especially opposed to Alcibiades, as being in the way of their obtaining a sure influence over the people, laying hold of these imputations, and thinking that if they could drive him away, they should be at the head of affairs, aggravated the charges, and bellowed out that "the abolition of democracy was the object aimed at both in the mock celebration of the mysteries, and in the defacement of the Hermæ; and that nothing of these things had been without his participation;" alleging, too, in proof, the other licentious irregularities of his behaviour and mode of life, so contrary to the laws, and so unsuitable to a democracy.²

Certainly there is nothing in the language of Thucydides that countenances the supposition that it was committed by the opposite party; he only charges them with making a handle of it against Alcibiades. And as to the concert and secrecy of the deed, it proves nothing, since all such outrages must be secret. At all events, the enemies of Alcibiades were sure to take the thing up as they did, and agitate the public mind.

¹ *Much celebrations, &c.*] In truth, the thing appears to have been done in one house, that of *Polytion*, as we learn from Plutarch Alcib. 19., Isocrates de Bigis, p. 605., Andocides de Myst. p. 7., Reiske, and Pausan. Attic. 1, 2, 4.

² *And now those who were especially opposed to Alcibiades, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "Of the party in opposition to Alcibiades were all who leaned to oligarchy, and most of the most powerful men of the commonwealth, who indignantly bore the superiority assumed by that young man, by whose abilities, assisted by the splendour of his birth and the greatness of his fortune, and supported by the favour of the people, they found themselves so overwhelmed, that they had, for some time past, submitted in silence. But the present was an opportunity not to be neglected: they set themselves instantly to take advantage from it to ruin him in the favour of the people,—that foundation of sand on which all power in Athens must rest, and then the reins of the commonwealth would, of course, pass into their hands." They might plausibly enough represent that irregularity of life so similar to that of Pausanias, and probably connected with similar plans for the enslavement of his country.

On the question of the guilt or innocence of Alcibiades, Goeller refers to an ample discussion of Meier de bonis damn. p. 179. note.

XXIX. He, however, for the present made his defence, as to the informations, and was ready to submit to a trial¹ as to what hand he had had in the affair, before his departure (for the preparations were now completed), and if he had done any such thing, to suffer whatever punishment the law should inflict, and only, if entirely acquitted, take the command. He also conjured them not to receive any calumnious accusations of him, when absent, but to put him to death now, if he were found guilty. Propriety, he said, demanded that they should not send him in command over so great an armament, while labouring under such a charge, and before the affair had been brought to a decision.

But his enemies, fearing lest he should have the good will of the army, if he were now to stand trial, and that the people (who showed him respect, because by him the Argives and some of the Mantineans took part in the expedition) would suffer their resentment to die away, dissuaded and put aside the proposed measure², by setting on *other* orators³ who proposed that he should now sail, and not retard the departure of the armament, but, on his return, be brought to trial on certain

Diodorus relates that a witness came forward, who stated that about midnight of the new moon he saw persons go into a house for the purpose of these malpractices; and that among these was Alcibiades. Upon being asked how he could be sure it was he, the fellow answered that he saw his face by the light of the moon: which, of course, completely negated his own evidence.

¹ *Was ready to submit to a trial.*] So Xen. Hist. 1, 4, 14. ἐθίλοντος δὲ τότε κρινεσθαι παραχρήμα τῆς αἰτίας ἄρι γεγενημένης, ὥς ἡσέβηκός ἐς τὰ μυστήρια, ὑπερβαλλόμενοι δὲ ἰχθροὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα δικάζαι εἶναι, ἄποντα αὐτὸν ἰστέρησαν τῆς πατρίδος. It is truly observed by Mitford, "that in no one circumstance of his public life does Alcibiades seem to have conducted himself more unexceptionably than under this accusation. He neither avoided enquiry, nor attempted to overbear it; but coming forward, with the decent confidence of innocence, he earnestly desired immediate trial, and deprecated only accusation in his absence."

² *But his enemies fearing, &c.*] It is ably remarked by Mitford, "that, as usual with all factions, what prudence would dictate for the benefit of the commonwealth was, with his opponents, but an inferior consideration: what would advance the power of their party, was the first." Dreading, therefore, his popularity with the army, and the alienation of the Argive and Mantinean allies, and apprehensive that they should fail of their purpose, and even incur blame themselves, they resolved to wave the charge for the present, but hold it suspended over their victim.

³ *Setting on other orators.*] i. e. those of a different party from their own, that might not be suspected of any hand in the affair. The phrase ἄλλους ἐνίπνεις is borrowed by Dio Cass. p. 203, 25.

appointed days.⁴ Their intent in this was, upon greater matter of accusation, which they would easily contrive to be forthcoming after his departure, to have him sent for back to stand trial. Thus it was decided that Alcibiades should depart.⁵

XXX. After this, when it was the middle of summer, the embarkation to Sicily took place. And now the greater part of the allies, with the corn-transports, and such other vessels and barks as were to accompany the force, had received previous orders to rendezvous at Corcyra, it being intended from thence to cross the Ionian Gulf to the promontory of Japygia.¹ But the Athenians themselves, and such of the allies as were at hand, proceeding to the Piræus on an appointed day, early the next morning, went on board the ships, in order to immediately get under weigh. With them had gone down, in a manner, the whole of the rest of the multitude which was in the city, both of citizens and strangers; the former for the purpose of setting their relations on the way; the latter as conducting some their companions, some their relatives, others their sons, accompanying them with a mixture of hope and lamentation; of hope, that they would attain their aims; of lamentation, as uncertain whether they should ever again see each other, considering the remoteness of the expedition on which they were going.

At the present time, however, when they were now about to part from each other under circumstances of peril², the formidable nature of the expedition struck them more forcibly than when they had voted for its adoption. However, at the

⁴ *But, on his return, &c.*] Plutarch expresses it thus: ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἀγαθὴ τύχη κλείτω, τοῦ δὲ πολέμου διαπραχθέντος ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις ἀπολογείσθω παρῶν. where I would read for νόμοις, νομίμοις.

⁵ *It was decided that Alcibiades should depart.*] Plutarch Alcib. 19. writes thus: οὐκ ἐλάνθανε μὲν οὖν ἡ κακοήθεια τῆς ἀναβολῆς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἀλλ' ἔλεγε παρῶν, ὡς δεινὸν ἔστιν αἰτίας ἀπολιπόντα κατ' ἐαυτοῦ καὶ διαβολάς, ἐκπίπτειν μετῴρων ἐπὶ τοσαύτης δυνάμεως. ἀποθανεῖν γὰρ αὐτῷ προσήκει μὴ λύσαντι τὰς κατηγορίας, λύσαντι δὲ καὶ φανέντι καθαρῷ, τρίπτειν πρὸς τοὺς πολέμιους, μὴ δειδοῖκοι τοὺς συκοφάντας. where there is no such corruption in the preceding words ἀνεπαρρόν—ἀπολογία. as the editors suppose: it is only necessary to translate thus: "fiduciam receperunt, et ad causæ suæ dicendam tempore constituto præsto erant."

¹ *Japygia.*] The point chiefly made for by those bound for Sicily.

² *Under circumstances of peril.*] i. e. at least to one party.

manifest strength of the armament they took courage; cheered by the vast numbers which met their view. As to the strangers and the rest of the multitude³, they went for the sake of the spectacle, as something worth seeing, and connected with an enterprise stupendous.⁴

XXXI. For this was the greatest, the most costly, and the finest armament which up to that time had sailed from a single state with Grecian forces.¹ But in number of ships, and of heavy infantry, both that to Epidaurus under Pericles, and that to Potidæa under Hagnon, was not inferior to it. For there were four thousand heavy-armed and three hundred horse of the Athenians themselves, and a hundred triremes, besides fifty Lesbians and Chians, and also many other allies that joined him in the voyage.² But they set forth as for a short voyage, and with a slender preparation. Whereas *this* armament, as being meant for continuance, was fitted out for both kinds of service, as need may require, with both sea and land force: the naval one was elaborately equipped, at the great expense of the captains of triremes and of the state, the public giving a drachma a day to each mariner,

³ *The rest of the multitude.*] By this is, perhaps, meant the slave population, which was very considerable.

⁴ *Went for the sake of, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases thus: "the numerous foreigners more calmly gratified their curiosity with so splendid and interesting a spectacle."

¹ *For this was the greatest, &c.*] Such is the sense, if the words of the original be correct. But as the distinction between Grecian forces, as compared to Barbarian, seems harsh, and *πρώτη* has rarely, if ever, that sense, not to mention that the assertion is at once odd, and perhaps untrue, I am inclined to agree with Hack, that *Ἑλληνικῆς* is the true reading. Then *πρώτη* will be joined with *δυνάμει*. The sense will thus be at once plain and unexceptionable.

It has surely been very ill represented by Hobbes and Smith, especially the latter, who makes Thucydides say, "it was the finest and most glorious fleet the world had ever seen;" which is quite contrary to facts. Was not the fleet of Xerxes at least ten times as large? and the combined Grecian one thrice as large? Thucydides will, I believe, be very rarely, indeed, found mistaken in any assertion which he deliberately makes; though, at the same time, I grant the occasionally extreme difficulty of ascertaining what it is that he does assert.

² *For there were four thousand heavy-armed, &c.*] Hobbes renders as if he took this account to refer to the *present* expedition, whereas it only refers to that under Pericles. Thucydides mentions the amount of the present armament, *infra*, c. 43.

and supplying empty vessels³, sixty of them light, and forty having on board heavy infantry, also equipments⁴ for these at the expense of the captains, who also gave gratuities⁵, in addition to the public pay, to the Thranitæ (or highest bank of rowers) and to the servants⁶; and in other respects⁷ bestowed

³ *Empty vessels.*] i. e. empty in comparison with those which carried soldiers on board. Goeller refers to Boeckh. 1, 1. p. 90. t. 2. and Wolf. on Demosth. Leptin. p. 101.

⁴ *Equipments, &c.*] Such also is the sense of ὑπηρεσία at 1, 143. On the difference between the triremes ταχίοι and στρατιωτικοὶ or ὀπλιταγωγοί, Goeller refers to Boeckh. 1, 1. t. 1. p. 300. sq.

This whole passage is imitated by Nearch. ap. Arrian Ind. c. 20, 9. λαμπρότης τε πολλή τῇ παρασκευῇ ἐποῦσα, καὶ κόσμος τῶν νεῶν, καὶ σπουδαὶ ἰῶν τριηράρχων ἀμφὶ τὰς ὑπηρεσίας τε καὶ τὰ ἐκπληρώματα ἐκπρεπείας. where for ἐκπληρώματα, Raphael should have received from the Cod. opt. πληρώματα. As to ἐκπλήρωμα, it is a vox nihili.

⁵ *Gratuities.*] Ἐκφορά literally signifies *something added*. So Pollux 1, 153. τὸ τῷ μισθῷ προτιθέμενον—ὡς Θουκυδίδης. The word occurs very rarely in the present sense out of Thucydides. Yet I have noticed that in Dio Cass. 503, 90. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐξήρκει σφίσι οὔτε ἡ μισθοφορία (I conjecture μισθοφόρα) καὶ ὑπερεντελής οὔσα, οὔτε αἱ ἐξωθεν ἐπιφοραὶ, and Diod. Sic. t. 7. 447. τοῖς δὲ πασὶν ἐπιφορὰς ταγματικὰς ἔπενε.

⁶ *Servants.*] There are, perhaps, few who would not wish to know something of these ὑπηρεσίαι. The following illustrations may, therefore, be not unacceptable.

In Demosthenes (as Reiske tells us in his Index) the word denotes, in the singular (as distinguished from ναῦται, mariners or rowers, and ἐπιβάται, or rowers), "reliqui ministri nautici." Such, however, cannot be the sense here; for as the θρανῖται are especially mentioned, it is not likely that the gratuity was given to the other order, the Zeugitæ and Thalamii. The Scholiast observes that it was given οὐχὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐρίταις. In this passage it may signify *apparatus* nauticus. Stephens in his Thesaur. explains the word "quisque apparatus vel ministerium quidque." And Schweighauser on Polyb. 1, 25, 3. says it signifies in the plural "omnino quidquid ad ministerium nauticum pertinet." I have, however, sometimes thought that by these ὑπηρεταί are meant the two lower benches of rowers. And this is countenanced by the following illustrations of Goeller, or rather Boeckh.: "ὑπηρεταί interdum iidem sunt ac ναῦται, i. e. cuncti qui præter milites, ἐπιβάτας navibus vehuntur, quos nautas nos dicimus *Matrosen*. Interdum remiges discernuntur ab hyperetis et nautis, appellanturque ἐρίται κωπηλάται. Duplice igitur hominum genere constabat totum πλῆρωμα sive *die Schiffmannschaft*, militibus et nautis, qui latiori sensu appellantur, quique aut ναῦται strictiori sensu dicti, aut ὑπηρεταί, i. e. ministri eorum, aut remiges erant."

So also 1, 121. τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν, the rest of the crew. And thus Poppo in his Proleg. 2, 60. says that the ὑπηρεσία was what are elsewhere called ἐρίται and κωπηλάται.

⁷ *In other respects bestowed great expenses.*] Hence, as the whole *equipment* of the ship fell upon the captains, the office was very expensive, and thrown, as a burden, on the rich. So Antiph. ap. Athen. 103. F. τριηραρχῶν ἀπήγγατο. And in Aristoph. Eq. 910. Cleon threatens a person thus: ἐγὼ σε ποιήσω τριηραρχεῖν, ἀναλίσκοντα τῶν Σαντοῦ, παλαιὰν ναῦν ἔχοντ',

great expenses on the ensigns⁸, and the furniture, and equipments, each one striving to the uttermost that his ship should exceed in beauty and swiftness of sailing. As for the land forces,

Εἰς ἣν ἀναλῶν οὐκ ἐφίξεις, οὐδὲ ναυπηγούμενος· Διαμνηχανήσομαι θ', ὅπως ἀνίστιον σαπρὸν λάβεις. Æschines, too, p. 56, 27. says that many had consumed their whole fortunes on this office. Hence it is no wonder that prudent persons should dread it. So Aristoph. Ran. 1065. Οὐκ οὖν ἰδέλει γε τριηραρχεῖν πλουτῶν οὐδεὶς διὰ ταῦτα, 'Αλλ' ἐν ῥακίῳ περιελόμενος κλάει, καὶ φησὶ πένεσθαι.

⁸ *Ensigns.*] i. e. those images of tutelary gods or other figures by which the vessel was distinguished and named. The Scholiast interprets these σημεῖα of *pictures*; and Duker proves that pictures were in use, from a passage of Lucian; though he prefers to understand the word of the tutelæ-narium. Wesseling on Diod. Sic. 13, 3. doubts whether they were not certain ornaments extending from the prow, such as the ἀκροστόλιον or παράσημον. Which last interpretation is, doubtless, the best founded; and the following illustrations of the subject I shall extract from my note on Acts 28, 11. ἐν πλοίῳ -- παρασημῷ Διοσκούρου. "The τὸ παράσημον, the *insigne*, was that from which the ship derived its name. It was a painting, or bas-relief, on the prow, of some god or hero, or sometimes *animal*; nay, even inanimate substance, as shield, &c. So Ovid. Trist. 1, 10, 1. Est mihi, sitque precor, flavæ tutela Minervæ, Navis; et a pictâ casside nomen habet. Virg. Æneid. 5, 115. seqq. The *poop* bore the picture, or image of some god under whose protection the ship was supposed to be placed. Both the *tutela* and the *insigne* were of gold [or, rather, gilded metal], ivory, or other rich material. So Virg. Æn. 10, 171. Et aurato fulgebant Apolline puppis. Now the Romans distinguished the *tutela*, which was at the poop, from the *insigne*, which was at the prow. Thus of the ship mentioned in the above cited passage of Ovid, the *numen tutelare* was Minerva, placed on the poop; but the *insigne*, or παράσημον, was a *helmet of Minerva* painted on the prow, and gave name to the ship. Yet such was not the invariable custom. Sometimes the *tutela* and παράσημον were the same; as, for instance, whenever the effigies of the deity himself, to whose protection the ship was committed, supplied the place of an *insigne* (which often happened), then the ship was called by the name of that god who was painted or carved on the prow. Thus the Alexandrian ship in which Paul sailed had the *Dioscuri* for an *insigne* as well as a *tutela*: whence, too, it was called Διόσκουροι. See Alberti on this passage, Enschedii Diss. de tutelâ et insignibus navium, Kunz. Obs. de vexillo navis Alexandrinæ quâ Paulus in Italiam vectus est, Jen. 1734, 4, the commentators on Sil. It. 14, 409., Salmas. on Solin. p. 403., Bochart Geogr. Sac. I. 2. c. 3. p. 712., Meursius on Lycoph. 110, 1299, Scheffer de Militiâ navali 3. 1. p. 372 seq., Burman on Petron. c. 105. and Val. Flacc. 1, 301., Heyne on Virg. Æn. 10, 171., and Schütz on Æschyl. Theb. v. 210." See also the numerous passages illustrating the figures of ships' prows and poops, collected by Westein, a few of which I have in the above-mentioned note selected.

Of these *tutelæ* it may be added, the principal (as might be expected) were the παλλάδια, which, as appears from Aristoph. Acharn. 547., were gilt. At the same time it seems not improbable that these παράσημα were sometimes only paintings, not figures or bas-reliefs. Such, indeed, is proved by a passage of Aristoph. Ran. 933. (which has escaped all the editors), where we have the very word here used by Thucydides; σημεῖον, οὖν ταῖς ναυσὶν, ᾧ μαδίστατ', ἐνέγραπτο.

they were selected from the best lists⁹, and the different corps zealously vied with each other¹⁰ in their arms and accoutrements for the body. Insomuch that there would sometimes arise a strife as to the officers under whom any should be ranged¹¹, and to the other Greeks it suggested the idea of a display of power and opulence, rather than an armament against an enemy. For if any one reflected on the expense to the state, and the private one incurred by those who went on the expedition; of the *state*, considering what sums it had now expended on the expedition¹², and had sent in charge of the commanders; of *individuals*, what expense each had incurred in his personal equipment, and the captains on their ships, besides what it was probable every one would furnish as a provision for so long an expedition; also what sums each one, whether soldier, or merchant¹³, took with him for exchange and traffic¹⁴; he would find the whole sum thus car-

⁹ *Selected from the best lists.*] 'Εκρίναι is a vox propria de hac re, as in the Tragedians, in Herodotus, and Plato ap. Steph. Thes. So also Æschyl. Pers. 808. πλῆθος ἐκκρινον στρατοῦ.

¹⁰ *Vied with each other.*] Ἀμύλλησθαι is not, as Bauer fancies, put for the middle, but rather is a passive form with an active sense, on which see Matt. Gr. Gr. § 493 and 496.

¹¹ *A strife as to the officers under whom any should be ranged.*] So I have ventured to render the passage (in which I find I have the support of Smith), though I grant this version is not justified by the use of προστάσσεισθαι in Thucydides, according to which, Goeller has truly remarked, the sense should be: "contigit autem, ut simul et illi inter se certarent in illo munere, cui quisque fuerat præfectus et," &c. Thus the term will denote a quarrel for precedency among the officers, as to the corps each had assigned to him. That sense, however, cannot be elicited from the words, and the other seems more natural, and agreeable to what precedes.

¹² *What sums it had now expended on the expedition.*] I have here seen no reason to deviate from the common reading, and adopt the conjecture προετρελέκει, propounded by some. It is truly remarked by Goeller that the common reading may mean, "quæ in expeditionem impenderant." With the προστέλλω here we may compare προσδαπάνω in St. Luke, 10, 35.

¹³ *Merchant.*] These merchants seem to have been something like our *cutlers* and camp-followers; with this difference, that they calculated on driving some petty traffic with the people of the country where they were going. And, no doubt, their ignorance of its real nature, would cause as many ridiculous mistakes as to the kind of articles proper to be taken, as sometimes our own merchants have committed in sending off shipments to foreign countries.

¹⁴ *For exchange and traffic.*] Of this sense of μεταβολή I know no other example, though it is common in μετάβολος.

ried out of the city to amount to a considerable number of talents.¹⁵

The armament, too, was noised abroad with astonishment, no less at the daringness of the enterprise, and the splendour of the show, than at the immense magnitude of the force, as it regarded those it was going to attack, and because it was the longest voyage from their own country they had ever made¹⁶, and enterprized with the greatest expectation of future acquisitions in addition to present possession.

XXXII. When the ships were manned, and every thing was put on board which was to be taken with them, silence was ordered by the sound of the trumpet¹, and the usual prayers directed by law were recited, not by each ship sepa-

¹⁵ *The whole sum thus, &c.*] By this Thucydides seems to have thought that the removal of so much coin from the country was an injury; whereas most of our political economists are of another opinion, whether on just grounds, or not, I will not presume to say.

¹⁶ *And because it was the longest, &c.*] The translators seem to scruple at expressing the superlative sense, which, however, is required by the *δη* (for so I would read, with Bekker): perhaps they do this from remembering the Athenian expedition to *Egypt*. But though *Egypt* is, strictly speaking, farther from Athens than Sicily, yet the coasting navigation, necessary to be adopted in the latter voyage, made it in fact longer.

Mitford says, Thucydides calls it the greatest expedition ever undertaken by any Grecian state. This, however, Thucydides does not *precisely* say, for his words plainly regard *Athens* only; though such would be, perhaps, true of any single state in Greece. Nay, taking into consideration the magnitude of the future hopes in comparison with the present possessions, perhaps no armament had yet left any country that equalled it.

Of the words *ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων*, *πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα*, *ἐπεχειρήθη* the best commentary is the seventy-first chapter of book 1.

¹ *Silence was ordered by the sound of the trumpet.*] A mode of issuing orders used by all the antient nations, both Oriental and Occidental; the trumpet being employed to command attention to the order which followed its sound, as with us in the case of a beadle's bell. I will only cite Dio Cass. 521, 69. *σάλπιγγος — ὑπεσήμεινε*. and 575, 78. *ἡ σάλπιγξ ὑπεσήμενεν*. Joseph. 1124, 32. *ὑποσημάνει ἡ σάλπιγξ*.

The word is used *metaphorically* in Plato Polit. l. 8. of a factious demagogue, who preaches up and proclaims (a doctrine which would be relished by many of our own times) abolition of debts and division of property.

There is a passage highly illustrative of this whole context in Diod. Sic. l. 13, 3. (which seems to be taken from some more antient writer) *αἱ μὲν οὖν τριεῖς παρ' ὅλον τὸν λιμένα παρώρμον, κεκοσμημέναι τοῖς ἐπὶ ταῖς πύραις ἐπιστήμασι καὶ τῇ λαμπρότητι τῶν ὅπλων ὃ δὲ κύκλος ἅπας τοῦ λιμένος ἔγεμε θυμιατηρίων καὶ κρατήρων ἀργυρῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἐκπώμασι χρυσοῖς ἔσπευδον οἱ τιμωντες τὸ θεῖον, καὶ προσευχόμενοι καταταχεῖν τῆς στρατίας*.

rately, but all together, the whole multitude responding to the voice of heralds²; cups of wine, too, were mixed throughout the whole armament, and the officers and soldiers made libations³ out of golden and silver goblets. In these prayers, too, participated all the rest of the multitude of citizens on shore, and whoever else present with them wished well to the expedition. And after singing the Pæan, and completing the libations, they put to sea, at first sailing in column, and then making a race of speed⁴ as far as Ægina. They then made all speed for Corcyra, whither the rest of the allied forces was assembling.

At Syracuse they had received news of the expedition from various quarters; yet for a long time no credit was given to

² *Responding to the voice of heralds.*] Namely, who first pronounced the words to be uttered. Such is the real, though not literal, sense (which has been strangely mistaken by Hobbes and Smith, the signification assigned by whom is inconsistent with the *ἐννεπέχοντο*); for the idiom *ὑπὸ κήρυκος* (on which see Matt. Gr. Gr. p. 914.) hardly admits of a literal rendering.

³ *Cups of wine, too, &c.*] Hobbes confounds both together, or rather omits all mention of the latter. Smith, too, though he mentions the libations, makes the crews *drink* them out of the gold and silver cups. Whereas it was only cups of *mixed* wine which were *first* filled and drunk *round*, to the success of the expedition; and then the *officers*, with gold and silver cups of wine *unmixed*, made the libation, which was not *drunk*, but, as its name implies, *poured out* on the ship, or into the sea. It is to be observed, that, though the *ἐπιβάται* and the *ἀρχοντες* (the crews and officers) are placed together, yet (per hyperbaton) the former must be construed with *κεράσαντες*, the latter with *σπίνδοντες*.

On the pouring of the libation, Duker compares Arrian E. A. 6, 3. He might more aptly have adduced Pind. Pyth. 4, 343. *χρυσίαν χεῖρσσι λαβὼν φιάλαν ἄρχος ἐν πρύμνῳ, κ. τ. λ.*

⁴ *Making a race of speed.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of the phrase *ἄμωλλαν ποιοῦντο*: though the translators and commentators take it only to mean "made the best of their way." The above view of the sense, however, is required by the literal meaning of the phrase; and it is placed beyond doubt by the following examples, most of them imitations of this passage. Herod. 7, 44, 7. *ἰμῖθι τῶν νεῶν ἄμωλλαν γινομένην ἰδεῖσθαι*. Pausan. 2, 55, 1. *ἀμύλλης πλοῖων τιθείασιν ἄλλα*. Aristid. 2, 19. *οἱ δὲ κρατῆρες καὶ ἡ μέγρις Αἰγίνης ἄμωλλα*. 2, 24. *Δ. οὐκ ἀναμνησθησόμενα — ἀπομμονόμενοι*. and 2, 25. *Δ. ποίαν ἄμωλλαν ἀμύλλησονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀναπλίνοντας, ὅμοιαν τῇ πρῶν*. 2, 56. *ἡ τότε ἄμωλλα μεχρὶ Αἰγίνης*. Isocr. p. 303. *τρητῶν ἀμύλλας*. Onosand. 48. *ἄμωλλας ποιεῖσθαι*. Xen. Hist. 6, 2, 28. Virg. Æn. 3, 290. *Certatim socii feriunt mare, et æquora verrunt*; and 128. Pseudo Eurip. Rhes. 364. Æschyl. Prom. Vinc. 130.

At the same time I grant that the expression is sometimes used in a *figurative* sense, to denote making great haste; as Aristoph. Pac. 950. And so *connitor* in Livy, l. 32, 31. and Cæsar Bell. Civ. 1, 46.

the reports. However, on an assembly being called, speeches such as the following were made (some crediting the accounts of the expedition of the Athenians, others speaking to the contrary), and Hermocrates son of Hermon, having come forward to the assembly, as conceiving that he had certain knowledge of the matter in question, addressed to them the following counsels:⁵

XXXIII. "It will perhaps be my lot¹, as it has been that of others, to utter what may seem incredible, when I speak of the expedition as a matter of actual truth; and well I know that those who tell or relate what seems unworthy of belief, not only fail to persuade, but are even regarded as fools.² However, I will not, through fear of such an imputation, hold my peace, while my country is in danger, since I persuade *myself*, at least, that I am speaking from more certain information than others possess.

"*The Athenians, then, (however ye may be amazed) are advancing*³ against you with a great armament both for sea and land service, under the pretext, indeed, of rendering assistance to their allies the Egestæans, and again settling the Leontines; but, in truth, through desire to subdue Sicily, but especially

⁵ Addressed to them the following admonition.] The patriotic and able Hermocrates, the peace-maker of Sicily when harassed by internal war, was among the foremost to propose vigorous measures against foreign attack. (Mitford.) The same writer also gives the following able statement of affairs at Syracuse: "It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydides makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in the administration, since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens. The democratical party now bore the sway; and some jealousy toward the nobles, lest preparation for war should throw an increase of power into their hands, appears to have influenced the leaders of the day. At the same time the circumstances of Syracuse, considerably altered since the former interference of Athens in the affairs of Sicily, were such as would inflame the usual presumption of a democratical government."

¹ *It will perhaps be my lot, &c.*] The commencement of this oration is imitated by Herodian 7, 8, 6. ἀπιστα μὲν οἶδα καὶ παράδοξα λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Dionys. Hal. Ant. 282. δέδοικα μὴ ἀπιστα τ. α. Ε. δόξω λέγειν.

² *And well I know, &c.*] This passage is thus imitated, or rather copied, by Dio Cass. 698. 79. καὶ γινώσκω τοῦθ' ὅτι οἱ τὰ μὴ πιστὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι λέγοντες, οὐχ ὅσον οὐ πείθουσι τινὰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κόβαλοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

³ *The Athenians, &c., are advancing.*] This may very well bring to mind the spirited commencement of the song, "The Campbells are coming." The γὰρ is inchoative.

our city, thinking that if they get possession of this, they will easily obtain the rest.

" Since, therefore, they will be speedily at hand, consider, with your present means ⁴, in what way you may best repel their attacks; and neither, through contempt of your enemy, expose yourselves defenceless, nor, through incredulity, neglect the public safety.⁵

" Let not, however, such as may credit my representations feel astonished at the daring, and alarmed at the power, of the enemy. For they will not be able to *inflict* on us more than they will themselves *suffer*; nor, because they come upon us with a great armament, will they be without giving us some advantage ⁶; nay ⁷, it will be the better for us, with respect to the other Siceliots, for, through alarm, they will be more disposed to side with us; and if, indeed, we either worst the enemy, or send them away without effecting their purpose (for, truly, I fear not lest they should attain their aims), a work will be effected most glorious for us, and, indeed, such as I am not without hopes to see accomplished. For, indeed, few great armaments, whether of Greeks or Barbarians, which have gone from thence, have been successful.⁸ Neither are our assailants superior in number to the inhabitants of this and the neighbouring cities (for, through fear, all will unite), and if, through want of necessaries in an enemy's country, they should prove unsuccessful, they, nevertheless, will leave a fame to those whose destruction they have sought, even though they should miscarry chiefly through their own fault; which was the case with these very Athenians themselves, who, on the Medes

⁴ *With your present means.*] i. e. pro præsentī copia, &c. Such is plainly the sense, which, however, the translators have missed.

⁵ *The public safety.*] Such must be the sense of τοῦ ἐμπάντος, with which the translators have been perplexed.

⁶ *Will they be without giving us some advantage.*] This sense of ἀνωφελεῖς εἶναι, which is required by the context, is not easy to be paralleled out of our author.

⁷ *Nay.*] I agree with Bauer that for ἀλλά τε we should read ἀλλά γε, quin certo.

⁸ *Few great armaments, &c.*] This is, perhaps, as true in modern as it was in antient times, except that since the great improvements in arts and sciences, armaments can go farther from home with less danger. Even now, however, expeditions, I will not say to India, but even across the Atlantic, have usually been disastrous.

suffering defeat unlooked for, grew great by the object professed by the enemy, that 'he was going only against the Athenians.' And that something like this⁹ may happen in our case I am not without hope.

XXXIV. "With confidence, then, let us make our preparations here, and send to the Siculi, in order more to confirm the amity of some, and endeavour to form connections of friendship and alliance with others; let us, too, despatch embassies to the rest of Sicily, apprizing them that the danger is common, and also to Italy, that they may either form an alliance with us, or at least engage not to receive the Athenians. It seems to me, too, advisable to send also to Carthage: for the thing is not unexpected by them; nay, they have been always in fear lest the Athenians should make an attack upon *their* city; so that perhaps, conceiving that if they abandon us they may themselves be in trouble, they may choose, either secretly, or openly, in some way or other, to give us assistance. And they are of all present powers the most *able* to do this¹, if they be but willing; for they are in possession of the most gold and silver, whence war and every other purpose is facilitated. Let us also send to Lacedæmon and Corinth, entreating them to give assistance with all speed, and stir up the war there.

"But what I especially account expedient, and you by your accustomed indolence will least of all heartily be induced to²—nevertheless it shall be spoken.³ If, then, the Siceliot (all

⁹ *Something like this.*] This is certainly modest in Hermocrates; indeed, he could not reasonably reckon on so complete a triumph as his countrymen afterwards obtained.

¹ *Of all present powers, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases, "the richest commonwealth upon earth, and, therefore, ablest to give that kind of assistance which was most desirable, as being most efficacious with least danger;" which is very true, but not the truth expressed by Thucydides. The most effectual assistance they could have was *naval* assistance; for unless the sea were open to the Athenian ships bringing reinforcements and supplies, the army in Sicily could not long exist.

² *Induced to.*] The aposiopesis here (which, however, is unnoticed by the commentators) has a fine effect.

³ *Nevertheless it shall be spoken.*] This has been extensively imitated by other authors; ex. gr. Demosthenes *περί Συμφορ.* p. 11. edit. Allen. *παράδοξον μὲν οἶδα λόγον ὃν μέλλω λέγειν, ὅμως δ' εἰρήσεται.* Dionys. Hal. 390, 25. *ὃ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶ κράτιστον ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις, καὶ οὔτε ἡμεῖς αὐτὸ ἐνεδυμήθητε πω, οὔτε τῶν συμβούλων οὐδεὶς λέγει, τοῦτο προσθεῖς παύσομαι.*

together; if it be thought good, or, if not, a considerable force in conjunction with us), launching the whole of their ships, were to go, with two months' provisions, and meet the Athenians at Taras and Cape Japygia, thus showing them that they must have to fight for the passage across the Ionian gulf, before they combat for Sicily—it would strike them with the utmost terror, and set them on reflecting that we are sallying from ⁴ a friendly country as its defenders (for Taras will receive us), whereas *they* will have a wide extent of sea to traverse, with all their stores and equipments, and, because of the length of the voyage, it will be difficult for them to preserve order, and their line will be a ready object of attack to us, while it is making its way slowly, and can engage with us but by a few at a time.⁵ And if, again, they clear ship ⁶, and bear down upon us with their swift-sailing squadron in more compact order, then, should they take to their oars, we can attack them when wearied, or, if that should seem inexpedient, it is in our power to retire to Taras: while they, making their passage with but slender stores, as for a sea-fight ⁷, will soon be in want of provisions in places that afford no supply, and either, if they remain, will be reduced by starvation ⁸, or, if they attempt to proceed, will leave behind them the rest of their consorts ⁹, and, being ill assured whether the cities will receive them, or not, they will be dis-

The counsel in question was at once bold, and yet judicious, and to a certain degree safe, such in fact as great generals in perilous circumstances choose. This was, perhaps, suggested by the counsel of Themistocles to put to sea, and meet the Persians on their way to Greece.

⁴ *We are sallying from.*] Or, "we have a sally-post in," &c.; ὁρμώμεθα being for ὁρμωτήριον ἔχομεν. Mitford here paraphrases: "we shall go into action with our crews refreshed in a friendly port, and our galleys light."

⁵ *By but a few at a time.*] I here read, with the recent editors, κατ' ὀλίγον. To the passages adduced by Duker may be added Polyæn. 3, 9, 48. ἀπλῆτας ἐκτάξας — κατ' ὀλίγον ἄλλον ἄλλῃ.

On the above sense of προσπίπτοντες see note on 3, 78.

⁶ *Clear ship.*] Namely, for action; as Dio Cass. 628, 81. 817, 31. 227, 8. 315, 98. On the thing itself, see Polyb. 2, 5, 11. 7, 39, 4. 1, 60, 3. and 8. A similar expression occurs in Acts 27, 38. ἐκούφιζον τὸ πλοῖον, where see my note. Here it is contemplated that part of the stores may be thrown overboard.

⁷ *As for a sea-fight.*] i. e. as expecting to fight by the way.

⁸ *Reduced by starvation.*] i. e. be compelled to surrender. Πολιορκεῖντο is for ἐκπολ., which verb is used at 1, 135. and 7, 15.

⁹ *Leave behind them the rest of their consorts.*] i. e. the heavier laden vessels and transports. Here the translators are all in error.

heartened. ✓ Insomuch that (I fancy), daunted by this reflection ¹⁰, they will not even weigh from Corcyra; but either, while they are deliberating, and sending out squadrons of observation, to learn our numbers and position, they will be thrown upon the winter season ¹¹, or else, dismayed at this unexpected resistance, will give up the voyage; especially since (as I learn) the most experienced of their generals has unwillingly undertaken the command, and would be glad to lay hold of any reason for abandoning the measure, if any tolerable show of resistance should be made on our part. ✽ And well I wot ¹² that report will rate us ¹³ at more than our real strength. For indeed the sentiments of men are usually of a colour with what is rumoured, and they stand in greater awe of those who attack first, than such as merely show that they will repel assailants, since *those* they account as an equal match.¹⁴ Which

¹⁰ *Perplexed by this reflection.*] Literally, “hemmed in, excluded from opportunity to act.”

¹¹ *Will be thrown upon the winter season.*] i. e. the season will be protracted till the winter. This substitution of the person for the thing is frequent in all languages. The phrase is imitated by Appian 1, 773. ἔωσθῆναι ἕως χειμῶν ἐπίπεσε. And something like it occurs in Eurip. Cycl. 277. πνεύμασιν θαλασσίους Σὴν γαῖαν ἐωσθέντες ἤκομεν.

¹² *Well I wot.*] This, I think, will not ill represent the force of the εὖ οἶδα ὅτι, which may be more literally rendered, “And report will rate us (that I well know) at,” &c.; for the phrase is usually inserted parenthetically; as Xen. Cyr. 3, 3, 32. διαλεγόμενοι περὶ ἡμῶν, ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι, οὐδὲν παύονται.

¹³ *Report will rate us.*] This sense of ἀγγέλλεσθαι, as used of persons, is somewhat rare. I have, however, noted the following examples:—Eurip. Hec. 591. ἀγγελθεῖσα μοι γυναιὸς. Xenoph. Hist. 6, 4, 21. ὁφθεῖς ἢ ἀγγέλθεις ὅπῃ πορεύοιτο. and 4, 37. ἔλεγεν ὡς ἀγγέλοιτο ὁ Πείσανδρος τετελενηκώς. 6, 4, 16. ζῶντες ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν. Cyr. 5, 3, 15. δ Α. ἐμβάλλειν ἀγγέλλεται. Dionys. Hal. 1, 210. 13. ζῆν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀγγελομένου.

With respect to the ἐπὶ τὸ μῆζον, it has the sense of the Latin *in majus*; as in a kindred passage of Livy, l. 21, 32. “Quâ (scil. famâ) incerta in majus vero ferri solent.” So Dionys. Hal. Ant. 46, 24. ἀγγέλλεται τὰ γινόμενα ἐπὶ τὸ φοβερώτερον. Aristid. 3, 5, 75. ἐπὶ τὸ μῆζον αἰραίν. So also ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον and ἐπὶ μᾶλλον, as Joseph. 673, 13. Hence may be emended an imitation of the present passage in Onosand. p. 67. ult. αἰ γὰρ ὃ μηδεπω τις ἐώρακεν ἐπὶ ζεῖ μῆζον γε, ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐπὶ καὶ τῷ τὸ μέλλοντος φόβῳ τὴν ἐλπίδα μετρεῖ πρὸς τὸ χαλεπώτερον. where for ταῖς ἀληθείαις I would read τῆς ἀληθείας (which emendation is confirmed by Herodian 8, 5, 15. φῆμαι μῆζον, ἐξ ὑποφίας, ἀληθείας ἐδίδοντο); and for ἐπὶ I conjecture ἐπὶ. Hence may be understood the gnome of Æschylus Choeph. 852. πρὸς γυναικῶν δειματούμενοι λόγοι (ex metu effecti) πεδαρσοῖο θρῆσκουσιν, θνήσκοντες μάτην.

¹⁴ *As an equal match.*] Literally, “as equally disposed to face danger.” The word ἰσοκίνδυνος is exceedingly rare; and not even the new edition of

would now be the feeling of the Athenians; for they come against us as persons who will make no resistance, justly condemning us because we did not unite with the Lacedæmonians in destroying their power. Whereas if they see us daring beyond their calculations, they will be more astounded at the unexpectedness of the thing, than at any force we may actually send forth.¹⁵

“Be persuaded, then, above all, to venture on this measure, or, at least, to lose no time in making preparations for the war. And let it be present to the mind of every one, that contempt of invaders is best evinced in energy of *deeds* — well assured that, for the present, to make our preparations, with fear, the safest (as in a time of danger), will turn out the most advisable course.¹⁶ Indeed, the enemy are advancing; — they are, I well know, already on the voyage; — and are all but upon us!”¹⁷

XXXV. Thus spoke Hermocrates: On which the multitude of the Syracusans were at great strife one with another, some maintaining that the Athenians would by no means come, and that the representations of the orator were not true; others exclaiming, “If they do even come, what can they inflict which they will not suffer in return, and to a greater degree?” Others, again, with an utter contempt of the news, turned the whole affair into ridicule. There were, however, a few who believed the account of Hermocrates, and were alarmed for the future.¹

Steph. Thes. gives any other example but the present passage. It occurs, however, twice in Dio Cass. p. 22, 21. and 297, 58. *καὶ ἰσόρροποι ἀλλήλους καὶ ἰσοκίνδυνοι ἐγίγγοντο.*

¹⁵ *Than at any force we may actually send forth.*] Literally, “than by our true force; namely, when they see it.” Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλήθους is a phrase for an adjective.

¹⁶ *Contempt of invaders is, &c.*] The best commentary on this passage is the kindred sentiment at l. 2, 11. *χρή δὲ — τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλείους στρατεύειν τῇ δὲ ἔργῳ, δεδότης παρασκευάζεσθαι.*

¹⁷ *Are all but upon us.*] Such is the sense of the idiomatical phrase ὅσον οὕτω πάρισι, of which, as it has been neglected by the commentators, the following examples may be not unacceptable: — Xen. Hist. 6, 2, 9. Ant. 7, 25. ὅσον οὕτω παρὶς ἦδη. Dionys. Hal. Ant. p. 45, 35. ἐς τὴν μέλλουσαν τε καὶ ὅσον οὕτω παροῦσαν εὐτυχίαν ἀπώσασθαι. Procop. Bell. G. p. 50, 15. ὅσον οὕτω ἀφίξεσθαι. Herodian 1, 13, 5. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον οὐδέπω ἀπολούμεθα.

¹ *And were alarmed for the future.*] As they justly might, when they saw danger so slighted, and so utterly unprepared for.

At length came forward Athenagoras, who was the leader of the democratical party, and at the present had much influence with the multitude, and spoke to the following effect :

XXXVI. "As to the Athenians, indeed, whoever does not *wish* them to counsel so ill, and, by coming hither, fall a prey into our hands, is either a coward, or disaffected to the state.¹ But as to those who tell such terrific stories, and throw you into consternation², I wonder not at their audacity, but am amazed at their folly, if they fancy that their views shall escape detection.³ As to the fearful, they, on their part, wish to throw the city into consternation, in order that they may overshadow⁴ their own terror under the common fear.

"Now this is the very scope of these reports ; which have not started up by chance⁵, but been manufactured⁶ by men who are ever working such mischief. As to yourselves, if ye consult wisely, ye will consider, and form your conjecture of probabilities *not* from what *they* tell you, but from what men long-

¹ *Is either a coward or disaffected to the state.*] This is an oratorical mode of expression, similar to that of Diodotus l. 3, 42. *ὅστις διαμάχεται — ἢ ἀξύνετος ἐστίν, ἢ ἰδία τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει.*

² *Consternation.*] *Περίφοβος* is a very strong term, occurring also in Xen. Anab. 3, 1, 9., &c. Dionys. Hal. 429, 23. 163, 31. Aristid. 1, 256.

³ *If they fancy that their views shall not escape detection.*] Literally, "if they think they shall not be seen through.

⁴ *Overshadow.*] The sense of *ἐπηλυγάζεσθαι* has been well illustrated by Duker, who gives examples from Aristotle, Diog. Laert., Synesius, and the Greek lexicographers. It may be added that the passage is imitated by Dexippus ap. Corp. Hist. Byz. t. 1. p. 11. D. *ὅπως ἂν τὸ σφέτερον δῖος ἐπηλυγάζεσθαι.* The word also occurs in Agath. p. 49. *Ælian Hist. An.* 1, 41. and in the Schol. on Pind. Pyth. 138. *ἡ παρδαλία — ἔσκεπε καὶ ἀπήλυγε*, I conjecture *ἐπήλυγε*.

As to the noun *ἡλύγη*, which Duker could only find in the Greek lexicographers, it occurs in Aristoph. Acharn. 682. *τῆς δίκης τὴν ἡλύγην.* Also *λύγη* occurs in Appian 1, 864. And I would restore it in a corrupt passage of Lucian, t. 3, 122, 46. *ἢ πρὸ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ σκότους, μηκέτι μὴ τολμήσεις τοιοῦτο μῆδεν*, where the critics could think of nothing better than *ἐργων* for *λόγων*. The true reading is, beyond all doubt, *λυγῶν*, and the sense may be thus expressed: "Certainly before dusk, yea, even before dark, you will no longer venture any thing of that kind."

⁵ *Have not started up by chance.*] Or, as it were, of themselves. This passage seems to have been in the mind of *Æschin.* C. Tim. p. 18, 8. *ὑψενόης τις ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου πλανᾶται φήμη κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ διαγγέλλει, κ. τ. λ.* He thus defines *φήμη* at p. 47, 23. *φήμη ἐστὶν ὅταν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτόματον ἐν μηδεμιᾷς προφάσειως λίγη τινα ὥς γεγεννημένη πράξιν.*

⁶ *Manufactured.*] Literally, "put together."

headed, and experienced stagers⁷ (as I reckon the Athenians to be) would be likely to do. For very improbable it is that they would leave the Peloponnesians at their backs, and, though they have not yet thoroughly disposed of the war there, voluntarily enter upon another of not less consequence. No; they are, I trow, well content that we, states so many and potent, do not invade *them*.

XXXVII. "But indeed should they come (as these men tell us), I am of opinion that Sicily will be more able to carry the war through⁸ than Peloponnesus, inasmuch as it is in all respects better provided with resources; and I hold that our own city itself is far an overmatch for the armament now (as they say) coming, nay, and for one twice as great, should it arrive. Sure I am that the enemy can at least bring no horses with them, nor procure any here, except some few from the Egæstæans; nor can they transport a force of heavy infantry equal to ours on board ships: for it were an arduous affair for them to accomplish so long a voyage as this, even with light ships⁹, and such other equipments as would be necessary against such a city as this, and which could not be small.

"So far, then, am I from seeing danger, that methinks, though they had another city as great as Syracuse, and carried on the war from an adjacent one, they would scarcely escape utter destruction; much less, then, in Sicily, entirely hostile and in combination as it will be; with an army, too, placed in perpetual dependence on their fleet, cooped up in paltry huts, and

⁷ *Long-headed, and experienced stagers.*] As the terms of this oration are not meant to convey *praise*, therefore the version here of Smith, "wise and enlightened," seems ill judged. Assuredly the terms in question are sometimes employed in *sensu deteriori*; as in Isocrates Panath. § 90. ἀνδρά δεινὸν καὶ πολλῶν ἐμπειρον. Herod. 5, 23, 10. ἀνδρὶ δεινῷ τε καὶ σοφῷ. Plut. Coriol. 27, 1. ἀνὴρ δεινὸς καὶ τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ τολμᾷ περιττός. On the sense of δεινός, see Wolf, on Liban. Epist. 277. With the πολλῶν ἐμπειρος may be compared Xenoph. Cyr. 8, 7, 5. Thiem. τῶν πλειόνων ἐμπείρω; and Lucian 1, 10. ἀπάντων ἐμπειρον; also the κακῶν ἐμπειρος restored at Æschyl. Pers. 604. by Dr. Blomfield. The above passages are adduced, chiefly to show how unnecessary is the conjecture of Lennep, mentioned by Goeller.

⁸ *Carry the war through.*] i. e. bring it to a successful conclusion. See 8, 14 and 25.

⁹ *It were an arduous, &c.*] Nothing can be a stronger proof of the inferiority of the ancients to the moderns in nautical skill than such an assertion as this.

with make-shiftly¹⁰ equipments and supplies, and not able to go far, for fear of our cavalry. In short, so superior do I account our force, that I think they would not even effect a landing, or secure a post.

XXXVIII. "But of all this the Athenians are so well aware, that they (sure I am) will mind their own affairs; and our men here are setting abroad² stories which are not and cannot be true³; men who, I know, are not now for the first time, but have been continually aiming, either with such words as these, or yet baser fictions than these, or else by actions⁴, to throw the common people into alarm⁵, and thus themselves rule over the city. And much I fear lest, after long attempting, they may at last succeed⁶ in their purposes, and we be too sluggish and pusillanimous to foreguard, or, on perceiving the mischief, to remedy it before we are suffering under the consequences. From this cause, indeed, it is that our country is seldom quiet, but takes up multiplied factions and quarrels, not so much against the enemy, as within itself, and at times falls under tyranny and unjust domination.⁷ Of these I will endeavour,

¹⁰ *Make-shiftly.*] Such (to use a colloquial expression) is the true sense of ἀναγκαίως.

¹ *Mind their own affairs.*] And not attempt to meddle with ours.

² *Setting abroad stories.*] The word λογοποιέω is used by Josephus frequently, by Dio Cass., Dinarchus, Polyænus. It implies falsehood. So Hesych. λογοποιήσαντες. πλάσσαντες λόγους ψευδείς; and Theophrastus Char. Eth. περί λογοποιίας. ἡ δὲ λογοποιία ἐστὶ σύνθεσις ψευδῶν λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων, ὧν βούλεται ὁ λογοποιῶν. The punishment for this was very heavy; namely, to be broken on the wheel, as appears from Plutarch Nic. 1, 542.

³ *Which are not and cannot be true.*] Literally, which neither have nor can have any existence in truth. So Eurip. frag. incert. 132. πᾶς τις ἤδεσται λέγων τὰ ἔδντα καὶ μὴ. Lucian 3, 19. οὔτε ὄντος τινός, οὔτε γενομένου πότε. Xenoph. Hist. 1, 1, 51. δόξας τὰ ὄντα λέγειν. et Anab. 4, 4, 15. οὗτος ἰδὼκει πολλὰ ἤδη ἀληθεύσαι, τοιαῦτα τὰ ὄντα τε ὡς ὄντα, καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ὄντα. In the same sense, too, γίνεσθαι is used.

⁴ *By actions.*] i. e. by deeds of seditious tendency.

⁵ *Throw the common people into alarm.*] The very mode, in all ages and countries, of working upon the multitude, who, being governed by passion rather than reason, are, like instruments, played upon by every artful agitator.

⁶ *And much I fear lest, &c.*] For as Theocritus says, Idyl. 15, 62. ἱς Τροίαν περὶ ὤμενοι ἦλθον Ἀχαιοί — πείρα δὲν πάντα τελείναι.

⁷ *Tyranny and unjust domination.*] By the former of these expressions there seems a reference to the government of Gelon and others; and by the latter, to the occasional predominance of aristocracy, which appears to have prevailed when the last pacification of Sicily was effected, under Hermo-

if at least you be disposed to support me, to permit none to arise among us, and that by bringing *you the many* to my opinion, and by punishing the authors of such machinations, —not only when caught in the fact (for hard it were to catch them), but for what they meditate, but cannot accomplish. For it behoves us to anticipate vengeance on our foe not for what he *effects* only, but for his very *intention*; for if a man use not this foreguard, he will suffer *first*. On the other hand, with *you the few*⁸ I shall deal partly by convicting, partly by watching, and partly by admonishing you.⁹ For thus, I conceive, may such most effectually be deterred from their malpractices.

“ And now (what has often occupied my reflections) what is it, young men, that you would have? Is it to bear rule at present? But that is not permitted by law. And the law was promulgated from your not having the requisite ability, rather than to disgrace you being competent.¹⁰ Well, then, is it that you should not be put on an equal footing with the multitude? But how can it be just that the same fellow-men should not be thought worthy of the same privileges?¹¹

crates; but since that time to have been displaced, or, at least, its power clogged, by the formidable increase of democratical influence.

⁸ *You the few.*] i. e. those of the aristocratical or oligarchical party.

⁹ *I shall deal partly by convicting, &c.*] Athenagoras is here speaking rather of the course he intends to adopt respecting the party in question, than that which he is now going to pursue; for thus *φύλασσω* would have no sense. Smith and others have therefore missed the scope of the passage.

¹⁰ *And the law was promulgated, &c.*] By this it should seem that a law had been enacted during the last ascendancy of the democratical party, limiting the age at which any should be eligible to state offices. And it appears by these words that the young men of the higher ranks conceived the law to have been levelled against *them*, as, indeed, it doubtless was; there, perhaps, happening to be a considerable number of young men of talent and spirit, of the higher ranks, who would otherwise have aspired to the offices of the state. This law, then, the orator now justifies, but in a manner which would be little satisfactory or palatable to the persons in question. It is plain, however, that, though the democratical party bore the sway, yet the state offices were still left to be filled by the privileged classes.

¹¹ *But how can it be just, &c.*] Such is certainly the sense; and the *τῶν ἀνδρῶν* is equivalent to *τῶν*. Here we have the common argument so perpetually harped upon by democrats of every age, the “*natural equality of men*, and the *naturally equal rights of men*,” who forget that there is little natural equality at all; and what there is, is materially changed by circumstances. My learned and reflecting readers will not be indifferent to

XXXIX. "But you will urge that democracy is a state repugnant both to wisdom and equity, but that those who have wealth are the fittest to govern well. I, however, aver, first, that democracy is the name of the whole, but oligarchy of a part¹; and then, that, though the rich are the best guardians of the treasury², persons of ability make the best counsellors³, and that *the multitude*, on hearing what is urged, are the best to decide. Now in a democracy, all these, both conjointly and severally, have an equal share of privileges.⁴ But oligarchy imparts an equal share of *dangers* to the many, while of the *advantages* it not only holds a greater portion, but takes away and keeps the whole. Now this is what the rich and the young among you zealously promote; a thing impossible to be attained in a great city. But even yet now, O ye greatest of dolts! unless ye know that ye are contriving evil, ye are either the most ignorant I know of Grecians, or the most wicked if, knowing it, ye dare persist in your practices.

XL. "Now, then, either informing yourselves better, or changing your purposes, strive to promote with all the common prosperity of the state; assured of this, that the good among you will have an equal, nay a greater share than the multitude of the city; but that if ye aim at aught further, there may be danger of being deprived of the whole. With such sort of stories, then, have done, as being told to those who perceive and will not permit your designs. For this city, even should

the strong sense and perfect truth of the following observation of the Stagirite (Polit. 5, 3.) στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ πολλοί, ὥς ἀδικούμενοι, ὅτι οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἰσῶν, ἴσοι ὄντες. ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ γνώριμοι, ὅτι μετέχουσι τῶν ἰσῶν, οὐκ ἴσοι ὄντες. How would this mighty master in the theory of politics have admired a constitution like our own, which unites the benefits, and avoids the peculiar defects, inherent both in democracy and oligarchy.

¹ *That democracy is, &c.*] So Herod. 3, 80. πλῆθος δὲ ἀρχον — ὄνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει ἰσονομίην.

² *The rich are the best guardians of the treasury.*] See Dionys. Hal. Ant. 223, 10. and Isocrat. Areop. § 10. p. 224. et Panath. § 52.

³ *Persons of ability make the best counsellors.*] There is something very similar in Herod. 1, 3, 80. ἀρίστων δὲ ἀνδρῶν εἶκος ἀρίστα βουλευμάτα γίνεσθαι.

⁴ *Have an equal share of privileges.*] So Dio Cass. 388, 14. Δημοκρατία γὰρ ὄνομα εὐσχημον ἔχει, καὶ τινα ἰσομοίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῆς ἰσονομίας φέρειν δοκεῖ. See also Aristot. 1, 389. A.

the Athenians come, will repel them in a manner worthy of itself, and we have generals who will look to such matters. And if aught of your story be true, which I think is not the case, it will not be terrified at your reports, nor, by choosing you for rulers, put its neck voluntarily into the yoke of servitude, but will of itself consider and judge the *words* that come from you as *works*, and will not, by hearkening to your counsels, be deprived of the liberty it possesses; but by keeping actual guard of you, will endeavour to frustrate the execution of your purposes."

XLI. Thus spoke Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals arose, and would not suffer any other orator to come forward, but himself spoke respecting the present points to the following effect¹:

"Criminations such as these it is neither decorous in any to vent against each other, nor prudent² in the hearers to listen to, but rather, from what is reported, to consider how we may be prepared, both individually and collectively, to repel the invaders. And if, indeed, our care should prove unnecessary, there can be no harm that the public should be furnished with horses and arms, and the other requisites for war.³ As to the care and inspection of this affair, we will look to it, and moreover contrive for the sending round to the cities, both for observation of the state of things, and to provide for what may seem necessary. Part of these matters we have already

¹ *Whereupon one of the generals arose and, &c.*] Mitford is wrong in saying that the general interrupted Athenagoras, who, it is clear, concluded his speech. Only the general, to stop the attempt to excite popular passion, would not suffer another to rise. He, there is no doubt, was one of the aristocratical party.

² *Decorous in, &c., nor prudent, &c.*] There seems to be a *dialogia* in σοφὸν, which is used in two significations in the two different clauses of the sentence.

³ *Other requisites for war.*] Smith is here unusually literal, rendering, "other habitments which are the glory of war." But the expression (as is shown by the Scholiast) is a mere phrase (somewhat too bold and poetical, indeed), signifying ὡν χρεῖται. Thus Duker might here have spared his discussion on the comparative merits of ἀγάλλεσθαι and λαμπρόνισθαι.

The passage, it may be observed, is almost copied by Isidor. Epist. 2, 146. Our present Scholiast plainly appears to have lived before him; which may serve to prove the antiquity of this commentator.

taken care of, and whatever information we receive, we shall report to you."

On the general having thus spoken, the Syracusans broke up the assembly.⁴

XLII. As to the Athenians and their allies, they were all now at Corcyra.⁵ And first the commanders made a further review⁶ of the armament, and formed dispositions and arrangements as to the order and mode in which they should both take up their anchorage, and form their encampments; and having divided the forces into three parts⁷, they cast lots that each should have one.⁸ This they did in order that they might not, by sailing together⁹, be in want of water, harbourage, or necessaries at the places where they touched; and

⁴ *Broke up the assembly.*] i. e. departed. Hobbes wrongly renders, "dissolved the assembly;" for that was the office of the general, who had virtually done this by permitting no more speeches to be delivered, nor the question to be put to vote.

Of these generals (or prætors) there were fifteen; whose duties were, doubtless, the very same as those of the state generals of Athens.

⁵ *Were all now at Corcyra.*] It should seem, then, that the plan proposed by Hermocrates was impracticable; for the Athenians would probably have reached the coast of Italy before the Syracusans could have been there to hinder them.

⁶ *Further review.*] Notwithstanding that some MSS. have ἐπ' ἐξέτασιν, doubtless ἐπεξετάσιν is the right reading. The word is of the same form with ἐπεξεργασία. But the translators are wrong in affirming its sense to be the same as that of the simple ἐξέτασις. The ἐπ denotes what is done further. There had, it seems, been a review at Piræus previous to the departure; and now there was a further one at Corcyra, after all the allied forces had joined.

⁷ *And having divided the forces into three parts.*] Polyænus, 1, 40, 4. ascribes this measure to Alcibiades; only, perhaps, because he was in the chief command (for such he was, notwithstanding that Mitford all along supposes Nicias to have been the commander-in-chief).

⁸ *Cast lots that each should have one.*] I have here followed the emendation of Valcknaer and Reiske, and the reading of Valla, ἐν, which has been received by all the recent editors. Yet the common reading may very well be defended as to the sense. They cast lots on each of the divisions separately, namely, whose it should be. Such was the custom in casting lots, as appears from Polyb. 6, 20, 20. κληροῦσι (scil. Tribuni) τὰς φυλάς κατὰ μίαν, καὶ προσκαλοῦνται τὴν αἰ λαχοῦσαν. And so I understand St. Mark, 15, 24. βάλλοντες κλήρον ἐπ' αὐτὰ, τίς τι ἀρῇ. Yet as ἐν is the more difficult reading, so it is probably the true one. There is here a blending of two phrases.

⁹ *Sailing together.*] Here again I adopt, with the late editors, the reading of Valla, ἅμα πλείοντες. And I would add, that such seems to have been read by Polyænus ubi supra.

that in other respects they might be in better order, and more easy to govern, being ranged into squadrons each under a separate commander.

They then sent forward three ships to Italy and Sicily, to learn which of the cities would receive them ¹⁰, with orders to meet them before they made the opposite coast, that they might know where to touch.

XLIII. This done, the Athenians now weighed from Corcyra with the grand armament, and proceeded to make their passage to Sicily, with, in all, one hundred and thirty-four triremes, and two Rhodian fifty-oared barks ¹, (of which one hundred were Athenian, whereof sixty were swift-sailing vessels, the remainder such as conveyed the troops ²). The rest of the navy was composed of the Chians and the other allies, with heavy infantry, in all amounting to five thousand one hundred (of which one thousand five hundred were Athenians of the regular lists ³, and seven hundred Thetes (or marines ⁴):

¹⁰ *To learn which of the cities would receive them.*] Mitford ascribes the ignorance in this respect, which argued a deficiency in preparatory measures, to the rash precipitation of one party, and the opposition which perplexed and hampered the other.

¹ *One hundred and thirty-four triremes, and two Rhodian fifty-oared barks.*] Plutarch. Alcib. c. 20. reckons them at something short of one hundred and forty; and Diodorus, 12, 84., at one hundred and thirty. But I suspect that for M should there be read A. The error seems to have arisen from the M^{en} following.

² *Sixty were swift sailing, &c.*] Smith ill renders, "sixty were tight ships fit for service; the rest were transports for the soldiery." Thucydides says nothing about their tightness, or fitness for service. No doubt all that went were such. And, as to *transports*, if the forty last mentioned were only *such*, how could the one hundred be made up? This as well as many other blunders that translator would have avoided, simply by consulting the Scholiast, who briefly makes all clear by thus mentioning the different kinds of vessels which composed the fleet: *τριηρεῖς ταχέας, τριηρεῖς στρατιωτικῆς, πεντηκόντοροι, ἱππαγωγοί, πλοῖα, ὀλκάδες*. Of these last two the *πλοῖα* were *barges* attendant on the triremes; the *ὀλκάδες* (which Mr. Mitford oddly calls *holcads*, though the word is in fact the same as our *hulk*) were vessels of burden, transports loaded with provisions, stores, &c.

³ *Athenians of the regular lists.*] Namely, of the census. Goeller here refers to Krueger on Dionys. p. 109., Hemsterhusius on Lucian, t. 1. p. 425, Schneider on Aristot. Polit. 5, 2, 8., Sturz. lexic. Xenoph. t. 2. p. 688., and Boeckh. l. 1. t. 2. p. 35.

⁴ *Seven hundred marines.*] Such is the exact sense of *ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν*. These, as plainly appears from the passages cited by Duker and Goeller, exactly corresponded to our marines. They were not *sailors*, but only *soldiers* who served on board ship. To the passages cited by that com-

the rest who served were of the confederates, some of whom were of the subject allies⁵, and of the others, the Argives five

mentator, to prove the distinction, I add the following:—Xen. Hist. 7, 1, 3. Polyb. 1, 51, 2. 1, 160, 30. and 1, 61, 3. Arrian E. A. 2, 17, 6. and 22, 7., and especially Herod. 7, 184. *ἐπιβάτεον δὲ*. Æschyl. Pers. 385. Herod. 6, 12. *ὅπως τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ὀπλίσειε*, "might keep them to the exercise of their arms." Herodotus (who *elsewhere* mentions the Epibates) at 6, 15, 6., shows the *place* assigned to them in a trireme, and the usual number on board.

⁵ *Some of whom were of the subject allies.*] How many Thucydides does not say. And, indeed, his whole account is any thing but perspicuous; and, therefore, it is no wonder that it should have been (as it has) misunderstood, nay, even, I conceive, by Wesseling on Diod. Sic. t. 1, 543., who, deceived, it should seem, by Diodorus, writes, "universam gravem levemque armaturam, tum civium tum sociorum multitudinem vii mill. paulo ampliorem fuisse." For my own part, after close and repeated examinations of the passage, I must be of opinion that the whole number of the infantry *here mentioned* was six thousand four hundred, and of horse thirty. My view of the sense is confirmed by Plutarch Alcib. c. 20., who, obviously following Thucydides, certainly took the passage in the same manner. His words are these: *ἀνέχθη* (scil. Alcibiades) *μετὰ συστρατήγων, ἔχων τριήρεις — ὀπλίτας δὲ πεντεκισχιλίους καὶ ἑκατὸν, τόξοντας δὲ καὶ σφενδόνητας καὶ ψίλους περὶ τριακοσίους καὶ χιλίους. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀξιόλογον*. As to the accusation of error brought against Plutarch by Wasse, it is unfounded. That learned commentator seems to have read this passage of Thucydides somewhat negligently, and was led into error by Diodorus, or rather corrupt MSS. of that historian. For he *intended*, I conceive, as usual, to follow Thucydides. But the equivocal kind of reckoning adopted deceived him, as, indeed, it has done almost all, with the exception of Plutarch. To avoid error, it is proper to regard the words *καὶ τούτων — διακόσιοι* as parenthetical, and explanatory of the sort of forces whereof the five thousand one hundred heavy-armed was composed. For want of attending to which, Diodorus, with many others, falls into the error of reckoning part of the troops twice over, namely, the Argive and Mantinanæan quotas.

Diodorus, then, *meant* (according to the above mentioned error) to put down the whole number at somewhat more than seven thousand; but I suspect besides that his text is corrupt. At l. 62. there seems to be wanting the article, to be put after *καὶ*; and then *οἱ τῶν ἐυμαχῶν* seems to stand for *οἱ ἐυμαχοί*, and a comma should be placed after *ἐυμαχῶν*.

The real number, then, of heavy-armed and regular-armed, mentioned by Thucydides, is as follows:—

Heavy-armed Athenian	-	-	-	2200
Ditto of the allies	-	-	-	2900
Archers, Athenian	-	-	-	400
Ditto, Cretan	-	-	-	80
Slingers, Rhodian	-	-	-	700
Regular light-armed, Megarean	-	-	-	120
Horse, Athenian	-	-	-	50
				6450

Now Plutarch's calculation comes to the same number, putting aside the thirty horse; for he is only reckoning *infantry*. It may, however, be

that in other respects they might be in better order, and more easy to govern, being ranged into squadrons each under a separate commander.

They then sent forward three ships to Italy and Sicily, to learn which of the cities would receive them¹⁰, with orders to meet them before they made the opposite coast, that they might know where to touch.

XLIII. This done, the Athenians now weighed from Corcyra with the grand armament, and proceeded to make their passage to Sicily, with, in all, one hundred and thirty-four triremes, and two Rhodian fifty-oared barks¹, (of which one hundred were Athenian, whereof sixty were swift-sailing vessels, the remainder such as conveyed the troops²). The rest of the navy was composed of the Chians and the other allies, with heavy infantry, in all amounting to five thousand one hundred (of which one thousand five hundred were Athenians of the regular lists³, and seven hundred Thetes (or marines⁴):

¹⁰ *To learn which of the cities would receive them.*] Mitford ascribes the ignorance in this respect, which argued a deficiency in preparatory measures, to the rash precipitation of one party, and the opposition which perplexed and hampered the other.

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⁴ *Seven hundred marines.*] Such is the exact sense of *ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν*. These, as plainly appears from the passages cited by Duker and Goeller, exactly corresponded to our marines. They were not *sailors*, but only *soldiers* who served on board ship. To the passages cited by that com-

the rest who served were of the confederates, some of whom were of the subject allies ⁵, and of the others, the Argives five

mentator, to prove the distinction, I add the following:—Xen. Hist. 7, 1, 3. Polyb. 1, 51, 2. 1, 160, 30. and 1, 61, 3. Arrian E. A. 2, 17, 6. and 22, 7., and especially Herod. 7, 184. *ἐπιβάτεινον δὲ*. Æschyl. Pers. 385. Herod. 6, 12. *ὅπως τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ὀπλίσει*, “might keep them to the exercise of their arms.” Herodotus (who *elsewhere* mentions the Epibates) at 6, 15, 6., shows the *place* assigned to them in a trireme, and the usual number on board.

⁵ *Some of whom were of the subject allies.*] How many Thucydides does not say. And, indeed, his whole account is any thing but perspicuous; and, therefore, it is no wonder that it should have been (as it has) misunderstood, nay, even, I conceive, by Wesseling on Diod. Sic. t. 1, 543., who, deceived, it should seem, by Diodorus, writes, “universam gravem levemque armaturam, tum civium tum sociorum multitudinem vii mill. paulo ampliorem fuisse.” For my own part, after close and repeated examinations of the passage, I must be of opinion that the whole number of the infantry *here mentioned* was six thousand four hundred, and of horse thirty. My view of the sense is confirmed by Plutarch Alcib. c. 20., who, obviously following Thucydides, certainly took the passage in the same manner. His words are these: *ἀνήχθη* (scil. Alcibiades) *μετὰ συστρατήγων, ἔχων τριήρεις — ὀπλίτας δὲ πεντεκισχιλίους καὶ ἑκατὸν, τόξοτας δὲ καὶ σφενδόνητας καὶ ψιλοὺς περὶ τριακοσίους καὶ χιλίους. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀξιόλογον*. As to the accusation of error brought against Plutarch by Wasse, it is unfounded. That learned commentator seems to have read this passage of Thucydides somewhat negligently, and was led into error by Diodorus, or rather corrupt MSS. of that historian. For he *intended*, I conceive, as usual, to follow Thucydides. But the equivocal kind of reckoning adopted deceived him, as, indeed, it has done almost all, with the exception of Plutarch. To avoid error, it is proper to regard the words *καὶ τούτων — διακόσμοι* as parenthetical, and explanatory of the sort of forces whereof the five thousand one hundred heavy-armed was composed. For want of attending to which, Diodorus, with many others, falls into the error of reckoning part of the troops twice over, namely, the Argive and Mantineaean quotas.

Diodorus, then, *meant* (according to the above mentioned error) to put down the whole number at somewhat more than seven thousand; but I suspect besides that his text is corrupt. At l. 62. there seems to be wanting the article, to be put after *καὶ*; and then *οἱ τῶν ἐυμαχῶν* seems to stand for *οἱ ἐυμαχοί*, and a comma should be placed after *ἐυμαχῶν*.

The real number, then, of heavy-armed and regular-armed, mentioned by Thucydides, is as follows:—

Heavy-armed Athenian	-	-	-	2200
Ditto of the allies	-	-	-	2900
Archers, Athenian	-	-	-	400
Ditto, Cretan	-	-	-	80
Slingers, Rhodian	-	-	-	700
Regular light-armed, Megarean	-	-	-	120
Horse, Athenian	-	-	-	50
				<hr/>
				6450

Now Plutarch's calculation comes to the same number, putting aside the thirty horse; for he is only reckoning *infantry*. It may, however, be

hundred, and the Mantinæans and mercenaries two hundred and fifty), with archers, in all four hundred and eighty (whereof eighty were Rhodian), and slingers of the Rhodians seven hundred, and Megaræan light-armed (exiles) one hundred and twenty, and one horse-boat carrying thirty cavalry.

XLIV. Such was the amount of the armament which at first passed over to the war. But besides these there were thirty corn hulks, as transports, laden with necessities, having on board the bread-makers, and also stone-cutters ¹ and artisans ², with such tools as were necessary for walling; also one hundred barges, which had been impressed, and sailed with the hulks.³

There were, too, many other barges and hulks which accompanied the armament voluntarily, for trading purposes.⁴

All these, then, crossed together the Ionic gulf, and the whole armament having made the coast at the promontory of Japygia and Taras, as each was able ⁵, coasted along the shore

asked, was then 6430 the whole amount of the land forces taken out in the first expedition to Sicily? Thucydides, describing the state of the Athenians when about to leave Syracuse after their last fatal defeat, speaks of the total number as about 40,000. That, however, included both soldiers and sailors, and supernumeraries of every kind, sutlers, camp-followers, and perhaps women. I am therefore of opinion that the above was the whole number; for, though targeteers, and other irregular light-armed, were sometimes taken out for expeditions near at home, yet as this was so distant, and the means of conveyance not very easy, none, it seems, were employed. It was, perhaps, that their place might be supplied by Italian auxiliaries or barbarian mercenaries enlisted by the way.

¹ *Stone-cutters.*] Literally, stone-layers (as we say *brick-layers*).

² *Artisans.*] I am induced to adopt this general name, because I suspect that *τέκτων* was often used in that manner; just as our word *wright* signified formerly an artisan, but afterwards a *carpenter*. Our translators here, as on a former occasion, render the word "carpenters;" but (as I have before observed) it is difficult to conceive what carpenters could have to do with *building walls*. *Smiths*, we know, were used for such a purpose. Yet carpenters, too, might be taken; for walls of circumvallation were sometimes partly formed of wooden framework.

³ *Hulks.*] These (just before called corn-hulks) were of a very large burthen, and of a square or roundish form, something like Chinese junks, or Dutch Indiamen.

⁴ *For trading purposes.*] Mitford well paraphrases this, "for the sake of profit from the market of so large an armament." Probably, too, several would go for a trading voyage to Italy or Sicily, under so powerful a convoy.

⁵ *As each was able.*] At *ἐνπόρῃσαν* subaud τοῦ ἐπλοεῖν. See note on Acts 11, 29.

of Italy, the cities not⁶ receiving them either into port, or granting them supplies⁷, but only anchorage and water, and Taras and Locri not even that, until they arrived at Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. And here they were now collected together, and formed a camp outside of the city (for the townsmen would not admit them within), in the temple of Diana (where a market was granted them), and having drawn their ships on shore, they lay quiet. And now they entered into conferences with the Rhegines, requesting them, as Chalcidæans, to aid the Leontines, who were also Chalcidæans. But they declared that they would be of neither party; however, what should seem good to the rest of the Italians, *that* they would do. So the Athenians took consideration on the state of Sicily, and deliberated in what manner they should best manage affairs. They also waited for the return of the three ships sent before⁸ to Ægesta, wishing to have some intelligence respecting the money, whether there were what the ambassadors at Athens reported.

XLV. Meanwhile the Syracusans had from various quarters and from their spies received intelligence that "the fleet is now at Rhegium." Under these circumstances¹, then, they

⁶ *The cities not, &c.*] Diodorus is here more circumstantial. His only variation from the account of Thucydides is, that "they were received very kindly by the Thracians;" which, from what we know of the place and its after history, seems very probable.

⁷ *Granting them supplies.*] Literally, a market for supplies.

⁸ *The three ships sent before.*] It seems that the three ships before sent forward to procure intelligence on the Italian coast, were, after its arrival, sent off to Ægesta. I cannot think with Goeller that these were *lembi*, for such would have had no force to be depended on; but rather three of the swiftest-sailing *triremes* of the fleet, which might thus escape the Syracusan fleet, should it be at sea.

The word *πρόπλους*, it may be observed, occurs in Dio Cass. 610, 55. Appian 2, 824, 73. and 827, 27. It is strange that the most recent editors on Xen. Hist. should, on the conjecture of Brødæus, have altered *πρόπλους* (the reading of the old editions and MSS.) to *πρωτόπλους*. Sometimes the word *πρόπλους* is used substantively, as in Appian 2, 858, 48. *ἐπὶ τοῦ πρόπλου*, where Schneider ill renders "ad navigationem parata." Rather "*parata ut præmitteretur*."

¹ *Under these circumstances.*] Or the sense may be, "made all preparation that circumstances would permit."

with united counsels ² made preparations, and were no longer incredulous. They also sent round to the Siculi — to some, guards to hold them in fidelity ³, to others ambassadors. To the Peripolia ⁴ [or militia forts] in their territory they introduced garrisons, examining also into the state of things in the city, by a review of arms ⁵ and horses, to see whether they were effective, and making all other dispositions as for speedy and all but present war.

XLVI. And now the three ships sent forward to Eggesta arrived from thence to the Athenians at Rhegium with the intelligence that the rest of the money which they promised was not forthcoming, but only thirty talents were to be found. At

² *With united counsels.*] Such seems to be the sense, which has been mistaken by the translators.

³ *Guards to hold them in fidelity.*] These were the tributary Siculi before mentioned.

⁴ *Peripolia.*] The common reading and that of many MSS. is *περίπολια*, which Duker professes he does not understand, and the Scholiast has in vain attempted to explain. Other MSS. have *περιπόλια*, which is approved by Duker, and received by all the recent editors. And in support of this, Duker refers to the words of Pollux, which are as follows: *ἐν δὲ τοῖς προαστείουσιν καὶ τὰ περιπόλια εἶη ἂν, εἰ μὴ χωρίον ὄνομα αὐτὸ νοοῖμον παρὰ Θουκυδίδῃ ὅταν φῇ, ἐν περιπολίῳ τισὶν ἐλήφθη.* But the words *ἐν περιπολίῳ τισὶν ἐλήφθη* there mentioned do not occur in Thucydides. This, indeed, Duker imputes to *negligence* in the lexicographer. I am, however, rather inclined to consider the passage corrupt. I conjecture that Pollux wrote *παρὰ Θουκυδίδῃ, καὶ παρὰ Ὑπερίδῃ ὅταν φῇ, &c.* The *καὶ παρὰ Ὑπερίδῃ* might very easily be omitted *per homœoteleuton*. *

It is evident that the lexicographer had reference to this passage of Thucydides; but it seems that his mind was divided between two opinions. 1. That *περιπόλια* might signify *suburbana loca*; 2. that it might be a *proper name* (in which case, perhaps, he would read *Περίπολια*). But, in fact, the word signifies a guard-fort garrisoned by *περίπολοι* or *patroles*; and so it is explained by the Schol. Cassel. This, too, is confirmed by a kindred passage of Dionys. Hal. 1, 612, 2. *καὶ μετ' οὐ πολὺ τῶν περιπολίῳ τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταλήφθην ἱκαίετο.* for so the passage is to be understood, as appears from the words following, *οἱ δὲ, διαπάσαντες καὶ κατακάσαντες τὸ φρούριον ἀπήσαν.*

⁵ *Review of arms.*] Or, perhaps, heavy-armed, *ὅπλων* for *ὀπλιτῶν*. So Xen. Anab. 5, 3, 3. *ἰξέτασις ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις.*

* So in a passage of Suidas, in *ἀντὶ τοῦ παραχρήμα, Θουκυδίδης. [καὶ Ὑπερίδης] χειμῶν.* The passage of Thucydides referred to by Suidas is l. 1, 141. *init. ἀντὶ δὲ νῦν δὴ διασηδῆτε ἢ ὀπακοῦεν ἢ, κ. τ. λ.* Also in a passage of the Etymol. *ἐμποδὼν Θουκυδίδης, ἀντὶ τοῦ προχείρους,* I suspect ought to be read, *ἐμποδὼν Θουκυδίδης, ἀντὶ τοῦ [ἐναντίων καὶ Ὑπερίδης] ἀντὶ τοῦ προχείρους, φῆσι γάρ.*

this the commanders were presently much dispirited, since this *first* circumstance had crossed their hopes¹, and the Rhegines, whom they had before begun to prevail upon (as it was likely they would, being connected by blood with the Leontines, and even attached to the Athenian cause), now were unwilling to join the armament. As to Nicias, the disappointment at Egesta was by him expected; to the rest it was less looked for.² The Egestæans, indeed, had, when the first ambassadors of the Athenians went to them to examine the state of their funds, devised the following trick.³ They took them into the temple of Venus at Eryx, and showed the offerings, as goblets and flagons, censers, and other furniture in no small quantity, which, being of silver, afforded a very great show with but little comparative value. And on giving hospitable entertainments to those of the trireme⁴, they collected cups, both gold and silver, from Egesta itself, and borrowed⁵ others from the neighbouring cities, both Phœnician and Grecian⁶, and each brought them to the entertain-

¹ *This first circumstance had crossed their hopes.*] So Appian 1, 438, 19. τοῦτο αὐτοῖς πρῶτον ἀντεκεκρούκει. and 2, 543, 3. καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἀπὸ τὸν Κ. πρῶτον ἀντεκεκρούκει. Demosth. π. Στεφ. ἀντίκρουσέ τι καὶ γέγονεν ὅλα οὐκ ἔδει.

² *Less looked for.*] Literally, "more contrary to their reckoning." Smith has not well rendered it, "they were quite amazed and confounded at it." Mitford has better seen the truth by paraphrasing: "Probably, none of the generals had relied much upon the wealth of Egesta; yet as it had been seriously proposed as the fund which was to afford means for the first conquests, they were distressed by its deficiency."

³ *Devised the following trick.*] This is (with little judgment) recorded among military stratagems by Polyænus 6, 21.

⁴ *Those of the trireme.*] The τριημιτῶν is usually interpreted of the trierarchs. But it must be extended, also, to the officers generally; for to those alone can there here be reference, though otherwise the Scholiast's interpretation τῶν ἐν ταῖς τριήρεσιν ἀφικομένων does not ill explain the meaning: and in that sense the word is used by Herodotus 5, 85, 9. the word (which is rare) also occurs in Xen. Anab. 6, 6, 6. Dio Cass. 570, 53. 611, 25. 1533, 15. Lucian 3, 515.

⁵ *Borrowed.*] The Scholiast well explains αἰρησόμενοι by χρησάμενοι. And so Polyæn. ubi supra, whose words are these: χρησάμενοι ἐκ τῶν πλησιῶν πόλεων ἀργύρον καὶ χρυσόν. where Masv. ought to have edited ἀργυρᾶ καὶ χρυσᾶ. It is strange that the commentators should not have adduced a kindred passage at Exod. 3, 22. αἰρήσου γυνὴ παρὰ γείτονος σκεύη ἀργυρᾶ καὶ χρυσᾶ. In the same sense the Latin *peto* is used in Eutrop. l. 10, 1. adeo autem cultus modici, ut feriat diebus, si cum amicis numerosioribus esset epulandum, privatorum eis argento ostiatim petito triclinia sternerentur.

⁶ *Phœnician and Grecian.*] The former may be supposed to have been Motya, &c., and the latter Hyccara, Soloeis, and Panormus.

ments as their own. Thus all using mostly the same utensils, and every where a great show appearing, threw the Athenians that came on board the trireme into astonishment, so that, on their arrival at Athens, they published about what great wealth they had seen. And they being themselves deceived, and awaying the minds of others, when the account went forth that the wealth they spoke of was not in Egesta, bore much of the blame⁷ from the soldiery.

XLVII. And now the commanders took counsel on the present posture of affairs.⁸ The opinion of Nicias was⁹, that they should sail against Selinus (whereunto they were especially sent) with all the forces, and if, indeed, the Egestæans should supply money for the whole armament, to consult thereupon; but if not, to demand support for the sixty ships which they had required, and that remaining there, they should, either by force or by negotiation, bring about a peace with the Selinuntians; and then coasting to the other cities, and displaying the power of the Athenian state, and having shown their zeal and alacrity for their friends and allies, should de-

⁷ *Bore much of the blame.*] The *ambassadors*, however, must have deserved the *most*. These had, doubtless, been appointed by the party of Alcibiades, whether for their ability or their folly, Mitford thinks, it is hard to guess. He is inclined to think that they *affected* to believe the wealth of the Egestæans. It is, however, more natural to suppose that they were purposely selected, as weak and sanguine characters, and (being devoted to their party) willing to believe, and ready to report all that would be acceptable to their employers; very much like the military agents sent by the British government to Spain, in the earlier part of the peninsular war.

On the other hand, the commissioners sent by the three commanders from Corcyra would be persons of a different character, persons on whose judgment and impartiality entire reliance might be placed. And their purpose being (as Mitford says), not to procure partial evidence to promote a decree for the expedition, but to find means (for what would now be a principal object of Alcibiades himself) to prosecute its purpose, they made strict scrutiny.

⁸ *Took counsel on the present posture of affairs.*] When it came to be debated what should be the first measures of the armament, the three generals differed, nearly as might be expected from their difference of character; and each had plausible ground for his opinion. (Mitford.)

⁹ *The opinion of Nicias was, &c.*] Nicias, experienced, prudent, from the first little satisfied with his command, and now in ill health, proposed to relieve Egesta, which was the primary object of their instructions; and, unless the Egestæans could fulfil their engagement to furnish pay for the whole armament, or readier means should occur than yet appeared for restoring the Leontines, not further to risk the forces or waste the treasures of the commonwealth. (Mitford.)

part home (unless, in a short time, or by some unexpected occurrence, they should be able to benefit the Leontines, or bring over some of the other cities), and not bring the state into peril, while they were expending their own wealth.¹⁰

XLVIII. But Alcibiades urged ¹ that they ought not, after coming forth with such a force, return home dishonourably, and without effecting their purpose; but should open a correspondence ² with all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and should try what could be done with the Siculi, to detach some from the Syracusan interest, and others to bring over as friends and allies, so that they might thence procure provision and troops.³ They should (he said) first try to persuade the *Messenians* (for they were situated at the very passage and approach ⁴ to Sicily, and would afford a port and a most opportune naval station ⁵ for the armament), and having

¹⁰ *Bring the state into peril, &c.*] Of the various modes which have been proposed of taking the words of the original, the simplest and truest seems to be that of the Scholiast, which I have followed. That of Stephens is, indeed, specious, but not solid. How very expensive the expedition had been to individuals, we know from what has preceded.

The phrase *κινδυνεύειν τῇ πόλει* is rare, but it has occurred once before (supra, c. 10.), and is found, as Stephens in his *Thesaurus* tells us, in Herodotus.

¹ *But Alcibiades urged, &c.*] Alcibiades, whose temper was impetuous, but his mind capacious, and his abilities universal, elated with the extraordinary effects which his first essay in political intrigue had produced in Peloponnesus, and not dejected by disappointments for which he was more prepared than his colleagues, had formed his own plan for laying the foundation of extensive conquest, and persevered in it. (Mitford.)

² *But should open a correspondence, &c.*] Or negotiation. Namely, by embassy or message; for the *literal* sense of *ἐπικηρυκεῖσθαι* cannot here be admitted, since the Athenians did not consider any others as enemies but Selinus and Syracuse, and to the former, therefore, the sending *heralds* would be out of place.

Mitford introduces this clause with, "Yet he would not disapprove prudent, or even cautious measures."

³ *To detach some, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "In some places, perhaps, zeal in the Syracusan interest might be merely slackened; in others, defection from it might be procured: in some, supplies of provisions only might be obtained; in others, auxiliary troops."

⁴ *Passage and approach.*] As it were, bridge and threshold.

⁵ *Naval station.*] Goeller, in a very instructive note (after Duker and Schæfer), satisfactorily proves that *ἐφόρμιον* is here the true reading. The most important matter he brings forward is as follows: "*ὀρμίζειν* et *ὀρμίζεσθαι* respondent proxime præcedenti, et verbo *ὀρμῆν*, quæ quietem exprimit, at *ὀρμίζειν* et medium ejus significant motum et actionem: *naves in statione locare, in ancora locare.* vid. Lexic. Polyb. s. v. Thom. M. p. 656.

brought over these cities⁶, and ascertained with whose aid they should carry on the war⁷, to then make their attack on Syracuse and Selinus, unless the one would come to an agreement with the Egestæans, and the other would suffer them to restore the Leontines.⁸

XLIX. As to Lamachus¹, he pronounced it as his decided² opinion that they should proceed against *Syracuse*, and as speedily as possible; and carry the war to the gates of the

ὁρίζω, τὸ ἰλλμενίζω — Θουκυδίδης πολλάκις. Thucyd. 3, 76. 7, 50. adde Hesych. in ὕρμισον. Hinc ὕρμισις, προσόρμισις (quo vocabulo Schol. ad Thucyd. 4, 1, 53. utitur ad illustrandam vocem προσέδωλη, nam ὕρμισις et inde ducta non solum significant actionem locandi navem in statione, sed ipsam stationis opportunitatem)."

⁶ *Those cities.*] Namely, those of the Siculi, and Messene.

⁷ *Ascertained with whose aid, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases thus: "When trial had been duly made what might be done by negotiation, when they were fully assured who were determined enemies, and who were, or might probably be made, friends, then they should have a clearer view of the business before them."

⁸ *Unless the one would, &c.*] Mitford, who has so carefully paraphrased the rest of this report of the speech of Alcibiades, omits this part, though extremely important, because it shows more moderate and pacific views than could have been expected from Alcibiades. And upon the whole, the counsel was more judicious than that of Nicias. It was, perhaps, no good policy to go out to Sicily, especially with so large a force, and with avowed intentions of hostility to Syracuse and Selinus. But having gone, the credit and true interest of the state did seem to require that they should not return without effecting something. And as so powerful an armament was evidently meant, not for Selinus, but Syracuse, it was the part of policy to take the bull by the horns, and, as soon as they had tolerable co-operation of allies, proceed against Syracuse, while the neglect of preparation, occasioned by the imperfect constitution of that city, made it very assailable.

This, then, was unquestionably the most judicious plan of conquest to be aimed at. Whether that *should* have been the aim, is another affair. In fact, the plan of Alcibiades, though it seems prudent and even cautious on paper, would never, by so impetuous and ambitious a character, have been acted on in its true spirit. Had that plan been cordially adopted by Nicias and carried into effect by his prudence, the disasters of Athens would have been infinitely less. But Nicias, so far from heartily adopting *any* plan for such distant war, was engaged in it much against his will and with a presentiment that ruin would ensue; and, therefore, no plan was likely to prosper in his hands. Some points of resemblance may be observed between the situation of Nicias and that of our meritorious, but unfortunate, Sir John Moore in Spain.

¹ *Lamachus.*] Mitford describes him as much of a soldier and little of a politician, but experienced in the captious and greedy temper of the people, his sovereign.

² *Decided.*] Ἀνυκερὲς literally signifies, *unhesitatingly*, *sur le champ*.

city, whilst yet the inhabitants were unprepared, and in the most alarm. For it is at the first (he said) that an army is *most* the object of apprehension, but if it delay its appearance³, men take courage, and at the *sight* of what they dreaded, rather conceive contempt. Whereas, if a sudden attack were made, whilst the people were fearfully expectant, they might most gain the mastery, and should in all respects affright them, both by the *sight* of the force (for now they would make the greatest show), and by the *expectation* of what they should suffer⁴, especially contemplating the immediate peril of battle.

It was likely, too, that many were left outside in the country⁵, from a disbelief that they would come. And if they should even have betaken themselves to the city, the army would still be in no want of money and goods⁶, should it be once master of the field, and fairly set down before the city.

The rest of the Siceliots, he said, would thus be more disposed⁷ not only to withhold assistance from the Syracusans, but to come over to *them*, and would not make delays, as looking round to see which should have the upper hand. As to a naval station⁸ for them to retreat to, and make their sallies from, Megara⁹, he said, should be taken for that purpose, as

³ *Appearance.*] Literally, "coming into sight."

⁴ *By the expectation of what they should suffer.*] Smith very well represents the meaning thus, "by the forebodings of their hearts what miseries were likely to ensue."

⁵ *It was likely, too, that, &c.*] Namely, when the rest took refuge there.

⁶ *Would still be in no want of money and goods.*] "And thus," Mitford paraphrases, "they should acquire means to prosecute the war, without the invidious measure of applying to Athens for money." Thucydides, however, says nothing that glances at the probability of "the other towns of the territory immediately falling into the hands of the Athenians," or, "that the Syracusans would be provoked to risk a battle;" which Mitford introduces into his paraphrase.

⁷ *Would thus be more disposed, &c.*] "A victory," as Mitford well paraphrases, "would do more towards procuring alliance among the Sicilian cities, than negotiation for twenty years."

⁸ *Naval station.*] Or rather, "harbour for laying up the ships in the winter."

⁹ *Megara.*] Otherwise called the Hybla Minor, or Geleatis, which had been seized by Gelo, and, after that time, had been gradually abandoned, and was, therefore, neglected and defenceless. One difficulty, however, occurs, namely, that the place is represented in the maps as being somewhat inland; whereas, the present passage will prove that it had a port of some sort: that must have been the mouth of the river Alabus.

being deserted, and at no great distance¹⁰ from Syracuse, whether by sea or land.

L. Lamachus, though he spoke thus, yet nevertheless himself, too, acceded to the opinion of Alcibiades.¹ After this, Alcibiades having passed over in his own ship² to Messene, and held some communication with the citizens respecting alliance, but without success, receiving only the answer, "that they would not admit the army into the city, but would grant them a market outside of the walls³," he made sail back to Rhegium. Having then manned⁴ sixty ships out of the whole, and taken provisions aboard, the commanders immediately coasted to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament with one of the commanders at Naxos.⁵ And on the Naxians agreeing to receive them⁶ into the city, they passed on to Catana. And on the Catanæans refusing to admit them (for there were there some persons who were attached to the Syracusan interest⁷), they passed on to the river Terias⁸; and having encamped there for the night⁹, on the following day they sailed in line

¹⁰ *At no great distance.*] About fifteen miles by land, but more by sea.

¹ *Acceded to the opinion of Alcibiades.*] It was necessary that he should come over to the opinion of one or other of the two commanders, since it seems neither would adopt his counsel, which, even to Alcibiades, seemed too hazardous; though, upon the whole, it was, perhaps, the safest course, and would, probably, have been successful, if the forces sent, in the two separate armaments, had gone forth at once. Certain it is that Alcibiades was, in many respects, better adapted to act on his own plan, as having a great talent for negotiation and intrigue.

² *His own ship.*] Namely, that which he had himself equipped, &c., according to the law, and of which he was trierarch.

³ *Market outside of the walls.*] Mitford interprets this, "permission for the Athenian armament to contract for provisions throughout their territory."

⁴ *Manned.*] The *ἐν* in *ἐνυπλήρωσαντας* refers to this squadron being composed out of the three divisions into which, as we are before told, the fleet had been distributed.

⁵ *One of the commanders.*] Namely, Nicias, who had no mind to the business, and whose health would not admit of much exertion.

⁶ *Agreeing to receive them.*] Such must here be the sense of *δεξιμίων* τῇ πόλει, where τῇ πόλει is for εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

⁷ *Attached to the Syracusan interest.*] Or, who wished well to the Syracusan cause; as Theopomp. ap. Steph. Byz. 771. A.

⁸ *Terias.*] On which Leontini was situated.

⁹ *Encamped there for the night.*] For the Greeks always availed themselves of any opportunity of sleeping on shore; their, small and shallow

towards Syracuse, with the rest of the ships ¹⁰, for ten they had sent forward with orders to sail to the great port, and observe whether any fleet is launched, and to proclaim from the ships (approaching to the shore ¹¹), "that the Athenians were come, out of alliance and affinity, to reinstate the Leontines in their territory; that, therefore, such of the Leontines as were in Syracuse might fearlessly come off to the Athenians as to friends and benefactors." After having made this proclamation, and reconnoitred both the city and the ports, and the situation of the country from which they were to carry on the war, they sailed back to Catana.

LI. And now, an assembly being called, the Catanæans would not admit the *army*, but the commanders they desired might enter, and speak what they had to say.¹

And as Alcibiades was haranguing and the attention of the citizens was turned to the assembly ², the soldiers contrived unobserved to break through ³ at a postern ill walled

vessels being ill adapted for that purpose; and hammocks had not then been invented.

¹⁰ *With the rest of the ships, &c.*] The Scholiast absurdly understands this of those at Rhegium; and the translators are perplexed.

¹¹ *Approaching to the shore.*] So Plutarch, Nic. c. 14. καὶ Λεοντίνους ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἀποκαλοῦσαι διὰ κήρυκος αὐταὶ, λαμβάνουσι ναῦν πολεμίας σανίδας κομίζουσιν, εἰς ἃς ἀπεγράφοντο κατὰ φύλὰς αὐτοῦς οἱ Συρακοῦσιοι, κείμενα δ' ἄνωθεν τῆς πόλεως ἐν ἱερῷ Διὸς Ὀλυμπίου, τότε πρὸς ἐξέτασιν καὶ κατάλογον τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ μετεπέμφθησαν, ὥς οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δλοῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἱκομίσθησαν, καὶ τὸ πλεῖθος ὥφθη τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἡχθίσθησαν οἱ μάντις, μὴ πότε ἄρα τὸ χρεὼν ἐνταῦθα τοῦ χρησμοῦ περαινοί, λίγοντες, ὥς Ἀθηναῖοι λήφονται Συρακοσίους ἅπαντας.

¹ *The Catanæans would not, &c.*] Apprehension either of the Athenian armament or of a party among their own people, had so far wrought a change in the minds of the Catanæan leaders, that they consented to admit the Athenian generals to declare their purpose to the assembled people. The forces being landed, were stationed without the walls, while the generals went into the town; and Alcibiades undertook to address the Catanæan people.

Probably, the proposal was made at the suggestion and by the intrigues of Alcibiades. We have before observed that this admittance of *generals*, especially when (like Brasidas or Alcibiades) eloquent and insinuating, seldom failed to accomplish the *whole* object in view.

² *The attention of the citizens was turned to the assembly.*] Such seems to be the sense of πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τετραμμένων, with which the translators seem to have been perplexed. Of this sense there is another example at 2. 25. πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος τετραμμένον.

³ *Contrived unobserved to break through, &c.*] Mitford ascribes this to

up ⁴, and having entered into the city, walked up and down the market-place.⁵ When, however, those Catanæans who were in the Syracusan interest saw the army within, they were seized with alarm, and some few immediately stole off. The rest decreed to conclude an alliance with the Athenians, and desired the commanders to fetch the rest of the armament from Rhegium. After this, the Athenians passed over to Rhegium, and then removed with their whole force to Catana, and, on their arrival, formed a camp.

LII. And now word was brought ¹ from Camarina, that if they would go thither, the Camarinæans would join their side, and that the Syracusans were manning their fleet. They therefore coasted along with their whole forces, first to Syracuse, and, when they found no navy then equipped and manned ², they coasted

mere wantonness in the soldiery; but it is far more probable that the thing was done by the secret orders of Alcibiades. And so Polyænus must have thought, or he would not have inserted this affair among the *stratagems of Alcibiades*.

⁴ *Ill walled up.*] The translators and commentators interpret this *ill built*; but a gate cannot well be said to be *built* at all. Besides, the *ἐν* will admit of no such sense, but requires that which I have adopted. It is true that the word is sometimes applied to the erection of a tower, or fort, as Thucyd. 3, 51 and 85. 4, 92. 8, 4 and 84. Plutarch t. 9. 281. Reisk. Æschines 1, 70, 13. Lucian t. 2, 97. οἰκίαν ἐνοικοδόμητο. Theocr. Idyll. 17, 82., to omit other passages which I have noted. And thus the term has, perhaps, an allusion to the deep foundations which were usual in such cases. This, however, cannot well apply to a *gate*. The sense, then, is doubtless that which I have assigned; of which the following examples may suffice: Arrian E. A. 6, 29, 16. τὴν θυρίδα δὲ ἀφανίσαι, τὰ μὲν αὐτῆς λίθῳ ἐνοικοδομήσαντα. Diodor. Sic. t. 4. 125 and 180. And so the Latin *inædificare*; as Cæsar B. Civil. 1, 27. Portas obstruit, vicos plateasque inædificat. See Facciolati.

We may, therefore, dispense with Bauer's conjecture, ἀνωκ.; ἀνωκ. would have been more probable, but no alteration is necessary.

⁵ *Walked up and down the market-place.*] Or, in a general way, in foro versabantur. To the examples and references of Duker I add Aristoph. Lys. 633. Herod. 3, 137, 4. ἐβρόντες δὲ μὴν ἀγοράζοντα. So that in St. Matt. 20, 5. εἶδεν ἄλλους ἱερωτάς ἐν ἀγορᾷ. the more classical Greek would be ἀγοράζοντας. See also Valckn. on Herod. 2, 35, 7. Alberti on Hesych. in ἀγοράζειν, and Spanheim on Julian, p. 142.

¹ *Word was brought.*] No doubt, this had been brought about by the intrigues of Alcibiades. "It soon," Mitford observes, "appeared that the project of Alcibiades to strengthen the Athenian interest by negotiation, and proportionally, of course, to weaken the Syracusan, had been extensively founded."

² *Equipped and manned.*] Both significations seem included in πληροῦμενον.

along to Camarina, and touching at the shore, they sent a message. But the citizens would not admit them, alleging that they were bound by oath not to receive the Athenians when coming with more than *one* ship, unless they should themselves send for more.³ Having thus failed of their purpose, they sailed away; and landing on a certain part of the Syracusan territory, and committing some ravage, the Syracusan horse having come up and cut off some stragglers of the light-armed⁴, they departed for Catana.

LIII. And here they meet with the ship called the *Salaminia*⁵, arrived from Athens to fetch Alcibiades (to order him home to defend himself against the charges brought against him by the state), and also for certain others of the soldiers, accused with him, some as guilty of impiety respecting the mysteries, others about the affair of the statues of Mercury. For the Athenians, after the armament had sailed⁶, made as strict an inquisition⁷ as ever concerning what was perpetrated respecting the mysteries and the statues; and not examining or cross-questioning the informers,

³ *Alleging that they were bound by oath, &c.*] Such is the sense universally assigned to the passage. But surely the last words have thus a very strange meaning; for if they were bound not to admit the Athenians with more than one ship, how could their oaths permit them to send for more? I suspect that the oaths here mentioned were oaths on a treaty with the Athenians, by which treaty it was agreed and ratified by oath that they should not be obliged to receive the Athenians with more than one ship, unless they should voluntarily send for more. We may, therefore, render thus: alleging that the oaths with them (i. e. the Athenians) were to receive them, &c.

⁴ *Light-armed.*] These were chiefly employed on such excursions.

⁵ *Salaminia.*] See note on 3, 33.

⁶ *For the Athenians, after the armament had sailed, &c.*] Since the armament sailed for Sicily, Athens had been experiencing the worst evils of democratical phrenzy. The oligarchal party, unequal to open contention with the democratical, had resolved upon the bold project of making democracy itself their instrument for exciting popular passion, with the hope of directing it to the promotion of their own interest. Instantly after the departure of the fleet, they became sedulous in diffusing rumours and observations that might excite suspicion and alarm. (Mitsford.)

⁷ *Made as strict an inquisition.*] *Ἐκζητήσας* is not well rendered by Hobbes's *enquiry*; for the force of the *ἐκ* is intensive, and, in fact, the word is generally used to denote examination into crimes of the worst kind. So Dionys. Hal. 1, 128 and 130. 180, 205, 256. Liban. Orat. de Uls. Jul. C. 8. *ἐκζητήσας τοῦ αἱματός*. So Psalm 9, 12. "when he maketh inquisition for blood."

but in a suspicious spirit admitting whatever deposition they would offer ⁴, through their belief of bad men, apprehended and imprisoned the most worthy and respectable citizens, reckoning it more expedient ⁵ to strictly examine ⁶ and find out the affair, than that any person, of however good reputation, when once impeached by the villany of an informer, should escape unquestioned. For the people knew by report the tyranny of Pisistratus ⁷ and his sons to have been in the end very grievous, and, moreover, that it was not at last overturned by *themselves* and by Harmodius, but by the *Lacedæmonians* ⁸; therefore, they were ever fearful, and regarded every thing with suspicion and jealousy.

⁴ *Admitting whatever, &c.*] I have long been convinced that πάντα (which I have here followed) is the true reading; and such has been adopted by Goeller. There is an ellipsis of κατὰ or ἐς, which is supplied by Appian 1, 472, 88. ἐς πάντα ὡν ἤδη περιδεής.

The ὑπόπτως must be referred to the persons accused, or to the public in general. Mitford well paraphrases: "fear, suspicion, and their certain concomitant, a disposition to severity, thus gained complete possession of the public mind."

⁵ *Reckoning it more expedient, &c.*] It was deemed better that just men should suffer, than that the constitution should be endangered. Every one was bent to discover, by any means, the plot and its authors. (Mitford.)

⁶ *Strictly examine.*] The translators are here all needlessly, and, I think, unfaithfully, literal in rendering "examined by torture." Βασανίζω has, indeed, that force, but only with an accusative of person, not of thing, as here, where it would be very harsh. To the examples in Steph. Thes. I add the following. Aristoph. Lys. 478. ἀλλὰ βασανιστέον τόδε σοι πάθος.

⁷ *For the people knew by report the tyranny of Pisistratus, &c.*] It would not at first strike any one what this has to do with the present case. But, in fact, the people suspected that a plot for a revolution was at the bottom of the whole business, and that Alcibiades was the ringleader. "The power and influence of Alcibiades (says Mitford), his magnificence, his ambition, his unprincipled conduct, and his various extravagancies were made constant subjects of public conversation. His abilities, at the same time, and even his virtues, were compared to those by which the Peisistratids had acquired the tyranny. The severities which had occasioned the expulsion of those celebrated tyrants were then magnified tenfold; the execration to which their memory had been condemned by the party which had overborne them, was alleged in proof of their enormities; and the circumstance that the Athenians, unable to effect their own deliverance, had owed it to the Lacedæmonians, was pressed upon public recollection."

⁸ *By the Lacedæmonians.*] i. e. by the aid of Cleomenes. See Herod. 5, 64. What the same author says at c. 70 of the same book, ἐξέβαλε Κλεισθένια καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλους πολλοὺς Ἀθηναίων, is to be referred to what is related by Thucyd. 1, 126. ext., as is observed by Valckn. Herodotus says that the Alcæonidæ were the authors of the liberty of Athens. See Valckn. on Herod. 5, 55. (Goeller.)

LIV. Now, the daring enterprise of Aristogiton and Harmodius¹ was undertaken for a love adventure, which by relating at large, I shall show that neither others, nor the Athenians themselves, have spoken with any exactness concerning their own tyrants, nor concerning any thing.

When Pisistratus died at an advanced age in the tyranny², he was succeeded in the government not by *Hipparchus*, as is generally supposed, but by *Hippias*, his eldest son.³ Now, Harmodius being in the flower of youth and beauty, Aristogiton, a citizen of the middle rank⁴, was his lover, and

¹ *The daring enterprise of Aristogiton and Harmodius, &c.*] The story here introduced by Thucydides is also related by Pausan. p. 70. sq., Scylax, Heraclides de Polit. p. 430., Lucian t. 2. 873. seqq., Max. Tyr. Diss. 24., Timæus 1, 454. Reisk. See also Herod. l. 5, 55, 7. All of which authorities (together with those referred to by Duker) merit attention.

Still many may not see the reason for the historian's introducing the story in such detail, especially as it is not a very decent one. The reason, however, for his mentioning it was, in order to show that men, in their natural love of liberty and their detestation of whatever wears the name of tyranny, are often very ill informed of the nature of that which they censure, or the circumstances connected with it. Of this the historian means to say there was a memorable example in the case of Pisistratus and his sons; though, as the occurrences were of no remote date, it was singular that so much error in opinion should have existed. The lesson meant to be inculcated is, that we should endeavour to be well informed as to what we censure, and to learn to be just even where we feel bound to censure with severity. From what has been said, it is evident that Thucydides could not suppress any circumstances, however disgusting to himself or others; and he places what is most disgusting so prominently, and first adverts to it, in order to show that merely personal, and which might then be lightly regarded, circumstances had tended to rouse the resentment of those redoubted patriots, Harmodius and Aristogiton. It is scarcely necessary to say that we must judge Thucydides, in this instance, solely by his age, when things, which we are taught by the wisdom from on high should "not be so much as named among us," were adverted to with a coarseness little accordant with the delicacy which, in matters of taste and, in some respects, moral feeling, distinguished the antients.

² *Tyranny.*] The original τυραννίς is not to be regarded as a term of reproach any more than τύραννος in the early Greek writers, where it merely denotes one who exercises monarchical sway.

³ *Hippias, his eldest son.*] On the controverted question as to the seniority of the two brothers, Hippias and Hipparchus, see Hudson and Duker. By the former, indeed, it is considered as a disputable one; and he cites Plato, Heraclid., and Clidemus, in favour of the seniority of *Hipparchus*. But, as Bekker remarks, it is now agreed that Plato was not the author of the dialogue called the Hipparchus. As to the other authorities, it is remarked by Duker that the words of Clidemus are not decisive; and that those of Heraclides are very consistent with the hypothesis of Perizonius, that the brothers held conjoint rule.

⁴ *A citizen of the middle rank.*] As Duker has given but one example of the phrase μέσος πολίτης, the following may not be unacceptable: Heliod.

had him in possession.⁵ But the fidelity of Harmodius being tampered with by Hipparchus son of Pisistratus, he not repulsing his solicitations, discovered the affair to Aristogiton; who, stung with love-jealousy, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him by force, immediately laid a plan, such as his rank in life would admit, of putting down the tyranny. Meanwhile Hipparchus, after again making an attempt on Harmodius, with no better success than before, was unwilling, indeed, to use any violence, but contrived how he might put an affront upon him⁶, in some secret way⁷, as if not on that account. For neither was he in the rest of his government oppressive to the people, but conducted himself irreproachably.⁸ Nay, in truth, those tyrants for the most part cultivated virtue and discretion⁹, and levied of the Athenians only a

1, 9. Ἀθηναίοις τῶν μίσων. Helioid. 1, 24. Plutarch Camill. 25. and Sol. 14. Hence may be emended Alciphron l. 3, 34. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν Ἀθηνησίων μεσπολῶντων. where for the evidently corrupt reading μεσπολῶντων, Perizonius corrected νεοπολῶντων. But I prefer μεσοπολῶντων, which word is of the same form as νεοπολίτης, φιλοπολίτης, ἰσοπολίτης, μεσονάσσης. And in Æsop. Fab. ρ τ 3. ἀνὴρ μεσοπολῶς, I conjecture μεσοπολίτης. These are, by some writers, called the οἱ ἐν μίσῳ, or διὰ μίσον.

Finally, I cannot omit to introduce a most apposite and admirable passage on this subject to be found in Eurip. Suppl. 238—245. Τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες, οἱ μὲν ὀλβιοὶ, Ἀνυφελεῖς τε, πλειόνων τ' ἐρῶσ' αἰέ. Οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες, καὶ σπανίζοντες βίον, Δείνοι, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλείον μέρους, εἰς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφιάσιν κακὰ, Γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι. Τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ ἓν μίσῳ σώζει πόλεις, ἡ Κόσμον φυλάττουσ' ὄντιν' ἀν' τάξῃ πόλεις. The sentiment is as true now as it was in the age of the poet, and *will* be so as long as human nature continues what it is.

⁵ *Had him in possession.*] Εἶχεν αὐτόν. Of this coarse use of the phrase, Wasse adduces an example from Aristippus ap. Diog. Laert. 2, 75. And Goeller refers to two examples of a similar sense (as used of a *wife*) in Hom. Od. 4, 569. and Il. 6, 398. But they are not similar, being only that of St. Matt. 22, 28. οἱ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσχατα αὐτῆς. Yet the ἔσχατα being an equivocal expression, St. Mark and St. Luke might add the γυναῖκα verecundè.

⁶ *Put an affront upon him.*] Goeller here aptly adduces from Heraldus the following remark on the use of προπηλακισμός: “Προπηλακισμός dicitur omne omnino injuriæ et contumeliæ genus, sive re sive verbis factæ; item sive de qua ibatur in jus sive de qua non dabatur judicium, et verbum erat elegans atque usus communis, sed non legum, in quibus ἔθρις, αἰκία, κακηγορία, λοιδορία, quæ omnia προπηλακισμός comprehendebat.” He also refers to Meier and Schœmann on Attic Process, pp. 327. 550.

⁷ *Way.*] I here follow the conjecture of Levesque τρόπῳ, approved by Bekker and Goeller. Yet the textual reading, τόπῳ, may very well be defended in the sense, *occasion, opportunity*, as in Acts, 25, 16. Ephes. 4, 27. and Hebr. 12, 17.

⁸ *Irreproachably.*] i. e. so as not to excite envy or hatred.

⁹ *Cultivated virtue and discretion.*] Or, evinced both virtue and ability.

twentieth part ¹⁰ of their revenue; and they adorned the city, carried forward the wars, and provided for the sacrifices very honourably. In other respects, too, the city was governed by the laws formerly enacted, except inasmuch as they always contrived that one of themselves should be in the offices. And others of them exercised the annual office of archon at Athens, especially Pisistratus son of Hippias, the tyrant, who bore the same name as his grandfather, and who, when archon, consecrated the altar of the twelve gods in the market-place and that of Apollo in the Pythium.¹¹ From that in the market-place, the Athenian people, afterwards lengthening the altar, effaced the inscription. But that in the Pythium is even yet visible, though in faded ¹² letters, with these words:

Pisistratus, from Hippias born,
Of Pythian Phœbus, radiant God of day,
Chose thus the temple to adorn,
And thus record his own superior sway.

LV. Now, that Hippias held the government, as being the eldest son, I can affirm, as knowing it by report more certainly than others. It may also be known by this, that there seem to have been sons to him alone of his legitimate brethren, as both the altar shows, and the pillar set up in the citadel of Athens, in which no son is mentioned either of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but of Hippias *five*, who were born to him by Myrrhine daughter of Callias son of Hyperochides. For it was likely that the eldest should marry first. And that he

¹⁰ *Only a twentieth part.*] Whereas Pisistratus had taken a tenth, which was lowered to a twentieth by his sons.

¹¹ *In the Pythium.*] i. e. the temple of Apollo (on which see l. 2, 15.), or rather the sacred close, as we find by the *inscription* just after mentioned.

¹² *Faded.*] Ἀμυδρός seems to come from α (for ἄμα) and μύδρος, *madidus*, from μυδάω, *madeo*, to be or grow damp or wet. Thus ἀμυδρόν is well defined by Lennep, "*cujus vestigia evanescent, quodque quasi lique-scendo formam suam pristinam amittit*"; adeoque, quod obscurum est, nec dignosci facile potest." The word is old Attic and rare; but occurs in Plutarch Rom. 7. γραμμάτων ἀμύδρων ἐγκεχαραγμένων. For ἀμυδρός the later writers used ἀμανρός (which I suspect to be of the same origin). So Pollux, 5, 120. γράμματα — ἀμανρά, ἐξηηλά. With respect to the ἐξηηλάς, by which Pollux explains ἀμανρός, it is, I think, to be derived from ἐξιμι, and signifies what is gone or worn out.

should be written on the pillar first after his father, was also likely, as having possessed the tyranny. No, nor do I conceive that Hippias would easily have kept the tyranny, if Hipparchus had died in the office, and himself had that day had to occupy it himself. But because of the accustomed awe with which the citizens were inspired, and the diligence with which mercenaries¹ had been provided, he accomplished the seizure of the government with abundance of security, and was not like a younger brother, who had not before been accustomed to the government, at a loss what to do. But so it happened that Hipparchus being afterwards renowned by the calamity which happened to him, gained also in succeeding times the repute of having been tyrant.

LVI. This Harmodius, then, who had repulsed his solicitations, he afterwards, as he had intended, threw into disgrace. For after having desired² the attendance of his sister to bear a basket³ in a certain procession, they dismissed her on attending, alleging that they had never sent any such order, inasmuch as she was not worthy. And Harmodius being irritated at this treatment, Aristogiton, on his account, was even more enraged. Whereupon, all the dispositions for the attempt were concerted by them with those that were to co-operate in the deed. They, however, waited for the great Panathenæa, on which day alone it excited no suspicion for those of the citizens who led the procession in arms to be collected together.⁴ It was planned that *they* should begin⁵ the

¹ *Mercenaries.*] Or, hired troops, in opposition to the unpaid citizen soldier. A frequent sense of *ἐπικούρος*, These were, no doubt, the body guards of the tyrant.

² *Desired.*] Or, warned by message.

³ *To bear a basket.*] Such were borne by virgins of unblemished reputation on all the festivals, but especially the Panathenæa. See Meurs. and Perizon., referred to by Ælian; to which I would add the following illustration from Aristoph. *Lysist.* 646. *Κῆκονηφόρουν ποτ' οὔσα Παις καλῇ, σχοῦσ' ἰσχάδων ὀρμαδόν.* See also Harpocration on *κνήφορος*, Irmisch on Herodian, l. 5, 5, 20., Theocrit. *Idyll.* 2, 66., and the note of the Schol. in Kiesling in loco.

⁴ *In arms to be collected together.*] It seems that on other days, though any were allowed to carry arms, they were not permitted to assemble in bodies.

⁵ *They should begin.*] This may remind us of Brutus and Cassius on the assassination of Cæsar, who, no doubt, considered themselves as imitating the example of Harmodius and Aristogiton.

deed, but that *those* should immediately render them assistance against the guards. Now the conspirators were not many, for security's sake, and because they hoped that even those who had not been privy to the deed, would, if any, ever so few⁶, should run the hazard, forthwith (especially as they had arms) themselves cooperate in freeing their country.

LVII. When the festival arrived, Hippias, attended by his guards⁷, was arranging the solemnities outside of the wall, at what is called the Ceramicus, directing in what manner each procession should proceed. And now Harmodius and Aristogiton being armed with short swords⁸, proceeded to the execution of the deed. And as they saw a certain person of the conspirators conversing familiarly with Hippias⁹ (for he was affable and courteous to all), they were alarmed, and thought that they were informed against¹⁰, and would be immediately apprehended. Therefore, upon him that had aggrieved them, and by whom they were brought into all this danger, they wished, if possible, first to revenge themselves¹¹, and forthwith rushing within the gates, they met with Hipparchus near what is called the Leocorium¹², and, without reflection,

⁶ *If any ever so few.*] Such is the sense of ὀλίγοι οὖν, which I read with Bekker and Goeller. Though the common reading may be defended in the sense, "in any manner whatever." To the examples of lexicographers I add Agath. p. 11. med.

⁷ *Guards.*] These were called Λυκόποδες, on which see Hesych. and the commentators in loc. It is supposed that they were so called from wearing wolf's skin boots.

⁸ *Short swords.*] Ἐγχειρίδιον is generally rendered dagger. But it should seem that the ἐγχειρίδια, of the early Greeks, were not like our daggers, but rather something between a sword and dagger. The word literally means a hand-sword.

⁹ *As they saw a certain person of the conspirators conversing familiarly with Hippias.*] Here again there is a strong resemblance to the affair of Brutus and Cassius.

¹⁰ *They thought they were informed against.*] The translators render as if πράγμα were to be supplied at μεμήνησθαι. But I prefer εἰδέναι: as at ἐλληθίσαι just after. This use of the word with a person is rare; but an example occurs in Xen. Hist. 3, 3. Thiem. πρὶν ἀποθίσθαι ὅτι μεμήνηνται.

¹¹ *Wished to revenge themselves.*] Besides, they might think with Eurip. Helen. 814. δρῶντας γὰρ ἢ μὴ δρῶντας ἡδὺν θανεῖν.

¹² *Leocorium.*] This (as we learn from Ælian Var. Hist. l. 12. c. 28.) was a temple at Athens, of the daughters of Leos, Praxithea, Theopa, and Eubule. These, it is said, were put to death for the safety of the city of

but especially instigated by passion ¹³ (the one that of love-jealousy, the other that of personal insult), immediately falling upon him, struck and killed him. And Aristogiton for the moment escaped the guards, from the concourse of people; but being afterwards apprehended he was not very mildly dealt with.¹⁴ As to Harmodius, he was slain on the spot.

LVIII. News of the deed being carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus, he immediately advanced, not to the place where the thing was done, but towards the armed persons in the procession, and reached them before they (who were far off) knew of the occurrence; and in his countenance dissembling the calamity ¹, he ordered them (pointing out a certain place) to march thither, after having laid down their arms. This they did, supposing that he was going to address a speech to them.² But he having ordered the mercenaries (his guards) to carry off their arms, proceeded to pick out those whom he meant to criminate, and whoever was found with a dagger

Minerva, on being delivered up by their father, Leos, in consequence of a Delphian oracle, which intimated that the city could not be saved unless they were immolated. (Duker.)

¹³ *Especially instigated by passion.*] Thucydides means to say that the deed was not done on conscience and principle, but solely from passion, and private and personal feelings

¹⁴ *Not very mildly dealt with.*] Cruelly treated. Here we have an Attic meiosis. There was no reason for Bauer to have conjectured for διετίθη, διεχρήθη: since this use of διατίθημι is not unfrequent, though generally misunderstood by editors, and defaced by scribes; of both which I shall give instances in my edition. Of the phrase the following are examples: Herod. 3, 155. σιωπῶν ἀνηκίστως διαδίειναι. Dio. Cass. 354, 2. δυσχερῶς διαδίειναι. Menand. ap. Brunck Gnom. 18. διατεθειμένῳ κακῶς. Marc. Anton. 12, 23. κακῶς διετίθη. The word is often used with οὕτως. And, therefore, at Plutarch de Is. and Os. § 72. διετέθησαν: there was no need of Reiske's emendation. Κακῶς may be repeated, or οὕτως understood, with reference to κακῶς.

¹ *In his countenance dissembling the calamity.*] The phrase, ἀδήλως τῇ ὄψει πλασάμενος πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν, is a very extraordinary one. Goeller regards it as put for πλασάμενος τὴν ὄψιν, ὥστε ἀδήλος εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν, and renders: "vultuque ad calamitatem dissimulandam composito." I had myself long ago conjectured τὴν ὄψιν (as Lysias ap. Steph. Thea. πλάσσαι τὸν τρόπον), which would much lessen the harshness of the phraseology. With respect to πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν, it must not be construed with ἀδήλως (as Goeller supposes), but with πλασάμενος; and ἀδήλως may more simply be regarded as put for ἀδήλῳ τρόπῳ.

² *Address a speech to them.*] It was, it seems, usual for them to lay down their arms before they assembled around him to hear a speech.

about him; for the processions were accustomed to be made with shield and spear only.

LIX. In this sort of manner, and by a love-provocation, the plot took its rise, and the reckless daring of Harmodius and Aristogiton arose from sudden consternation.¹ After this the tyranny was heavier on the Athenians than before², and Hippias now, through fear rather³, put to death many of the citizens, and moreover cast his eyes around on foreign states, in order to devise some secure retreat for himself, in the event of any revolution. Thus he gave his daughter in marriage to Æantides son of Hippocles, the tyrant of Lampsacus⁴ (though an Athenian to a Lampsacene⁵) having learnt that they⁶ had

¹ *By a love-provocation, &c.*] Thus the historian shows that Harmodius and Aristogiton were not actuated by that exalted patriotism which was generally attributed to them. And yet (to use the words of Smith) "so violently were tyrants detested at Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was ever honoured there, as martyrs for liberty, and first authors of the ruin of tyranny. Their praises were publicly sung at the great Panathenæa. No slave was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was employed to cast their statues, which were afterwards set up in the forum. Xerxes, indeed, carried them away into Persia, but Alexander afterwards sent them back to Athens. Plutarch has preserved a smart reply of Antipho the orator, who will appear in this history, to the elder Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. The latter had put the question, which was the finest kind of brass? "That," replied Antipho, "of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made."

² *The tyranny was, &c.*] As might be expected, since every attempt to shake off the yoke of tyranny compels the tyrant, in his own defence, to hold the reins of despotism yet tighter. The fact is attested by Herodotus 6, 123, 7. (where it is said of the Alcæonidæ) καὶ οὕτω τὰς Ἀθήνας οὗτοι ἔσαν οἱ ἐλευθερώσαντες πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἢ περ Ἀρμόδιός τε καὶ Ἀριστογείτων, ὥς ἐγὼ κρίνω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξηγρίωσαν τοὺς λοιποὺς Πεισιστρατιδῶν Ἱππαρχὸν ἀποκτείναντες, οὐδὲ τι μᾶλλον ἔπαυσαν τοὺς λοιποὺς τυραννεύοντας.

³ *Rather.*] Namely, than from any natural cruelty of disposition.

⁴ *Lampsacus.*] A very antient city, though, on the period of its foundation, chronologers are not agreed. It is supposed to be the Pitæa of Homer, by others called Pityusa, a name, doubtless, derived from the adjoining country abounding in pines. With respect to *Lampsacus*, it is by some derived from a mythological personage. But it may more rationally be deduced from the old future of λάμω, λάμψω, which had, perhaps, a reference to its site being such as men *would choose and take*; for the vicinity was very fertile. The place is now called Lapsake. Its history may be gathered from the references in Wasse's note, and its present state from Wheler, and Motraye, referred to by Wasse.

⁵ *An Athenian to a Lampsacene.*] This is meant to hint that Hipparchus stooped to what might be thought *infra dig.*; for the Lampsacenes were semibarbarians.

⁶ *They.*] i. e. Hipparchus and Æantides; not the Lampsacenes, as Hobbes renders.

a powerful interest with King Darius. And her monument is at Lampsacus, having this inscription:—

“ From Hippias sprung, with regal power array’d,
Within this earth Archedice is laid;
By father, husband, brothers, sons, allied
To haughty thrones, yet never stain’d with pride.”

As to Hippias, after having continued in the tyranny three years longer, and being in the fourth deposed by the Lacedæmonians and the exiled Alcæonidæ, he departed, under treaty, to Sigeum, and so to Lampsacus to Æantides, and from thence to King Darius; whence, twenty years after, when now an old man, he went on the expedition with the Medes, and was present at the battle of Marathon.⁷

LX. The Athenian people, reflecting on these transactions, and remembering what it had learnt by report of them, was at this time very bitter and suspicious¹ towards those who had been criminated respecting the mysteries: and the whole seemed to them to have been perpetrated with a conspiracy for the establishment of oligarchy and tyranny. And, amidst their angry feeling at such a procedure, many persons, and some of great note, had been thrown into prison; and yet matters seemed to wear no appearance of cessation², nay, the

⁷ *Went on the expedition, &c.*] Such seems to be the full sense, which is imperfectly expressed by Hobbes and Smith.

¹ *Was very bitter and suspicious.*] The word ὑπόπτῃς is rare. From the Scholiast we learn that it was used of a shy horse. And in this sense I have remarked it in Xenoph. Hipp. 3, 9. Of the word in the present sense, Duker cites an example from Ælian: it is strange that he did not remember a passage of Soph. Philoct. 136. ἡ τι λέγειν πρὸς ἀνδρ’ ὑπόπτον;

But, to turn from words to things, this suspicious temper of the Athenians, especially in whatever had any supposed connection with the suppression of democracy, is well depicted in Aristophanes Vesp. 488. Ὡς ἀπανδ’ ὑμῖν τυραννίς ἐστι καὶ ξυνωμότης, Ἦν τε μείζον, ἢν τ’ ἔλαττον πρᾶγμα τις κατηγορεῖ, Ἦς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤκουσα τοῦνομ’ οὐδὲ πενήτηκοντ’ ἐτῶν. Νυν δὲ πολλῶ τοῦ ταρίχους ἐστὶν ἀξιώτερα.

² *Matters seemed to wear no appearance of cessation.*] Reiske and Toup here conjecture ἀνάπαυλα, which is approved by some editors: but the common reading may be considered correct. To the examples of παῦλα given by Duker from Plato, Aristotle, and Dionysius, I add Soph. Philoct. 1329. At ἐφαίνετο subaud πρᾶγματα.

Mitford paraphrases the whole thus: “Nor was this indiscriminating jea-

people every day rather gave way to a more ferocious spirit, and greater and greater numbers were apprehended.

Under these circumstances, one of the prisoners³ who was most obnoxious to suspicion, was persuaded by one of his fellow-prisoners to make a confession and information, whether the matter were true or false: for it was the subject of conjecture both ways, but the positive truth concerning those who had done the deed, no one, either then or afterwards, was able to tell. Thus he brought him by arguments to think that he ought to take this course, even if he had not participated in the crime; for he would procure a pardon for himself, and would liberate the city from the present suspicion: that there was a better chance of safety for him to confess, with promise of pardon, than by denying, to stand trial.⁴ Hereupon, he impeached both himself and others of the deed concerning the statues of Mercury. And now the Athenian people rejoiced at attaining (as they thought) to certainty of the fact, having before been highly chagrined that they should not know those who were plotting against democracy, immediately set at liberty the informer, and such of the rest of those accused with him as he had not impeached; but those that were implicated they brought to trial, and such as were apprehended they put to death⁵, denouncing the same punishment against those that had escaped, and proclaiming a re-

lousy a humour that had its hour and passed; it held, and grew daily more severe. Suspicion extended; more persons were imprisoned; and there was no foreseeing where popular rage would stop."

³ *One of the prisoners.*] Namely, Andocides, as we learn from Plutarch Alcib. c. 20. and 21., and from his own Oration de Myster. A person always regarded as one of the oligarchical party. The man who persuaded him to turn informer was one Timæus, a person of little repute, except for shrewdness and an enterprising spirit.

⁴ *For he would procure a pardon, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "The popular mind would evidently not otherwise be appeased; and a confession would not only be more likely, than perseverance in asserting innocence, to procure his own safety, but would restore quiet to the city; and though some must be sacrificed, yet numbers might so be saved from that mad vengeance, excited by fear, which now threatened so indiscriminately and unboundedly."

⁵ *Such as were apprehended they put to death.*] Hence it appears that all who were brought were in a manner necessarily condemned and put to death, either by the executioner, or (as far as they could prevail) by the hands of private persons.

ward⁶ to whoever should kill them. And though, meantime it was uncertain whether those that suffered were punished justly or not, yet the rest of the city was, for the present, manifestly benefited.

LXI. Much embittered, too, were the people against Alcibiades, instigated by those who had attacked him before his departure. And since they thought they had now come at the truth concerning the Mercuries, he was the more suspected to have been guilty of the crime whereof he was accused respecting the mysteries, with the same purpose, namely, conspiracy against the democracy. An additional reason was¹, that about the time in which they were in disturbance respecting these matters, an army of Lacedæmonians happened to advance as far as the isthmus, concerting some scheme with the Bœotians.² It was, therefore, thought to have come at *his* contrivance, and upon some understanding and agreement; and that, had they not themselves anticipated the thing by apprehending the persons on information given, the city would have been betrayed. Nay, they one night even slept in arms in the temple of Theseus³ in the citadel. The hosts, too, of Alcibiades in Argos were about the same time suspected of planning an attack on democracy, and the Athenians then delivered up the hostages of the Argives who were deposited in the islands to be put to death. In fact, causes of suspicion against Alcibiades started up on all sides. So that wishing to bring him to trial and punishment, they thus sent the ship *Salaminia* to Sicily for him and the rest, concerning whom there had been information made. They were ordered to command him to follow them in order to make his defence, but not to

⁶ *Proclaiming a reward.*] Namely, of a talent. See Wesseling on Diod. Sic. l. 15, 2.

¹ *An additional reason was.*] Such seems to be the true force of the *καὶ γὰρ*.

² *Concerting some scheme with the Bœotians.*] Such is the sense assigned by Valla, Duker, and Smith. Others, as Hobbes and Portus, render, "against the Bœotians." But the Bœotians were not enemies but friends, especially as having the same common enemy Athens. Of the phrase *πράσσειν πρὸς τινα* in this sense, examples are given by Duker.

³ *Temple of Theseus.*] See Meurs., referred to by Hudson, and especially the recent works of Stuart, Clarke, and Dodwell.

apprehend him. This they did out of caution, that they might create no disturbance among their own soldiers, nor afford encouragement to the enemy⁴; and especially as being desirous that the Mantinæans and Argives should remain, and knowing that they had been induced by his influence to take part in the expedition. Thus he, in his own ship⁵, together with those who had been impeached with him⁶, departed with the Salaminia from Sicily, bound to Athens. But when they were arrived at Thuria⁷, they no longer followed, but left the ship and absconded⁸, fearing to stand trial under the accusation. And those of the Salaminia for some time made search for⁹ Alcibiades and his companions; but when they could nowhere be found, they sailed away. As to Alcibiades, who was now a fugitive, he not long after passed on board a ship from Thuria to Peloponnesus. And the Athenians passed sentence

⁴ *Nor afford encouragement to the enemy.*] Namely, to attack them when in disturbance. Such is, certainly, the sense (which is that pointed out by the Scholiast), though it must be confessed that this is very imperfectly expressed by our author.

⁵ *In his own ship.*] Or, "occupying his own ship," the ship which he at least had equipped, though it is very probable that he furnished the ship itself. Thus it is said of his grandfather by Plutarch Alcib. ἰδιοστὸν τριήρει περὶ Ἀρτεμίσιον ἐνδόξως ἐναυμάχησεν. And so Herod. 5, 47, 5, συνέσπετο οἰκῆν τε τριήρει καὶ οἰκῆν ἀνδρῶν δαπάνη· and 8, 17, 6. ὃς δαπάνην οἰκῆτην παρεχόμενος ἱστρατεύετο, καὶ οἰκῆν νηϊ. Pausan. 10, 9. (of Phayllus) ἐναυμάχησε ἐναντρία τοῦ Μήδου, ναὺν παρασκευασάμενος οἰκίαν. Hence is illustrated Soph. Phil. 497. ἱστέλλον αὐτὸν — αὐτόστολον πῖμψαντα. and Horace Epist. 1, 1, 93. locuples, quem ducit *priva triremis*, where the poet seems to have had in mind this passage of Thucydides.

⁶ *Together with those who had been impeached with him.*] This was, strictly speaking, not according to the letter of the order, which only forbade Alcibiades to be apprehended. He, however, rescued the rest by taking them on board his own ship.

⁷ *Thuria.*] Afterwards called Thurium, by which name it is generally known. It was founded nearly on the site of the antient and long-ruined Sybara.

⁸ *And absconded.*] Literally, "were not found forthcoming;" namely, on leaving Thuria. Alcibiades seems to have absconded at Thuria, and to have effected his escape by getting on board some vessel at that place (where the ships had touched, to procure water and provisions). Thus Polyænus 1, 40, 6. positively says that he got on board a merchant ship, and was conveyed to Lacedæmon. It is not, however, clear whether he got on board at the time the Salaminia was at Thuria, or afterwards; but the latter seems the more probable. He was, we may suppose, concealed somewhere in the country. And this is countenanced by what is just afterwards said, that he passed on board a ship from Thuria to Peloponnesus. Now Thuria was the name of the country, Thuriî that of the city.

⁹ *Made search.*] Namely, both on board the ship, and at Thuriî.

of death¹⁰ upon him and those with him, in what is called an abandoned cause.

LXII. After this, the rest of the Athenian commanders in Sicily, dividing the armament into two parts, and each casting lots for his division, sailed with their whole force for Selinus and Egesta.¹ And coasting Sicily along that part which is opposite to the Tyrrhene gulf, and keeping it on their left hand, they landed at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in that part of Sicily. Being, however, not received, they stood along the coast, and in their passage took Hyccara², which is a Sicanian town indeed (and a petty seaport), but³

¹⁰ *Passed sentence of death.*] And not only that, but, as Justin narrates, "diris per omnium Sacerdotum religiones devotus est." And so Max. Tyr. Diss. 12, 6. 1, 225. ἐπηράσαντο αὐτῷ κήρυκες καὶ Εὐμολπίδαι. where Davis thinks that to this may be referred a fragment of Suidas in Εὐμολπ. ἐπηράσαντο δὲ αὐτῷ Εὐμολπίδην καὶ κήρυκας.

Plutarch Alcib. c. 22. has preserved the indictment.

¹ *The rest of the Athenian commanders, &c.*] When Alcibiades, the soul of extensive enterprise and political intrigue (as Mitford observes), had left the armament, nobody remained capable of prosecuting his plans. For political intrigue Nicias had no turn, and to all plans for extensive conquest (even had he been able to carry them forward) he was decidedly opposed. Being now left commander-in-chief, he therefore reverted to his own peddling plan for relieving Egesta, intending to ascertain whether the Egestæans would furnish the money, and likewise to examine into the state of affairs at Salamis, and learn the points of difference with the Egestæans.

² *Hyccara.*] So called, as we find from Athenæus and others, from the Hycca, a kind of fish found there by the first colonists. *What* kind of fish that was has not been ascertained; but as Fazelli, cited by Cluver., says that there is there a *tunny fishery*, that was, doubtless, the fish meant. The town was sometimes called Hyccaron.

This was never a place of any great account, though it appears from Wasse that coins of it are found, and that it was yet in being in the time of Cicero. It was situated at the bottom of a little bay, and the mouth of a small river; and Fazelli says its ruins yet remain near a place called Garbilange, the site itself being named (with a vestige of the ancient appellation) Muro di Carini, i. e. d'Iccarini.

The chief thing this place was famous for was its being the birth-place of the celebrated Lais, who is said to have been among the slaves here made and sent thence to Greece: but what we read of that courtesan refers to a period of about fifty years after the sacking of Hyccara, when she must have been an old woman. There must, then, have been (as some have said) two of the same name, mother and daughter; to the *latter* of whom should be referred almost all that is said of the Lais in question, though it may be true that the first and least celebrated Lais was mistress to Alcibiades.

³ *Is a Sicanian town indeed, &c.*] This is mentioned because, as being of Sicanian origin, it might be expected to have been on good terms with Egesta, seeing that it was of the same origin.

was then at hostilities with Egesta. And having made slaves of the inhabitants, they delivered the place to the Egestæans, whose cavalry had joined them, and themselves marched back with their infantry through the country of the Siculi to Catana ⁴, while the ships sailed round carrying the slaves. Nicias, immediately having coasted along from Hyccara to Egesta, and despatched the other affairs, and received thirty talents, repaired to the army.⁵ And now the slaves were sold ⁶, and a hundred and twenty talents were raised from the sale of them. Then they sailed round to their allies among the Siculi, urging them to furnish some troops; and with the half of their own forces they went against Hybla Geleatis ⁷, which was hostile to them; but failed to take the place. And so ended the summer.

⁴ *Marched back with, &c.*] A formidable march, being through one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty miles of exceedingly hilly country, and must have occupied eighteen days of valuable time. Yet even this was thought preferable to going round by sea; a proof of the imperfect state of navigation in those times.

⁵ *Nicias immediately having coasted along, &c.*] It should seem that he went with only a small squadron to Egesta.

Mitford here accuses this general of being wavering in his measures: but certainly he was acting in perfect accordance with his original plan. We may more justly accuse him, with Plutarch Nic. 15., of timidity and tardiness, in removing far away from the enemy, by which he restored their courage; and then, by failing in his attempt to take a petty town, incurred the contempt of the enemy.

⁶ *The slaves were sold.*] Namely, those taken at Hyccara, not, together with them, Siculi taken on their march, as Mitford relates; whose words are these: "The army marching through the country of the Siculi, the unhappy Barbarians suffered for the false promises of the Egestæans, and were seized in such numbers that," &c. Of this action Mitford speaks with reprehension, but extenuates it on the plea of necessity, and on the ground that, among the antients, even the philosophers, to drag barbarians, whenever met with, into slavery, was not commonly deemed a breach either of justice or humanity." How the historian could prove his assertion as to the philosophers, I know not; but be that as it may, the justification is quite unnecessary, since *there is not the least reason to think from Thucydides* that the slightest injury was done to the Siculi, whom, indeed, it was the plain interest of the Athenians to conciliate, and bring over as allies against the Syracusans, as their common enemy: indeed, it is just afterwards said, that "the Athenians sailed round to their allies among the Siculi," who could be no other than those through whose territories the army passed, as depending on some alliance which had not long before been formed with the Siculi. To injure such, therefore, would have been as impolitic as unjust. Finally, by *the slaves* can only be understood the slaves just before mentioned as embarked on board the ships.

⁷ *Hybla Geleatis.*] Or, Major. Situated on the left bank of the river Symæthus, and about twenty miles S.W. of Catana.

LXIII. On the commencement of winter, the Athenians prepared for an immediate attack on Syracuse¹, and the Syracusans themselves set about advancing against *them*. For since the Athenians² had not, at their first alarm and expectation, immediately attacked them, they every day resumed fresh courage³; and after the enemy were seen sailing to the further parts of Sicily, far remote from *them*; and when, proceeding against Hybla, they failed in their endeavours to carry it by storm, they conceived yet greater contempt, and demanded of their commanders (as the multitude is used to do when elated) to lead them against the enemy, since *they* would not come against *them*. And some Syracusan horse, who were always watching their motions, riding up to the Athenian camp, among other insulting expressions, asked them whether they were not rather come to settle (with them) in a foreign country, than to restore the Leontines to their own.

LXIV. On learning this, the Athenian commanders designed to draw them as far as possible from the city, so that they might themselves meanwhile go thither by *night* with the fleet, and occupy an encampment without molestation; knowing that they should not be so able to do it in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, because the Syracusan cavalry being numerous, would greatly annoy their light-armed, and the multitude⁴ themselves having no horse to cover them. Thus, too, a situation might be occupied, where they could not suffer any considerable annoyance from the horse. They had been informed of the

¹ *Prepared for an immediate attack on Syracuse.*] After a campaign wasted in trifling operations, which had incurred little but the contempt of the Syracusans, Nicias was now, it should seem, induced by the representations and remonstrances of Lamachus, to abandon his original plan, and prosecute the schemes for conquest, for which alone he had been sent out: indeed, dilatory measures were no longer possible, since, as we are told, the Syracusans were going to attack *them* at Catana.

² *For since the Athenians, &c.*] There is an able passage relating to this in Aristid. 2, 37. A.

³ *Every day resumed fresh courage.*] The state of things here described strongly justified the counsel of Lamachus.

⁴ *The multitude*] Namely, of camp-followers.

situation near the Olympieum⁵, which they afterwards occupied, by some Syracusan exiles, who had joined them. In order, therefore, to accomplish the object of their wishes, they contrived the following scheme.⁶ They send as emissary to them a person faithfully attached to their interests, and yet esteemed as no less well affected to the Syracusan cause. The man was a Catanæan, and said that he came deputed by some persons at Catana with whose names they were well acquainted, and knew to be those persons in the city who yet remained well affected to them. He told them that the Athenians took up their night quarters apart from their camps, in the city, and that if the Syracusans would, on an appointed day, come in full force at daybreak against their army, they themselves would close the gates⁷ near them, and set fire to the fleet, while those assaulting the palisade, might carry the camp⁸ by storm. There were many, he said, of the Catanæans who would cooperate in the design, and that those from whom he came were now in readiness.

LXV. The commanders of the Syracusans, besides that they were otherwise full of confidence, and were inclined, even *without* this proposal, to make preparations for proceeding against Catana, so they too inconsiderately yielded credence to the man's representations, and immediately agreeing on a day whereon they would be there, sent him away,

⁵ *Olympieum.*] Or, temple of Jupiter Olympus, whose ruins show that it was formerly a most magnificent fane; on which see Dorville's *Sicula*, Hoare, Hughes, and Duppa; which last writer observes, "that if this be the same temple which was enriched by Gelo (who died B. C. 478) with the spoils of the Carthaginians, the remains are probably among the most antient that we are acquainted with." He adds, that in the seventeenth century there were seven columns yet standing of this majestic fane.

⁶ *Contrived the following scheme.*] Polyænus *Stratag.* 1, 40, 6. and Frontinus 2, 2, 7. insert this among the stratagems of *Alcibiades*: of whom, indeed, it would not have been unworthy, but who could have had no part in it. And yet Polyænus evidently founded his story on *Thucydides*, with a carelessness not very unusual to him, but very censurable.

⁷ *Close the gates.*] Namely, upon those without, to separate the Athenians in the city from those in the camp, and exclude the latter from any refuge in the city. The translators render "shut in;" but that sense the word will not admit.

⁸ *Camp.*] Not *army*, as Portus renders. This sense is required by the context, and, though rare, I have remarked it in Xen. *Anab.* 1, 4, 15., and Arrian *E. A.* 2, 11, 15.

and themselves immediately issued orders for the Syracusans and allies (for the Selinuntians and some others were come up) to take the field in full force, And when their preparations were completed, and the time¹ on which they had agreed was near at hand, they went forth towards Catana, and took up their quarters for the night at the river Symæthus² in the Leontine territory. Now when the Athenians had learnt their approach, they took the whole force of themselves and such Siculi or whoever else had joined them, and embarking on board their ships and barks sailed by night for Syracuse. At break of day, the Athenians disembarked at the spot³ opposite to the Olympieum in order to occupy it as an encampment, and the Syracusan cavalry first pushing on to Catana, and finding that the whole army was embarked and gone, turned back, and told the news to the infantry. And now, all turning back, went to the aid of the city.

LXVI. In the meantime, the way they had to traverse being long, the Athenians had unmolestedly fixed their camp at a convenient spot, and wherein they would have it in their power to engage in battle, or not, at their pleasure, and where the Syracusan horse could least annoy them, both in and before battle. For on one side they were flanked by walls, houses⁴, trees, and a marsh; on the other by precipitous

¹ *The time.*] In αἱ ἡμέραι ἐν αἷς we have the plural for the singular, or (which is more probable) the plural αἱ ἡμέραι is, by an Oriental idiom, used to denote time in general, and thus is a vestige of the Oriental origin of the Greek language. Hence it is frequent in the New Testament; as St. Mark 2, 1. πρὸ τούτων τῶν ἡμερῶν. Hebr. 5, 7. ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ. Luke 2, 6. ἐπέλθουσαν αἱ ἡμέραι, adest tempus, and 18, 22. ἐλεύσονται ἡμέραι.

² *Symæthus.*] Or Simæthus; for MSS. and authors vary, but authority in *Thucydides* greatly preponderates in favour of the former. It is also more agreeable to the probable ratio appellationis.

³ *At the spot.*] At ἐς τὸν κατὰ τὸ Ὁ. the Scholiast and Duker supply τόπον: which is, however, so harsh an ellipsis that I prefer, with Duker, for τὸν, to read, from two MSS., τῷ, which, it may be added, is confirmed by c. 64. περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ Ὀλοχωρίου. I have sometimes thought that τὸν might arise from an abbreviation for τόπον. And certainly that would be more perspicuous, but less Thucydidean.

⁴ *Walls, houses, &c.*] Namely, I imagine, those which stood on the road from Syracuse to Olympieum. I cannot but observe, that the situation assigned by Goeller, in his Plan to the Athenian camp, seems to be too far to the north. There is, I conceive, little doubt but it was at the mouth

ground.⁵ And having felled the neighbouring trees, and conveyed them down to the sea, they fixed down a palisade⁶ by the ships, and hastily raised a fort with unwrought stones⁷ at Dascon⁸, where it was most accessible to the enemy, and

of the Anapus, and on its left bank, reaching down to the port, and extending in the contrary direction nearly to where was the bridge over the Anapus, which they broke down. Thus by the *τῇ μὲν* Thucydides means the left flank; and by *παρὰ τὸ* the right flank. It may be observed that he mentions the *flanks* only, because their *rear* was secured by the Anapus; and, as to the *front*, it was never thought in danger from cavalry. The *houses* and *walls* seem to have been on the road to Olympieum, and the *marsh* to have come up nearly to the road. The *precipitous ground* mentioned was on the right flank, and seems to have been rocky ground, descending with a steep declivity, and by numerous brooks and gorges, to the port.

⁵ *Precipitous ground.*] Polyænus adds, that, at the suggestion of Nicias, *τριόλοι*, or three-pointed spikes, were scattered up and down, by which the horses, he says, were lamed.

⁶ *Palisade.*] So all the translators render; and this version I have retained, for want of a more definite term. The nature of this *σταύρωμα* is involved in obscurity, and perhaps little understood. It might be better denoted by what, in Cambridgeshire and Lincolnshire, is called *piling* (a word which is well explained in Skinner's Dictionary), and perhaps it consisted of a double row of strong *piles* (or stout and long beams), driven into the ground, and connected together by transverse beams, something like those wooden jetties which are to be seen in our seaports. This framework of piles was, no doubt, put down at the extremity of the Athenian naval station (which we may be sure was adjacent to the camp), and extended some distance into the sea; and was used to secure the Athenian naval station, and make it like a *separate port*.

⁷ *Unwrought stones.*] Namely, such as were picked out to fit in according to their shape.

⁸ *Dascon.*] See Goeller de Situ, and in his edition, t. 2. p. 107. The learned editor has changed his opinion as to the situation of Dascon. (See the plan of Syracuse, according to Goeller, prefixed to vol. iii.) To me it seems that Dasco should be placed far nearer to the Anapus; and was probably situated under the hill of Olympieum, and that the *fort* was placed at the mouth of the Anapus, for the defence of its navigation.

On the ratio appellationis in Dascon the commentators offer no conjecture. Now, as names in *ων* often come from other forms in *ος*, so I suspect that *Δάσκων* was derived from *Δασκός*, which is thus explained by Hesych.: *δασκόν. δασύ.* And *δασκός* was undoubtedly from *δάσκιος*. So Hesych. *δάσκιον. μεγάλως σκιάζον, διὰ τὸ σύνδενδρον, καὶ δασύ.* Considering this, and that nouns in *ων* often denote *place*, so *Δάσκων* may well have denoted *the thicket*. So *Ἀκανθών* and *Λασιών*, a thicket or thorn bush; *ἰτέων*, a willow thicket; *ἐλαιών*, an olive grove; *ὄρνιθών*, an aviary; *κνηκιών*, *κοπριών*, *ὄπωριών*, and many other words.

This view of the word is much confirmed by the presence of the *article*, though the name has not occurred before. For when places receive such kind of names, the article (which then has the use *κατ' ἑξοχὴν* treated on by Middleton, p. 47.) cannot at first be dispensed with; but when the name had grown into a commonly recognised *proper name*, it was no longer necessary, and therefore was sometimes omitted.

As

broke down the bridge over the Anapus. While they occupied on these preparations, none of the citizens went forth to hinder them, but first the Syracusan horse came to bring assistance, and afterwards the infantry was called in full force. And at first they advanced near to the camp of the Athenians; but when they found they would not come against them, they retreated, and crossing the road to Helorum⁹, they took up their quarters for the night.

LXVII. On the day following, the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, and ranged themselves in the following order. The Argives and Mantinæans occupied the right wing, the Athenians the centre, and the rest of the allies the left. One half of their forces was placed in front¹, ranged eight deep; the other half was posted in column at the tents² in the form of an oblong square, with orders to observe if any part of the line should be in distress, and immediately repair to its assistance. The baggage-bearers

As, therefore, the Dascon occupied the farthest part of the great port so we may easily comprehend why, when Thucydides speaks at l. 7. of the *τῇ κοιλῇ καὶ मुखῇ τοῦ λιμένος*, Diodorus should, in narrating the same circumstance, substitute *τὸν κόλπον τὸν Δάσκωνα*. The name Dascon, it seems, came to be given to that sort of gulf of the great port in which it is situated.

⁹ *The road to Helorum.*] See the plan of Syracuse. Thus the road seems to have been at present the boundaries between the ground occupied by the Argives, and that by the Syracusans.

The position was a secure one, since their flanks were protected by the marsh of Lysimalia and by the city walls.

¹ *In front.*] Namely, the front of their position. Goeller maintains that it must signify, in *Vordertreffen*, the *van*: but he seems mistaken.

² *At the tents.*] So all the translators take *ἐν ταῖς ἐύναϊς*, except Goeller, who maintains that it must mean *the shore, or anchorage*; on the authority of Photius and Hom. Il. 14. 77. I had myself, long since, noticed the gloss of Photius; but I am inclined to think the lexicographer mistaken in his interpretation, which is certainly very harsh; neither is it easy to see why the column should have been placed at the anchorage, where there was nothing to defend. Whereas, ranged at the tents and rear of the first column, they would be ready to act as a corps de reserve; and that they were to serve as such, is expressly indicated in the words following. The *ἐύναϊς* has here the same sense as at 3, 111. *ἐν ταῖς ἐύναϊς*, which should be rendered, "in their tents."

It may perhaps be thought strange that the Athenians should not have placed more than the *half* of their force in line. The reason, however, seems to have been, that the *half*, ranged eight deep, would occupy the whole front of their position, which was flanked on the left by the marsh, and on the right by the precipitous ground near the sea.

and sutlers they placed between the reserve and the front line.³

The Syracusans ranged *their* heavy infantry *sixteen* deep, consisting of the whole force of the Syracusans, and such allies as were present. These were supported principally by the Selinuntians, then by Geloan cavalry, some two hundred in all, and of Camarinæans about one hundred and twenty horse, and about fifty archers. Their cavalry, to the number of not less than twelve hundred, they posted on the right wing, and next them the lancers.

The Athenians being about to attack first, Nicias advanced along the line by nations, and then made the following general address : —

LXVIII. “ What need, comrades, can there be of a long exhortation to such as (like ourselves) are come for the sole purpose of fighting.⁴ Indeed, the very army itself seems to me more calculated to impart courage than fine spoken words with an insufficient armament.⁵ For where (as now) Argives⁶, Mantinæans, Athenians, and the flower of the islanders are present, how is it possible that we should *not* (associated with so many and so brave allies) have a great, nay, *every* hope of victory? especially having to contend against men defending themselves in promiscuous posse, and not chosen troops, like

³ *The baggage-bearers and sutlers, &c.*] Such is the sense maintained by Goeller in an elaborate note, which see. I am, however, half inclined to prefer the common interpretation, “ within the reserve; ” i. e. within the hollow square. For the sense in question cannot easily be elicited from the words; and it should seem injudicious to interpose a posse of baggage-bearers and camp-followers between the two lines, thus impeding the motions of the reserve in rendering assistance to the front line.

⁴ *What need, &c.*] Such appears to be the sense, which, however, is somewhat obscurely expressed. The Athenians had not only come to Syracuse to seek a battle with the Syracusans, but they seem this day to have *first* drawn up in order of battle; and therefore the words οἱ πάρεσμεν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀγῶνα may refer to *both*.

⁵ *Indeed, the very army, &c.*] So Onosand. p. 65, 5. λόγοις μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἡπίστησαν, ὥς τοῦ καιροῦ πεπλασμένοις ἔνεκεν. ὅψιν δὲ θαρσοῦσαν ἀνυπόκριτον εἶναι νομίζοντες, ἐπιστώσαντο τὴν ἀφορίαν. There is a sentiment very similar in Xen. Cyr. 6, 4, 5. τί οὖν με δεῖ καθ' ἐν ἑκάστον λέγειν; τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οἶμαι σοι πιθανώτερα παρεσχῆσθαι τῶν λεχθέντων λόγων. also at 3, 3, 55.

⁶ *For where (as now) Argives, &c.*] See a similar passage in Xen. Cyr. 2, 3, 5. This was certainly a very adroitly-turned compliment to his allies.

ourselves, and moreover against *Siceliot*s, who indeed *contemn*, but will not *wiethstand* us, by reason of their skill being inferior to their courage.

“Let, too, *this* occur to the mind of every one—that we are far from our country, and near no friendly state, nor any but such as we can gain by our swords. And now I am, I know, going to suggest an admonitory remembrance the reverse of the exhortation employed by our enemies. For *they* urge that ⁷ the contest will be for their country; but I, that you are to fight in what is *not* your country, but that wherein you must conquer, or not easily get away ⁸—for a numerous cavalry will press upon you. Mindful, therefore, of your own dignity, advance upon the enemy with spirit, and account that our present necessity and difficulties are far greater objects of terror than the enemy.”

LXIX. Having delivered this exhortation, Nicias immediately led on the army.

As to the Syracusans, they, not expecting at present that they were going to fight, had some of them, as the city was near, gone thither; and who, though they took up arms with all haste, and set off at full run, yet came too late; each, however, joining the ranks of any corps that he happened to approach.¹ For indeed they were not deficient in *courage*, either in that battle or in the rest; but, though not indeed inferior in bravery so long as their skill held out, when *that* fell short, they, however unwillingly, slackened in their alacrity.² Never-

⁷ For *they* urge that, &c.] So Æschyl. Theb. 13. ὥστε συμπεριτὲς, Πόλει τ' ἀρήγειν, καὶ θεῶν ἐγχωρίων βωμοῖσι, τιμὰς μὴ ἔλατφθῆναι ποτὶ τέκνοισ τε, γῇ τε μητρὶ, φιλότατ' τροφῇ. Compare also the Pers. 400 seqq.

⁸ You are to fight in what is not your country, &c.] Such seems to be the true sense of this perplexed passage. I have ever been of opinion that οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι is put for ἐν οὐ πατρίδι, on which see 1, 141. and 6, 18. And this is confirmed by Bauer and Goeller. The construction is: ἐγὼ δὲ (παρά-κελεύομαι) ὅτι ἐν οὐ πατρίδι (ἀγὼν ἴσται) ἀλλ' (ἐν χώρᾳ) ἐξ ἧς (ὀρμωμένους ὑμᾶς) κρατεῖν δεῖ, ἢ (ἐξ ἧς) μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποχωρεῖν (ἴσται). The δεῖ is to be repeated in the sense of *will*, by dilogia. As to the ellipsis of ὀρμωμένους, it is somewhat harsh, but Thucydidean; and this view is confirmed by a kindred passage at 6, 50. κατεσκέψαντο τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὀρμωμένοις πολεμητέα ἦν. See also 3, 85. and 4, 63. s. f.

¹ Not expecting at present, &c.] Such seems to be the true sense of the passage.

² When that fell short, they, &c.] Literally, “gave up part of their

theless, though never thinking that the Athenians would *first* attack *them*, and being compelled to come to combat in haste, they took up their arms, and immediately advanced against the enemy. And first the stone-casters and the slingers³ maintained a prelusive skirmish, and, as is usual with light troops, mutually routed and chased each other. Then the soothsayers brought forward the accustomed victims.⁴ And now the trumpeters roused the heavy-armed to the engagement. And they respectively marched on, the *Syracusans*, to fight for their country, and each, individually for his own present preservation and future freedom. Of their *enemies*, the *Athenians* had to contest both for a foreign country, in order to hold it as their own, and not, by being defeated, to injure their own. The *Argives and independent allies*, to assist the Athenians in acquiring what they came for, and after victory, to again revisit their own country. The *subject allies* were prompt to engage, principally for their immediate safety, not to be hoped for unless they should conquer; and next, as a

alacrity." We must not too rigidly scan the expression *ἀκοντες προυδίσαν τὴν βούλησιν*: it must be taken *populariter*. The best commentary on the sense is a kindred passage at 2, 89. *τῷ δὲ ἑκάτεροι τι ἐμπειρότεροι εἶναι θρασύτεροι ἐσμέν.*

³ *Stone-casters and the slingers.*] It is plain from this passage that the former, who threw stones with the hand, were distinct from those that launched them with slings; the missiles of the former being, we may suppose, more formidable from their size and weight; those of the latter, from the impetus with which they were thrown. In proof and illustration of this distinction, Wasse has here adduced several passages, only *one* of which, however, (Pollux 1. 131.) have mention of the *λεθοόδοι*. Stephens in his *Thes.*, however, supplies another from *Athenæus*, to which I add Polyb. 8, 7, 2. and 9, 41, 8.

⁴ *Brought forward the accustomed victims.*] Duker refers (as alluding to this custom) to Pollux 1, 162. To which may be added Eurip. *Phœn.* 1125. *Πορ. ἔχωρε, σφάγι' ἔχων ἐφ' ἄρμασιν ὁ μάντις Ἀμφίραος.* In the passage of Pollux referred to by Duker, for *προὔθυσαν οἱ μάντις τὰ ἱερεῖα ἰθύσαντο*, I suspect, ought to be read *προὔθισαν οἱ μάντις ἱερεῖα, ἰθύσαντο* (scil. *ἱερ.*). Now, *προὔθισαν* (which will answer to the *προὔφερων* of Thucydides) is read in one MS., and favoured by another.

It may be remembered that Brasidas, immediately previous to the battle, and though the time was pressing, yet did not omit this religious observance. And here, may we not suppose that, as Thucydides thought proper to minutely advert to this among many other observances, both religious and civil, he contemplated the possibility, perhaps the probability, of a period arriving, when the former would be exploded, and the latter be only a tale of other times? On the same principle we may account for the geographical and genealogical details, many of which his own countrymen and contemporaries could not need.

secondary motive, in order that by cooperating in the subjugation of others, *their* yoke might be made the easier.

LXX. And now, coming to close combat, they, for a long time, respectively maintained their ground; and it happened that there came on thunder and lightning, and heavy rain¹, insomuch, that to those who² were fighting their first battle, and very little conversant with war, this, too, contributed to alarm them³; whereas, to the better informed and experienced⁴, what happened was supposed to have occurred by the ordinary effects of the time of year⁵; and, by thus maintaining the combat unconquered, they threw the enemy into much greater alarm.⁶ At length, the Argives first making the left of the Syracusans

¹ *There came on thunder and lightning and heavy rain.*] Probably, flashing and beating chiefly in the Syracusans' faces. So in a similar passage of Pausan. 4, 21, 4, it is said: ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπήγαγεν ἄθρόον μᾶλλον μετὰ ἰσχυροῦ τῶν βροντῶν τοῦ ψόφου, καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν ἐναντίας ταῖς ἀστραπαῖς ἐξέπληττε.

Perhaps this was the period when a stratagem, recorded by Pausan. 1, 40, 7. and ascribed (wrongly) to Alcibiades, took place. The Athenians, seeing that the wind was directly in the face of the Syracusans, set fire to some dry fern between the armies, of which the smoke driving into the eyes of the Syracusans, annoyed them considerably; insomuch that (Polyænus tells us) they took to flight.

There is also something much to the present purpose in Polyæn. 1, 32, 2. where he records that Leonidas had the good sense to perceive, and the power to convince his troops, that in violent storms only natural causes operated. Thus he preferred fighting at such times; for his own men felt so much the more alacrity, as knowing there was no reason for superstitious fear, and aware that the enemy would be daunted.

² *Those who, &c.*] Namely, the Syracusans.

³ *Contributed to alarm them.*] I cannot but censure the temerity of Goeller in introducing *ξυνεπιλαέσθαι* into the text, in opposition to all the MSS. and Greek grammarians. He refers, indeed, to c. 3, 36.; but see the note on that passage. In defence of the common reading, *ξυνεπιλαέσθαι* I would adduce c. 8, 26. Herod. 3, 48. *ξυνεπιλάθοντο τοῦ στρατεύματος*. Menand. ap. Corp. Byz. Par. 1, 111. B. *ξυνεπιλαέσθαι οἱ τοῦ κινδύνου* *κίευν*. and 155. c. *ξυνεπιλαέσθαι τοῦ κινδύνου τοῖς οἰκείοις*.

⁴ *The better informed and experienced.*] Namely, the Athenians, who had, together with their other superior knowledge, a tolerable acquaintance with natural philosophy, and were, therefore, free from many of the superstitious fears of most other nations.

⁵ *The time of year.*] Such is, I conceive, the simplest and most exact version of *ῥα ἔτους*. So Appian 1, 399, 85. *ἐκ ποδηρίας τροφῶν, καὶ ἀκινήσιας ἔργων, καὶ ῥας ἔτους*. Arrian E. A. 1, 17, 16. *ῥα ἔτους χεμῶν ἐπιγίγνεται, καὶ βρονταὶ σκληραὶ, καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ οὐρανοῦ, κ. τ. λ.*

⁶ *And, by thus maintaining, &c.*] Such seems to be the real sense, though not the literal version, of the original, which has been imperfectly understood by the translators.

give ground, and, after them, the Athenians having done the same to those opposed to them, the whole of the rest of the Syracusan army was broken, and put to flight. The Athenians, however, did not pursue them far; for the Syracusan cavalry⁷ being numerous and unconquered, hindered them, and charging on their heavy infantry, if they saw any going in pursuit, held them in check. The Athenians, after following them in collected bodies, and as far as it was safe, then retreated, and set up a trophy. But the Syracusans rallying on the road to Helorum, and putting themselves in the best order that circumstances would permit, conveyed (notwithstanding what had happened⁸) a guard to Olympieum⁹, fearing lest the Athenians should take away the treasure there deposited, and the rest retreated to the city.

LXXI. As to the Athenians, they made no movement on the temple; but collecting together their own dead, and laying them on pyres, they spent the night there. On the following day, they gave up to the Syracusans their dead, under treaty. There were slain of them and their allies about two hundred and sixty. Of their own men, who were slain to the number of

⁷ *The Syracusan cavalry.*] These do not appear to have been *in line*. They were probably stationed behind; for Plutarch Nic. 16. says that they were in the way of the flying infantry.

⁸ *Notwithstanding what had happened.*] It is plain that the defeat was but trifling. And to this Thucydides adverts in the *ὑμῶς*, which Goeller absurdly renders, "*quamvis vix sufficebantur urbi defendendæ, tamen,*" &c. Thucydides has never given us the least reason to suppose that the Syracusans were scarcely numerous enough to defend their city.

⁹ *Conveyed a guard to Olympieum*] The rallying on the road to Helorum was intended to cover this movement; for, on inspecting the *plan*, it will appear that no troops could be conveyed to Olympieum but by a very circuitous road, except in this direction.

From Polyæn. p. 345, 5. and Diodor. l. 13, 6. it appears that the Olympieum was taken by the Athenians on their first entering the port; and the former adds, that they did not meddle with any of the sacred offerings, but appointed the Syracusan priest to keep guard over them. This, however, is inconsistent with the account of Thucydides, which is confirmed by Plutarch Nic. 16., who blames Nicias for *not* occupying the temple, but suffering the Syracusans to send a garrison to it; though it does not seem that the Athenians were *ever* able to *prevent* the Syracusans from garrisoning it, at least, after they had returned from Catana. The only time at which they *might* have seized the Olympieum was at the very time when Polyænus and Diodorus say they did so, namely, at their first entering the great port; and

fifty, they collected the bones¹; and, with the spoils of the enemy in their possession, they sailed away to Catana.² For it was winter, and it was thought no longer practicable to carry on the war thence, before they had procured cavalry from Athens, and assembled some from their allies in those parts (that they might not be utterly beaten out of the field by cavalry): also until money were collected from thence, and pro-

even then they had so many other things to attend to, as the securing of their camp, that *this* was not likely to be thought of. *

¹ *Collected the bones.*] Namely, in order to be interred in their own country. So Æschyl. Agam. 423. ἀντι δὲ πατρῶν Τεύχη καὶ σποδὸς εἰς ἑκάστου δόμους ἀφικνεῖται.

² *Sailed away to Catana.*] Plutarch censures Nicias for making no advantage of so brilliant a victory, but retiring to Catana; and he brings against him the usual charge of tardiness and delay, if not timidity. But Nicias and Lamachus had in the late affair against Syracuse shown much decision, judgment, and courage: and it really does not seem that he would have been justified in continuing any longer at Syracuse, for it was now the unwholesome season of autumn, and his position, so near the marshy pool of Lysimelia could not be a healthy one; circumstances which afterwards were found very detrimental. And to stay the winter in so inclement and cooped up a spot could have answered no purpose; for, until the Syracusans were beaten in the field, no operations could be attempted against the city. But to beat them in the field was hopeless, without cavalry; for there was no other position where Nicias could have ventured on a battle but his late one, and *that* the Syracusans would of course avoid. Thus it appears that had the Athenians stayed at their position, they could have effected nothing against Syracuse, and the army must have suffered severely from disease; and, therefore, it was not only justifiable, but highly expedient, that they should remove to Catana, to husband their strength, and recruit their numbers.

The only fault, perhaps, was the original one of coming to a country celebrated for its horse, almost entirely without cavalry. But it may be asked, why should he have come to Syracuse at all, unless he meant to stay? what purpose could the expedition serve? To which it may be answered, that it was necessary to restore the tarnished glory of Athens, and to decide the wavering cities of Sicily. And it was impossible to say what consequences might not have followed a decisive and utter defeat of the Syracusans, which was not improbable: and we may suppose Nicias was not aware of the real number of the Syracusan horse. But, as it happened, the victory was any thing but decisive; and had not the violent tempest occurred, there would probably have been none at all. And Nicias had seen so much bravery displayed in the fight, and such an overwhelming force of cavalry, as left him no hope of subduing Syracuse without reinforcements

* Plutarch, indeed, affirms that they not only *did think* of it, but wished to have done it; but that Nicias intentionally neglected so to do, because he was unwilling that any impiety should be committed which could only benefit individuals, not the state; which is certainly very accordant with the religious character of this commander.

cured from Athens; and until they had brought over certain cities (which they hoped after this battle would more readily listen to their requests); and before they had prepared corn and other necessities, in order to ^{make} an attack on Syracuse in the spring.

LXXII. With this intention, they sailed away for Naxos and Catana, to winter there. As to the Syracusans, they, after burying their dead, held an assembly. And Hermocrates son of Hermon (a person who, in other respects, seemed to be inferior to no one in wisdom, and, in war, of competent skill and experience, and of distinguished bravery) came forward, to animate their courage, and would not suffer them to be dismayed at what had befallen them. In *mind and heart*¹ they were, he said, unconquered; it was the *want of discipline* that had done the mischief.² They were, however, not so much worsted as it was likely they should, especially when contesting with Greeks most celebrated for skill, and being (so to speak) mere raw bunglers against consummate workmen.³ Highly injurious, too, was the number of generals, and the command distributed among many⁴ (for they had fifteen commanders),

¹ *In mind and heart.*] So 2, 87. οὐδὲ δικαίον, τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικῆσθαι, — τῷ ἀποθάνει ἀμελύνεσθαι.

² *It was the want of discipline, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases: "It was not in strength, but in order and discipline; not in bravery, but in system of command and subordination, that they were inferior."

³ *Being (so to speak) mere, &c.*] In this difficult and controverted passage I have followed the reading of Pollux and the margin, χειροτέχναις, which has been rightly edited by Goeller, though it had been rejected by almost all the preceding editors. Such, indeed, I long ago conceived to be the true reading, and defended and illustrated it from the following passages: Dio Cass. p. 615., where Anthony says to his men, καὶ παντὸς εἶδους μάχης καὶ χειροτέχναις ἐσσι. It is plain that Dio Cass. had then in view the present passage, and read χειροτέχναις. And so also seems Aristotle Eth. 3, 8. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόητοις ὀπλισμένοι μάχονται, καὶ ἀδύναται ἰδιώταις. Dionys. Hal. 464, 26. πολέμικων ἔργων χειροτέχναις. Eurip. Philoct. frag. 6. χειρώνακτος λόγων. in which sense Coray adduces two other examples of χείρ. from Hippocrates and Soph. Trach. 1001. This sense, indeed, is very usual in τεχνίτης, as Joseph. 861, 41. πρὸς δὲ τεχνίτας τῶν πολέμων μαχοῦμεθα. where he had, perhaps, Thucydides in view. So τεχνίτας τῶν πολέμων are opposed to αὐτοσχεδιάσθαι by Xenoph. Repub. Lac. 13. And so ἐργάτης μάχης by Suid. in Δικέβαλλος.

⁴ *Highly injurious, &c.*] According to the Homeric adage, Il. β. 304. οὐκ ἀγαθὴ πολυκοιρανίη. So also Plutarch Camill. c. 18. οὐδενὸς δ' ἥττον ἐτάραττον ἢ πολυαρχία τὰ πραττόμενα. Joseph. 172. πολυαρχία γὰρ, πρὸς

broke down the bridge over the Anapus. While they were occupied on these preparations, none of the citizens issued forth to hinder them, but first the Syracusan horse came up to bring assistance, and afterwards the infantry was collected in full force. And at first they advanced near to the camp of the Athenians; but when they found they would not come out against them, they retreated, and crossing the road to Helorum⁹, they took up their quarters for the night.

LXVII. On the day following, the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, and ranged themselves in the following order. The Argives and Mantinæans occupied the right wing, the Athenians the centre, and the rest of the allies the left. One half of their forces was placed in front¹, ranged eight deep; the other half was posted in column at the tents² in the form of an oblong square, with orders to observe if any part of the line should be in distress, and immediately repair to its assistance. The baggage-bearers

As, therefore, the Dascon occupied the farthest part of the great port so we may easily comprehend why, when Thucydides speaks at l. 7. of the *τῷ κοιλῷ καὶ μυχῷ τοῦ λιμένος*, Diodorus should, in narrating the same circumstance, substitute *τὸν κόλπον τὸν Δάσκωνα*. The name Dascon, it seems, came to be given to that sort of gulf of the great port in which it is situated.

⁹ *The road to Helorum.*] See the plan of Syracuse. Thus the road seems to have been at present the boundaries between the ground occupied by the Argives, and that by the Syracusans.

The position was a secure one, since their flanks were protected by the marsh of Lysimalia and by the city walls.

¹ *In front.*] Namely, the front of their position. Goeller maintains that it must signify, in Vordertreffen, the *van*: but he seems mistaken.

² *At the tents.*] So all the translators take *ἐν ταῖς ἐύαις*, except Goeller, who maintains that it must mean *the shore*, or *anchorage*; on the authority of Photius and Hom. ll. 14. 77. I had myself, long since, noticed the gloss of Photius; but I am inclined to think the lexicographer mistaken in his interpretation, which is certainly very harsh; neither is it easy to see why the column should have been placed at the anchorage, where there was nothing to defend. Whereas, ranged at the tents and rear of the first column, they would be ready to act as a corps de reserve; and that they were to serve as such, is expressly indicated in the words following. The *ἐύαις* has here the same sense as at 3, 111. *ἐν ταῖς ἐύαις*, which should be rendered, "in their tents."

It may perhaps be thought strange that the Athenians should not have placed *more* than the *half* of their force in line. The reason, however, seems to have been, that the *half*, ranged eight deep, would occupy the whole front of their position, which was flanked on the left by the marsh, and on the right by the precipitous ground near the sea.

and sutlers they placed between the reserve and the front line.³

The Syracusans ranged *their* heavy infantry *sixteen* deep, consisting of the whole force of the Syracusans, and such allies as were present. These were supported principally by the Selinuntians, then by Geloan cavalry, some two hundred in all, and of Camarinæans about one hundred and twenty horse, and about fifty archers. Their cavalry, to the number of not less than twelve hundred, they posted on the right wing, and next them the lancers.

The Athenians being about to attack first, Nicias advanced along the line by nations, and then made the following general address:—

LXVIII. “What need, comrades, can there be of a long exhortation to such as (like ourselves) are come for the sole purpose of fighting.⁴ Indeed, the very army itself seems to me more calculated to impart courage than fine spoken words with an insufficient armament.⁵ For where (as now) Argives⁶, Mantinæans, Athenians, and the flower of the islanders are present, how is it possible that we should *not* (associated with so many and so brave allies) have a great, nay, *every* hope of victory? especially having to contend against men defending themselves in promiscuous posse, and not chosen troops, like

³ *The baggage-bearers and sutlers, &c.*] Such is the sense maintained by Goeller in an elaborate note, which see. I am, however, half inclined to prefer the common interpretation, “within the reserve;” i. e. within the hollow square. For the sense in question cannot easily be elicited from the words; and it should seem injudicious to interpose a posse of baggage-bearers and camp-followers between the two lines, thus impeding the motions of the reserve in rendering assistance to the front line.

⁴ *What need, &c.*] Such appears to be the sense, which, however, is somewhat obscurely expressed. The Athenians had not only come to Syracuse to seek a battle with the Syracusans, but they seem this day to have *first* drawn up in order of battle; and therefore the words οἱ πάρεσμεν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀγῶνα may refer to *both*.

⁵ *Indeed, the very army, &c.*] So Onosand. p. 65, 5. λόγοις μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἡπίστησαν, ὥς τοῦ καιροῦ πεπλασμένοις ἔνεκεν. ὅψιν δὲ θαρσοῦσαν ἀνυπόκριτον εἶναι νομίζοντες, ἐπιστάσαντο τὴν ἀφορίαν. There is a sentiment very similar in Xen. Cyr. 6, 4, 5. τί οὖν με δεῖ καὶ ἐν ἑκαστον λέγειν; τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οἶμαι σοὶ πιθανώτερα παρεσχῆσθαι τῶν λεχθέντων λόγων. also at 3, 3, 55.

⁶ *For where (as now) Argives, &c.*] See a similar passage in Xen. Cyr. 2, 3, 5. This was certainly a very adroitly-turned compliment to his allies.

ourselves, and moreover against *Siceliots*, who indeed *contemn*, but will not *withstand* us, by reason of their skill being inferior to their courage.

“Let, too, *this* occur to the mind of every one—that we are far from our country, and near no friendly state, nor any but such as we can gain by our swords. And now I am, I know, going to suggest an admonitory remembrance the reverse of the exhortation employed by our enemies. For *they* urge that ⁷ the contest will be for their country; but I, that you are to fight in what is *not* your country, but that wherein you must conquer, or not easily get away ⁸—for a numerous cavalry will press upon you. Mindful, therefore, of your own dignity, advance upon the enemy with spirit, and account that our present necessity and difficulties are far greater objects of terror than the enemy.”

LXIX. Having delivered this exhortation, Nicias immediately led on the army.

As to the Syracusans, they, not expecting at present that they were going to fight, had some of them, as the city was near, gone thither; and who, though they took up arms with all haste, and set off at full run, yet came too late; each, however, joining the ranks of any corps that he happened to approach.¹ For indeed they were not deficient in *courage*, either in that battle or in the rest; but, though not indeed inferior in bravery so long as their skill held out, when *that* fell short, they, however unwillingly, slackened in their alacrity.² Never-

⁷ For *they* urge that, &c.] So Æschyl. Theb. 13. ὅτε συμπεπῆς, Πόλει τ' ἀρήγειν, καὶ θεῶν ἐγχωρίων βωμοῖσι, τιμὰς μὴ ἔαλειφθῆναι ποτὶ Τέκνοις τε, γῇ τε μητρὶ, φιλόατρ' τροφῇ. Compare also the Pers. 400 seqq.

⁸ You are to fight in what is not your country, &c.] Such seems to be the true sense of this perplexed passage. I have ever been of opinion that οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι is put for ἐν οὐ πατρίδι, on which see 1, 141. and 6, 18. And this is confirmed by Bauer and Goeller. The construction is: ἐγὼ δὲ (παρακλεύομαι) ὅτι ἐν οὐ πατρίδι (ἀγὼν ἵσται) ἀλλ' (ἐν χώρῃ) ἐξ ἧς (ὀρμωμένους ὑμᾶς) κρατεῖν δεῖ, ἢ (ἐξ ἧς) μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποχωρεῖν (ἵσται). The δεῖ is to be repeated in the sense of *will*, by dialogia. As to the ellipsis of ὀρμωμένους, it is somewhat harsh, but Thucydidean; and this view is confirmed by a kindred passage at 6, 50. κατεσκέψαντο τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὀρμωμένοις πολεμητρία ἦν. See also 3, 85. and 4, 63. s. f.

¹ Not expecting at present, &c.] Such seems to be the true sense of the passage.

² When that fell short, they, &c.] Literally, “gave up part of their

theless, though never thinking that the Athenians would *first* attack *them*, and being compelled to come to combat in haste, they took up their arms, and immediately advanced against the enemy. And first the stone-casters and the slingers³ maintained a prelude skirmish, and, as is usual with light troops, mutually routed and chased each other. Then the soothsayers brought forward the accustomed victims.⁴ And now the trumpeters roused the heavy-armed to the engagement. And they respectively marched on, the *Syracusans*, to fight for their country, and each, individually for his own present preservation and future freedom. Of their *enemies*, the *Athenians* had to contest both for a foreign country, in order to hold it as their own, and not, by being defeated, to injure their own. The *Argives and independent allies*, to assist the Athenians in acquiring what they came for, and after victory, to again revisit their own country. The *subject allies* were prompt to engage, principally for their immediate safety, not to be hoped for unless they should conquer; and next, as a

alacrity." We must not too rigidly scan the expression *ἀκοντες προῦδισαν τὴν βούλησιν*: it must be taken *populariter*. The best commentary on the sense is a kindred passage at 2, 89. *τῷ δὲ ἐκότεροι τι ἐμπειρότεροι εἶναι θρασύτεροι ἰσμεν*.

³ *Stone-casters and the slingers.*] It is plain from this passage that the former, who threw stones with the hand, were distinct from those that launched them with slings; the missiles of the former being, we may suppose, more formidable from their size and weight; those of the latter, from the impetus with which they were thrown. In proof and illustration of this distinction, Wasse has here adduced several passages, only *one* of which, however, (Pollux 1. 131.) have mention of the *λιθοβόλοι*. Stephens in his *Thes.*, however, supplies another from Athenæus, to which I add Polyb. 8, 7, 2. and 9, 41, 8.

⁴ *Brought forward the accustomed victims.*] Duker refers (as alluding to this custom) to Pollux 1, 162. To which may be added Eurip. *Phœn.* 1125. Pors. *ἐχῶρει, σφάγι' ἔχων ἐφ' ἄρμασιν ὁ μάντις Ἀμφιάραος*. In the passage of Pollux referred to by Duker, for *προῦδισαν οἱ μάντις τὰ ἱερεῖα ἐθύσαντο*, I suspect, ought to be read *προῦδισαν οἱ μάντις ἱερεῖα, ἐθύσαντο* (scil. *ἱερ*). Now, *προῦδισαν* (which will answer to the *προῦφερον* of Thucydides) is read in one MS., and favoured by another.

It may be remembered that Brasidas, immediately previous to the battle, and though the time was pressing, yet did not omit this religious observance. And here, may we not suppose that, as Thucydides thought proper to minutely advert to this among many other observances, both religious and civil, he contemplated the possibility, perhaps the probability, of a period arriving, when the former would be exploded, and the latter be only a tale of other times? On the same principle we may account for the geographical and genealogical details, many of which his own countrymen and contemporaries could not need.

secondary motive, in order that by cooperating in the subjugation of others, *their* yoke might be made the easier.

LXX. And now, coming to close combat, they, for a long time, respectively maintained their ground; and it happened that there came on thunder and lightning, and heavy rain¹, insomuch, that to those who² were fighting their first battle, and very little conversant with war, this, too, contributed to alarm them³; whereas, to the better informed and experienced⁴, what happened was supposed to have occurred by the ordinary effects of the time of year⁵; and, by thus maintaining the combat unconquered, they threw the enemy into much greater alarm.⁶ At length, the Argives first making the left of the Syracusans

¹ *There came on thunder and lightning and heavy rain.*] Probably, flashing and beating chiefly in the Syracusans' faces. So in a similar passage of Pausan. 4, 21, 4, it is said: ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπήγαγεν ἀέρον μάλλον μετὰ ἰσχυροῦ τῶν βροντῶν τοῦ ψόφου, καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν ἰναγτίαις ταῖς ἀστραπαῖς ἐξέπληττε.

Perhaps this was the period when a stratagem, recorded by Pausan. 1, 40, 7. and ascribed (wrongly) to Alcibiades, took place. The Athenians, seeing that the wind was directly in the face of the Syracusans, set fire to some dry fern between the armies, of which the smoke driving into the eyes of the Syracusans, annoyed them considerably; insomuch that (Polyænus tells us) they took to flight.

There is also something much to the present purpose in Polyæn. 1, 32, 2. where he records that Leonidas had the good sense to perceive, and the power to convince his troops, that in violent storms only natural causes operated. Thus he *preferred* fighting at such times; for his own men felt so much the more alacrity, as knowing there was no reason for superstitious fear, and aware that the enemy would be daunted.

² *Those who, &c.*] Namely, the Syracusans.

³ *Contributed to alarm them.*] I cannot but censure the temerity of Goeller in introducing *ἐννεπιθαλίσθαι* into the text, in opposition to all the MSS. and Greek grammarians. He refers, indeed, to c. 3, 36.; but see the note on that passage. In defence of the common reading, *ἐννεπιθαλίσθαι* I would adduce c. 8, 26. Herod. 3, 48. *ἐννεπιθάβοντο τοῦ στρατεύματος*. Menand. ap. Corp. Byz. Par. 1, 111. B. *ἐννεπιθαλίσθαι οἱ τοῦ κινδύνου ἰκίευν*. and 155. c. *ἐννεπιθαλίσθαι τοῦ κινδύνου τοῖς οἰκείοις*.

⁴ *The better informed and experienced.*] Namely, the Athenians, who had, together with their other superior knowledge, a tolerable acquaintance with natural philosophy, and were, therefore, free from many of the superstitious fears of most other nations.

⁵ *The time of year.*] Such is, I conceive, the simplest and most exact version of *ῥα ἔτους*. So Appian 1, 399, 85. *ἐκ ποδηρίας τροφῶν, καὶ ἀκινήσιας ἔργων, καὶ ῥας ἔτους*. Arrian E. A. 1, 17, 16. *ῥα ἔτους χειμῶν ἐπιγίγνεται, καὶ βρονταὶ σκληραὶ, καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ οὐρανοῦ, κ. τ. λ.*

⁶ *And, by thus maintaining, &c.*] Such seems to be the real sense, though not the literal version, of the original, which has been imperfectly understood by the translators.

give ground, and, after them, the Athenians having done the same to those opposed to them, the whole of the rest of the Syracusan army was broken, and put to flight. The Athenians, however, did not pursue them far; for the Syracusan cavalry⁷ being numerous and unconquered, hindered them, and charging on their heavy infantry, if they saw any going in pursuit, held them in check. The Athenians, after following them in collected bodies, and as far as it was safe, then retreated, and set up a trophy. But the Syracusans rallying on the road to Helorum, and putting themselves in the best order that circumstances would permit, conveyed (notwithstanding what had happened⁸) a guard to Olympieum⁹, fearing lest the Athenians should take away the treasure there deposited, and the rest retreated to the city.

LXXI. As to the Athenians, they made no movement on the temple; but collecting together their own dead, and laying them on pyres, they spent the night there. On the following day, they gave up to the Syracusans their dead, under treaty. There were slain of them and their allies about two hundred and sixty. Of their own men, who were slain to the number of

⁷ *The Syracusan cavalry.*] These do not appear to have been *in line*. They were probably stationed behind; for Plutarch Nic. 16. says that they were in the way of the flying infantry.

⁸ *Notwithstanding what had happened.*] It is plain that the defeat was but trifling. And to this Thucydides adverts in the *ἔμωε*, which Goeller absurdly renders, "*quamvis vix sufficebantur urbi defendendæ, tamen,*" &c. Thucydides has never given us the least reason to suppose that the Syracusans were scarcely numerous enough to defend their city.

⁹ *Conveyed a guard to Olympieum.*] The rallying on the road to Helorum was intended to cover this movement; for, on inspecting the *plan*, it will appear that no troops could be conveyed to Olympieum but by a very circuitous road, except in this direction.

From Polyæn. p. 345, 5. and Diodor. l. 13, 6. it appears that the Olympieum was taken by the Athenians on their first entering the port; and the former adds, that they did not meddle with any of the sacred offerings, but appointed the Syracusan priest to keep guard over them. This, however, is inconsistent with the account of Thucydides, which is confirmed by Plutarch Nic. 16., who blames Nicias for *not* occupying the temple, but suffering the Syracusans to send a garrison to it; though it does not seem that the Athenians were *ever* able to *prevent* the Syracusans from garrisoning it, at least, after they had returned from Catana. The only time at which they *might* have seized the Olympieum was at the very time when Polyænus and Diodorus say they did so, namely, at their first entering the great port; and

fifty, they collected the bones¹; and, with the spoils of the enemy in their possession, they sailed away to Catana.² For it was winter, and it was thought no longer practicable to carry on the war thence, before they had procured cavalry from Athens, and assembled some from their allies in those parts (that they might not be utterly beaten out of the field by cavalry): also until money were collected from thence, and pro-

even then they had so many other things to attend to, as the securing of their camp, that *this* was not likely to be thought of.*

¹ *Collected the bones.*] Namely, in order to be interred in their own country. So Æschyl. Agam. 423. ἀντὶ δὲ φετρῶν Τεύχη καὶ σποδὸς εἰς ἑκάστου δόμον ἀφικνεῖται.

² *Sailed away to Catana.*] Plutarch censures Nicias for making no advantage of so brilliant a victory, but retiring to Catana; and he brings against him the usual charge of tardiness and delay, if not timidity. But Nicias and Lamachus had in the late affair against Syracuse shown much decision, judgment, and courage: and it really does not seem that he would have been justified in continuing any longer at Syracuse, for it was now the unwholesome season of autumn, and his position, so near the marshy pool of Lysimelia could not be a healthy one; circumstances which afterwards were found very detrimental. And to stay the winter in so inclement and cooped up a spot could have answered no purpose; for, until the Syracusans were beaten in the field, no operations could be attempted against the city. But to beat them in the field was hopeless, without cavalry; for there was no other position where Nicias could have ventured on a battle but his late one, and *that* the Syracusans would of course avoid. Thus it appears that had the Athenians stayed at their position, they could have effected nothing against Syracuse, and the army must have suffered severely from disease; and, therefore, it was not only justifiable, but highly expedient, that they should remove to Catana, to husband their strength, and recruit their numbers.

The only fault, perhaps, was the original one of coming to a country celebrated for its horse, almost entirely without cavalry. But it may be asked, why should he have come to Syracuse at all, unless he meant to stay? what purpose could the expedition serve? To which it may be answered, that it was necessary to restore the tarnished glory of Athens, and to decide the wavering cities of Sicily. And it was impossible to say what consequences might not have followed a decisive and utter defeat of the Syracusans, which was not improbable: and we may suppose Nicias was not aware of the real number of the Syracusan horse. But, as it happened, the victory was any thing but decisive; and had not the violent tempest occurred, there would probably have been none at all. And Nicias had seen so much bravery displayed in the fight, and such an overwhelming force of cavalry, as left him no hope of subduing Syracuse without reinforcements.

* Plutarch, indeed, affirms that they not only *did think of it*, but wished to have done it; but that Nicias intentionally neglected so to do, because he was unwilling that any impiety should be committed which could only benefit individuals, not the state; which is certainly very accordant with the religious character of this commander.

cured from Athens; and until they had brought over certain cities (which they hoped after this battle would more readily listen to their requests); and before they had prepared corn and other necessaries, in order to ^{make} an attack on Syracuse in the spring.

LXXII. With this intention, they sailed away for Naxos and Catana, to winter there. As to the Syracusans, they, after burying their dead, held an assembly. And Hermocrates son of Hermon (a person who, in other respects, seemed to be inferior to no one in wisdom, and, in war, of competent skill and experience, and of distinguished bravery) came forward, to animate their courage, and would not suffer them to be dismayed at what had befallen them. In *mind and heart*¹ they were, he said, unconquered; it was the *want of discipline* that had done the mischief.² They were, however, not so much worsted as it was likely they should, especially when contesting with Greeks most celebrated for skill, and being (so to speak) mere raw bunglers against consummate workmen.³ Highly injurious, too, was the number of generals, and the command distributed among many⁴ (for they had fifteen commanders),

¹ *In mind and heart.*] So 2, 87. οὐδὲ δίκαιον, τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικῆσθαι, — τῷ ἀποβάντι ἀμελύνεσθαι.

² *It was the want of discipline, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases: "It was not in strength, but in order and discipline; not in bravery, but in system of command and subordination, that they were inferior."

³ *Being (so to speak) mere, &c.*] In this difficult and controverted passage I have followed the reading of Pollux and the margin, χειροτέχναι, which has been rightly edited by Goeller, though it had been rejected by almost all the preceding editors. Such, indeed, I long ago conceived to be the true reading, and defended and illustrated it from the following passages: Dio Cass. p. 615., where Anthony says to his men, καὶ παντὶ εἶδους μάχης καὶ χειροτέχναι ἐστέ. It is plain that Dio Cass. had then in view the present passage, and read χειροτέχναι. And so also seems Aristotle Eth. 5, 8. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὠπλισμένοι μάχονται, καὶ ἀσθηταὶ ἰδιώταις. Dionys. Hal. 464, 26. πολέμιων ἔργων χειροτέχναι. Eurip. Philoct. frag. 6. χειρώνακτος λόγων. in which sense Coray adduces two other examples of χεῖρος. from Hippocrates and Soph. Trach. 1001. This sense, indeed, is very usual in τεχνίτης, as Joseph. 861, 41. πρὸς δὲ τεχνίτας τῶν πολέμιων μαχοῦμεθα. where he had, perhaps, Thucydides in view. So τεχνίτας τῶν πολέμιων are opposed to αὐτοσχεδιάσθαι by Xenoph. Repub. Lac. 13. And so ἐργάτης μάχης by Suid. in Δεκίβαλλος.

⁴ *Highly injurious, &c.*] According to the Homeric adage, Il. β. 304. οὐκ ἀγαθὴ πολυκοιρανίη. So also Plutarch Camill. c. 18. οὐδένος δ' ἦτρον ἐτάραττεν ἢ πολυαρχία τὰ πραττόμενα. Joseph. 172. πολυαρχία γὰρ, πρὸς

and the disorderly insubordination⁵ of the multitude. If, on the contrary, the commanders were few and skilful, and they would, during the winter, train the heavy infantry, deliver out arms and armour to such as had them not⁶, that they may be as numerous as possible, and compel them to such other drilling as was necessary, they would, he said, be likely to overcome the enemy; if also to bravery, which they had, were superadded good order and discipline in the field. Indeed, *both* of them (he said) would increase; the latter when exercised with dangers; and courage itself grew bolder when accompanied with the confidence of skill.⁷ They should choose commanders both few and armed with complete authority⁸, and should swear to them an oath, "that verily they would let them direct as they thought best." For thus, he said, what ought to be concealed would be better kept secret, and all other equipments and stores would be furnished in due order, and without hesitation or subterfuge.⁹

LXXIII. Having heard this discourse, the Syracusans decreed wholly according to his recommendations, and chose as commanders, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides son of Ly-

τῷ τοῖς ὀλίγῳ τι πράττειν ἀνάγκη ἔχουσιν ἐμπόδιον εἶναι, καὶ βλάπτειν πῶς τοὺς χρωμένους. Compare, too, Xenoph. Anab. 6, 1. Isocrat. Nic. p. 59.

It is truly observed by Mitford, that "it were difficult to imagine any thing more inconvenient, or more adverse to effectual exertion, than the system of military command which democratical jealousy, enforced by frequent sedition, had established at Syracuse. The supreme military authority was divided among no less than fifteen officers; and even this numerous board, if the term may be allowed, was, upon all momentous occasions, to take its orders from the people."

⁵ *Insubordination.*] Literally, anarchy. So Æschyl. Suppl. 920. πολλοὺς ἀνακτας — τάχα Ὀψέσδε θαρσεῖτ', οὐκ ἐρεῖτ' ἀναρχίαν. Theb. 1032. ἀπιστον τὴν δ' ἀναρχίαν πόλει. See Dr. Blomfield on Æschyl. Pers. 642.

⁶ *Such as had them not.*] For, among the Greeks, the heavy-armed were expected to provide their own arms and armour. Some of these Syracusans, however, it should seem, were too poor to provide them for themselves.

⁷ *Both of them would increase, &c.*] The best commentary on this is to be found in the kindred passage at 2, 87.

⁸ *Few, and armed with complete authority.*] They should (to use the words of Mitford) be few, but they should be experienced; they should be trust-worthy, and they should be trusted.

⁹ *All other equipments, &c.*] Here there seems a reference to the calls which must be made on individuals to supply what was wanting; in which case nothing but complete authority procures unhesitating obedience.

simachus, and Sicanus son of Execestas, these three.¹ And they sent ambassadors both to Corinth and to Lacedæmon, in order to form alliance with them, and prevail upon the Lacedæmonians, in defence of them, to make war more decidedly and openly against the Athenians, in order that they might either withdraw them from Sicily, or make them less inclined to send any further reinforcements to the army in Sicily.

LXXIV. As to the army of the Athenians at Catana, it presently sailed to Messene, expecting that it would be delivered into their hands. But the schemes which had been laid did not take effect. For when Alcibiades quitted the command, being summoned home, and knowing that he must become an exile, he (well aware what would be attempted) divulged the scheme to the Syracusans' party in Messene.² On which they first put to death the persons criminated, and then those who were of the same mind with them rising into sedition, and taking up arms, accomplished the point that the Athenians should not be admitted. The Athenians, after remaining thirteen days, being tossed with tempestuous weather, provisions falling short, and no prospect of success appearing, they went to Naxos³, and, forming a palisade round their camp, wintered there. They also sent a trireme to Athens, to fetch money and horsemen, which should be with them by the spring.

LXXV. The Syracusans, during the winter, raised a wall

¹ *These three.*] A sort of pleonasm very much like that of St. Paul, 1 Corinth. 13, 13. *ὅτι δὲ μὲν πλοῖς, ἑλπίς, ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα*, in my note on which passage I have adduced several other examples.

² *Divulged the scheme, &c.*] This baseness shows how little of real patriotism had before filled the bosom of this ambitious man.

³ *To Naxos.*] I have here followed Portus and Bekker, who cancel *Θῆρας*, as an interpretation of *σταύρωμα*; or rather, I conceive, of *σταυρώματα*. As to Palmer's conjecture, *Θρανίους*, it is by no means satisfactory; for it were very improbable to suppose that the Athenians would use the necessary parts of their vessels to form the paling, nor is it likely that wood would be wanting for that purpose, Sicily, and especially Italy, then abounding in wood. The conjecture of Heilman and Bauer, that this portentous *Θῆρας* stands for the name of some unknown place in the neighbourhood of Naxos, is also very improbable. I must, therefore, acquiesce in the first-mentioned method, and would illustrate the subject from the following most graphic and elegant passage of Lycophron Cass. 296. *Τοῖς αὖτε τάρρος, οὔτε ναυλόχων σταδμῶν. Πρόβλημα, καὶ σταυροῖσι κορσῶτη πτέρυξ, οὐ γίεσα χρασμῆσουσαν, οὐδ' ἐπάλξεις.*

fronting the whole way towards Epipolæ; thus enclosing the Temenites ⁴, in order that, should they indeed be defeated, they might not be so easily circumvallated, as in a lesser circuit; they also put a garrison into Megara ⁵, and another into Olympeum. They also fixed palisades at the sea, at every place fit for disembarkation. Knowing, too, that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they took the field in full force against

⁴ *Temenites.*] This may be as proper an occasion as any of giving some general description of the different parts of the great city of Syracuse. Those parts were five, Ortygia, Acradina, Tyca, Neapolis, and Epipolæ. The first was that originally colonised and fortified by the Corinthians, under Archias; and, being then an island, and most of it rocky and of difficult approach, it must have been very strong. It is now about two miles in circumference; and, probably, obtained its name from the abundance of quails there. In process of time the city extended to the continent, and a suburb was added, called *Acradina*, probably from the rockiness of its ground. This, in time, occupied all the lower part of that peninsula between the Portus Laccius and the Portus Trogiliorum, and was, next to Ortygia, the best peopled, though not, I suspect, in proportion to its extent. A wall was then drawn, in a straight line, from the Portus Trogiliorum to the docks at Syracuse; and this was for some time the limit of Syracuse. Afterwards, however, were added no less than three suburbs, *Tyca*, *Temenites*, and *Epipolæ*. For as to *Neapolis*, it was of later foundation than the time of Thucydides, and occupied the situation of Temenites. Of the three above mentioned, Temenites and Tyca were so called from the temples of Apollo and of Fortune situated there, and of which the *τεμένη*, or sacred close, no doubt originally occupied a great part of their sites. *Τύκη* was, probably, Syracusan for *ρύχη*. Now these were all gradually surrounded with walls, and included in the city; though, in the time of Thucydides, only Temenites had been so enclosed, and that at the present crisis. Tyca, too, was still an open and, probably, thinly inhabited suburb. Thus, in the end, Syracuse was one of the most extensive cities in Europe, and even at this period was very considerable, and seems, as far as the vestiges of its antient extent remain, to be pretty correctly laid down in Goeller's plan.

It may be further observed that Ortygia, being the original city, was called the citadel or *the city*, *κατ' ἰσχυρὴν*. The Epipolæ, which was north of Temenites and Tyca, and of a triangular figure, derived its name from its elevated site, now called Belvedere; the highest parts of which were occupied by the Syracusan castles of Euryalus and Labdalum.*

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to add more, since the plan will better point out the site of various parts than any verbal description.

⁵ *Megara.*] Namely, the Hyblæa. Cluverius has proved that the fort here called Megara had properly the name of Styalla; and Goeller thinks it probable that Megara obtained this name from the period of the fortifying.

* The former of which names seems to mean the *broad knob*, forming the crown of the hill, *ἄλυσ* signifying *exorescence*; the latter is of uncertain derivation, but probably it may have had reference to the *peaked* form of the hill, like the letter *labda*, the Syracusan for *lambda*. As to the *άλυσ*, it seems to stand for *ἡλυσ*.

Catana⁶; and, after ravaging some of their land, and burning the tents, or huts, and camp of the Athenians, they returned home.

And having heard that the Athenians had sent an embassy to Camarina, according to the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to try if they could bring them over, the Syracusans themselves sent a counter-embassy. For they much suspected that the Camarinæans⁷ had not sent the assistance they did send cordially, at the first battle; nor would now be disposed to lend them any future assistance; and seeing that the Athenians had the best of it in the battle, would now be prevailed upon to join them according to the former alliance.

Hermocrates, then, and others, having repaired to Camarina, on the side of the Syracusans, and Euphemus, with others, on the side of the Athenians, and an assembly being convened, Hermocrates, desirous of first criminating⁸ the Athenians, spoke to the following effect:

LXXVI. "It was not, Camarinæans, because we feared lest you should be terrified at the present forces of the Athenians that we came on this embassy, but rather that we apprehended the representations which might proceed from that quarter, previously to hearing any thing from us, lest they should prevail with you.

⁶ *Took the field, &c.*] This expedition, Mitford thinks, was undertaken rather to revive the spirits of the people, than with the expectation of any important advantage.

⁷ *The Camarinæans.*] These, though a Dorian people, had been from of old adverse; they were the only Sicilian Dorians who had constantly refused to put themselves under the degrading and oppressive protection of the Syracusan commonwealth. (Mitford.) They had engaged in alliance with Athens, but with the stipulation of not admitting more than a ship at a time. They had also entered into alliance with Syracuse, at the general pacification brought about by Hermocrates; but they were very wavering, and the embassies were respectively such as to fix them decisively in the interest of one or other of the belligerents.

⁸ *First criminating.*] I here adopt, after the recent editors, the reading *προδιαβαλῆναι*, as offering a sense far more apposite. It is also confirmed and illustrated by the *προκατηγοροῦντες* of some MSS., at 3, 42.

It was usually thought politic to secure the first hearing, and thus pre-occupy the good-will of the assembly, and prejudice it against the opposite party. Sometimes, however, it was found more effectual to be the *last* speaker, since weak and wavering minds are most ready to assent to what has most recently been advanced.

“ Well, then, they have come to Sicily with the *pretext* which you have heard assigned, but with the *real intention* which we all shrewdly suspect. Yes, their meaning, I know, is not to plant the Leontines, but rather to supplant you.¹ For, surely, it were irreconcilable with reason to subvert the cities there, and to settle them here²; to be solicitous for the welfare of the *Leontines*, being *Chalcideans*, on the score of relationship, but to hold in servitude the Chalcideans in Eubœa, whose colony these are. No; it has been in the same policy that they seized dominion there, and now attempt it here.³ For becoming leaders by the voluntary appointment of the Ionians, and such as were of themselves allied, for defence against the Medes, the Athenians charging some with deficiency in military service⁴, others with mutual hostilities⁵, and to the rest, whatever specious criminations they could devise, they subjugated them all. Nor was it, truly, for the freedom of the Grecians that these people, nor for their own liberty that the Ionians opposed themselves to the Medes; but the former did it that the Greeks might be enslaved to *themselves*, not the Medes, the latter to obtain a change of master, one not *less wise*, but rather *evil-wise*!⁶ ”

¹ *Plant the Leontines, &c.*] The reader will observe the paronomasia, which, however, cannot be so well expressed in our language. Without attending to the paronomasia, we might render, *settle* — *oust*.

² *The cities there, &c.*] By the *cities* are meant the Chalcidic cities; and the words following are exegetical of the preceding.

³ *Seized dominion there, &c.*] The words *ἐκείνα* and *τὰ ἐνθάδε* seem to have been regarded by the translators as referring to the Chalcideans of Eubœa and Sicily. But, from the words which follow, it should seem that they refer not only to the Chalcideans, but also to the other states subdued by Athens. Thus the sense will be more extensive, and worthy of the author. The orator, it may be observed, proceeds from a *particular* to a *general* accusation.

⁴ *Charging some with deficiency in military service.*] Namely, that which they owed to the common league. The orator, or the historian, seems to have had in mind the very similar passage of Herodot. l. 5, 27, 7. *πάντας κατεσπέρτο* — *τοὺς μὲν, λειποσπαρίης ἐπὶ Σκύδας αἰριώμενος, τοὺς δὲ, κ. τ. λ.* The words of Thucydides are imitated by Dionys. Hal. Ant. 704, 12. *λειποσπαρίαν ἐπενέγκοντες*.

⁵ *Mutual hostilities.*] It should seem that by the laws of the confederacy, there was to be no war between the several members, but that their differences were to be settled by the suffrages of the general congress.

⁶ *One not less wise, but rather evil-wise.*] Hobbes renders, *worse wise*. But our language will not admit such a compound; nor is it required by the original, since the comparative *κακοῦναιωρόπου* δὲ seems merely to be put

LXXVII. "But we come not hither to show among you who well *know*, in how many things the Athenian state (obnoxious enough to crimination) has committed injustice; but much rather to censure ourselves, who, though having before us the examples of the Greeks there (how *they* have been enslaved by not defending each other), and now seeing the same kind of sophism¹ directed against us (the resettling of their kindred the Leontines, and the assistance of their allies the Egestæans), yet are not disposed with alacrity to unite for defence, and to show them that the people here are not *Ionians*², nor *Hellespontians*, and *islanders* who have ever bowed to the yoke of *some* master, either the Mede, or some one other; but *free Dorians*, come to inhabit Sicily, from independent Peloponnesus. Or do we wait till we each be subdued city by city, when we know that by *this* way only are we conquerable, and see them bent on this policy, namely, some of us to dissever³ by words, and others by hope of their alliance to set at war together; to others, again, to use such cajoling speeches by which they may most effectually work the ruin of each? Or do we each fancy when our distant fellow-countryman⁴ *only* is first destroyed, that the danger will not

for ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κακοζύνετος. By *evil-wise* is meant, "wise to do evil" (to use the words of Jeremiah, 4, 23.); and it denotes that kind of wisdom which the serpent in Genesis is described as possessing, and which is a mixture of craft and malice. The Scholiast and commentators, therefore, who explain the term of *craftiness*, take too limited a view of the sense.

¹ *Sophism.*] i. e. mere shallow flimsy pretences.

² *To show them that the people here are not Ionians.*] There is something very harsh in the οὐκ Ἴωνες τὰδε εἰσίν, with which Krueger and Goeller compare Eurip. Troad. 100. οὐκ εἰσι Τροία τὰδε. and the inscription on the column erected by Theseus: τὰδ' οὐχὶ Πελοπόννησος, ἀλλ' Ἴωνία. To which I add Eurip. Androm. 168. οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' Ἐκτωρ τὰδε, ἀλλ' Ἑλλάς πόλις. and Cycl. 63. οὐ τὰδε Βρόμιος κ. τ. λ. Hence may be defended the common reading in Eurip. Ion. 1464. τὰδε δ' ἔχει τυράννους. where Scaliger and Reiske conjecture γὰρ ἔχει. The above passages, however, only prove that the neuter plural was used to denote a *country*. They will not justify the bold expression of Thucydides, which may, I think, best be considered as a *blending of two phrases*, namely, οὐκ Ἴωνία τὰδε εἰσὶ and οὐκ Ἴωνες οἶδε. And, possibly, the τὰδε in the passage of Eurip. Ion. may be put for οἶδε.

³ *Dissever.*] Or, dissociate; sow dissensions among.

⁴ *Fellow-countryman.*] Not, neighbour, as the translators render. This signification of ξυνοίκος (which is altogether Thucydidean) occurs also at l. 4. of these very Siceliot, γέγονας ὄντας καὶ ξυνοίκους μίας χώρας: so also in Pausan. ap. Steph. Thes.

come to *himself*⁵, and that he who is suffering before him will be *alone* in his calamity.⁶

LXXVIII. "If, too, there be indeed any one who fancies⁷ that the Syracusans, but not himself, are the object of enmity to the Athenians, and thinks it hard to encounter danger for our country, let him reflect that he will in that country combat not so much for ours, but in an equal degree for his own likewise⁸, and with so much the more security, inasmuch as by our not being previously destroyed, he will have us for his helper, and will not have to fight destitute of aid. He should consider that the Athenians are not avenging the enmity of the Syracusans to any, but chiefly, under pretence of the Syracusans, they mean to strengthen themselves by the alliance of those.⁹ If, too, any one¹⁰ envies or fears us (both of which passions are excited by those in elevated stations), and on these accounts may wish Syracuse to be *humbled* indeed, that we may be taught moderation, but escape utter ruin¹¹, for the sake of his own safety, he is entertaining a hope not within the bounds of human power to be accomplished. For it is not possible that the same person should be at once the disposer of his own

⁵ *The danger will not come to himself.*] According to the Horatian "Tua res agitur, paries cum proxima ardet."

⁶ *Will be alone in his calamity.*] Namely, that the evil will stop there, and reach no further.

⁷ *Who fancies.*] i. e. to whom the thought may occur.

⁸ *Will in that country combat, &c.*] So far the arguments of Hermocrates were unanswerable. But when he was to justify the past conduct of Syracuse, and persuade the Camarinæans to assist the Syracusan cause, whatever fear the power of Athens might excite, the consideration of the nearer and more obvious danger preponderated, of servitude to a people of their own island, their fellow-colonists; a servitude likely to be more severe, and certainly more grating. (Mitford.)

⁹ *The Athenians are not avenging, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense of this perplexed sentence, the obscurity of which is partly owing to delicacy. By the "to any" are meant especially the Camarinæans. The Athenians, it is meant, were not come there to fight the Camarinæans' battles, but their own.

For τὴν φιλίαν, I suspect, the true reading is τῇ φιλίᾳ, which, as the sense absolutely requires it, I have followed.

¹⁰ *Any one.*] i. e. any power, meaning Camarina; for the orator, all along, through delicacy, masks his expressions under the form of *general* positions, though meant to be particular.

¹¹ *Escape utter ruin.*] This is all that περιγενέσθαι can mean; though the Scholiast and others take it to signify "obtain the victory over the Athenians."

wishes, and of *fortune*.¹² And if he should err in his reckoning, he may quickly, mourning over his own calamities, per-adventure wish he could again envy our prosperity. But this it will be impossible for any one who has abandoned us and refused to undertake the same dangers (not in word, but in fact) to bring about. For in *word*, indeed, any one would promote our preservation, but in effect his own safety.

“And it was especially incumbent on you, Camarinæans¹³, as being borderers, and whose turn of danger must come next, to have forecasted for this, and not, as now, to have assisted us so coldly; but rather *of yourselves* have come to us¹⁴; and (what, in case the Athenians had first attacked the Camarinæan territory, ye would, in your need, have ~~called~~ upon us to do) have *encouraged* us, that we might not crouch. But hitherto at least neither ye nor others have shown any such promptitude.

LXXIX. “Perhaps, however, through timidity, ye will affect to observe a *just impartiality* both towards us, and the invaders, alleging that you are in alliance with the Athenians. But this, forsooth, ye did not make to the *prejudice* of your friends, but in case any enemy should attack you; and to assist the Athenians when unjustly treated by others, and not, as now, when they themselves maltreat their neighbours; since not even the Rhegines, though they be Chalcidæans, chose to assist in replanting the Leontines. And hard were it, if *they*, mistrusting whether the matter be with good intention, show a prudence unwarranted by reason¹, while you, under a

¹² *It is not possible that, &c.*] Bauer has here a long discussion on the sense, but makes nothing clear. Indeed, he and the other interpreters miss the only clue to the sense, which is to be found in the kindred sentiment of the same orator at 4, 64. init. μηδὲ μωρία φιλονικῶν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς τε οικίας γνῶμης ὅμοιος αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι, καὶ ἥς οὐκ ἄρχω τύχης. which is a sufficient commentary on the present passage.

¹³ *Incumbent on you, Camarinæans, &c.*] The orator now slides from the indirect to the direct address.

¹⁴ *Come to us.*] Now; as now, we to you.

¹ *Show a prudence unwarranted by reason.*] i. e. beyond what reason would seem to justify, without a εὐλογος πρόφασις. Such seems to be the meaning of this obscure clause, which is thus explained by Goeller. “Nempe ἀλόγως σωφρονεῖν est caute agere, ita tamen ut rationem agendi tuam defendere non possis, quod tamen certe fore, ut Rhegini possint, prædicat orator. Eodem sensu (nicht zu rechtfertigen) λόγῳ ἀδρατ 1, 32.”

specious pretext, are desirous to benefit your natural enemies, and to destroy, in conjunction with their *open foes*, those who are yet more your *natural friends*.

“ But this were not justice; no, *that* would require you to render us assistance, and not stand in awe of their power. For if we all band together, it will not be formidable, but only if, on the contrary (which they study to promote), we split into parties; since neither when they came against us singly, and gained the advantage in battle, did they effect what they intended, but departed in haste.

LXXX. “ So that there is no reason for us (at least if we be but united) to be dejected, but to enter into alliance with the more alacrity, especially as assistance will soon arrive from the Peloponnesians, who are in all respects superior to our foes in military affairs. Nor should you think that that *cautious forethought*, namely, to aid neither, as being allies of both, is either just with respect to us, or safe in regard to yourselves. For this is not so equitable in effect as it is in allegation. For if, through your not rendering succour, the suffering party¹ be ruined, and the victor carry his purpose, what else do ye do by this same keeping aloof, but not assist the one party to be saved, and not hinder the other from doing evil?² Whereas, it were nobler for you, by joining with the wronged party (and, moreover, your kindred), to preserve the common safety of Sicily, and not to suffer your *friends*, forsooth, the Athenians, to do wrong.

“ To sum up the whole, we, Syracusans, say that it were an easy though superfluous task to clearly show either you or others what you yourselves know just as well. But we, withal, protest, if we fail to persuade you, that we are plotted against by our own perpetual foes, the Ionians, and are by you betrayed, Dorians by Dorians! And that if the Athenians do subdue us, they will, indeed, conquer by *your means*; but will

¹ *The suffering party.*] Namely, he who suffered the injury; meaning the Syracusans. Consequently, in ὁ κερῶν, *the victor*, is implied also the aggressor.

² *Not assist the one, &c.*] This sounds somewhat harsh in our language; and may in a free translation be rendered, with Hobbes, “leave the safety of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do evil.”

have the honour of it in their *own name*, and for the reward of their victory, they will have no other than the very party which put the victory into their hands. If, however, on the other hand, *we* obtain the upper hand, you must yourselves suffer punishment for the perils you will occasion us.

“Consider, therefore, and now choose, either slavery exempt from present danger, or, saving yourselves with us, not to basely take *those* as your masters, and thereby avoid an enmity with us which could not quickly be appeased.”

LXXXI. Thus spoke Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke to the following effect :

LXXXII. “Our coming hither was only for the renewal of the formerly existing alliance; but as the Syracusan orator has inveighed against us, it is necessary for us to speak respecting our dominion, showing that we hold it justly. Now, the greatest proof of this he hath himself adduced¹, in saying that the Ionians have been ever at enmity with the Dorians. The fact is even so.² For we, being Ionians, and having to do with Peloponnesian Dorians, both superior in number and close at our door, have ever had to consider in what manner we might best avoid subjection to them. And, having become masters of a navy, we, at the close of the Median war, freed ourselves from the dominion and guidance of the Lacedæmonians, there being no more cause why *they* should dictate to³ *us*, than *we* to *them*, except that they were at the present the stronger. And we ourselves being constituted leaders of those states which were before under the king, have continued to administer the office⁴, thinking that we should thus be least likely to fall under the Pelopon-

¹ *Adduced.*] Or, let fall in his speech. From the verb a participle of the same sense must be taken.

² *The fact is even so.*] Or, the case is this; for it has been rightly observed by Haack, that the words refer not so much to the preceding as the following.

³ *Dictate to.*] Such is the sense here of *ἐπιτάσσειν*, which literally signifies “issue commands to.”

⁴ *Have continued to administer the office.*] The present tense is here used for the first aorist.

nesians, having power wherewith we might defend ourselves, and, to speak the real truth, having *not unjustly* subdued the Ionians and islanders, whom, though our kindred, the Syracusans say we enslaved. For they came against us, their parent state, with the Mede, and did not venture by revolting to destroy their property, or to abandon their city, as we did; but were willing to be themselves slaves, and would have brought slavery upon us.

LXXXIII. "For these causes we took upon ourselves the dominion, and have exercised it, both as being worthy thereof (because we furnished to the service of Greece the greatest fleet, and the most unhesitating alacrity, and because *they*, by readily doing as much for the Mede, injured us), and, moreover, having been actuated by a wish to thereby furnish ourselves with strength against the Peloponnesians.¹ Nor are we using² fine rhetorical speeches³, — as that we justly hold the dominion, as alone beating off the Barbarian, or that it was for the liberation of *these*⁴, rather than

¹ *For these causes, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of this perplexed passage, the true scope of which has been, I apprehend, not clearly seen by the commentators. Goeller offers the following explanation: "Dignos, ait, nos censemus esse imperio, quod in socios exercemus, duabus de causis, quia ut nos animum maxime strenuum in bello Persico exhibuimus, ita hi in servitium regis et in damnum nostrum proni erant. Deinde, ut tuti simus a Peloponneso, socios imperio coercemus." But there would appear to be *three* causes. The truth, however, is, that the orator first urges two claims to the dominion over the Ionians. 1. That it was for the good of Greece that they should be held in subjection; and none were so worthy of the addition to dominion as the Athenians, by whose means the *whole* that *any* possessed was preserved. 2. That they had a sort of right of conquest, as over enemies and injurers. So much for the *right*; then comes the *inducement by which they were led to take it*, namely, their own security and defence against the Peloponnesians.

² *Nor are we using.*] This version is preferable to "nor do we use;" because the Athenians did sometimes, nay, it seems, not unfrequently, employ the very mode of arguing in question. See c. 1, 73 and 74.

³ *Fine rhetorical speeches.*] I have here followed the version of three MSS. καλλιπούμεθα, which has been adopted by Bekker and Goeller, after Valcknaer, who adduces two examples of the word from Plato. To which may be added Theophyl. Sim. 76. D. οὐ μεταμορφῶν τὸ μὴ κεκαλλεπημένον τῆς φρασίως, where read κεκαλλεπημένον. Schol. on Eurip. Hec. 382. τὰ κεκαλλεπημένα ῥήματα λέγειν.

⁴ *That it was for the liberation of these.*] Namely, the Ionians; as if, having delivered them from Barbarian slavery, they had a right to rule over

that of the Greeks at large and of ourselves, that we encountered the dangers. But in fact it is excusable for all to provide means for their own preservation.⁵ And now, having for own safety's sake, come hither, we conceive that your advantage is the same. This we shall show even from what they make matter of calumnious accusation, and you of too fearful surmise. Being well aware that those who entertain violent suspicions, though they may be for the moment won over by the charms of insinuating oratory, yet afterwards, when the thing comes to performance, act as their interest guides.⁶

"Well, then⁷, we have told you that we hold our empire *there* through fear⁸, and we are come with the same view, in concert with our friends, to establish matters on a secure footing *here*, with no view to enslave any, but rather to hinder any from suffering oppression.

LXXXIV. "Nor let any one object that we are solicitous for your welfare, who are nothing to us¹; for he cannot but see, that by your being preserved, and being not too weak to resist the Syracusans, we shall be less annoyed by those

them. The orator avows that it was more for *their* freedom than for that of the Greeks at large, and also of themselves.

⁵ *It is excusable, &c.*] The same phrase ἀνεκρίθονόν ἐστι is used at c. 1, 75 and 82. And so in a kindred passage of Eurip. Hippol. 499. οὐν δ' ἄγων μίγας Σώσαι βίον οὐδ', οὐκ ἐκρίθονον τόδε. Similar to which is the Homeric οὐ γὰρ τις νέμεσις φύγειν κακὸν (Il. ξ, 80.); whence may be illustrated a similar use of ἀνεμίστητον in Æschyl. p. 50. 51. and 63, 8.

⁶ *Though they may be for the moment, &c.*] This is one of the many *eternal truths* contained in this κῆρυγμα ἐς αἰεῖ, and, as a maxim of policy, is peculiarly valuable to governments like our own, where the adoption of measures depends much upon the strong appeals of oratory. We may here compare that dict of Pericles 1, 140. init. "I am well aware that men are not in the same disposition when at first induced to undertake a war, and when engaged in its toils and dangers, but that their minds fluctuate according to events."

⁷ *Well then.*] The γὰρ is inchoative.

⁸ *Through fear.*] i. e. fear of the consequences of laying it down; a subject often adverted to in the orations of Athenian orators.

¹ *That we are solicitous, &c.*] Literally, "though it does not belong to us; though we have nothing to do with it." At οὐδὲν προσήκον supply ὅν, and take the phrase as a nominative absolute. The orator means to refute the objection, that as there was no natural bond of connection between Athens and Camarina, for the former to be busy in caring for the latter might seem suspicious.

sending any forces to the aid of the Peloponnesians. Now, in this respect you are very much to us. Wherefore also, it is colourable and reasonable to re-settle the Leontines, *not* in a state of subjection, as their kindred in Eubœa, but as free and powerful as possible, in order that from their territory, as being borderers on the Syracusans, they may annoy them in our behalf. For *there*, indeed, we are of ourselves a match for our enemies; and the Chalcidæans (whom, says the orator, having enslaved there, we inconsistently² pretend to make free here) ^{are} most beneficial to us, unprovided with military defence, and only contributing money³; but the states here (both the Leontines and our other friends) will be most so, in the possession of perfect independence.

LXXXV. "And, assuredly, to any individual, as potentate, or to any state in the exercise of government⁴, nothing is *inconsistent* which is *profitable*⁵; nor is kindred anything, unless there be sure reliance.⁶ Friend or foe we must be, seasonably for each conjuncture.⁷ And it is here

² *Inconsistently.*] Or, absurdly and contradictorily.

³ *Is most beneficial to us, &c.*] By this it seems that Eubœa did not, like some other islands, contribute ships or troops, but money: and certainly it was the most effectual way of holding them in subjection, not to allow them the use of arms, and to levy no troops from them; a policy probably adopted after the final subjugation of the island by Pericles. "At this time, indeed," Haack observes, "most of the allies of the Athenians assisted the state, not with ships and arms, but only with money, or tribute; a custom which had arisen since the Persian wars, partly from the allies being averse to military operations, and partly from the Athenians themselves choosing to have it so, that they might the more securely exercise dominion over their allies, as destitute of ships and military skill."

⁴ *To any individual, &c.*] Here, it should seem, Thucydides means simply to designate the two forms of government, monarchy and democracy; by the former of which is to be understood unlimited monarchy; for such *τυράννος* denoted.

⁵ *Nothing is inconsistent, &c.*] This is meant as an answer to the above charge.

⁶ *Nor is kindred, &c.*] Smith renders, "nothing is secure that cannot be safely managed." That, however, is any thing but the sense, which has not been ill expressed by Hobbes, except that *οἰκείον* must here denote, not *friends*, but *kindred*; for there is a reference to the Chalcidæans of Eubœa, who, though their kindred, were little to be relied on, and therefore ought not to be trusted with arms.

⁷ *Friend or foe, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense of this obscure passage, which may be partly illustrated by another at l. 1, 43. γνόντες τοῦτον ἐκείνον εἶναι τὸν καρὸν, ἐν ᾧ δ, τε ὑπουργῶν, φίλος μάλιστα, καὶ ὁ ἀντιστάς, ἐχθρὸς. and l. 56. ὁ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκιοῦται καὶ πολεμοῦται.

our benefit, not to weaken our friends, but to contrive that by the strength of our friends our enemies may become powerless.

“ This you ought not to disbelieve ; for we rule over our allies there, in the very way that each may be useful to us. The Chians and Methymnæans⁸ we permit to be *independent*, on the condition of contributing ships ; but the greater part we rule somewhat more severely, by requiring a tribute of money : others, again, we permit to be allies in complete liberty, though islanders⁹ and easy to be subdued, because they are situated in places very opportune around Peloponnesus. So that it is likely that the affairs *here* should be managed in conformity to our interest¹⁰, and, as we said, our fear of the Syracusans. For they aim at dominion over you, and desire, by leaguings you together¹¹ for their interest, through suspicion of us on our departing (by force or by destitution) without accomplishing our object, *themselves* to rule over Sicily. And that cannot but be the case if ye rally around them ; for neither will so great a force combined on our part be again easily practicable to be got together, nor will *they*, if we be absent, be without power to accomplish their designs against you.

LXXXVI. “ And him who entertains other opinions the event itself will refute. For before, you called us in for assistance, holding out no other terror¹ than that if we should

⁸ *Methymnæans.*] Not the Lesbians in general ; since, on their reduction after revolt, they were condemned to a pecuniary payment, and that not as tribute, but *rent* for their lands. Thus it appears that the ships, mentioned occasionally of late as furnished by the *Lesbians*, must be understood of the Methymnæans ; which accounts for their paucity.

⁹ *Others, again, &c.*] Namely, the Zacynthians and Cephallenians.

¹⁰ *Conformity to our interest.*] With the phrase *πρὸς τὸ λυσιστελοῦν* may be compared Isæus p. 44, 51. Reisk. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων μισεῖ τὸ λυσιστελοῦν. and Æschin. p. 13, 41. οὐδ' ἰδύνατο ἀναμένειν τὸ λυσιστελοῦν.

¹¹ *Leaguings you.*] i. e. not the Camarinæans only (as interpreters suppose), but the Siceliots in general. Hobbes has mistaken the sense of the whole sentence.

¹ *Holding out no other terror.*] The true sense of *προσίειν* here has been learnedly explained by Duker and Ruhnk. To the passages cited by them may be added Eurip. Herc. Fur. 1189. τί μοι προσίειν χεῖρα σημαίνεις φόνον ; Hence may be emended a corrupt passage of Ælian frag. 1015. καὶ ἐνέκειντο τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προφέροντες, καὶ προσίοντες, ὡς εἰπεῖν, Γόργονα, κατιστόγασαν, ἀλλ' ὡς πρόβαλον ὄντα καὶ ἱταμον. where I would read καὶ

permit you to fall under the dominion of the Syracusans, we should ourselves be in danger. Now surely it were not just that you should discredit the same argument wherewith ye then sought to persuade us, nor that we should be suspected because we are here with a larger force against the power of the Syracusans; nay, it is rather just that you should give no faith to *them*. For *we* should neither be able to remain, except by your aid, and if even we were so perfidious as to reduce any states to subjection, we should be unable to hold dominion over them, by reason of the length of the voyage, and the impracticability of keeping watch over great cities and provided with continental forces.² Whereas *they*, not posted at a camp, but occupying³ a city near you more powerful than our present armament⁴, are always plotting your subjection; and whenever they find an opportunity for attacking any of you⁵, they will not let it slip. Other events have shown this, and now the affair of the Leontines. And yet they have the effrontery to solicit you, as if you were very dolts, to act against those who hinder such proceedings, and have hitherto prevented Sicily from being under their dominion. But *we*, on the other hand, invite you to a more assured safety, entreating you not to betray that which we now mutually hold by each other, and to consider that *those* have always, even *without* allies, a ready access to you by reason of their numbers; whereas, you will not often have it in your power to oppose them with so considerable an aid, which if, through suspicion, ye shall suffer to depart without effect, or even be defeated, ye will then wish⁶ to see even the smallest

ἐνέκειντο τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προφέροντες [νομοθεσίαν] καὶ προσείοντες, ὥς εἰπεῖν, Γόργονα, κατεσίγασαν ἄλλως πρόλαον ὄντα καὶ ἴταμον.

So *προτείνω* is used at Eurip. Andr. 428. and Heracl. 21.

² *Continental forces.*] Such as cavalry and heavy-armed, together with such stores as were bulky and difficult of conveyance so far.

³ *Not posted at a camp, but, &c.*] There is here a play upon the two senses of *ἵκναι*, the former of which involves the notion of a temporary abode.

⁴ *More powerful than our present armament.*] The expression *μειζον τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας* is one of more than Pindaric boldness, not to say harshness, and certainly unsuitable to an oration of no very elevated character.

⁵ *Any of you.*] Namely, Siceliot cities.

⁶ *Ye will then wish, &c.*] There is a very similar passage in Xenoph. Cyr.

portion, when, even if present, it could no longer be of any service to you.

LXXXVII. " But neither be ye, Camarinæans, persuaded to give ear to the calumnies of those, nor let others be so; for we have told you the whole truth of the matter whereof we have been suspected, and shall now only address a brief recapitulation by way of remembrance, which we think ought to prevail with you. We say, then, that we hold dominion over those yonder, that we may not be subject to any; and we are liberating those here, that we may not be injured by them. Many undertakings, however, we are compelled to embark in, because we are obliged to be on our guard many ways¹; and both now and before, we came hither not as uncalled, but sent for as helpers to such of you as suffered wrong. And you, attempt not as judges of what is done by us, nor as moderators, to divert us from our purpose (which were now hard to do²), but inasmuch as this our *busy meddling humour*³ is also profitable to you, take and use it; nor think that it alike injures all men, but, that it benefits far more of the Grecians. For all in every place⁴ (even with

5, 4, 7. *ἡ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀφῆσθε, σκόψασθε πόσιν αὖτις ἀν τοιαύτην δύναμιν λάβοιτε ξόμμαχον.* and Liv. 31, 29. *sero ac nequidquam, quam dominum Romanum habebitis, socium Philippum quaeritis.*

¹ *We are compelled to embark in, &c.]* This exactly describes the present state of our Indian empire.

² *Which were now hard to do.]* Because, as the expense of the expedition had been exceedingly heavy, the Athenians would not easily be brought to abandon the purpose of it.

³ *This busy meddling humour.]* The orator here uses the expressions employed by the enemies of Athens. Thus Acacius aptly cites Eurip. Suppl. 576. *Πράσσειν σὺ πᾶλλ' εὐδαίς, ἥ τε σὶ πόλις.* Duker, indeed, thinks that the orator uses *πολυπραγμοσύνη* in its primitive and favourable sense: but thus the sentiment will be exceedingly enervated.

⁴ *For all in every place, &c.]* Such seems to be the true sense and closest version of this involved sentence, of which the general scope is correctly pointed out by the Scholiast; but no tolerable assistance is afforded either by him or the commentators in extricating the difficulties of the phraseology. The chief of these are seated in *μη ἀδείεις εἶναι κινδυνεύειν* and *ἀναγκάζονται* — *ἀπραγμόνως σώζεσθαι*, where *ἀδείεις* is to be taken in a passive sense, like the Latin participles in *duo*. At *κινδυνεύειν* is to be supplied *αὐτόν*, and *ἡμᾶς* and *ὥστε* at *ἀδείεις εἶναι*: a somewhat harsh ellipsis. At *ἀναγκάζονται ἀπραγμόνως σώζεσθαι* the sense of *ἀναγκ.* is not to be pressed on, but, by dilogia, somewhat modified to the second clause of this sententia bimembris.

which we have no friendly connection), both he who fears he shall be wronged, and he who meditates wrong, by reason of the present hope the one has of obtaining aid from us, and the full expectation of the other, that if we come, he may run the risk of finding us formidable enemies — both parties are obliged, the one to learn moderation, however unwillingly, the other to seek his safety without troubling others.

“This common security, then, which now is presented, both to the power that asks it⁵, and to yourselves, reject not; but, acting like other men, instead of always *standing on your guard* against the Syracusans, now unite with us, and take your part to *counterplot* against them, as they have against you.”⁶

LXXXVIII. Thus spoke Euphemus. As to the Camarinæans, they stood thus affected: they were, indeed, well disposed to the Athenians, except as far as they supposed that they meditated the subjugation of Sicily; while with the Syracusans they had ever been at difference on account of questions about borders.¹ Standing, however, in not less awe of the latter, as being so near them, and apprehensive lest they should, even *without* their aid, obtain the superiority, they had at the first sent that small body of cavalry, and now resolved for the *future* rather to aid the Syracusans, though, in fact, as sparingly as possible; but for the *present*, that they might not seem to concede less to the *Athenians*, since they had been victors in the battle, they resolved to return an equal answer to both.

So, after having deliberated, they returned this reply. “That since there happens to be a war between those who are their allies, it seemed to them most agreeable to their oaths to at

This sort of influence, it may be observed, has long been exercised by Great Britain in the affairs of Europe, not to say the world at large.

⁵ *The power that asks it.*] i. e. Athens, which is here, as often, considered as a person.

⁶ *Instead of always, &c.*] It is not difficult to perceive the general meaning of the sentence; but to express it so as not to sacrifice the sense, or lose the *point*, hoc opus, hic labor est.

There is something similar at l. 3, 12. fin.

¹ *On account of questions about borders.*] Or, by reason of being borderers.

present aid neither party." And with this answer the ambassadors departed.

And now the Syracusans put their own affairs in preparation for the war; while the Athenians who were encamped at Naxos were negotiating with the Siculi, that as many as possible should join their party. And those, indeed, of the Siculi who inhabited rather the lowlands, being under subjection to the Syracusans, most of them kept aloof²; but of those that occupied the interior (their habitations being ever aforetime independent and inviolate³) all but a few were immediately on the side of the Athenians, and brought down to the army provisions, and occasionally money also. Against those that had not come over the Athenians sent forces, and some they brought over by compulsion; but in respect to others, they were frustrated, by the Syracusans sending garrisons and reinforcements.⁴ In the course of the winter, also, they shifted their harbour from Naxos to Catana, and re-erecting the camp-huts which had been burned by the Syracusans, they stayed there the rest of the winter. They sent, also, a trireme to Carthage, in order to form a friendly con-

² *Kept aloof.*] Or, *held off*, namely, from alliance with the Athenians. So l. 7, 7. ἡ μὴ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἡ παντάπασιν ἐπὶ ἀφιστήκει τοῦ πολέμου. and Joseph. 1313, 35. Thus it is not necessary to adopt, with Duker and others, the conjecture of Carter οὐ πολλοί, which, though it may seem at first sight more suitable, is inconsistent with the words following.

³ *Their habitations being, &c.*] I know not why Duker should have pronounced the words αὐτόνομοι — οἰκήσεις "numerus Platonis obscuriora." There is surely no obscurity at all, if the words be taken parenthetically, and in the sense above assigned; nor does any thing in the original seem wanting, except that αὐτὸν should be inserted before οἰκήσεις, as Bekker conjectures, and, indeed, I myself did many years ago; though, certainly, it might easily be lost between the αὐτὸν and the αὐτὸν. This sense of οἰκήσεις is, indeed, somewhat rare, but examples are not wanting. The word is used by Sophocles Philoct. of the cave of Philoctetes. So also Pausan. 9, 5, 1. τοῖς μὲν οὖν Ἀσσι κατὰ κώμας ἐπὶ ἦσαν αὐτὸν οἰκήσεις. And, what is more apposite, Xen. Cyr. 2, 4, 13. αὐτὸν οἰκήσεις αὐτὸν ποτίοντες ἐν ἰσχυροῖς χωρίοις εἰσιν, and 7, 4, 1. And in nearly the same manner it is used supra, c. 1, 6.

The above mode of taking the passage is much confirmed by Diodor. Sic., who mentions the perpetual independence of these mountaineers, and uses the word οἰκήσεις to designate their houses, which, he says, were subterraneous.

⁴ *But in respect to others, &c.*] I have here followed the conjecture of Bekker, approved by Goeller, ἀπεκώλυντο for ἀπεκώλυν. The το seems to have been absorbed by the τὸν following.

nection, or gain what other benefit they could ; and another to Tyrnesia⁵, some cities having of themselves promised to take their part in the war. They likewise sent round messages to the Siculi, and likewise to Egesta, requiring them to furnish them with as many horses as possible ; they also provided themselves with all sorts of materials for circumvallation, both bricks and iron, and other necessities, as intending at the commencement of spring to apply themselves closely to the war.

Those who were sent as ambassadors from the Syracusans to Corinth and Lacedæmon, endeavoured as they coasted along to persuade the Italiots⁶ not to look on as unconcerned spectators of what the Athenians were doing, since those proceedings were planned against *them* also. And when they were arrived at Corinth, they made a speech, requesting, on the ground of affinity, that assistance might be sent them. Upon which, the Corinthians immediately decreed themselves to aid them with all alacrity, and they sent off ambassadors, in company with the others, to Lacedæmon, that they might unite in urging them to make war on the Athenians in a more open manner, and send some auxiliary force to Sicily. At the same time that those ambassadors repaired to Lacedæmon, Alcibiades also was there, who with his fellow-fugitives had immediately, on the former occasion⁷, passed on board a vessel of burden from Thuria to Cyllene in Elæa, and afterwards to Lacedæmon⁸ ; the Lacedæmonians sending for and

⁵ *Tyrnesia.*] Or, Tyrrhenia, otherwise Hetruria. Poppo Proleg. 2, 544. observes that Italy, in the time of Herodotus and Thucydides, was considered as divided into four parts, Italia, Japygia, Opicia, and Tyrnesia. See also Bredow.

⁶ *Italiots.*] Namely, the Greek colonies settled in that part of Italy called Magna Græcia.

⁷ *On the former occasion.*] Namely, when he was sent for home, and made his escape at Thurii.

⁸ *And afterwards to Lacedæmon.*] Not, however, directly ; for he proceeded first to Argos, where his interest was considerable, and by the aid of which he expected to be recalled to Athens. But the Athenians having forbidden any Grecian state to harbour him, and especially sent to demand his person, he scrupled not to form a party at Lacedæmon which favoured him. See Isocrat. pro Alcib.

granting him safe conduct. For he feared them ⁹, on account of the affair with the Mantinæans. ¹⁰

And it happened in the assembly of Lacedæmonians that the Corinthians and Syracusans swayed the Lacedæmonians by entreating to the same measures as did Alcibiades. And as the Ephori and those in the offices of state were meditating to send ambassadors to Syracuse, to hinder them from treating with the Athenians, but were backward to send there any succours, Alcibiades advancing forward, exasperated and stimulated the Lacedæmonians by the following address:

LXXXIX. "It is necessary that I should first address you on the subject of the injurious prepossessions ¹ entertained respecting me, in order that you may not, by any prejudice against me, lend a worse ear to the counsels which affect the welfare of the state.

"My ancestors having, on a certain ground of dispute, renounced the office of public host to your state, I myself again taking it up, showed attentions to you, as well on other occasions as on the occurrence of the calamity at Pylus. But while I continued thus well affected towards you, *you*, on making a treaty with the Athenians, negotiated the matter through the medium of my adversaries, thus investing them with power, and covering me with dishonour. ² And on this account ye justly suffered hurt by the measures I resorted to with the

⁹ *For he feared them, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases: "he feared the body of the people, who might be apt to recollect, with no friendly mind, the evils which had been suffered, and the greater evils apprehended and risked, from the war excited in Peloponnesus by his ambition, his talents, and his influence."

¹⁰ *The affair with the Mantinæans.*] Namely, that narrated at l. 5, 46. seqq.

¹ *Injurious prepossessions.*] Not, *accusation*, or *calumny*, as Hobbes and Smith render. For διαβολή sometimes signifies *prepossession* or *prejudice*. So Hesych. explains it ὑπόπτεσις or ὑπόληψις. "This prejudice (says Mitford) could scarcely fail to be entertained against him, on account of his constant connection with the democratical, and opposition to the oligarchical interest, in his own country."

It may be observed, that the whole of this oration has been closely imitated by Dionys. Hal. Ant. i, 484. seqq. in the oration of Coriolanus to the Volsci.

² *Investing them with, &c.*] A metaphor taken from honouring or disgracing, by putting on any one rich robes, or mean vestments. So Psal. 71, 13. (Sept. 70, 13.) περιβαλλέσθωσαν αλσύνην οἱ ζητοῦντες τὰ κακά μοι.

Mantinæans and Argives, and in whatever other respects I acted to your prejudice. And now if any of you was then, when you suffered unjustly, incensed against me, let him, after considering the matter in the true light be appeased; or if any one should think worse of me because I espoused the cause of democracy, let him learn that neither on *that* account has he any reason for displeasure.³ For to tyrants we have ever borne aversion — (now whatever is opposed to a single ruler is termed *democracy*⁴, and hence has all along continued our support of democracy.⁵) Besides, as the state had a democratical constitution, it was necessary in most things to follow the present system. But we endeavoured to make the frame of polity more moderate than suits the present headstrong humours of the populace. There, however, were *others*, both in former times and now, who have hurried the people into the worst measures⁶, and who also brought about my banishment. We have been the patrons of democracy⁷, conceiving that in that form of polity whereby the state had attained to its height of power and freedom, and which we received from our ancestors, in that we should preserve it⁸; since other-

³ *Let him learn, &c.*] Hobbes has here strangely mistaken the sense; which is the less excusable, as it had been correctly expressed in the Latin version.

Πρόκειμαι in this sense is Attic. So Plato Apolog. p. 71. οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον εὐρίσσετε ἀτεχνῶς προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει.

⁴ *Now whatever is opposed, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of the clause πᾶν δὲ — ὠνόμασται. Democracy is affirmed to be the principle of any constitution which is opposed to the rule (i. e. sole, and without accountableness) of any single person. See more in the notes on l. 2, 37 and 65.

Here perspicuity seems to be promoted by throwing the words into a parenthesis.

⁵ *Hence has continued our support of democracy.*] Alcibiades here, as just before, is speaking of his family, who had, indeed, expelled the Pisistratidæ.

⁶ *The worst measures.*] Πονηρότερα. It may be considered as put either for the positive (evil) or the superlative. The sense is much the same either way, and classical examples might be adduced in favour of both.

⁷ *We have been the patrons of democracy.*] Hobbes and Smith have here alike mistaken the sense, though it had been well expressed by Portus. Τοῦ ξύμπαντος must denote *democracy*, or government in the hands of the public; for that is the literal sense of the phrase. By *we* is here again meant, not Alcibiades alone, but his family.

⁸ *Conceiving that in, &c.*] This is not a general gnome; but a general gnome seems almost implied in it, and which well deserves to be borne in mind by the statesmen of our own country.

wise⁹, forsooth, we know (and such of us as have any sense must know) what democracy is; and myself should know it¹⁰ as well as any (so much, however, that I might justly *speak evil* of it; though of confessed and manifest madness¹¹ and folly nothing new could be said); yet to change it seemed to us unsafe, when you, as enemies, were arrayed against us.

XC. "And thus stands the matter concerning your suspicions and criminations of me. As to the affairs whereon you are to consult, and I am (if I know any thing) to advise, now hear and learn.

"We undertook, then, this expedition to Sicily, in order, if we could, to subdue first all the Siceliots, after them the Italiots, and then to make attempts on the dependencies of Carthage, nay, even Carthage itself.¹ Finally, if these, or most of these, enterprises had succeeded, we should then have made an attack on Peloponnesus, bringing hither the whole force of Greeks supplied by those countries, and taking into pay numerous Barbarians, both Iberians and others acknowledged to be most warlike of all Barbarians now there existing. We should also have built numerous triremes, in addition to those we already have, by means of wood so abundantly supplied by Italy, with which blockading Peloponnesus around, and with our infantry attacking it by land, and taking the cities, some by assault, and others by siege, we expected we should easily subdue it, and after that rule over the whole of the Grecian nation. As to money and provisions, for the more easy accomplishment of these enterprises, the very acquisitions² them-

⁹ *Since otherwise.*] Such is the sense of *ἐπει*, as often in the New Testament; e. g. Rom. 3, 6. 1 Cor. 5, 10, and 14, 16. 15, 29. Hebr. 10, 2.

¹⁰ *Should know it.*] Such is the sense of *ἀν*.

¹¹ *Of confessed and manifest madness.*] I here read, with all the recent editions, *ἀνοία*. On the distinction between the two words *ἀνοία* and *ἀνοία*, and the confusion of them by scribes, in various classical passages, I shall have much to adduce in my edition.

¹ *Dependencies of Carthage, &c.*] Literally, "the dependencies of the Carthaginians and the Carthaginians themselves." This sense of *ἀρχή*, as considered separate from a country itself, is very rare, and would not be applicable to any powers but such whose dominions lay widely scattered.

² *The very acquisitions, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "The conquered countries, each as it was reduced, would furnish supplies for farther conquest, without burdening Athens."

selves there would have abundantly supplied them, without drawing on the revenue here.

XCI. " Thus, then, ye have heard the real intent of the expedition now gone, from one who possesses the most accurate knowledge. And these projects the remaining commanders will, if they be able, execute.¹

" Furthermore, learn next that unless ye render assistance, the states there will not successfully stand their ground. For the Siceliot is indeed very deficient in military skill or experience; yet if they rally in united force, they may even yet save themselves. But the *Syracusans alone*, being now in battle with their whole force, and, moreover, hemmed in by a fleet, will be unable to withstand the forces of the Athenians now there. And if that city be taken, the whole of Sicily goes with it², and presently Italy also. And thus the danger of which I forewarned you from thence must fall upon you at no long interval (for let no one suppose³ that he is consulting for Sicily only, but also for Peloponnesus), unless you speedily take these measures, and send thither on board ship such forces as, working their passage thither, shall immediately act as heavy-armed, and (what I deem yet more serviceable than an army) a Spartan as commander in chief, who may direct and discipline those already present, and use compulsion with those who are unwilling to join the cause.⁴

¹ *These projects the, &c.*] The orator hints that these projects are not impracticable, and then proceeds to show how they may be accomplished.

Mitford here well paraphrases thus: " And, however wild and visionary these vast projects may on first view appear, I, who have long meditated upon them, who know the resources of Athens, who have seen the deficiencies of the ill-constituted and unconnected commonwealths against which its arms are now directed, am confident that success is not impossible."

² *Goes with it.*] i. e. hangs by it, depends upon it, and must fall with it. Such is, I conceive, the sense of *ἐπερατ*, and not that assigned by the translators. The same view, I perceive, was taken by Bauer.

³ *So let no one suppose, &c.*] I have here adopted a punctuation very different from that of the editors and translators, but which seems to be the true one, and that by which alone the sense or coherence of the whole passage can be adjusted.

⁴ *Direct and discipline those, &c.*] Mitford very well paraphrases thus: " who may establish discipline among the Sicilians already firm in the cause, and whose authority may bring over, and hold united under one command, those not disposed to obey the Syracusans. Thus, more than

For thus those who are already your friends will be more courageous, and such as are in doubt will more fearlessly come over. Also you must more openly carry on the war here, that the Syracusans, supposing that you have some regard to their safety, may hold out, and that the Athenians may be less disposed to send reinforcements to their army. You ought, further, to fortify Decelea in Attica; a measure of which the Athenians have been ever especially apprehensive, and which, of all the inflictions of war, they reckon they have alone not experienced. For *thus* may we most surely injure our enemies, if what we, on certain information, learn that they fear, *that* we bring upon them. For it is reasonable to suppose that they each feel fear with the exactest knowledge of what is most formidable to them.

“As to the points wherein you will yourselves be benefited, and your foes be annoyed, by this fortifying, I will, among many, sum up the principal. Know, then, that of those by whom the country is cultivated ⁵, the greater part will fall into your hands, partly by capture, and partly by voluntary desertion. And as to the revenues of the mines at Laurium, and the profits which they derive from the land ⁶, and those from the courts ⁷, of such they will be now deprived; but they

by any other measure, your decided friends will be encouraged, and those dubiously affected will be confirmed in your interest.”

⁵ *Of those by whom the country is cultivated, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of the passage; though I have deviated from all former translators, since the sense they assign to *κατοικίαι* cannot be admitted, whereas the above is undoubtedly inherent in the words. The use of the neuter plural (at which the translators seem to have stumbled) has a reference to the common name given to slaves, *σώματα*. Besides, among the other injuries calculated on by the erection of this fort, it is impossible that Alcibiades could omit, that of its affording a retreat for the runaway slaves. Pylus, in Laconia, had served the very same purposes against the Lacedæmonians, by the capture and the harbouring of slaves.

⁶ *Profits which they derive from the land.*] By these are not to be understood the regular profits of the cultivator, but those of the government; for that is alone the subject of these and the following words. There seems to be reference to that sort of *land-tax*, which consisted in a certain proportion of the produce, or a pecuniary commutation. Now, in proportion as the cultivator suffered, so must the government taxes be diminished.

⁷ *From the courts.*] Namely, from fees and fines. The Scholiast tells us that many of the punishments of the Athenian law consisted in pecuniary fines. Of these, then, they would be in a great measure deprived; for the country courts would scarcely be held, and such would be the agitation

will especially be injured by the revenues being less regularly rendered ⁸ by the allies, who, thinking that the war is carried on vigorously on your parts, will set lightly by them.⁹

XCII. "Now that each of these measures should be carried into effect quickly and promptly rests, Lacedæmonians, with *you*¹, since that they are *possible* I am quite confident, and I think I shall not be found mistaken.² And let me crave that I may not be thought the worse of ³ by any of you, because, though once esteemed a true patriot, I now strenuously assail⁴ my country in conjunction with its bitterest foes; nor that my words may be misconstrued as proceeding from the busy zeal of a fugitive.⁵ For I am, indeed, a fugitive from the malice of those that drove me out, but not (if ye hearken to my counsels) from your benefit.⁵ Nor are those so much enemies who (like

throughout Attica, that the course of justice would be interrupted, or much impeded. See the Schol. and the note of Goeller, who, however, has failed to perceive that we are not bound to justify the fact, since this is plainly an *oratorical exaggeration*.

⁸ *Less regularly rendered.*] The Scholiast rightly explains *διαφορουμένης* by *διηλεκώς φερομένης*. Nearly the same sense occurs *infra*, c. 100. In other authors but Thucydides, however, *διαφορίω* always signifies *diripio*, *plunder*; except that Dio Cass. 629, 41. uses it in the Thucydidean sense.

⁹ *Set lightly by them.*] Or, the expression may signify, "neglect the payment of the tribute."

¹ *Rests, Lacedæmonians, with you.*] On this sense of *ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι* see Dr. Blomfield on Æschyl. Pers. Gloss. 177.

² *That I may not be thought the worse of.*] This is imitated by Andocid. p. 39. *μηδὲ τῷ χείρονος δόξωμεν εἶναι*.

³ *Strenuously assail.*] So Appian, t. 1, 59, 1. *τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐγκρατῶς ἐξόμεθα*. See note on l. 1, 76.

⁴ *Nor that my words may be misconstrued, as proceeding, &c.*] The construction of *ὑποπτεύεσθαι* with *εἰς* and an accusative is very rare. The only examples I know of are Dio Cass. 22, 100. *εἰς ἐκείνους ταῦτὸν ὑπόπτειν*. and 269, 8. 274, 94. 309, 58. 322, 41. 429, 80. 690, 96.

It is always observed, that deserters and new converts (especially when turncoats) ever evince peculiar alacrity in their new cause, and the keenest animosity to their former friends.

⁵ *I am, indeed, a fugitive from, &c.*] Here I have closely followed the antithetical *paronomasia* of the original, though somewhat at the expense of perspicuity. The sense is explained by the Schol. *ὁ φεύγω τὸ ὠφελεῖν ὑμᾶς*: but it should rather seem to mean, "I am not removed from the power of doing you service." The *paronomasia* is, indeed, somewhat frigid, but probably well represents the character of oratory peculiar to Alcibiades, which (as I have before remarked) is said to have been full of daring and even harsh metaphors, and now and then somewhat frigid *concelli*.

you) have at any time annoyed their foes⁶, as who have compelled their friends to become enemies. And my love of my country I hold not inasmuch as I have been wronged, but in so far as I have lived in security therein.⁷ Nor do I reckon that I am now going against what is any longer a country of mine, but much rather to recover what is not my country.⁸ And he is a true lover of his country, not who having wrongfully lost his country⁹ scruples to invade it, but he who, from his desire for it, endeavours by every method to recover it. Thus I entreat you, Lacedæmonians, to confidently employ my services in all perils or hardships whatever, knowing, forsooth, the argument advanced by all¹⁰, that 'if, while an enemy, I did you much injury, so when a friend I can render you eminent service,' inasmuch as I well know the state of things with the Athenians, and yours I can conjecture.

"And now I entreat you, considering that ye are consulting on matters of the weightiest importance, not to shrink from

⁶ *Nor are those so much enemies who, &c.*] Literally, "and those are rather enemies, not who," &c. A harsh construction, not unfrequent in our author. It must be remarked, that the comparative is here for the positive with μᾶλλον.

⁷ *My love of my country I hold, &c.*] Smith renders (or rather *paraphrases*) thus: "My patriotism is far from thriving under the injustice I have suffered; it was merely an effect of gratitude for that protection I once enjoyed from my country." But it may be doubted whether that be a correct view of the sense. In what light the antients considered the passage, will appear from the following imitations which I have noted:—Dionys. Hal. Ant. p. 486, 10. πατρίδα δὲ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ τὴν ἀπαρησαμένην με πόλιν, ἀλλ' ἥς ἀλλότριος ὢν, πολίτης γέγονα. γῆν τε οὐκ ἐν ᾗ ἡδίκημαι φιλῶ, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἀσφαλές ἐχω. Appian, t. 1. 35, 74. (εἶπε) οὐκ εἶναι πατρίδα τὴν ἐκβαλοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὑποδεχομένην.

⁸ *Nor do I reckon that, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "I hold that no longer my country, which is governed by a set of men who have so injuriously driven me from it. Nor ought I to be considered as persuading war against my country; but rather as endeavouring to restore myself to the country which was once mine." Indeed, one who has been punished and cast off from a country may well esteem it as no longer his.

⁹ *Lost his country.*] Hence may be defended the common reading in Justin, 6, 1, 6. Ut eligat Conona, qui amissa bello patria, Cyprī exulabat.

¹⁰ *Knowing that argument advanced by all.*] Namely, by all fugitives. For προβαλλόμενον cannot mean, as Portus renders, "quod jactatur," or *the hackneyed maxim*, as the versions of Hobbes and Smith represent. There is something very similar in Dionys. Hal. Ant. 487, 23. καὶ εὖ ἵσται ὅτι δεξιὰ πολέμων ὑμῖν μεγάλα βλάπτειν δυνατός ἦν, καὶ σὺν ὑμῖν ἀγωνιζόμενος, μεγάλα δυνήσεται ὠφελεῖν.

the expedition to Sicily and Attica, in order that by proceeding thither, you may, with a moderate force, secure the great interests there at stake, and pull down both the present and the future power of the Athenians, and, after that, *yourselves* live in security, holding the whole of Greece in a voluntary and not forced, but well-affected obedience."

XCIIL. Thus spoke Alcibiades. And now the Lacedæmonians, who had of themselves before intended to take the field against Athens, but were as yet procrastinating and hesitating¹, were, at these details of information, so much the more animated, conceiving that they had them from one thoroughly acquainted therewith. Insomuch that they now applied their whole attention to the fortifying of Decelea, and, for the present², sending some forces to the allies in Sicily. And appointing Gylippus³ son of Cleandridas as commander in chief over the Syracusans, they directed him to consult with them and the Corinthians⁴, and adopt such measures as, under existing circumstances, should most conduce to the ready and speedy transportation of an auxiliary force to Sicily. He directed the Corinthians to despatch him two triremes to Asine, and desired that the rest which they intended to send should be fitted out, so as to be ready when opportunity should serve.

¹ *Hesitating.*] Poppo, however, thinks *περισωρόμενοι* may be put for *περισκοπούντες*, as at l. 4, 75., but with the sense of *περισκοπεῖν* at l. 6, 49. *διεμελλήσειν περισκοποῦντες ὁπότεροι κρατήσουσι.* And so Appian, t. i. 293, 28. *τὸ μᾶλλον ἐσιεῖσαι περιωρ.*

² *For the present.*] Since that pressing emergency required the first attention.

³ *Gylippus.*] A person who had been banished, when tutor to the young king Pleistoanax, for misconduct in a former war with Athens, and on suspicion of taking bribes from Pericles.

A man, however, more qualified for the business committed to him could hardly have been selected. (Mitford.)

⁴ *Consult with them and the Corinthians.*] Not, "with the leading men of Syracuse and Corinth," as Mitford narrates; for how could he consult with the leading men of Syracuse at Lacedæmon? By the Syracusans and Corinthians must be meant the *ambassadors* of both powers then present. The *measures* to be concerted doubtless were, that the Corinthians should supply, besides vessels of burden, some triremes as a convoy, and that the Syracusans should send out a naval force to assist in conveying the transports.

There arrived also from Sicily the Athenian trireme which the commanders had sent in order to procure money and horsemen. And the Athenians, after hearing their requests, decreed to send off to the army the supplies⁵ and the horsemen.⁶ And thus ended the winter and the seventeenth year of the war which Thucydides hath narrated.

YEAR XVIII. B. C. 414.

XCIV. Immediately at the commencement of the spring of the subsequent summer, the Athenians in Sicily, weighing from Catana, coasted along to Megara in Sicily, the inhabitants of which the Syracusans having (as I have before related) expelled, in the time of Gelo the tyrant, themselves held the territory. Having disembarked there, they ravaged the country, and proceeding against a certain fort⁷ of the Syracusans, and not taking it, they again proceeded along the coast with their land and sea force to the river Terias⁸, and ascending to the plain⁹, they wasted it, and burnt the corn on the ground; and happening upon a small party of Syracusans, and killing some, and raising a trophy, they retreated to their ships: then having sailed to Catana, and furnished themselves with provisions, they marched to Centoripa¹⁰, a town of the Siculi; and having brought it to surrender on terms, they departed, after having burnt also the corn of the Inessæans¹¹

⁵ *Supplies.*] By τροφήν may be meant, as often in Thucydides, the *pay* of the troops; a sense, indeed, which here seems to be required by the article.

⁶ *Horsemen.*] Horses, it seems, they could procure in Sicily.

⁷ *A certain fort.*] This seems to have been the fort lately erected by the Syracusans on the site of the old Megara.

⁸ *Terias.*] On which see *supra*, c. 50.

⁹ *The plain.*] Namely, of Leontini.

¹⁰ *Centoripa.*] The situation of this place may be tolerably well ascertained from two passages of Strabo and Sil. Italicus, cited by Cluverius. It was on a high hill, at the roots of Mount Ætna, and not far from the river Symæthus. See more in Cluverius and Wasse on Thucyd. 7, 32.

With respect to the ratio appellationis (on which all the geographers are silent), it may perhaps denote *Drover's town*; for κεντρόπιος seems to have been an adjective for κέντρον, which, as we find from Hesych., signified a *drover*.

¹¹ *Inessæans.*] See note on l. 3, 103. The antient little city of Inessa,

and Hyblæans¹²; and on reaching Catana, they find the horsemen arrived¹³ from Athens, two hundred and fifty, with accoutrements, but without horses, which were to be provided for them in the country; also thirty horse-archers, and three hundred talents of silver.

XCV. This same spring also the Lacedæmonians, taking the field against Argos, advanced as far as Cleone; but on the occurrence of an earthquake they retired: and after this, the Argives, making an irruption into the bordering territory of Thyrea, took considerable spoil of the Lacedæmonians, which was sold for not less than twenty-five talents.¹

This same summer, and not long after, the popular party² at Thespiæ made an attack on those that held the offices of state, yet could not seize the reins of government; but on the Thebans³ proceeding to support the government, some were seized, while others fled to Athens.

XCVI. And now this same summer, the Syracusans hearing that the Athenians, having received the horsemen, were about to advance upon them, and considering that unless the enemy should acquire possession of Epipolæ (a steep and rocky tract, lying immediately above the city),

which seems to have been first called *Ætna*, was (as we find from Strabo) not far from Centoripa, and (as he says) eighty stadia from Catana. Wasse supposes it to have occupied the site of the present *Cœnobium S. Johannis de Arenis*; Dorville (*Sic. p. 224.*) that of *St. Nicola dell' arena*, probably another chapelry of the same parish, and corresponding almost exactly to the distance given by Strabo.

¹² *Hyblæans.*] Those of Hybla Galeatis, or Major.

¹³ *Find the horsemen arrived.*] The Athenians had been all this while waiting for them, during which much time was lost in petty operations.

¹ *Sold for not less than twenty-five talents.*] Hence it appears that the spoil was not permitted to be appropriated by individuals, but was thrown into one common stock, and sold, whether for the benefit of the captors, or of the state.

² *Popular party.*] That there was such a party at Thespiæ, namely, those who were then suspected of Atticizing, we may conjecture from l. 4, 133. The Thebans, however, demolished their walls, and probably placed the oligarchical party in possession of all the power. Hence, perhaps, the present attack proceeded from the long-suppressed indignation of the democratical party at this treatment, who therefore attempted a revolution.

³ *Thebans.*] I here follow the reading of two good MSS., which is adopted by Bekker and Goeller. The common reading *Ἀθηναίων* yields a sense the contrary to what is required.

they (i. e. the Syracusans) could not easily, even if defeated in battle, be circumvallated¹, formed the design of guarding the ascent thither, that the enemy might not unawares mount and seize the post: for in no other way could they effect their purpose, as the rest² of the situation, the whole of Epipolæ, is elevated³ (insomuch as to afford a complete view of all—within the place); but it inclines gradually down to the city. It was called by the Syracusans *Epipolæ* because⁴ of its being *above* the rest of the country. And the Syracusans going forth at the early morn, in full posse to the meadow⁵,

¹ *They could not, &c. be circumvallated.*] Mitford understands this difficulty to have consisted in the form of a hill, over the skirt of which a suburb extended; and the hill, sloping towards the town, being precipitous toward the country. This, however, seems to be a mistaken view of the subject. The impracticability of circumvallating did not arise from the form, or situation of the hill, for it was not so near as that the line of circumvallation should have needed to cross any part of it; and as to the suburb of Epipolæ, there was *at that time* none, it having arisen in after-ages. The impracticability adverted to seems to have been this: that as the Epipolæ consisted of a continuity of lofty heights, which would have extended all along the upper part of the line of circumvallation, therefore if that ground were occupied by any tolerable force, the wall of circumvallation would always be in danger of attack, and the guards have no defence from their assailants on the heights; therefore, *circumvallation alone* was impracticable, and a wall of *contravallation* also would be requisite: but the Athenian force was not sufficient to man both.

² *As the rest, &c.*] I have here somewhat altered the arrangement of the clauses, as seemed required by perspicuity.

³ *Is elevated.*] As the commentators have not adduced examples of this sense of *ἐκπρᾶσθαι* (like *suspendi* in Latin), the following may be acceptable: Plutarch Anton. 46. τὰ μέγιστα πύδια τῶν λοφῶν τούτων ἐξήρηται. Strabo ap. Steph. Thes. ἐξήρηται ἡ χωρὰ πρὸς νότον.

⁴ *It was called Epipolæ because, &c.*] So Etym. Mag. 363, 28. Ἐπίπολις. τόπος ἐν Συρακοῦσιν, καὶ ὠνόμασται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι. See also Schwebel on Onosand. 18.

Mitford observes that Epipolæ is synonymous with the English name Overton. Perhaps we may more appositely compare the name of a part of Lincolnshire called Above-hill. It may be remarked that Thucydides uses the article with Epipolæ even in the *first* mention of the place, because such was usually done in the case of names of places which had yet scarcely become regular appellatives. Now since, as descriptive nouns, they required the article used κατ' ἐξοχήν, so, as being yet in the midway between common nouns and nouns appellative, they retained it.

⁵ *The meadow.*] It may seem strange that the article should here be used, as no meadow has before been mentioned; but, in fact, the article is here employed to denote a *certain* meadow well known, and a usual place of military exercise. This use of a noun often ended in the noun becoming a regular appellative, at first employed *with* the article, and afterwards *without* it. Sometimes, for perspicuity's sake, some case of the participle καλούμενος is employed, as just after τὸν καλούμενον Λέοντα.

near the river Anapus, Hermocrates and his colleagues (for they were yet in possession of the command) made a review of the heavy-armed, and first set apart six hundred⁶ chosen men of the heavy infantry (putting them under the command of Diomilus, a fugitive from Andros⁷), in order that they might serve as a garrison for Epipolæ, and be quickly at hand for any service where their presence might be necessary.

XCVII. And now the Athenians, on the day subsequent to this night¹, were reviewed, and, undiscovered by the Syracusans, effected a landing (after leaving Catana) at what is called Leon², which is distant from Epipolæ six or seven

It may be observed, that there were places in our antient Roman stations which had a similar name, and were used for a similar purpose. Thus a field called the *Wang* at Horncastle, in Lincolnshire.

⁶ *Six hundred.*] All the MSS. have *seven* hundred; but the present reading (adopted by Bekker from Valla) is required by almost all the best MSS. in the next chapter, and *all* at l. 7, 43.

The Syracusan generals might well appoint their troops to guard this post, fearing that it should be as suddenly and secretly seized by the Athenians landing at the port of Trogilus, as their former station was occupied. How well founded their apprehensions were, the event speedily proved.

⁷ *Diomilus, a fugitive from Andros.*] The appointment of an Athenian exile to this important command, strongly indicates (Mitford observes) how conscious the Syracusan generals were of the inferior skill and experience of their own officers.

¹ *The day subsequent to this night.*] Such is the import of the words of the original. Smith renders the whole passage thus: "The Athenians, who had mustered their forces on the preceding day, had stood away from Catana, and were come in the night undiscovered to the spot called Leon." So also Mitford. And certainly that is a very intelligible sense; yet it cannot be elicited from the words as they now stand; nor do the MSS. supply any materials for emendation: and, probably, the common reading is correct. By *this night* must be meant the night of the day when the Syracusans met for review: consequently, the Athenians reviewed their troops on the *next* day, and, embarking in the evening, made the coast at Thapsus on the morning of the day after the review in question. Yet, as we afterwards find the Syracusans were in the meadow at the time the Athenians landed, we must suppose that the review (which was, indeed, a sort of exercise and training) was extended to a second day. If such be not the sense, the passage must be corrupt.

² *Leon.*] There has been some difference of opinion as to the situation of this place, which Letronne puts between Thapsus and Catana. He is, however, solidly refuted by Goeller, who rightly maintains that Leon was between Thapsus and the Portus Trogiliorum; and he adds, that it was some distance inland. But this last opinion, though maintained by Bochart and others, seems very ill founded; and to take *kara* in such a sense were very harsh. I cannot but think that Leon was an inlet running up the

stadia, and disembarking, they anchored with the fleet at Thapsus.³ Now this is a peninsula, with a narrow isthmus, jutting out into the sea, and is at no great distance from Syracuse, by either sea or land. The naval forces of the Athenians, having formed a palisade across the isthmus at Thapsus, lay still; but the land forces marched full speed to Epipolæ, and anticipated the Syracusans by ascending at Euryalus, before they heard of it at the meadow, and leaving the review, repaired thither⁴; proceeding to succour, with all possible haste, both the rest and also the six hundred under Diomilus.⁵ But the distance they had to traverse from the meadow was not less than twenty-five stadia. Meeting, therefore, with the enemy in

land near to the Portus Trogiliorum; from which, to some parts of Epipolæ, it would not be more than the distance mentioned by Thucydides. It is true that Livy l. 24. 39. speaks of it as five miles from Hexapylum; but Cluverius has proved that the reading is corrupt, and for v. millia passuum he would read *mille et quingentis passibus*. That, however, is too bold; and I would propose for v. millia passuum, *ii. millia passuum*. Thus there will be no discrepancy between Thucydides and Livy; for, no doubt, some parts of Epipolæ were nearer by several stadia to Leon than others.

Leon, then, was very near the place afterwards called Galeagra, or Scala Græca.

³ *Thapsus*.] This place was taken in preference to the Portus Trogiliorum, because, from its peninsular situation, there would be far better defence for the sailors when on shore.

It is remarkable that this peninsula, in Goeller's plan, is made any thing but with a narrow isthmus. And though such is its form at present, yet that will not justify his representation, since, from the perpetual earthquakes, and irruptions of the sea here, great changes must have taken place.

The origin of the name Thapsus is uncertain; for though it may seem to be derived from *θάπρω*, yet that is, perhaps, more specious than true. Probably it is of Punic origin.

⁴ *Hearing of it, &c.*] Such appears to be the sense of this perplexing passage, the difficulty of which has been chiefly occasioned by excessive brevity, and the blending of two phrases. I have followed the reading of Bekker and Goeller, *ἐκ τοῦ λιμῶνος καὶ τῆς ἐξέτασεως*, as founded on most of the MSS.; yet I cannot admit that the common reading is *bad Greek*. It may, indeed, justly be questioned (with Duker) whether *ἡ ἐξέτασις τοῦ λιμῶνος* be equivalent to *recensio, quæ fit in prato*. But, why Goeller should regard Dorville's mode of taking the words (namely, "the field of review") "yet worse," I cannot imagine. We use the very same kind of expression when we say, "the field of exercise." Bauer remarks that it savours of *Hebraism*. But it is probably one of those modes of speech which are common to all languages, antient and modern.

⁵ *The six hundred under Diomilus*.] It is plain that these troops were then at the meadow with the rest, and not on guard at Epipolæ; which, if this was the second day of review, was a fault of the generals.

a somewhat disordered manner, and being defeated in battle ⁶ at Epipolæ, they made a retreat to the city, with the loss of Diomilus and three hundred others. After this, the Athenians, raising a trophy, and giving up the dead, under truce, to the Syracusans, descended on the following day to the city itself, and on the enemy not coming forth to meet them, they retired and erected a fort at Labdalum, on the summit of the rocky eminence of Epipolæ ⁷, and looking towards Megara, in order that it might serve as a depository for their utensils and effects ⁸, when they advanced either for battle or for circumvallation.

XCVIII. And not long after, there came to them from Egesta three hundred horse, and of Siculi, Naxians, and some others, about one hundred. There were also two hundred and fifty Athenians, for whom they had procured horses, some from the Egestæans, and others by purchase. And the total number of cavalry collected together was six hundred and fifty. ¹

Having stationed a garrison at Labdalum, the Athenians then marched to Syca [or Tyca ²], whither taking post, they raised, with all speed, the wall of circumvallation ³; and by

⁶ *Defeated in battle.*] This defeat seems to have been occasioned not only by their disorder, but by the Athenians having the vantage ground. Mitford relates that there was a *fiere* battle: but to this the words of Thucydides do not give the least countenance.

⁷ *Labdalum, on the summit, &c.*] This sense has, indeed, been objected to, on the ground that *Esryalus* was the top. But, as I have shown in a preceding note, *Labdalum* was probably the top, as would seem from its name, which signifies *peaked*.

⁸ *Effects.*] Hobbes and Smith render, *money*; Mitford, "military chest." But such would be yet safer on board the fleet; and *χρήματα* may very well signify effects and moveables of every kind.

¹ *The total number, &c.*] Diodorus Siculus, however, reckons eight hundred. And, indeed, we might have expected that the Siculi, Naxians, and others should have furnished more than one hundred.

² *Syca, or Tyca.*] The *latter* is thought by Duker and others to be the true reading; while Goeller considers the *Syca* as a Doric form. See, however, Schweighauser on Polyb. 8, 5, 2. and the commentators on Liv. l. 24, 21.

³ *Wall of circumvallation.*] So the Scholiast, Letronne, and Goeller rightly take *τὸν κύκλον*; though others understand it of the fort of Labdalum. That, however, is satisfactorily refuted by Goeller, who truly remarks that *κύκλος* is in like manner used of the *blockading wall* at l. 7, 2.;

the rapid progress of the work, they struck a terror into the Syracusans, who, going forth, determined to give battle, and not suffer the accomplishment of the work. When, however, they were already ranged for battle in opposite lines, the Syracusan commanders, seeing their men in disarray, and not easily to be put into order⁴, led them back to the city, except a party of the cavalry, who, in spite of the Athenians, hindered the men from bringing up stones, or wandering to any distance⁵; until, at length, one battalion⁶ of the Athenian heavy-armed, in conjunction with the whole of their horse, charged and put to rout the Syracusan cavalry, and having slain some, set up a trophy.

XCIX. On the day following, the Athenians, part of them, were employed in building the wall at the north part of the line of circumvallation⁷; while others brought together stone and timber⁸, and laid them down, in regular order⁹, towards the place called Trogilus¹⁰, where was the shortest cut for their circumvallatory wall from the great port to the

and it may be added, that the term *κύκλος* is here employed, as being adapted to the sense included in *circumvallation*.

⁴ *In disarray, and not, &c.*] The very fault of all raw troops, especially when over-eager and not in much subordination.

⁵ *Wandering to any distance.*] Namely, to procure wood, water, &c.

⁶ *One battalion.*] Or rather, tribe: for Acacius and Duker have proved, by a reference to Herod. 6, 111. Plutarch. Aristid., Thucyd. 3, 90. and 100., and the present passage, that the Athenians always fought with each tribe separate; as was the case (Goeller remarks) with the Lacedæmonians and most other nations of antiquity, and of which vestiges (he thinks) may be found in the words of Nestor, Hom. II. 2, 362. See also Schneider on Xenoph. Hist. 4, 2, 19.

⁷ *The wall at the, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of τὸ πρὸς βορίαν τοῦ κύκλου τείχος, which words are absurdly rendered by Hobbes, and inaccurately by Smith, according to whose version the Athenians were building a *second* wall, besides that of circumvallation. It is clear that the Athenians commenced their wall on the north part, and drew it towards Trogilus.

⁸ *Timber.*] Hence it clearly appears that timber was used, together with stone, in walls of circumvallation; chiefly, we may suppose, for the towers. And, therefore, *carpenters* would be taken as well as other artisans.

⁹ *In regular order.*] i. e. as they were brought, depositing them in heaps to be ready for the work.

¹⁰ *Trogilus.*] This is supposed by the commentators to have been a village. But that is not clear. By the name's being accompanied by τὸν καλούμενον, it seems to have been a place of very little account.

other sea. But the Syracusans, at the suggestion, in a great measure, of Hermocrates, resolved no longer to put matters to hazard by any general battles with the Athenians. It was likewise thought most advisable to build an *under* (or *intercepting*) wall ¹¹, in the direction where the Athenians were about to carry their wall, seeing, that if they were beforehand with the thing, they should cut off all further progress. And, moreover, in case the Athenians should attack them in the work, they determined to send part of their army to keep them off; and it was thought that *they* would thus preoccupy with palisades the approaches of the enemy, while the *Athenians* would have to cease from their work, if they turned their attention thither with all their forces. ¹² They, therefore, went forth, and set to work (commencing from their city wall), and carried forward a transverse wall below the wall of the Athenians ¹³, cutting down the olives of the Temenos ¹⁴, and therewith erecting wooden towers. As to the Athenian fleet, it had not yet sailed round to the great port; but the Syracusans still had the command of the parts by the sea ¹⁵,

¹¹ *An under (or intercepting) wall.*] i. e. a wall which should protrude from the north part of their city wall, and which, crossing the place where their wall of circumvallation was meant to be carried, should effectually prevent the accomplishment of the thing. See the Schol. (who has here an excellent explanation) and the plan of Syracuse.

¹² *It was thought that they would, &c.*] This is the best version that the passage seems to admit; for it is so obscurely and briefly worded that no mere version can clearly give the sense, which may best be represented in paraphrase thus: "It was thought that in this attempt they should at least succeed in raising a double palisade across the proposed line of the circumvallation. *This* they thought might be accomplished even against a *part* of the Athenian forces; and if they should choose to draw forth their whole force, the wall would, in the meantime, be suspended. If they raised the double palisade, they might easily, by degrees, convert that into a *wall*; and so long as they could keep up the palisade, so long they had a safe approach to the raising of a wall."

¹³ *Below the wall of the Athenians.*] Goeller here explains: "Quia enim inde ab inferiore et Epipolas subterjacente regione urbis murus transversus a Syracusanis ducebatur, alterum correlativum posuit."

¹⁴ *Cutting down the olives of the Temenos.*] i. e. the olives in the grove of the sacred close belonging to the temple of Apollo Temenites. Goeller remarks that they worshipped Apollo as the ἀρχαγίτης, or arch-leader of their colony, he having directed the colonization by his oracle.

It is well known to have been the custom of the antients to surround their temples with a *sacred close*, encircled by a high wall, most of which enclosure was occupied by groves.

¹⁵ *Parts by the sea.*] Such as the hill of Plemmyrium, and the island of Plemmyrium, at the entrance of the great port.

while the Athenians had to fetch all their necessary stores by land from Thapsus.

C. When they conceived that their under wall was sufficiently accomplished by palisade and stone work, and that the Athenians came not to hinder them in the erection ¹, the Syracusans, since they feared they (i. e. the Athenians) should engage with them more to advantage when apart ², and, moreover, as they were hastening forward with their circumvallation ³, leaving one battalion (or tribe) as a guard of the building, retired to the city. Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed the pipes, which, by subterraneous ducts, brought water for drinking to the city. ⁴ And watching the time when the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at noon-day, and when some had gone into the city, and those in the palisaded work were keeping guard but negligently, they ordered three hundred of their chosen troops, and some picked light infantry with complete arms ⁵, to run suddenly at full speed up to the counter-wall; and while the rest of the army, under one commander, marched towards the city (to repel attack from thence) the above-mentioned division, under the other commander, went towards the palisades, near the postern gate. ⁶ And the three hundred, making their assault, carried the palisade, the garrison abandoning it, and taking refuge in the fore-wall ⁷ around Temenites. And the pursuers

¹ *Came not to hinder, &c.*] The Athenian generals saw the policy of Hermocrates, and perceived that it was most for their own interest to complete the wall down to Trogilus.

² *Apart.*] i. e. when with only a part of their forces, as at present, and of those some engaged in building. They feared lest the Athenians should muster their whole force, and attack them.

³ *Hastening forward with their circumvallation.*] And, therefore, might speedily finish it, and then attack them in full force.

⁴ *The pipes which, &c.*] Of this noble aqueduct the ruins even yet remain, and descriptions of it may be seen in Dorville, Swinburne, Hoare, and others.

⁵ *Picked light infantry with complete arms.*] Such is the real sense, which has been mistaken both by Hobbes and Smith.

⁶ *Near the postern gate.*] Namely, from the Temenites to Epipolæ. From this postern we must distinguish the gates of Temenites, which also led from Temenos, but in the direction of Olympieum and the Anapus. (Goeller.) See the plan of Syracuse.

⁷ *Fore-wall.*] Namely, that which the Syracusans had drawn around Temenites, to increase the difficulty of circumvallation.

burst in with them, but when within they were forced head-long back again, and some few of the Argives and Athenians were there slain. Then the whole army having entered, destroyed the under, or counter-walling, and pulling up the pales, distributed them among their own men, and then set up a trophy.

CI. On the day following, the Athenians carried forward their wall of circumvallation to the rocky ground beyond the marsh, which at that part of Epipolæ looks toward the great harbour, and where their circumvallation would be the shortest, descending through the level ground, and the pool or marsh, to the port. Meanwhile the Syracusans went forth, and themselves again sought to cut off the work by a palisade¹ carried from the city across the middle of the marsh; and likewise dug a ditch, in order that it might not be possible for the Athenians to carry their wall as far as the sea. But they, when they had accomplished the part up to the steep, prepared for an attack on the palisade and ditch of the Syracusans, ordering the *fleet* to sail round from Thapsus to the great port of Syracuse; while the army, about daybreak (descending from Epipolæ to the level ground, and so across the marshy pool, where it was clayey and stiffest, laying doors and planks, and passing thereon), accomplished the storming of the palisade (all but a small part²), and the ditch, and afterwards took the remaining portion. A battle then ensued, wherein the Athenians gained the victory; and such of the Syracusans as were on the right wing fled to the city, while those on the left took to the river. And now, with a view to hinder them from crossing it, the three hundred select troops of the Athenians in all haste made for the bridge. But the Syracusans, alarmed at this movement, closed with those three hundred (for many of their horse were there), and putting them to the rout, made an attack on the right wing of the Athenians. In the course of this charge, the first

¹ *Palisade.*] By this is meant a work consisting of two palisades, between which the guards were posted.

² *A small part.*] Namely, it should seem, that next to the city wall.

Plan of
SYRACUSE.
according to
 PROFESSOR GÖLLER.

The map illustrates the city of Syracuse, Sicily, with various landmarks and geographical features. Key locations include TAPUS, TROGILUS, PORTUS TROGILIORUM, TYCA, LADALUS, CASTRA SYRACUS, LEO MIAE, FARMUM FORTINUM, ANAPUS R., PORTUS LACIUS, PORTUS MINERVAE, ARETHUSA, MAGNUS, PLENTIA, and OLYMPIUM. The map also shows the city walls, the harbor, and the surrounding landscape. A scale bar at the bottom indicates distances in miles and paces.

Engraved by S. J. Hall.

battalion³ of the wing was seized with a panic. On seeing which, Lamachus went to their succour, following with him some few archers, and the Argives; when having passed a certain ditch⁴, and being cut off from the main body with only a few⁵, who had passed over with him, he was slain, and five or six of those with him. These the Syracusans immediately snatching up, hurried across the river into a secure spot, and on the rest of the Athenian army advancing, themselves retreated.

CII. In the mean time, such of them as had first taken refuge in the city, when they saw what had happened, themselves resuming courage, issued from thence, and again ranged themselves against the Athenians, opposite, and sent a part of their force to the Athenian wall of circumvallation at Epipolæ, thinking that they should find it destitute of defence, and easily take it. And to the extent of ten plethra (or six hundred and eighty cubits) they took and destroyed the outwork¹; but the wall itself of circumvallation, Nicias (for he happened to be there, left behind by indisposition) hindered them from taking; ordering the labourers² to set fire to the machines, and whatever other timber had been deposited before the wall; being sensible that, from want of troops, they could in no other way save themselves. And it happened according to his expectation; for the Syracusans, by

³ *First battalion.*] I here read, with Valla, Duker, and Portus, *πρῶτη*. The reading *φυλακή*, the fore-guard or picket-guard, yields no tolerable sense.

⁴ *Having passed a certain ditch.*] *Ἐπιδιαβάντες*: this verb is somewhat rare; but I have noted it in Pausan. 1, 56, 2. *ἐπιδιαβάντων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυττιλείαν*. Xenoph. Hist. 5, 3, 4. *Ὀλύνθιοι διέβαινον τὸν πόταμον*. Herod. 4, 122, 10. *ἐπιδιαβάντες ἐδιώκον*. Polyb. 3, 14, 8. 5, 71, 10. 4, 64, 9. Dio Cass. 292, 57. Arrian E. A. 2, 3. Joseph. 5, 56, 40.

⁵ *Separated from, &c.*] The expression *μονῶδεις μετ' ὀλίγων* may seem to involve an inconsistency; but by the best writers *μονῶς* is used in a qualified sense, as Herod. 6, 15. Æschyl. Pers. 740. *μονάδα δὲ Πέρξην ἐρημον φασὶν οὐ πολλῶν μετὰ*, where Dr. Blomfield compares Eurip. Hec. 1130. *μόνον δὲ σὺν τέκνοισι μ' εἰσάγει*.

The story told by Plutarch of the death of Lamachus seems entitled to no attention.

¹ *The outwork.*] Namely, we may suppose, a sort of palisade, by way of defence to the workmen and others against any sudden attack, or the annoyance of straggling parties.

² *Labourers.*] Probably, slaves. Not servants, as Hobbes renders.

reason of the fire, made no farther advances, but immediately retreated back. Indeed, by this time there had come up a reinforcement from the Athenians below, who had now chased off the enemy there, and at the same time their fleet from Thapsus (agreeably to orders) came to port in the great harbour. At sight of this, those on the height quickly departed, as did the whole army of the Syracusans, to the city, being now of opinion that with their present forces they should no longer be able to hinder the carrying of the wall down to the sea.³

CIII. After this, the Athenians raised a trophy, and gave back the dead, under treaty, to the Syracusans, and received those slain with Lamachus, and Lamachus himself. Then with their whole armament, both of the sea and the land service, they began to block up Syracuse with a double wall of circumvallation, down to the sea. And now supplies of necessities for the army were brought in from all parts of Italy.¹ Many, too, of the Siculi, who had before stood aloof, looking to see which should be the conquerors, now came over to the Athenians as allies; who were also joined by three fifty-oared ships from Tyrnesia. Other affairs, also, took a turn according to their wishes. For the Syracusans, as no assistance came to them from Peloponnesus, no longer thought that they should surmount their difficulties, but were holding conferences with each other, and correspondence with Nicias, respecting capitulation; for, since the death of Lamachus, he had held the sole command. Nothing, however, was concluded², but (as was

³ *Who now supposed, &c.*] Mitford very well paraphrases thus: "All hope of intercepting the contravallation, or by any means preventing its completion, was now given up by the besieged."

¹ *Supplies of necessities, &c.*] From the fear that their previous refusal or hesitation to join in the attack or furnish provisions might draw down upon them the vengeance of a powerful and prosperous state.

² *Nothing, however, was concluded.*] Because (as Mitford thinks) the terms were not such as Nicias thought would satisfy his greedy masters. The real reason, however, might be, that the persons in communication with Nicias were chiefly, if not entirely, of the lower ranks, who had not that apprehension of subjection to a democracy which might justly be entertained by the aristocracy. "Thus nearly, however," says Mitford, "was a great point, and perhaps the most important, carried towards realising the magnificent visions of the ambition of Alcibiades; and so near

likely to be the case with men not knowing what course to take, and besieged more closely than before) many proposals were made to him, and yet more debates were agitated in the city. For, by reason of their present calamities, they had conceived a suspicion of each other³, insomuch that they removed from office the commanders under whom these misfortunes had occurred (as if the harm had befallen them either by their ill luck or treachery), and elected others in their stead, Heraclides⁴, Eucles, and Tellias.

CIV. In the meantime, Gylippus the Lacedæmonian, and the ships from Corinth, were now about the parts of Leucas, designing to bring assistance with all speed to Sicily; but when terribly alarming reports reached them, and all concurring in the falsehood that Syracuse was now completely blockaded, Gylippus no longer entertained any hope of *Sicily*, but being desirous of preserving *Italy*, he himself and Pythen, the Corinthian commander, crossed, with all haste, the Ionian gulf, with two Laconian and two Corinthian vessels, to Taras; for the Corinthians, having equipped, besides ten of their own, two of the Leucadian and three Ambraciote triremes, were to sail after. Gylippus, having first gone on an embassy from Taras to Thuria (on account of his father having been once a citizen of that place¹), but not being able to bring them over, he weighed anchor, and coasting along the Italian shore, was seized by a wind from off the Tarantine gulf² (such as

was Nicias to gaining, almost against his will, the glory of conqueror of Syracuse and of Sicily, and adding to the dominion of Athens the greatest acquisition ever yet made by Grecian arms."

³ *Had conceived a suspicion of each other.*] This suspicion of treachery between party and party Mitford justly considers as "the universal bane of the Grecian commonwealth, especially in adverse circumstances."

⁴ *Heraclides.*] Probably, the same person that was in office before.

¹ *On account of his father, &c.*] His father, Cleandridas, being joined as counsellor to Plistonax in his expedition against the Athenians, and, after his return, accused and found guilty of having received bribes from Pericles to hasten his departure, was exiled, and went and resided at Thurium.

² *Seized by a wind from off the Tarantine gulf.*] I have here followed the conjecture of Poppo *Ταπριννον*, for *Τερινναίον*, which (it may be added) is somewhat confirmed by the reading of one MS. *Τερινναίον*. The *ε* and *α*, as also the *ν* and *ρ*, are often confounded. Certainly, the common reading cannot be tolerated, since the *Terinæan* gulf is on the other side of Italy, and it is quite inconsistent with what follows. However, *κατὰ μὲν*,

there has a mighty force³ when standing at north⁴), and carried off⁵ to sea, and after being exceedingly tossed by the storm, he again made Taras, where he drew on shore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered from the storm.

Nicias, though he heard that he was on the voyage, yet contemned the paucity of his ships (which had excited a similar feeling in the Thurians), and conceiving that Gylippus had sailed rather for privateering purposes than regular war, he had as yet kept no watch on his motions.⁶

CV. About the same time this summer the Lacedæmonians (themselves and their allies) made an irruption into Argos, and ravaged most of the country; on which the Athenians went to the assistance of the Argives with thirty ships, which was a most manifest violation of their treaty with the Lacedæ-

in spite of the objections of Poppo, signify in the direction of, ortus ab, as Benedict rightly renders it.

³ *Has a mighty force.*] So Soph. Aj. 1148. ἐκπνεύσας μίγας ἀνεμος. Pseudo-Eurip. in Rheseo 319. ἐξώσσης — ἔθραυσε λαίρην — μίγας πνέων. Aristoph. Vesp. 1123. Βορέας ὁ μίγας. See also Herod. 8. 138. and Plutarch Ages. 32.

⁴ *Standing at North.*] The Scholiast and Goeller rightly observe that ἰσηκώς is applicable to what we call a steady or stiff wind. Here I would compare Aristæn. l. 2, 11. τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος ἔνθεν ἰσηκός. Herod. 6, 140, 4. ἰσηίων ἀνέμων κατεστηκότων.

Goeller censures the Scholiast for adducing the phrase στάσις ἀνέμων, affirming that that means quite another thing; but the passage of Æschyl. Prom. 1093. which he adduces from Coray, seems to justify the Scholiast; and if that should be thought dubious, the following must be acknowledged to be decisive. Dio Chrys. (the page I have not noted) "Ὅσπερ γὰρ αἱ τὸν ἀνέμον σημαίνουσαι ταινίαι, κατὰ τὴν στάσιν αἰεὶ τοῦ πνεύματος αἰωροῦνται, νυνὶ μὲν οὕτως, πάλιν δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα. So also Suidas explains the phrase by ἐπὶ πνοῆς βιαίου ἀνέμου.

That violent winds do sometimes blow from gulfs cannot be doubted, and they are occasionally mentioned by the antients; ex. gr. Plutarch Anton. ἀπὸ τοῦ κόλπου πολλὴν ἐκπνεύσαντες λίβα.

⁵ *Carried off.*] Bekker and Goeller edit ἀρπασθεῖς, which may be confirmed from Eurip. Cycl. 108. ἀνέμων θυέλλαι δειρό μ' ἥρπασεν βίη. Æschyl. Agam. 610. ἡ χεῖμα — ἥρπασε (scil. αὐτὸν.) See also the commentators on Acts 27, 12. Yet the common reading ἀναρπ. is confirmed by Æschin. c. Ctes. § 45. καὶ γὰρ ναυτικὴ καὶ πῆλξη στρατία καὶ πόλεις ἄρδην εἰσὶν ἀνερπασμένα. The sense will thus be "in transversum abripi," which, as being more significant and apposite, I should be inclined to adopt, did I not suspect that the ἀν arose from the αὶ preceding. However, nihil decerno.

⁶ *Kept no watch on his motions.*] This was certainly very unwise in so experienced a person as Nicias. The Athenian government, too, seems to have been very blamable in having no squadron, however small, in the western parts of Greece, to watch the motions of the fleet now fitting out at Corinth and elsewhere, and pick up stragglers.

monians: for *before*, indeed, they had carried on hostilities from Pylus, and by cruising round Peloponnesus, rather than making any debarkation on the Laconian territory, or *carrying on war* (as now) in conjunction with the Argives and Mantinæans; and though the Argives repeatedly counselled them only to land with arms on the Laconian territory, and, after having ravaged a very little of the territory, to return, they would not. Nay, having now (under the command of Pythodorus, Læspodius, and Demaratus) landed at Epidaurus Limera, and ravaged Prasia and certain other parts of the territory, they gave the Lacedæmonians a plausible reason for going to war with them.¹ After the Athenians had retired with their fleet, and the Lacedæmonians gone home, the Argives made an irruption into Phliasia, and having ravaged part of the country, and slain some of the inhabitants, they returned home.

¹ *Gave the Lacedæmonians, &c.*] This ebullition of ill will, however natural and merited, was certainly a very impolitic step, and by exciting the Lacedæmonians to go to war, and send Gylippus and the forces to Sicily, was the immediate cause of the failure of the Sicilian expedition, which led to the ruin of Athens.

BOOK VII.

I. **AND** now Gylippus and Pythen, after having refitted their ships, coasted along from Taras to Locri Epizephyrri; and having now learnt, on more accurate intelligence, that Syracuse was not yet completely circumvallated, but that it was still possible for any coming with an army to gain entrance by the way of Epipolæ, they consulted whether, keeping Sicily on the right, they should adventure to enter the place by sea, or whether, with Sicily on the left, they should first sail to Himera, and having added the people there and such other forces as they should prevail on to join them, should go by land. And it was resolved to sail to Himera, especially as the four Attic ships, which Nicias, however he might despise them¹, yet, on hearing that they were at Locri, despatched, had not arrived at Rhegium. Having thus been beforehand with this guard-force, they make their passage through the strait, and only touching at Rhegium and Messene, arrive at Himera. Being there, they prevailed on the Himeræans to join them, and both themselves to follow, and also to supply arms and armour² to such of the sailors as had them not (for the *ships* they drew on shore and laid up); and sent to desire the Selinuntians to meet them in full force at a certain place by the way. The Geloans, also, and some tribes of Siculi, promised them some inconsiderable force; the latter of whom were the more disposed to join, Archimedes being lately dead (who reigning over the Siculi in those parts, and possessing no little power, was attached to the Athenians), and since Gylippus seemed to have come from Lacedæmon with zeal for the business.³ Gylippus, then, having taken of the sailors

¹ *However he might despise them.*] This (as the Scholiast points out) is implied in the ὅμως, which has reference to a clause omitted.

² *Arms and armour.*] Both are meant by ὅπλα.

³ *With zeal for the business.*] Or, with alacrity in the cause. Thucydides hints that the people more readily came over to the cause, on seeing the Lacedæmonians lay aside their usual sluggishness and hesitation, and engage heartily in the affair.

and marines those that had been provided with arms, to the amount of seven hundred⁴, also Himeræans, of heavy and light-armed together, about one thousand, with one hundred horse and some Selinuntian light-armed, and a few Geloan horse, together with Siculi in all one thousand, he marched for Syracuse.

II. And now the Corinthian and other ships set forward from Leucas with all possible speed¹, and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though he set off with a single ship the last of all, yet arrived first at Syracuse, and a little before Gylippus²; and having found them about to hold an assembly, in order to form measures for bringing the war to a termination, he put a stop to this, and reanimated their drooping courage, telling them that the rest of the fleet were now coming up, with Gylippus son of Cleandridas, sent as commander by the Lacedæmonians. At these assurances the Syracusans were much encouraged, and immediately went forth in full force to meet Gylippus, for they had learnt that he was

⁴ *Seven hundred.*] This was probably not the full complement of the crews; for the air of the expression ἀναλαβών (*ik*) τῶν ναυτῶν τοῦς, &c. suggests that for some arms could not be provided; and others might not be fit to act as hoplites, from sickness or other causes; and a few would necessarily be left to take care of the ships. Thus there is nothing to negative the opinion that two hundred was the regular number of the crew of a trireme.

Mitford, indeed, estimates the total number, with the attendant slaves, at five thousand. But that appears far above the mark. Nor does it seem likely that slaves (who, indeed, were not much used for war by these nations) would be taken on such an expedition as this.

¹ *And now the Corinthians, &c.*] Smith has here strangely missed the sense, which, it must be confessed, is not very perspicuous. We may gather from what is implied rather than expressed, that the fleet did not set out all together, but that some ships which had not arrived at Leucas when it departed, sailed after it, and of these the last was the vessel of Gongylus.

² *Though he set off, &c., arrived first at Syracuse.*] That Gongylus made the passage in less time than the rest would, at first sight, seem to be a fact scarcely worth noticing. But it was really of great importance; for time was then very precious; and Gongylus, by arriving with one ship earlier than the rest, not only saved so much time, but was enabled to enter the harbour unobserved, probably by night: whereas, the whole fleet must have been observed, and would have been prevented from entering. There is no doubt but that the celerity of Gongylus's passage was, as Mitford (though without any authority) relates, effected by pushing across the gulf, and not, as usual, coasting the Italian shore. Thus, too, he arrived in the only direction where the Athenian ships were not on the watch.

now near³; and, in fact, Gylippus, having by the way taken Iegæ⁴, a fort of the Siculi, and putting his troops in order of battle, then arrives at Epipolæ⁵; and having ascended by Euryelus (where the Athenians at first gained access) he marched with the Syracusans against the wall of the Athenians. Now it chanced that at the time of his arrival the Athenians had completed eight or nine stadia of a double wall to the great port, except a small part next the sea, which they were now building. At the other part, too, of the circumvallation towards Trogilus to the other sea, stones were now laid ready most part of the way, and in some places the wall was half, and in others entirely finished. Into so imminent a danger had Syracuse come, and within so little of being enclosed.⁶

³ *They had learnt that he was now near.*] It is surprising that the Athenians should not, by this time, have so completed their lines of circumvallation as to have prevented all communication with the country. Their industry appears to have been as slender as their vigilance. It is true that they had many natural impediments to overcome, especially in the marsh across which they must carry their wall, before all communication with Epipolæ were cut off. Though, indeed, they seem to have done nothing there, but to have turned their attention to carrying the wall down to the great port.

⁴ *Iegæ.*] Hobbes and Smith write *Jegas*. But that cannot be tolerated; for there is little doubt but that the *Ἰέρα* mentioned by Steph. Byz. as a fort in Sicily, is the place here meant. Whether *Ἰίγας* or *Ἰίρας* be the true spelling, cannot be determined; but as all the MSS. of Thucydides support the *γ*, it should surely be retained; though Goeller edits *Ἰίρας*, and Bekker, most uncritically, *Ἰίρα*.

I cannot but suspect that *Jegæ* occupied the site of what was afterwards called *Acrae*.

It may seem strange that *Gongylus* should have stopped to take fortresses. But probably he was obliged to take *Iegæ*, or *Acrae*, because it was in his way to Syracuse, and occupied by the Siculi in the Athenian interest.

⁵ *Arrives at Epipolæ.*] Mitford here accuses Nicias of gross neglect in suffering *Gongylus*, with a force of scarcely two thousand heavy-armed, to ascend Epipolæ unopposed. But, in fact, as the Syracusans had advanced forth to meet *Gongylus*, the Athenians were really not strong enough to do any such thing. Perhaps it may be said that they should have posted a force on Euryelus. But, as there was no fort there, it could not have hindered the ascent of *Gongylus*, since it would have to contend with the Syracusan army. And thus the detachment would have been sacrificed, and for no advantage, since, if *Gongylus* had not ascended by *Euryelus*, he might have entered the place by some other way.

⁶ *Into so imminent a danger, &c.*] Such seems to be the full sense of the words, in which there is a blending of two clauses. What was the extent which remained to be circumvallated it is not possible exactly to determine; probably less than a mile, though this would have been the most difficult part of the whole, the ground being mostly a muddy marsh.

III. The Athenians, at Gylippus and the Syracusans suddenly coming upon them, were at first in some consternation, but soon ranged themselves in order. Gylippus, however, taking post, immediately sent a herald to them, to say that "if they are willing to evacuate Sicily within five days, taking their baggage and property, he is ready to treat for the purpose." The Athenians, however, paid no attention to this offer, and sent the herald away without an answer.¹ After this both parties made preparations for battle; however, Gylippus, perceiving the Syracusans to be in disarray, and not easily to be put in order², withdrew the army more into the open space. As to Nicias, he did not lead on his troops³, but lay quiet at his wall. When Gylippus saw that they were not advancing, he withdrew his army to the steep called the Temenites⁴, and there encamped for the night.

On the following day, he took the greater part of his forces, and drew them up in order at the walls of the Athenians, in order that they might not send succours elsewhere; and sending, meanwhile, a detachment against the fort Labdalum, he took it, putting to the sword all that were found there; for the place was not in the view of the Athenians.⁵ And this

¹ *Without an answer.*] Plutarch Nic. 19. adds: τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν τινες καταγελῶντες, ἡρώτων, εἰ διὰ παρουσίαν ἐνδὸς τριέωνος καὶ βακτηρίας Λακωνικῆς οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ τὰ Συρακουσίων ἐξαίφνης γέγονεν, ὥς Ἀθηναίων καταφρονεῖν. Indeed, Gylippus seems to have been almost the only Spartan. So Justin. 3, 4. says: "ab his (scil. Lacedæmoniiis) mittitur Gylippus solus, sed in quo instar omnium auxiliorum erat."

² *In disarray, and not, &c.*] Almost the very same expression has been before used; and it does seem that the Syracusans were not only deficient in *discipline* and *docility*, but really could not form in line with any precision, especially on rough or confined ground; which is the case with all raw soldiers. Gylippus, therefore, very judiciously, drew off his forces to the wider space of Temenites.

³ *Did not lead on his troops.*] Though it should seem that he might have done this to advantage.

⁴ *Temenites.*] This seems to have been the commencement of the high ground of Epipolæ, and which, perhaps, had there a sort of crag abruptly rising.

⁵ *Was not in the view of the Athenians.*] Mitford, indeed, narrates that Gylippus had taken such a position as to cut off the communication of the Athenians with Labdalum and his northern lines. But that does not appear from Thucydides, nor is it probable in itself, for Nicias was too wary not to have suspected his purpose. Besides, as the place was out of sight, such a precaution was unnecessary.

same day a trireme of the Athenians was taken by the Syracusans, as it lay off the port, reconnoitring it.⁵

IV. After this, the Syracusans and their allies set about building a single wall, commencing from the city, and running up through Epipolæ to the transverse wall¹, in order that the Athenians (unless they could hinder its erection) might no longer be able to circumvallate them.

And now the Athenians, having completed the wall to the sea, proceeded upwards. On which Gylippus, as some part of their work was but weak, took the army by night, and went to assault it. But the Athenians (for they happened to encamp outside) perceiving their approach, advanced against them. On seeing which, Gylippus withdrew his troops back. And now the Athenians having built the wall higher, themselves stood on guard here, stationing the allies at the rest of the circumvallation, at such posts as each were to occupy.² Nicias also thought it expedient to fortify what was called the Plemmyrium³ (a promontory opposite to the city, which

⁵ *Off the port, reconnoitring it.*] Such seems to be the sense, and not that which all the translators assign, "as it was entering the great port;" for the Athenian ships had all of them before entered the great port. Thucydides, however, does not say the *great* port, but *the* port, by which he means that part of the great port which the Syracusans occupied near Ortygia. The trireme had probably ventured too near, and was overtaken before it could reach the Athenian station; or, perhaps, on venturing too near, it might run aground on some shoal.

¹ *A single wall, &c.*] Such is the sense assigned by Goeller; and so I have myself ever understood the passage, which has been strangely misunderstood, from its not being perceived that *ταίχος* must be taken twice. The transverse wall here mentioned was that of which we read at 6, 101., which was double, and had wooden towers, like the wall at the siege of Platæa, l. 2, 21. Whereas, the wall now building was *single*, because, when it met the transverse wall (which, it seems, the Syracusans still retained), it would require no defending on more than one side. Or, perhaps, the Syracusans thought that if they were strong enough in the field to accomplish the building and guarding of this wall, the Athenians could not carry through their circumvallation. Indeed, this wall completely intersected, and made nugatory the whole of the line of circumvallation.

² *At such posts as, &c.*] i. e. assigning to each their posts to guard.

³ *Plemmyrium.*] A promontory and small island at the entrance of the great port. On which see Goeller de Situ. With respect to the *ratio appellationis* (on which the commentators say nothing), it seems to have been so called as being the place where the *tide* (*πλημύρα*) rose and beat, making what is called in Lincolnshire and Cambridgeshire an *eger*. Hence the read-

jutting out into the great port, makes the entrance narrow), since it appeared to him that if this were fortified, the introduction of necessities would be easier; for they might blockade the port of the Syracusans at a nearer distance, and not, as now, have to make their approaches ⁴ from the very farthest recess of the harbour, whenever any movement was to be made with the naval force.⁵ Nicias, too, now paid the more attention to the maritime war, as perceiving affairs by land, since the arrival of Gylippus, to be in a less promising state. He removed, therefore, the army and navy thither ⁶, and erected three forts, in which were deposited most of the baggage and equipments; and now the large transports lay at anchor there, as also did the swift-sailing ships. Hence, however, chiefly arose ⁷ first the loss sustained in the crews. For the sailors used water scanty in quantity, and far to fetch; and, moreover, when they went for that, or to collect fuel, they were many of them ⁸ slain by the Syracusan horse, who were masters of the field; for a third part of the Syracusan horse (because of the forces in Plemmyrium, that

ing Πλημύριον, edited by Bekker but rejected by Goeller, seems to be the most antient and correct orthography.

⁴ *Approaches.*] Or, advances, attacks, by which, it is plain, are meant the advances or attacks made by the Athenians on the Syracusan fleet.

⁵ *Whenever any movement, &c.*] Such is the sense which I have ever supposed to be contained in the words of the original; and my opinion is supported by that of Hack and Goeller; though the earlier interpreters take κινῶνται of the *Syracusans*.

As Hack has so correctly pointed out the sense of κινῶνται, it is strange that he should have misunderstood the expression δι' ἑλάσσονος, which has no reference to the distance from *Italy*, but to the distance from the Athenian station to that of the Syracusan. The former, it seems, had hitherto been at the inmost recess of the great port, as being in communication with their land forces. It was, however, very inconvenient for blockading the entrance, as the distance the ships had to go to their blockading station was not small; and, from few being there at a time, ships sometimes made their entrance into the port in spite of them, as in the case of Gongylus.

⁶ *Conveyed the army and navy thither.*] Though this step had its particular and immediate advantages, it was, in fact, abandoning the attempt to circumvallate Syracuse, which, indeed, was now impracticable without a much larger force. And it must be confessed that the *safety* of the men (which Nicias ever kept in view rather than victory) demanded that there should be a constant and uninterrupted communication with the open sea.

⁷ *Hence, however, especially arose.*] Such seems to be the sense of ὅστε.

⁸ *Many of them.*] Bekker and Goeller insert from two MSS. οἱ πολλοί. Poppo, however, with reason, objects to the *sense* thence arising. The true reading seems to be πολλοί, which I have followed.

they might not go out to ravage) had been now stationed at Polichne⁹ near Olympieum. Nicias, too, learnt that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was approaching; and he despatched twenty ships to watch them, with orders to lie in wait for them about Locri, and Rhegium, and the approach to Sicily.

V. Gylippus, meanwhile, was carrying forward the wall through Epipolæ, using the stones which the Athenians before laid there for themselves; and, moreover, he regularly led forth and ranged in order the Syracusans and their allies in front of the wall¹⁰, on which the Athenians likewise drew up over against them. And when Gylippus judged that a favourable opportunity presented itself, he commenced an attack, and the armies came to close fight between the walls¹¹, wherein the Syracusan cavalry was of no service. And the Syracusans and their allies being defeated, and having fetched away their dead under treaty, the Athenians erected a trophy. Gylippus, calling together the army, said that the fault was not theirs, but his; for by drawing up the line too much within the walls, he had caused them to be deprived of all benefit from the cavalry¹² and the darters; and that now he meant to lead them on again. He bid them also to conceive of themselves as being a force nothing inferior to the enemy; and as to spirit and courage, he said it was a thing not to be endured, if *they*, as being Peloponnesians and

⁹ *Polichne.*] A small town (as, indeed, the name imports) adjacent to, and probably dependent on, the temple of Jupiter Olympus, having grown around it, as did the burghs and towns around the abbeys of the middle ages. Goeller de Situ, p. 86. mentions other towns of the same name.

¹⁰ *Ranged in order the, &c.*] For the purpose of guarding the works. The *dei*, it may be observed, represents what is *regularly* and *usually* done.

This was good policy on the part of Gylippus, since he thereby not only defended the works, but trained his men, and habituated them to face the enemy.

¹¹ *The walls.*] Namely, the Syracusan single wall across to Epipolæ, and the end of the Athenian wall of circumvallation, which was carried down to the great port.

¹² *Deprived of all benefit from the cavalry.*] For cavalry always required plenty of space, as also did light troops; since, if brought to close quarters, they were no match for the heavy-armed.

Mitford thinks that "this was not really an oversight of Gylippus, but was done on purpose to give practice to the Syracusans, with the least possible risk, and make them experience the necessity of submitting to the severity of Spartan discipline, if they would hope for the success for which the Spartan arms were renowned."

Dorians, should not overcome Ionians, islanders, and a promiscuous rabble ¹³, and drive them from the country.

VI. After this, when an occasion offered itself, he again led them forward. And Nicias and the Athenians, conceiving that if the enemy should not choose to begin the battle, it was necessary for *them* not to suffer the counter-wall to be carried forward (for the enemies' ¹ wall had now almost advanced past ¹ the end of theirs), and that, if it should be carried further, it would give them the double advantage ² of constantly conquering whenever they fought, and fighting, or not, at their pleasure; for these reasons they advanced against the Syracusans.³ And Gylippus, having led forth his troops somewhat farther from the walls than before, engaged with the enemy, after ranging the cavalry and darters on the flank of the Athenians ⁴, at the open space, where the works of both walls terminated. In the battle, these cavalry charging the left wing of the Athenians (which was opposite to them) routed it.⁵ And thereby the rest of the army, being *also* defeated by the Syracusans, was hurried precipitately ⁶ into the fortifications.⁷ And the next night the Syracusans got before the Athenians in their counter-wall, passing that building by the Athenians. So that now they could not themselves be

¹³ *Promiscuous rabble.*] On the sense of ξύγλυς I shall have much to treat in my edition.

¹ *Almost advanced past.*] Mitford paraphrases, "it barely did not intersect the line of the Athenian contravallation."

² *Give them the double advantage, &c.*] Literally, "*made theirs.*" How it could give them the advantage of constantly conquering, I see not. Nicias, in his Epistle, regards it as very possible, with a large force, to accomplish the circumvallation, after destroying the cross wall.

³ *Advanced against the Syracusans.*] i. e. they began the battle.

⁴ *On the flank of the Athenians.*] i. e. at the left flank.

⁵ *These cavalry charging, &c.*] It is surprising that Nicias should not have disposed his own cavalry, about six hundred and fifty in number, as some check. But, strange to say, no use seems to have been made of the cavalry; at least little or nothing is said of it. In fact, from want of forage and exercising ground, the horses must have been in a most inefficient state.

⁶ *Hurried precipitately.*] This sense of καταράσσω may be illustrated by the following examples: Dionys. Hal 614. μη καταράσσωσι πρὸς ἀναντίς χωρίον. Arrian E. A. 5, 17, 3. κατέρραχθησαν ὥσπερ εἰς τείχος τι φάδιον.

⁷ *Fortifications.*] i. e. their fortified wall of circumvallation.

hindered by them, but they (i. e. the Athenians), even if they should be masters of the field, would be utterly deprived of the power of circumvallating them.⁸

VII. After this, the remaining ships of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians, twelve in number, commanded by Erasinidas, a Corinthian, having escaped the observation of the Athenian guard force, made sail into the harbour, and carried on, jointly with the Syracusans, the remainder of the wall up to the transverse erection.¹

And now Gylippus set out to the rest of Sicily², to raise an army, and collect both sea and land forces, and bring over such of the cities as had either yet not been hearty in their cause, or had wholly stood aloof from the contest. Other ambassadors, too, of the Syracusans and the Corinthians were despatched to Lacedæmon and Corinth, in order that an army might yet be transported to Sicily, in whatever manner (whether in hulks, or barges, or by whatever other way) might seem most expedient³, since the *Athenians* were sending over for reinforcements.⁴

The Syracusans also manned their navy, and began to

⁸ *Would be utterly deprived, &c.*] I leave it to military men to explain this; for certainly I do not see why, if the Athenians should be masters of the field, they might not demolish this counter-wall, and then carry on their circumvallation as before. Indeed, Nicias, in his Epistle, admits as much.

¹ *The remainder of the wall, &c.*] By this it seems that the Syracusans were not content with carrying forward the *single counter-wall* past the Athenian wall of circumvallation, but carried it so far as to meet the former transverse wall: thus materially strengthening it on that side.

² *The rest of Sicily.*] Namely, such as he had not traversed in his march across from Himera, especially the southern and western parts of the island.

³ *Might seem expedient.*] Literally, "might be successful." Schæfer would cancel the words *ἐν δακρύων* — *ἄλλως*, as not agreeable to Thucydidean brevity. But Thucydides is occasionally *profuse* of words where there would seem to be no need of them; so much so, indeed, as to excite some disgust to modern ears. Such, however, is, more or less, the characteristic of all the ancient writers (especially Herodotus) as compared with the moderns, and may be regarded as a vestige of the simple phraseology of the earliest ages.

⁴ *Sending over for reinforcements.*] The *ἐπὶ* in *ἐπιμεταπομπήων* signifies *to, thither*. I prefer taking *ἐπιμετ.* as a participle present, because the Athenians had not yet sent, but were on the point of doing so; and, probably, the Syracusans had obtained secret intelligence of their intentions.

practise their men ⁵, as meaning to try their endeavours in *that* branch too; indeed, in all other respects, they had conceived much courage.⁶

VIII. Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and the distresses of his own army every day becoming greater, sent also himself to Athens, having, indeed, often at other times, as the events occurred, despatched messengers¹; but he was now especially induced to do so, conceiving that he was placed in a very perilous situation, and that unless those at home should either speedily recall the army, or send off other and not inferior forces, there would be no chance of preservation. Fearing, too, lest the messengers, either through inability of speech, or failure in memory², or by speaking to gratify the multitude, should not report things

⁵ *Practise their men.*] On this sense (which has not been well understood by some commentators) Goeller refers to Wesseling on Diod. l. 13, 8. and the Lex. Polyb. He might have added, that it is found in a kindred passage of Herod. l. 6, 12. *καὶ ἰσθαίνειν οὐκ ἐξήλεσκον ἐς τὰς νῆας, οὐδ' ἀναπειράσθαι.*

⁶ *Had conceived much courage.*] Portus, Smith, and Gail assign another but not so well founded a sense. *Ἐπιρρώνυσθαι* is often so used both by Thucydides and other writers. And as it is here joined with *ἔς*, so it is with *πρὸς* in Diod. Sic. t. 5, 293. *ἐπερρώσθησαν πρὸς.*

¹ *Having, indeed, often at other times, &c.*] Mitford remarks, "that writing was but beginning to come into common use for ordinary purposes. The despatches of generals were mostly, or, it rather appears, universally, committed to trusty messengers, who delivered them verbally." And he adds, that "Thucydides speaks of Nicias as the first general who made it his practice to transmit his reports home constantly in writing. From his first appointment, therefore, to a command with which he had always been little satisfied, and in which complex operations were to be conducted, at a greater distance from home than had been usual for the Athenian arms, he had used the precaution of frequently sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction." To the latter remark, however, I must take exception. Thucydides does not say that he was the first to adopt this practice. Though, indeed, from the expressions, "fearing, too, lest the messengers should — he wrote an epistle," it would appear that this was the first epistle he had sent, and that he had before sent verbal messages. Yet the expression *ἐν πολλαῖς ἀλλαῖς* seems to prove the contrary.

² *Failure in memory.*] Such is the sense, if the reading, edited by Bekker and Goeller, *μνήμης*, be the true one; but I am inclined to suspect it is merely a gloss, and that the common reading *γνώμης* should be restored. I cannot, however, approve of the sense assigned to it by Portus and Smith, "want of judgment;" for Nicias would not send fools, nor was judgment (or counsel, as Bauer explains) very necessary in delivering a message, but rather *presence of mind*, lest they should be disconcerted or embarrassed, as they might well be before such an audience.

as they were³, he wrote an epistle, conceiving that thus, especially, his own mind would escape being misunderstood or misrepresented by the messenger, and that the Athenians would know the truth, and form their resolves thereby.

Thus the messengers departed, bearing the letter, with instructions what they should say.⁴ As for himself, he now took care of the affairs of the army by keeping on the defensive, rather than by encountering voluntary dangers.⁵

IX. At the close of this same summer, Euetion, one of the Athenian generals¹, warring against Amphipolis, in con-

³ *Should not report things as they were.*] To this is applicable the passage of Homer Il. o. 207. *ἰσθλὸν γὰρ τίττεται, ὅτ' ἀγγελοῖς αἴσιμα εἰδῶ*, which is had in view by Pindar Pyth. 4. 494. Hence may be confirmed the emendation of Dr. Blomfield on Æschyl. Choeeph. 761. *ἐν ἀγγέλῳ γὰρ κρυπτός ὁρδοῦται λόγος*, where the common reading is *κρυπτός*.

⁴ *With instructions what they should say.*] Namely, in explanation of its contents, or farther particulars of the state of affairs. Thucydides mentions this, because though in general it was permitted to the messengers bearing letters to give explanations of the letter or the business, or further details (as Acts 15, 27. *καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ λόγου ἀπαγγέλλοντας τὰ αὐτὰ*), yet sometimes this was forbidden; so Arrian E. A. 2, 14, 6. *συμπέμπει θ. παραγγέλαις τὴν ἐπιστολὴν δοῦναι Δαρεῖω, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ διαλέγεσθαι ὑπὲρ μηδενός*. Nicias, however, though he permitted these persons to speak, yet took the precaution of telling them what to say.

⁵ *He now took care, &c.*] Such appears to be the true sense of this obscure and controverted passage, the variety of readings in which combines with anomalous phraseology to occasion considerable perplexity. I read from three MSS. *ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μάλλον ἢ δὴ ἔχων, ἢ δὲ ἰκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπιμελεῖτο (αὐτῶν)*. The conjecture of Reiske and Wyttenbach *ἀκουσίων* cannot be admitted, for how is it possible to tolerate such an expression as *ἀκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπιμελεῖτο*? As to the *ἰκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπιμ.* of Bekker and Goeller it is little better.

I am not aware that the reading I have proposed and followed is open to any fatal objections. The expression *ἰκουσίων κινδύνων* is sufficiently defended by the *πρὸς ἀσφαλείτους κινδύνους ἵνα* in a not dissimilar passage of Thucyd. l. 8, 27., also by Xenoph. Anab. 6, 5, 14. *ἀλλ' ἵστε μὲν με, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδένα πω κίνδυνον προξενησάντα ὑμῖν ἰδελοῦσιον κίνδυνον*. Philostr. Vit. Ap. 8, 13. *ὥς μὲν ἡς κινδύνους ἰκουσίους ἴοι*. Hierocles ap. Stob. Ecl. Phys. t. 2, 423. *κακοὶ ἀσφαίρειτοι*. But, what is of more consequence, I am enabled to prove that such was the reading of Dio Cassius, who closely imitates this passage at p. 613, 14. *αὐτὸς μὲν ἡσυχάζει, καὶ οὐδένα ἔτι κίνδυνον ἀσφαίρειτον ἀνηρεῖτο*, and 516, 58. *ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τε διὰ φυλακῆς, μάλλον ἢ διὰ κινδύνων τὸ στρατόπεδον ἰποκῶντο*. I grant, indeed, that there is something harsh and anomalous in *ἡ διὰ κινδύνων* scil. *ἔχων*, which is for *ἐκ κινδύνων ἰών*: but *ἔχων* διὰ is used with various genitives, as *φόβου, φρόντιδος, ἀνομιᾶς, φιλίας*, &c. Why not, then, *κινδύνων*? See note on l. 1, 17, and 2, 22.

¹ *One of the Athenian generals.*] Namely, I conjecture, the ten state generals.

junction with Perdiccas and with a large force of Thracians, did not indeed take the city, but bringing round the triremes into the Strymon, he besieged it from the river, making his approaches from Himeræum. And thus ended the summer.

X. On the ensuing winter, the messengers from Nicias arriving at Athens, spoke what had been ordered them to deliver by word of mouth, and answered whatever interrogations were propounded, delivering also the letter.¹ On which the state secretary² came forward, and read it to the Athenians, being to the following effect:

XI.³ "With our former proceedings, Athenians, ye have been made acquainted by many other epistles. On the present occasion, it is more especially seasonable that you should learn the situation in which we are placed, and form your counsels accordingly.

"Having, then, defeated the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, in many battles, and having erected the fortified walls wherein we now lie, there came Gylippus the Lacedæmonian, with an army⁴ from Peloponnesus, and from certain

¹ *Delivering also the letter.*] Hobbes and Smith studiously make the delivery of the letter come after the verbal information and interrogatories; which is very unlikely to have taken place; neither do the words of Thucydides demand this. There is here a sort of *hysteron proteron*; and though the delivery of the letter be mentioned last, that circumstance need not be much insisted on.

² *The state secretary.*] On this officer Goeller refers to Boeckh. *Staatsh.* t. 1. p. 201.; and he remarks that this officer is called by other writers *γραμματεὺς τοῦ δήμου*, or, *τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου*, and, according to Schoemann de comit. Athen. p. 320. *ὑπογραμματεὺς*. "Such a person," he adds, "was always at hand to the orators in the forum and the courts of justice, to read aloud, by their order, public writs and law papers. (See Wolf. on Demosth. Leptin. p. 244. 384.) This scribe was reckoned among the *ὑπὲρται*, not public magistrates, nor was his office very honourable, as we learn from the Scholiast and others."

³ This epistle is censured by Demetrius Phalereus (referred to by Goeller), as being too poetic, and written in too tumid a style. But certainly the former charge is very frivolous; and as to the other, I agree with Goeller that Demetrius has not shown in his work such judgment and taste as to give his criticism much weight. In short, there seems to be nothing in this address but what is extremely apposite, judicious, and impressive.

The whole of the epistle, it may be observed, is closely imitated by Procopius in an epistle of Belisarius to Justinian.

⁴ *With an army.*] Or, with forces; for no army had as yet arrived, but

other states in Sicily. And in the first battle, indeed, we defeated him, but in a subsequent one ⁵ we were overpowered by the numerous cavalry and darters, and compelled to retreat to our walls. Now, therefore, being obliged to cease from the circumvallation, by reason of the superior number of the enemy, we lie still. Nor indeed should we be *able* to employ our whole force, some part of our heavy-armed being necessarily employed in the guarding of our walls. They, too, have built a *single counter-wall* over against us, so that it is no longer practicable to circumvallate them, unless we should assail this counter-work with a great force, and take it. Our hap, however, it is, that while we seem to be besieging others, we are, at least by land, suffering siege ourselves. For we cannot go far into the country, by reason of their cavalry.

‡ XII. "They have also sent ambassadors to Peloponnesus, to request another army, and Gylippus is gone to the various states of Sicily, to stir up such as have yet been quiet, to join arms, and from the rest to fetch what auxiliaries he can, both land and sea forces. For the intentions of the Syracusans (as I learn) are, with their land forces to make an attack on our walls, and at the same time with their fleet to try an attack by sea. Nor let it seem strange that I say *by sea*, for though our navy at first, indeed, was in a most flourishing condition, both in the soundness of the ships, and the healthiness of the crews, yet now (as our enemy well knows), the vessels, by having so long kept the sea, are grown leaky and decayed, and the crews are mouldering away. For as to the *ships*, it is not possible to haul them on shore, and careen ¹ them, because the enemy's ships, equal or even superior in number, keep us in a continual expectation that they will make an attack (being

only a fleet, except that part of the sailors had been converted into heavy infantry.

⁵ *In a subsequent one.*] Or, as Goeller renders, "on the following day;" which sense, indeed, the expression τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ seems to require; but the words of Thucydides at c. 5. and 6. compel us to suppose a *longer* interval, though Goeller argues, that the activity of Gylippus makes it likely that he would attack on the following day.

¹ *Leaky — careen.*] The words θαλασσίω, διάδροχοι, and διαψύχω are all terms appropriate, which I shall fully illustrate in my edition.

plainly to be seen exercising), and the attacks are in their power², and they have far more the opportunity of drying their vessels³, not having to keep watch upon others.

XIII. "Nay, this would scarcely be in our power even with a great superabundance of ships, and certainly not, as now compelled to keep watch with all our force; compelled, I say, because if we should remit ever so little of our vigilance, we might be deprived of necessities, which even now we fetch in⁴ with great difficulty, close past their city. Hence it is that our crews have decayed, and are yet decaying; the *sailors*, by having to go far to fetch wood, water, and necessities, being destroyed by the cavalry. The servants⁵, too, since things have been brought to an equality, desert; and the foreigners, some, as entering from compulsion, go off straight to their homes; and others, at first allured by high wages, and supposing they had come to plunder rather than fight, since they have found the enemy's resistance, both in respect of naval and other forces, contrary to their expectation, some of them seize an excuse to go off, in order to desert⁶; others — just as they can, for wide is Sicily!⁷ Others there are who by purchasing

² *The attacks are in their power.*] i. e. the season for attack, and the power either to attack or not.

³ *They have far more the opportunity of drying their vessels.*] Not the means, as some render; for though the Syracusans had indeed far greater means for careening, and possessed docks (the Athenians having nothing that could be called a secure station), yet that is not here had in view.

⁴ *We fetch in.*] For *ἐκκομίζομενοι* I am inclined to conjecture *ἐκκομίζομενα*.

⁵ *The servants.*] Namely, those that had to wait on the mariners, and do the drudgery of the ship, like our *cabin-boys*; for I read, with Bekker and Goeller, for *θεραπεύοντες*, *θεράποντες*.

⁶ *Seize an excuse, &c.*] The true punctuation of the original is, *οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας, προφάσει, ἀπέρχονται*. At *προφάσει* subaud *ἐπι*, "excusatione aliqua arrepta." There is a similar construction in a kindred passage of l. 30, 111., where at *πρόφασιν* is to be supplied *κατά*. The word *αὐτομολία* is, indeed, rare in the plural, but it occurs in Joseph. 1288, 28., and Dionys. Hal. Ant. 380, 23.

As to the *excuses* to go forth, in order to desert, they would be many, as going for wood, water, &c.; some of which are adverted to in Plutarch *Æm. Paul. c. 23.*, cited by Goeller.

⁷ *Wide is Sicily.*] The phraseology here has been imitated by many writers, as Plat. *Phæd.* πολλή ἡ Ἑλλάς. Max. Tyr. Diss. 17. 1, 321. πολλή δ' ἡ Σικελία. Charit. p. 72. πολλή γὰρ ἡ Ἀσία. Joseph. 49, 9. πολλή γὰρ ἡ

Hyccaric slaves, to put on board in their stead (prevailing on the trierarchs to grant leave), have undermined the completeness of our navy.

XIV. "I am writing to those who well know that short in duration is the height of vigour¹ in any armament, and few are there of mariners who are able both to urge on the ship, and to back the rowing.²

"But of all these circumstances the most distressful is, that ✗ is not in my power, though commander in chief, to hinder these

¹ *Ἰδουμαῖα*. Theocrit. Idyll. 22, 156. Πολλά τοι Σπάρτα πολλά δ' ἰκπήλατος Ἄλις, Ἀρκαδία τ' εὐμαλός. Philostratus Vit. Ap. 8. c. 7. p. 346. ἔστι δὲ πολλή ἢ Ἀρκαδία καὶ ἄλωδής, where, from not being aware of this idiomatical use of πολλή, Olearius has greatly erred.

Mitford here well paraphrases thus: "Sicily is wide; and wholly to prevent these desertsions is impossible; even to check them is difficult."

¹ *Short in duration is the height of vigour.*] So Plutarch Anton. c. 28. εἰπεῖν ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ δειπνοῦντες, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὀδώκα. δεῖ δ' ἀκμήν ἔχειν τῶν παρατιθεμένων ἕκαστον, ἣν ἀκαρὲς ὥρας μαραίνειν.

² *Few are there of mariners, &c.*] There is no little perplexity connected with this passage, since, from our imperfect knowledge of maritime affairs in ancient times, it is difficult to assign any certain sense to the words. Ἐξορμῶντες ναῦν is rendered by Dorville and Duker "piloting a ship out of port, or out to sea;" and ξυνέχοντες εἰρεσίαν is explained "discharging that office among the crew which pertained to the *κελευσταί*." But that would confine the sense solely to *officers*, whereas the meaning seems to be in a general way, "that the loss of *able seamen* is one not easily repaired." The expressions must, therefore, have reference to the employments of seamen in general. Thus, I prefer taking the *ἐξορμῶντες*, with Portus and most others, in the sense *agere navem, navis cursum incitare*. And so it seems to have been taken by Pollux 1, 125. In the same manner, too, I would understand a passage of Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1398. τοῖς δὲ ἐξορμῶν, τοῖς δὲ στέλλειν scil. τὴν ναῦν. and, where it is used metaphorically, Aristoph. Thesm. 659. χρεὶ κοῦφον ἐξορμᾶν πόδα., and perhaps Eurip. Hec. 145. ἐκ τε γεραιᾶς χερὸς δρμήσας, where I would join *ἐξορμήσας*. The sense is to *separate*.

The *ξυνέχοντες εἰρεσίαν* I formerly, with Abresch, took to mean "keeping at the rowing," referring to Aristoph. Ran. 201., which passage contains, perhaps, the most graphic description of rowing any where to be found. That sense, however, is too feeble, and not significant enough. I must, therefore, acquiesce in the explanation of Goeller *remis inhibere*: *συνέχω* in the sense *hold, hold back*, is frequent. Now, it must be borne in mind that in the management of the row galleys of the antients, where in battle so much depended upon nimble and sudden turns, it was very necessary that the rowers should be as well able to *back* the ship as to *forward* it; which was done, I apprehend, not by altering and changing their places, but by a certain movement of the oars; though, when there was not sufficient time, and it was necessary to back the ship very speedily, all rose and shifted their places, and then *rowed to poop*, as it was called.

abuses³ (your tempers⁴ are difficult to govern), and that we have not any place from whence we can recruit our crews (which the enemy can do from various quarters); but must of necessity have them alone from whence we derived those which we had when we came, and those we have lost. For as to Naxos and Catana, which are now our allies, they are unable to supply us. If, too, one more advantage should be added to our enemies, that the cities of Italy which supply us with provisions, seeing the state we are in, and that you send no reinforcements, should go over to *them* — why then the war will be decided in their favour, and we be induced to surrender without striking a stroke!

“I could have written you other accounts of things more pleasing, but none which it more highly imports you to know⁵, if it behoves you to have a clear knowledge of things here, in order to take your measures accordingly. And moreover (knowing your dispositions, that you like, indeed, to hear the most pleasing and favourable reports, but afterwards, if things do not fall out according to those representations, you impeach the relaters), I thought it the safest course to make you acquainted with the truth.⁶”

XV. “And now rest assured of this, that in respect to the business which we at first came to accomplish, neither the soldiers nor the officers have so acted as to deserve any blame at your hands.

“But since the whole of Sicily is in combination against

³ *It is not in my power, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases: “I find my authority insufficient to control the perverse disposition, and restrain the pernicious conduct, of some under my command.”

⁴ *Your tempers.*] Literally, “natural dispositions.” So Eurip. *Heracl.* 199. ἀλλ’ οἷδ’ ἐγὼ τὸ τῶνδε (scil. Atheniensium) λῆμα καὶ φύσιν. Aristoph. *Pac.* 607., where it is said of the Athenians, Περικλῆς — τὰς φύσεις ὁμῶν δεδοκώς καὶ τὸν αὐτοδὲξ τρόπον. Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 674. αἱ τοιαῦται φύσεις Ἀθηναίων δικαίως εἰσὶν ἀλγίσται φέρειν.

⁵ *I could have written, &c.*] So Eurip. *Elect.* 293. φέρω λόγους ἀτερπείς, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκάσιους κλύειν.

⁶ *I thought it the safest course, &c.*] See the passages cited by Dr. Blomfield on *Æschyl. Agam.* 603., to which may be added the following: *Livy* l. 22, 38. concio fuit verior quam gratior populo. *Æschin* 71, 33. πότῃ τὰ ληθῆς εἶπω ἢ τὸ ἥδιον ἀκούσαι; τὰ ληθῆς ἐρῶ. τὸ γὰρ αἰεὶ πρὸς ἡδόνην λεγόμενον οὕτως τὴν πόλιν διατίθεικεν. See more in my note on *Galat.* 4, 16.

us, and the enemy are in expectation of other forces from Peloponnesus, consult what is to be done, bearing in mind that those already here are not a match even for the enemy's *present* forces, but that it is necessary either to recall these, or to send over another armament, both of land and sea force, not inferior to the former, and a supply of money to no small amount, as well as a successor to me, since I am unable to remain by reason of a nephritic disorder.¹ This indulgence, I think, I may claim at your hands; for when I was strong and healthy, I did you good service in several commands.

"But, *whatever* you determine to do, do it at the very beginning of spring, and not by procrastination², since the enemy will soon provide themselves with what assistance they can procure from Sicily; and that from Peloponnesus, though it will be later, yet unless you give your whole attention to the object, they will partly (as before) elude your observation³, and partly anticipate you."

XVI. Such was the purport of Nicias's epistle. After hearing its contents, the Athenians did not, indeed, remove him from the command, but, that he might not labour alone amidst sickness, chose two of the officers that were there, Menander and Euthydemus, as his colleagues *pro tempore*, until others, who might be appointed as joint commanders with him, should arrive. They also decreed to send over another army⁴ both of land and sea forces, composed both of

¹ *A nephritic disorder.*] Namely, the stone and gravel. See Foesii Œcon. Hippocr.

² *Do it not by procrastination.*] Μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε. As this idiom has been neglected by the commentators, the following examples may be not unacceptable: Herod. 8, 21. οὐκ ἔτι ἐς ἀναβολὰς ἱποιοῦντὸ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν. Plutarch Demetr. 56. οὐκ εἰς ἀναβολὰς, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον. Joseph. 508, 34. οὐδὲν εἰς ἀναβολὰς ὑπερίδεντο. and 770, 18. μηδὲν εἰς ἀναβολὰς, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ὁξέως (I would read ὁξέος) κτείναντας, κ. τ. λ. 784, 23. 788, 17. 804, 8.

³ *Elude your observation.*] Nicias, it seems, lays the blame of the Peloponnesians not being intercepted to the Athenians at home; who, indeed, deserved to share it, but not to bear the whole blame, since there must have been neglect on the part of the squadron despatched to watch the armament.

⁴ *Decreed to send over another army.*] One cannot but wonder at the pertinacity with which the Athenians clung to their purpose; though it may be thought the more excusable, considering how near it was of success.

Athenians from the *lists*, and of allies. They also chose as colleague to Nicias, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon son of Thucles; the latter whom they sent to Sicily, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships and twenty talents⁵ of silver, with orders to announce to the army there that a reinforcement would be sent, and every attention be paid to their welfare.

XVII. As to Demosthenes, he remained behind, and superintended the preparations for the voyage, in order to set out at the commencement of spring. He also proclaimed an expedition¹ among the allies, and furnished himself from every quarter with money, ships, and heavy-armed.

The Athenians, too, sent twenty ships² to cruise round Peloponnesus, in order to keep watch, that none might cross over from Corinth and Peloponnesus to Sicily. For the Corinthians, as soon as ambassadors had come, and brought news that things were much altered for the better in Sicily, thinking that they had well timed the former despatch of ships, prepared to send out heavy-armed to Sicily, in vessels of burden; and the Lacedæmonians, in like manner, were intent on doing the same from the rest of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians also equipped and manned³ twenty-five ships⁴, that they might attempt a battle against the guard-force at Naupactus, and that the Athenians might the less

⁵ *Twenty talents.*] Bredow, Benedict, Bekker, and Hack think that the true reading is one hundred and twenty; as twenty would seem too small a number. And I myself, many years ago, thought of the same conjecture. But this opinion has been shown to be groundless by Boeckh. Staatsh. d. Att. t. 2. p. 197. and Goeller in loc.

¹ *Proclaimed an expedition.*] i. e. sent notices for an expedition. I here read *σπαρταίαν*, which the sense requires. In the same signification *ἐπαγγέλλω* occurs at l. 5, 45. and 49., and elsewhere.

² *Twenty ships.*] Or rather, *thirty*; for at c. 20. we read of "*the thirty*" ships. And this is confirmed by Diodorus. The single λ and κ, it may be observed, are often confounded. It is, however, possible that the *thirty* in question arose from the present *twenty* being added to *ten*, which had before been stationed there.

³ *Equipped and manned.*] Both senses seem to be comprehended in *ἐπλήρου*, as in many other passages.

⁴ *Twenty-five ships.*] This passage has been had in view by Polyæn. Strat. 6, 23. where for *ἐξακοσίους* read *εἰκοσι*, and a little after for *ὀκτώ καὶ πέντε* read *εἰκοσι πέντε*.

hinder their transports from making their passage, having to keep watch against their own line of triremes ranged against them.

XVIII. The Lacedæmonians, too, were preparing for an irruption into Attica, as had been before determined on by them, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, when they heard of the reinforcements to be sent by the Athenians to Sicily, in order that, by the occurrence of the invasion, it might be hindered. Alcibiades, moreover, importunately urged them to fortify Decelea¹, and to carry on the war with spirit. The courage², too, of the Lacedæmonians was especially invigorated because they reckoned that the Athenians having in their hands a double war, both against themselves, and the Siceliots, would be the more easily brought down; and because they conceived that they *themselves* had been the first to violate the *former* treaty³, for that in the former war the breach of the peace had been *theirs*, because the Thebans had invaded Platæa in time of peace, and because, though it was a proviso in the former treaty, "that they should not resort to arms, if the other party were willing to submit to judicial determination," yet they had never hearkened to the Athenians when they invited them thereto.⁴ To this injustice they thought their disasters in the war might fairly be attributed, and in this light they considered their calamity at Pylus, and whatever other had befallen them. But when the Athenians with those thirty ships⁵, setting out from Epidaurus, had ravaged part of that territory, and Prasiæ and other places, and had also made devastations from Pylus; and, as often as differences arose from the debatable points in the treaty, on the Lacedæmonians inviting them to judicial decision, would not leave it to arbitra-

¹ *Decelea*.] One hundred and twenty stadia from Athens, and situated on a high and conspicuous spot which overlooked the plain, and was well adapted for the use the Syracusans meant to make of it. Its present name is *Tatoi*. See Poppo Proleg. t. 2, 262.

² *The courage, &c.*] *ῥώμη γίνεται* is here put for *ῥώννυσθαι*.

³ *The former treaty.*] Namely, the thirty years' truce, or peace, which was entered into after the reduction of Eubœa, l. 1, 23 and 115.

⁴ *Invited them thereto.*] As is recorded at l. 1, 145.

⁵ *Those thirty ships.*] See l. 6, 105.

tion, then, indeed, the Lacedæmonians, thinking that the transgression which had formerly been committed on their side⁶ was now, on the contrary, shifted round to the Athenians⁶, felt much alacrity for the war. They, therefore, in the course of the winter sent round to their allies to procure iron and other materials, with tools for the raising of the fort. And in order to send the succours to Sicily on board the transports, they themselves made provision, and compelled the other Peloponnesians to do the same. And thus closed the eighteenth year of the war which Thucydides hath narrated.

YEAR XIX. B. C. 413.

XIX. Immediately on the commencement of spring, the Lacedæmonians and their allies made the irruption into Attica, under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. And first they ravaged those parts of the country about the plain, then they fortified Decelea, portioning out the work among the several states. Now,

⁶ *Thinking that the transgression, &c.*] The same transgression, which they thought had already brought the vengeance of the gods on themselves, they concluded would now bring it on the Athenians. They now thought that justice (not simple justice, or a due consideration of the rights of men, which Grecian religion little taught to regard, but justice ratified by a solemn appeal to the gods) was now on their side. (Mittford.)

Here, I would observe, that we cannot fail to perceive the mighty force of what may be called *moral strength* in war. Whether the disasters, which the Lacedæmonians met with in their first and most unjust war, are to be ascribed to the judgment of a just Providence, we are not warranted in pronouncing: but few will hesitate to attribute most of their ill success to the indisposition which individuals felt to take part in so unjust a war. This must have ever hung on their minds, and unnerved their arms. Indeed, even those that have no religion, thus, by the force of conscience, tacitly do homage to its truth and obligations. To turn to a case in point, to what could the disasters, which so beset the latter years of Napoleon, be so fairly attributed as his iniquitous aggression on the rights of nations, in attacking allies who had deserved well of him? Indeed, the French officers and soldiers have since acknowledged, that the badness of their cause ever hung a dead weight upon them. And, in the bitterness of his heart, the mighty, but unprincipled, conqueror was often heard to exclaim, that the disorder which led to his political end, was the "*gangrene of Spain*." This made him (to use the words of Gray)

"——— groan,

With pangs unfelt before, unpitied and alone."

Decelea is distant from the city of Athens one hundred and twenty stadia, and about the same, or not much more, from Bœotia.¹ The fort was built in the plain, and the best parts of the country, for the purpose of annoyance, and was visible up to the city of Athens. This the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica occupied themselves in building; while those in Peloponnesus, about the same time, sent off the heavy-armed in the transports to Sicily; the Lacedæmonians having selected the best of the Helots and Neodamodes (or newly-made citizens) to the amount of seven hundred of both, appointing Eccritus, a Spartan, their commander. The Bœotians sent three hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Zeno and Nico, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. Those, then, amongst the first² having set sail from Tænarus in Laconia, committed their ships to the sea.³ Not long after these, the Corinthians sent five hundred heavy-armed, partly from Corinth itself, and partly hired from the Arcadians, under the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians, too, sent two hundred heavy-armed with the Corinthians, commanded by Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Now, the twenty-five ships of the Corinthians, which had been fitted out

¹ *About the same, &c.*] I entirely approve of the reading *δὲ καὶ οὐ*, introduced from two MSS by Bekker. In such an idiom the *καὶ* is for *ἤ*. So Polyæn. 1. 2, 86. *παραπλησίας καὶ ἴσας κλείδας*. I cannot, however, so much commend the introduction from two MSS. of *ἀπὸ*, which seems to be from the margin. Nor is there less reason to suspect the common reading *ἐπὶ*: though it appears to have arisen from another view of the construction. Neither, indeed, is *necessary*; for *ἀπὸ* may very well be repeated from the preceding, as also *ἀπείχει*. And the construction may be laid down as follows: *ἀπείχει δὲ ἡ Δ. σταδίους μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως ἑικοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν. παραπλήσιον* (for *παραπλησίως*, as in Polyb. 1, 4, 8, 4, 40, 10. 3, 33, 17.) *δὲ ἀπείχει οὐ πολλῷ πλείον (διάστημα) καὶ τῆς Βοιωτίας*.

It is truly observed by Goeller, that "if the above reading be correct (which there is no good reason to doubt), it will prove that most geographers are much in error in their representations of this part of the country."

² *Amongst the first.*] For *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις* Reiz, Bekker, and Goeller edit *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*. I prefer *πρώτον*, as there is no difference in sense, but must reserve the discussion for my edition.

³ *Committed their ships to the sea.*] The translators take the sense to be no more than "put to sea." But I am inclined to think that, in this peculiar phrase, there is a reference to the *mode* in which the voyage was made, namely, not by coasting along the shores of Greece and Italy, but by crossing the *sea*, and not the Ionian gulf.

in the winter, occupied a station over against⁴ the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus, until such time as those heavy-armed had set sail from Peloponnesus. For which purpose, indeed, they had been at first fitted out, namely, that the Athenians might not have their attention fixed on the transports so much as the triremes.

XX. In the meantime, and immediately on the commencement of spring, at the same time that Decelea was begun to be fortified, the Athenians sent thirty ships, commanded by Charicles son of Apollodoros, to cruise around Peloponnesus, with orders to go to Argos, and solicit from the Argives, in virtue of the alliance, some troops to go on board the ships. They also, as they had intended, sent Demosthenes off to Sicily with sixty Athenian and five Chian ships, and fifteen hundred Athenian heavy-armed from the lists, also as many of the islanders from every quarter as they could procure; from the other subject allies, too, supplying themselves with whatever they had which might be useful for the war. He was, moreover, ordered, as he was sailing round Peloponnesus, to first cooperate with Charicles in hostilities upon the Laconian coast.

And Demosthenes, sailing to Ægina, there waited for such as yet remained to join, and till Charicles should have taken on board the Argives.

XXI. In Sicily, about the same time this summer, Gylippus came to Syracuse, bringing from the cities which he prevailed upon to join the greatest force he could muster. And having convened the Syracusans, he told them they ought to fit out as many ships as possible, and make trial of a sea-fight¹; for he was in hopes that they would thereby

⁴ *Occupied a station over against.*] Namely, as appears from Polyæn. 6, 23., Panormus in Achæa. This passage of Thucydides may suggest more than one certain emendation of Polyænus ubi supra.

¹ *Make trial of a sea-fight.*] As the phrase ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν is neglected by the commentators, the following examples may be not unacceptable: Herodot. 8, 9, 7. ἀπόπειραν ποιήσασθαι. Herodian 2, 99. ἀπόπειραν ἱποῦίτο τῆς τῶν στ. γνώμης. Arrian E. A. 2, 20, 5. ἀπόπειραν τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐξαγνίσθαι. Polyb. 27, 4, 2. ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν. Hesych. Milesius ap. Corp. Hyst. Byz. p. 257. D. ἀπόπειραν ἱλαμβάνει τοῦ πολέμου.

achieve something for the war which would compensate the danger.² Hermocrates, too, was not least instrumental in jointly persuading them not to be alarmed at making an attack on the Athenians; telling them that neither *those* had their naval skill hereditary, or from time immemorial, but being landmen, more than the Syracusans now, they were compelled by the Medes to become seamen. To daring persons, he said, like the Athenians, those that counter-dared always seemed the most formidable foes.³ For by the same mode that they attack and terrify their neighbours (though occasionally not superior to them in power), by the same, namely, by bold enterprise, *they*, too, might meet the same fate at the hands of an enemy.⁴ The Syracusans, too, he said, well knew that by thus unexpectedly venturing to oppose the Athenian navy, they would, by their being daunted thereat, gain more the advantage over them than the Athenians would worst them by their superior skill.⁵ He bade them, therefore, not shrink from making a trial with their navy.

At the persuasions, then, of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and whoever else, the Syracusans were eager for a sea-fight, and equipped their ships.

XXII. When the navy was ready, Gylippus, having led forth by night the whole of the land forces, was prepared himself to attack by land the forts at Plemmyrium; while at the same time the Syracusan triremes, thirty-five in number, at signal, sailed forward from the great port, and forty-five from the lesser, where was their dock¹, and sailed round to

² *Compensate the danger.*] Literally, *counterbalance*; which is the primitive sense of ἀξιος.

³ *To daring persons, &c.*] Consequently of such they would stand in awe, and feel comparatively daunted. This is a very rare sense of χάλεπος.

⁴ *By the same mode, &c.*] Such appears to be the sense of the intricate passage of the original, which is passed over by the commentators.

⁵ *Gain more the advantage, &c.*] This is the closest version that I can offer of this involved passage, in which the difficulty has arisen from the antithesis being incorrectly drawn, and an expression employed (τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ — ἀπειρίαν βλάβοντας) which is fitter for a Pindaric ode than an historical passage.

¹ *Their dock.*] It is plain that this dock was in the lesser harbour, called the Laccius, which, by the way, was so called from its similarity to a cistern, being faced all round with freestone. From this dock (νεώριον) must be distinguished the νεώσοικα mentioned further on, which were undoubtedly

form a union with those within, and, moreover, make sail upon Plemmyrium, in order that the Athenians might be thrown into confusion in both places. But the Athenians, speedily manning sixty vessels, they with twenty-five of them fought against the thirty-five Syracusan ones in the great port, and with the remainder proceeded to meet those who were sailing round from the dock. And immediately they came to battle before the mouth of the great port, and for a long time maintained an equal contest one against another, one side being anxious to force the entrance, the other to hinder it.

XXIII. In the meantime, Gylippus, on the Athenians at Plemmyrium having gone down to the water-side, and with their attention turned to the sea-fight, snatches the opportunity, and suddenly, at daybreak, attacks the forts, and takes the largest first, and then also the lesser ones after ; the garrisons not daring to remain, when they saw the largest taken with ease. And of that first taken the garrison, such as got on board the barges and a transport, with some difficulty arrived at the camp ; for the Syracusan ships having as yet the advantage in the battle in the great port, they were chased by one swift-sailing trireme. But by the time that the other two forts were taken, the Syracusans happened then to be beaten, and the fugitives from the forts the more easily sailed past. Indeed, those Syracusan ships which fought before the mouth of the harbour, after having beaten back the Athenian ships, sailed

in the great port. The distinction is thus pointed out by Letronne, p. 28. : " *Νεώριον* was in ports the place wholly appropriated to building or refitting ships, or receiving them, when drawn on shore, to keep them moist. It may be also observed, that besides the place necessary for a certain number of vessels, the *νεώριον* contained likewise the stores of sails, cordage, wood, &c. See Demosth. Orat. in Euerget. p. 1145, 4. and in Polyclet. p. 1218, 13. t. 2. Reiske. Yet the word *νεώριον* was employed in a more restricted sense than our *arsenal*. The *νεώσοικοι* comprehended in the *νεώρια* were a kind of *huts*, where were put certain vessels, perhaps triremes, the construction or preservation of which required more attention and care, while the merchant-vessels were left in the *νεώριον*, exposed to the weather.—The *squari* of the dock at Venice, i. e. the sixty booths, where the galleys used to be built and refitted, will very accurately represent the *νεώσοικοι* of the ancients." Thus, Goeller remarks, *νεώριον* was the *whole*, *νεώσοικοι* a *part* ; and he compares a similar distinction between *ἐπιπεία* and *ναυοράδια*, paralleling these and the above words by the German terms *Seeplatz*, *Ankerplatz*, *Schiffswerft*, *Shiffsdocken*.

in great disorder, and being thrown into confusion, and running foul of each other, yielded up the victory to the Athenians. For they routed not only *these*, but those in the port by which they had been before conquered. They also sunk eleven of the Syracusan ships, slaying most of the men on board except those of three ships; and them they made prisoners.¹ Having drawn to land the wrecks of the Syracusans, and set up a trophy on the islet before Plemmyrium, they retreated to their own camp.

XXIV. And now the Syracusans, though they thus fared in the sea-fight, yet held the forts¹ in Plemmyrium, and set up three trophies for them. And one of the two forts last taken they demolished; but the remainder they repaired and garrisoned. At the capture of the forts many of the garrison were slain or made prisoners; and money and goods² to a considerable amount in all³ were taken. For as the Athenians had used the forts as a magazine, great quantities of merchants' goods and corn were there deposited; much property, too, of the trierarchs, since there were forty masts of triremes, besides much other tackling⁴ taken therein, and three triremes which had been hauled on shore.⁵ Indeed, the capture of Plemmyrium was what chiefly and principally ruined the Athenian armament. For the entrances were no longer safe for⁶ the importation of necessities; since the Syracusans, moored at anchor on the watch⁷, hindered their

¹ *They sunk, &c.*] It should seem that the *three* ships here mentioned were not actually sunk, but only put *hors de combat*. Perhaps, the rest were not all utterly sunk; at least, to them must apply what is said of drawing the wrecks on shore: indeed, if the ships were all sunk, to say that they put the crews to death, would seem to involve an absurdity. In that case, they would only leave them to their fate.

¹ *Forts.*] Not walls, as Hobbes.

² *Money and goods.*] Both these senses (the latter of which is not unfrequent in Thucydides) seem to be inherent in *χρήματα*.

³ *In all.*] Or, upon the whole. Hobbes has mistaken the force of the *τὰ ἅπαντα*.

⁴ *Tackling.*] See my note on Acts 27, 19.

⁵ *Hauled on shore.*] Namely, to be careened.

⁶ *Safe for.*] At τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς I would subaud *ἐνεκα*.

⁷ *Moored at anchor on the watch.*] For there was, probably, a sort of harbour between the island of Plemmyrium, at that time possessed by the

entrance, and thus the importations had now to be made by fighting their way in. In other respects, too, the circumstance threw a consternation and dejection over the army.

XXV. After this, the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan; one of which went to Peloponnesus, conveying ambassadors to make known that "they are in hopes," and to urge the prosecution of the war there with yet greater vigour. The other eleven ships stood over for Italy, having learnt that some Athenian vessels laden with stores were on their voyage. And having met with the vessels, they destroyed the greater part, and burnt some timber for ship-building in the territory of Caulon¹, which had been laid up there for the Athenians. After this, they went to Locri, and as they were at anchor there, one of the transports arrived from Peloponnesus, bringing some heavy-armed of the Thespians. And taking them on board their ships, the Syracusans coasted along homewards.

But the Athenians watching for them off Megara, with twenty ships captured one vessel with the men on board; the rest they could not come up with, they effecting their flight to Syracuse. There arose, too, a skirmish in the port, near the piles which the Syracusans had driven down² in the sea, in the front of the old docks, in order that their ships might anchor within them, and the Athenians not make sail upon them and damage them by charging with the beak. For the Athenians bringing up against them a vessel of vast burthen³, fitted up with wooden towers and parapets⁴, and some of

Syracusans, and the *continent*, or promontory, of Plemmyrium. Smith wrongly renders *ἰσχυροὺς* "rushed upon them."

¹ *Caulon.*] A town about twenty miles north-east of Locri Epizaphyrii. The place where the wood was deposited was probably at the mouth of the river Segras.

² *Piles which the Syracusans had driven down, &c.*] This was done in order that their station in the great harbour might thus be more private, and like a separate harbour.

³ *Of vast burthen.*] Namely, of a thousand amphoræ. ?

⁴ *Fitted up with, &c.*] The towers and parapets (accompanied, no doubt, with stages) were meant to cover the attempts of the men in the long boats by a galling shower of missiles launched against any that should attempt to defend the piles. It is well observed by Mitford, "that the

them fastening cables from certain long-boats to the piles, wrenched them up with a windlass⁵; while others dived, and cut them off with saws. And now the Syracusans assailed them from the docks with missiles, while those stationed in the transports returned their volleys, until at last the Athenians had torn up the greater part of the piles. The most formidable difficulty was with the piling which was hidden. For the Syracusans had driven down some piles so that they did not rise above the surface of the water; insomuch that it was perilous to approach, lest by not seeing them, they should run the ship foul of them, as upon a rock.⁶ But these, too, the divers descended and sawed off for a reward. However, the Syracusans again fixed piles, and they also (as was likely with armies lying near and ranged opposite to each other) used many contrivances against each other, and resorted to various attempts.

The Syracusans also sent ambassadors of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedæmonians to the cities⁷, to notify the capture of the Plemmyrium; and, respecting the sea-fight, to say that they had been defeated not by the power of the enemy, but by their own disorder. For the rest, they were to announce "that they are in hopes," and to entreat them to rally around them, both with sea and land forces; and "that the Athenians are expected with another army, and if they

merchant-ships of the antients, capacious, deep, and firm in the water, like modern vessels for ocean navigation, were much fitter for some purposes of stationary fight than their galleys of war."

⁵ *Wrenched them up with a windlass, &c.*] We must suppose that the long-boats were strongly moored and fastened to the ship, by which the machines would have the greater force. By those the piles (which seem not to have been near so thick as those used in our ports) would be first dragged on one side, and then gradually pulled up. The machines of the antients, it is to be remembered, were some of them more powerful than any of those used by the moderns.

⁶ *Run the ship foul of them, &c.*] So Herod. 7, 183. Æschyl. Eumen. 561. Schulz. τὸν πρὶν ὄλεον ἔρματι προσβαλὼν δίκαας. Hence may be emended Dio Cass. 672, 35. μήτε περίεσμα περὶ γαγῆναι ἰάσας scil. τὴν ὁκάδα, where read *περὶ ἔρμα*. Also a most corrupt passage of Æschyl. Agam. 977. ἀνδρὸς ἱπαισεν * * * * * ἀφαντον ἔρμα. where the *lacuna* is filled up by critics in various ways. I would propose σκάφος with some adjective, πρὸς or *περὶ ἀφαντ. ἔρ.*

⁷ *The cities.*] Namely, in Sicily, as appears from what follows. The ambassadors of the Corinthians, &c. were doubtless sent with their own, in order to strengthen the business.

should first destroy their present forces, the war would be decided." These affairs, then, they transacted in Sicily.

XXVI. As to Demosthenes, when all his forces were assembled which he was to take to the succour of those in Sicily, weighing from Ægina, and standing over to the Peloponnesian coast, he formed a junction with Charicles and the thirty Athenian ships there. And having taken on board some Argive heavy-armed, they made sail to the Laconian coast; and first they ravaged a part of the territory of Epidaurus Limera¹, and from thence having touched at that part of Laconia which is opposite to Cythera, where is situated the temple of Apollo, they devastated certain parts of the territory, and carried a wall across a kind of isthmus, in order that the Helots might desert thither, and that from them freebooters might make their incursions, as from Pylus. Immediately after having occupied the place, Demosthenes coasted along to Corcyra, in order, after taking on board there some of the allies², he might make the best of his way to Sicily; while Charicles stayed until he had fortified the place, and then, leaving a garrison there, made sail home with the thirty ships, and the Argives with him.

XXVII. This same summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracians of those called Machærophori (or sword-bearers³) and of the tribe of Dii⁴, who were to have gone with Demosthenes to Sicily; but, since they came too late, the Athenians determined to send them back again into Thrace. For, as their pay was a drachma a day, it seemed to be too expensive to keep them for the war carried on from *Decelea*; which, being first fortified this summer by the whole army, and afterwards occupied by garrisons going thither by turn from all the cities, exceedingly annoyed the

¹ *Epidaurus Limera.*] See 4, 56. and 6, 105. Mitford erroneously makes Demosthenes turn back to Epidaurus, namely, in Argolis.

² *The allies.*] Namely, we may suppose, the Zacynthians, Cephallenians, Acarnanians, Naupactians, Anactorians, and Corcyreans.

³ *Sword-bearing.*] Namely, armed with long swords, like the Scottish Highlanders of old. See note on l. 2, 96.

⁴ *Dii.*] See note on l. 2, 96.

Athenians, and was among the chief circumstances that brought affairs to ruin, both by the destruction of property and the loss of men.⁵ For *before*, the invasions, being of short duration, did not hinder them from enjoying the use of the ground for the rest of the time; but now, the enemy being continually stationed there, and sometimes a *greater force* arriving, at others the *ordinary garrison*, from necessity, overrunning the country, and making ravages; Agis, too, king of the Lacedæmonians, being present⁶ (and not carrying on the war as a secondary concern⁷), the Athenians were exceedingly distressed. Thus were they deprived of the whole country, and more than twenty thousand slaves deserted, of whom the greater part were mechanics and artificers; the whole, too, of their sheep, cattle, and beasts of burden were destroyed, as also the horses, of which (as the cavalry were every day riding to Decelea, and making attacks, or keeping guard over the country), some were lamed⁸ by the rough ground⁹, or worn down by incessant toil, others were disabled by wounds.

XXVIII. And the importation of necessities from Eubœa, which had before taken place with greater speed over land by Decelea, was now, as being by sea round Sunium, very expensive.¹ The city needed every thing alike to be imported,

⁵ *Loss of men.*] Namely, either by death, or by desertion.

⁶ *Agis, too, &c.*] Mitford incorrectly explains, "remained as governor of the garrison."

⁷ *As a secondary concern.*] Literally, "a bye concern." He made it a principal point, and attended to it entirely. See note on l. 1, 142.

⁸ *Were lamed.*] Literally, "were lamed and knocked up;" for that is the sense of the ἀπό. This term ἀπεχλωῦντο (neglected by the commentators) may be illustrated from the following passages: Pausan. 10, 42. ἀπεχλῶνυντο οἱ ἵπποι. Xen. Hipp. 7, 15. ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπόκροτον ἢ ὀλεθρὸν ἢ τὸ χῶριον. Pollux 1, 186. who, among χώρα δύσιππα, reckons ἀπόκροτα. Xen. Hist. 7, 2, 9. τοὺς νεκροὺς, ἐνίοις δὲ ζῶντας ἀποκεχλωμένους. Appian 1, 75. καὶ ἵππους ἀχρεῖους — καὶ χωλεύοντας ἐξ ὑποτριβῆς.

⁹ *By the rough ground.*] "The art of shoeing that animal," says Mitford, "being yet unknown."

¹ *By sea round Sunium, very expensive.*] Namely, compared with what it was by land. "A remarkable proof," Mitford observes, "of the imperfection of antient navigation. This, with the advantages of modern navigation, would be incomparably the preferable method." He then illustrates the observation by the fact, that the water carriage from London to Whitstable (nearly eighty miles off) is only the same as the land carriage from Whitstable to Canterbury (six miles). The historian, however, forgets that

and instead of being a city, it was become a fortress, for by day the Athenians standing guard at the battlements in turn, and by night *all*, except the cavalry, part being on duty under arms (at the guard-stations), and part on the walls, they were harassed both summer and winter.² But what lay heaviest on them was, that they had in hand *two wars at once*, having fallen into such a perverse doggedness as, before it occurred, no one who heard would have believed. For that those who, by the erection of the fortress, were besieged at home by the Peloponnesians, should not even then have desisted from their attempt on Sicily, but, on the contrary, have besieged there, in like manner, Syracuse, a city not at all less than Athens, and to have so much excited the astonishment of the Greeks at their power and daring (for at the beginning of the war some thought, if the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, they would only hold out ³ a year, others two, others

the two cases are any thing but parallel. The course from London to Whitstable is *straight*, and the voyage rarely interrupted; whereas, that from the channel of Eubœa to Athens was exceedingly circuitous, and required the doubling of the, to the antients, rather formidable promontory of Sunium; after which, a very different wind would be requisite to bring the vessel to Athens. Besides, we learn from Dr. Clarke that, even now, the passage from Sunium to Athens is often a tedious one, by baffling winds. In a voyage like that which Mr. Mitford instances, probably the difference between antient and modern navigation was by no means so great as he supposes.

² *Part being on duty, &c.*] Mitford remarks that "the exact value of the phrase *ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιοῦμενοι*, apparently a military phrase of the day, is scarcely now to be ascertained. And the explanations attempted by the commentators and translators are very unsatisfactory." Certainly, at the time when Mitford wrote, little had been done by the commentators; and the common Latin version would, indeed, seem not very satisfactory. The phrase, it may be observed, is very accordant with the more fully-expressed kindred passage at l. 8, 69., to which Mitford himself refers. Those *ἐφ' ὅπλοις* were men in complete armour, ready for service, at one or more guard-houses or stations. Those on the wall probably had only spears. The meaning intended is, therefore, clearly ascertained; and, if the words be correct, *φυλακὴν* must, according to Bauer's suggestion, be supplied from the preceding *φυλάσσοντες*. If this be thought too harsh, I would conjecture for *ποιοῦμενοι*, *πονοῦμενοι*, which will make all clear and easy. Nor will there be any pleonasm at *πονοῦμενοι* — *ἰταλαιπώροντο*, for the latter term may chiefly be referred to the exposure to weather implied in the preceding words. So l. 1, 134. *ἵνα μὴ ὑπαιθριος ταλαιπωροῖη*. The sense will thus be, "part harassed with keeping under arms, part with standing guard on the walls, they were distressed by exposure to the weather both summer and winter."

³ *Hold out.*] *ἱερίσσειν*. The antient lexicographers well explain the

three, none a longer time) as in the seventeenth year, when in all respects exhausted, to have gone into Sicily, and taken up a war not less weighty than that with the Peloponnesians; this, I say, no one would have believed.⁴ Wherefore, being by these wars, and the extreme injury sustained from Decelea, and the other heavy expenses which lay upon them, brought into great straits for want of money, they about this time levied upon⁵ their subject states instead of the *tribute, a twentieth of all goods* passing by sea⁶; conceiving that thus a greater revenue would accrue, [and need enough had they of it], for their expenses were not such as they had been, but had become far greater (inasmuch as the war was greater), while their revenues were decayed.⁷

XXIX. Being unwilling, then, by reason of the lowness of their funds, to expend money on these Thracians who came too late for Demosthenes, they sent them away, appointing Diitrephes to conduct them home, and ordering him, in the voyage (for they were to go by the Euripus) to annoy the enemy with them, to the utmost of their power. He, therefore, set them on shore at Tanagra, and made some hasty pillage; then at nightfall he sailed from Chalcis across the Euripus, and disembarking them in Bœotia, led them against Myca-

term by *περιείσθαι* and *ἀνθίζειν*. This signification is rare, but I have noted the following examples: Dio Cass. 14, 26. *οὐ γὰρ περιείσθην ἐπὶ τοὺς ἔνδον*. and 277, 42.

⁴ *This, I say, no one would have believed.*] This clause, which is in the original left to be supplied, must be repeated from the preceding sentence.

⁵ *Levied upon, &c.*] Mitford here remarks on the great obscurity of the original, and complains that the commentators take no notice of it. He, moreover, commends the "successful boldness" of Smith. But, in fact, Smith has not deviated a hair's breadth from the preceding translators (of whom Mitford cites Portus), except in rendering *τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν*, of which he gives rather an *interpretation* than a version. As to the obscurity, of which he speaks, in the original, I see not any such as needed the assistance of the commentators. It is only necessary to remark, that *ἐπιείσθαι* is used in a somewhat uncommon sense.

Boeckh. cited by Goeller, says that this tax (which was the same as our custom) was formed and continued during the remainder of the war.

⁶ *Passing by sea.*] i. e. both imports and exports.

⁷ *Revenues were decayed.*] Namely, by so many of the tributary states in Thrace and elsewhere having revolted; while, perhaps, by the rest the tribute was but irregularly paid.

lessus.¹ And during the night, he, without being discovered, takes his quarters in the temple of Mercury, which is distant from Mycalessus about sixteen stadia. And at break of day he attacks the city (which was but small), and takes it, falling upon the inhabitants unprepared, and never expecting that any enemy would advance so far from the sea to attack them; the wall, too, being weak, and in some places fallen down, in others built low, nay, moreover, the gates being open, through the confidence of security. The Thracians having thus burst into Mycalessus, plundered both the houses and temples, and massacred the inhabitants, sparing none of whatever age, old or young², but butchering all, as they came in their way, both children and women, nay, moreover, even the draught cattle and whatever they could find that had life. For the Thracian nation is, wherever it can dare to show it³, exceedingly bloody,

¹ *Mycalessus*.] A very antient city situated (as most of those of the early ages) not upon, but a few miles distant from, the coast, in the road from Thebes to Chalcis. That it was a large city in the time of Homer, is plain from the epithet *εὐρύχωρον*, which he gives it. The place seems never to have risen from the present destruction; and Pausanias describes it as in ruins in his time. Some fragments even yet remain. See Gell's Itinerary. Wasse refers to Herod. 1, 148., as he might also have done to Pausan. 1, 23, 2—4. and 9, 19, 4., from which passages some curious information may be gathered.

² *Sparing none, &c.*] This is mentioned because, though it was not very unusual to put to death the males of military age, yet those above or under that age were commonly spared.

³ *Wherever it can dare to show it.*] Or, "wherever it has the confidence of superiority." Smith wrongly renders, "when once their fury is inflamed." He did not perceive that there is a sarcasm couched under the words, exactly similar to that of Brasidas, c. 4, 126. fin. (of the Illyrians) οἱ δ' ἂν εἰξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὐψυχον ἐν τῇ ἀσφαλεὶ ὁρεὶ ἐνδείκνυνται.*

The above mode of taking the passage is confirmed by an imitation of Procop. B. G. p. 92, 40. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν σφίσι ἀπήντα (I conjecture ἀπαντα) γίνονται ὁμότατοι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων. Also Joseph. 597, 46. ὥστε διὰ τὴν τῆς ὁμότητος ὑπερβολὴν ἐπεκληθῆναι αὐτὸν παρὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων Θρακίδα. The passage is also imitated by Achill. Sat. p. 372 and 600. In short, such is more or less true of all Barbarians.

It is deplorable to think that the enlightened Athenians (as I find from Pausan. Attic. 1, 23.) erected a statue to the memory of this Diitrophes, representing him as assailed with arrows, perhaps with reference to the affair in question.

* Yet, strange to say, Dio Cassius seems to have fallen into the same error: for at p. 586, 92. he writes, τὸ γὰρ τοι γένος αὐτῶν θυμωδὲν, πικρότατόν ἐστι.

as much so as the most barbarous nations.⁴ And now there was complete disorder and every form of slaughter set on foot; so that, falling upon a boys' school (of which there was there a very large one⁵, and the children had now assembled), they put them all to the sword. This calamity to the city, as it was exceeded by none other, so it befel them unexpectedly, as well as was in itself terrible.

XXX. The Thebans, on hearing tidings of the attack, went to give succour, and overtaking the enemy when not far¹ on their way back, they took away their spoil, and throwing them into consternation, chased them down to the Euripus² and the sea, where the vessels which conveyed them were lying at anchor; they also killed a considerable number of them as they were getting on board, such, namely, as could not swim.³ For those in the vessels, when they saw what was doing on

⁴ *As much so as, &c.*] There is, doubtless, meant to be some stress laid on the last words; for the Thracians were in fact partially civilised, and were certainly not reckoned among the most barbaric people. From so long living among these men, Thucydides must have known them thoroughly.

⁵ *A boys' school, &c.*] That these edifices were sometimes large appears not only from the present passage, but from Porphyr. de Vit. Pyth. p. 184. init.; and sometimes, as we there find, they were of a semicircular form.

¹ *Not far.*] Οὐ πολὺ. Smith translates as if the οὐ were not here.

² *The Euripus.*] This is most graphically described by Livy, l. 28, 6. "fretum ipsum Euripi non septies die, sicut fama fert, temporibus statis reciprocatur: sed temere in modum venti, nunc huc, nunc illuc verso mari, velut monte præcipiti devolutus torrens rapitur." and 45, 27. "Chalcidem ad spectaculum Euripi avoque ante insulæ ponti continenti junctæ, descendet."

³ *A considerable number, &c.*] The words of the original are obscure, if not corrupt. Τοὺς πλείστους cannot, as some antient interpreters were of opinion, be referred to the γυνὴν οὐκ ἐπίσταντο: nor is it likely that the greater part should not have known how to swim, of which few Barbarians can be supposed ignorant. Those words must be referred to ἀποκτείνουσιν. Yet, as we are afterwards told that only two hundred and fifty were slain, the sense cannot be, what it would appear, that they killed the greater part of them. If, therefore, the common reading be correct, I know no other method but to take the τοὺς πλείστους, with Hack, of "the greater part of those who were killed in the retreat." For some were slain in the town, others, no doubt, on the road. This method, indeed, is not new, but was evidently adopted by Hobbes. But, supposing such to be the sense intended, the author has expressed himself very imperfectly; and I should prefer to cancel the τοὺς. How often the article is wrongly added to, or detracted from, πλείστος, is well known.

shore, moored their barks out of bow-shot.⁴ For as to the other part of the retreat, the Thracians made no contemptible resistance to the Theban horse, which first attacked them by sallying forward upon them, and forming in a dense body according to their country custom⁵, and here but few of them were slain.⁶ Some part of them also, being caught in the city, as they were plundering, perished. Of the Thracians two hundred and fifty in all, out of one thousand three hundred, were slain. Of the Thebans, and others who brought assistance, there were killed about twenty horse and heavy infantry, and Scirophondas, a Theban Bœotarch.⁷ Of the Mycalessians⁸, too, a part fell. Such were the occurrences which took place at Mycalessus, whose inhabitants suffered a calamity which, according to the size of the city, was not less deserving of being lamented than any other in the war.

XXXI. And now Demosthenes, after having planned the fort in Laconia, making sail for Corcyra¹, met with a vessel

⁴ *Out of bow-shot.*] I here follow the reading of two MSS., τοξέυματος, which Goeller has done well in editing, and which I have for many years been persuaded is the true reading. The objections of the other editors to this reading are as frivolous as their attempts to explain the common one; ξεύματος, are unsuccessful. It may suffice to refer to the annotation of Goeller; though, as he has adduced no examples or illustrations, the following may be not unacceptable: Xenoph. Cyr. 1, 4, 23. ἔξω τοξέυματος. Eunapius p. 161. init. ἐπιβάς πλοίου, τὸ πλοῖον οὐκ ἔχων τοξέυματος ἑρμηνεία ἔχων διέλεγτο τοῖς βαρβάρους. where I conjecture should be read ἐπιβάς (i. e. the Emperor Julian) πλοῖον, (τὸ πλοῖον ἀνέχων (ἔξω) τοξέυματος) ἑρμηνεία ἔχων, διέλεγτο τοῖς βαρβάρους, from which passage it is very probable that Eunapius so read.

At the same time, I cannot dissemble that I have met with a passage in *Procopius*, which makes it probable that he read τοῦ ξεύματος, namely, de Edif. 36, 52. (speaking of the Euripus) ζεύγμα δὲ πορθμῶ (i. e. Euripus) μία τις ἐγκειμένη ποιεῖται δόκος — ἕνος τε ζύλου ἐπιβολῇ καὶ ἀφαίρεσι, καὶ πέλειονσι καὶ ναυτίλλονται.

⁵ *Forming in, &c.*] Something, we may imagine, like what was afterwards, when perfected, called the Phalanx.

⁶ *Were slain.*] We hear of none being made prisoners. Indeed, after the horrible cruelties they had perpetrated, they could expect no quarter.

⁷ *A Theban Bœotarch.*] For there were two from Thebes.

⁸ *Of the Mycalessians.*] Namely, those of the country who came with the Thebans to the succour of the city.

¹ *For Corcyra.*] I here read, with two MSS. and Valla, ἐπὶ, which is edited by Bekker and Goeller. The common reading admits of no defence, and can only have arisen from the carelessness of scribes, who paid no

of burden at Phea of Eleans, wherein the Corinthian heavy-armed were about to take their passage to Sicily. The ship he destroyed; but the men made their escape, and afterwards sailed in another. After this, Demosthenes having arrived at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took on board some heavy-armed, and sent for others of the Messenians from Naupactus; and stood over for the opposite coast of Acarnania, to Alyzia² and Anactorium, which was in the hands of the Athenians. While he was there, Eurymedon from Sicily meets him (who had been despatched³ during the winter, with money⁴ for the army), and tells him, among other news, that he had heard, when already on the voyage, that Plemmyrium had been taken by the Syracusans. Conon also, the governor of Naupactus, comes to them⁵ with information, that the twenty-five Corinthian ships lying over against them, do not abandon the contest, and yet delay coming to battle. He, therefore, urged them to send some ships, since their eighteen ships⁶ were not a match for the twenty-five of the enemy.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, therefore, sent with Conon ten of their best sailing ships, which they had for reinforcement of those at Naupactus. And themselves set about making preparations for the assembling of the armament; Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, and ordering them to equip fifteen ships, and enlisting heavy-armed (for he was joint com-

attention to the context, but who knew that ἀποπλῖω is generally followed by ἐκ, or some such preposition.

² *Alyzia.*] In Acarnania. By Xenophon called Æluzia. The other orthography is supported by Scylax, Strabo, and Cicero. From these and other ancient writers scarcely any thing more than the name can be gathered.

³ *Despatched.*] In the original is added τότε, which scarcely admits of being introduced into a version, but signifies *then*, at the time I before mentioned, namely, during the winter.

⁴ *Money.*] Mitford strangely mistakes the sense of the passage, when he represents our author as saying that Demosthenes met with Eurymedon at Anactorium, collecting provisions for Sicily. Nay, by what follows, we find that he was on his way home, but turned back on learning that he was appointed to the joint command.

⁵ *Comes to them.*] He came *himself*, in order to give more effect to his request.

⁶ *Their eighteen ships.*] And yet at c. 17 and 19. they are said to have been twenty. Something not recounted by the historian must have happened to the two in question.

mander with Demosthenes, and had given up his voyage to Athens in consequence of his appointment), and Demosthenes collecting together slingers and darters from the parts of Acarnania.⁷

XXXII. As to the ambassadors, who, after the taking of Plemmyrium, had gone to the cities, having prevailed upon them to furnish an army, they, after collecting it, were about to bring it away, when Nicias, receiving previous intelligence, sent to such of the Siculi as occupied the passes, and to their allies (the Centoripes, Alicyæans¹, and others), saying, that "they ought not to allow them to go through, but should combine together to hinder them; for that they would not attempt to pass any other way, since the Acragantines had not granted them a passage." And now, as those Siceliots were on the way, the Siculi, agreeably to the request of the Athenians, having laid a triple ambuscade² for them, and besetting them unawares and suddenly, killed upwards of eight hundred, and all the ambassadors except one, namely, the Corinthian, who brought those that escaped, to the amount of one thousand five hundred, to Syracuse.

XXXIII. About the same time, the Camarinæans also arrived thither, with an auxiliary force of five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, and three hundred bowmen. The Geloans, too, sent a naval force of five ships, four hundred darters, and two hundred horse. Indeed, by this time, the whole of Sicily, except the Acragantines, who were neutral

⁷ *Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, &c., and Demosthenes collecting, &c.*] There was much judgment shown in this distribution, as Eurymedon must have had influence in Corcyra, and Demosthenes in Acarnania.

¹ *Alicyæans.*] So Poppo and Goeller rightly edit, from MSS., authors, and inscriptions, for Alicycæans.

² *A triple ambuscade.*] Τριχῆ is, by Hack, Bekker, and Goeller, put between brackets, as being omitted in most of the MSS. But this seems a very uncritical procedure, since it is far easier to account for its omission than for its insertion. It was doubtless omitted by those who thought it not reconcilable with *τῶν*, and thus *others* cancelled the *τῶν*: but, in fact, the ambuscade is considered as *one*, though distributed into *three parts*. The adverb is used for an adjective; as in Xen. Anab. 6, 2, 16. γίνεσθαι τὸ σπάρτεμα τριχῆ.

(even those who before had stood aloof to watch events), now combined in aiding the Syracusans against the Athenians.

As to the Syracusans, on the calamity which befel them among the Siculi, they desisted from immediately attacking the Athenians.

And now Demosthenes and Eurymedon (the armament being ready) set sail from Corcyra and the continent, and crossed the Ionian gulf, with the whole force, to the promontory of Japygia. Continuing their course from thence, they touched at the Choerades¹, islands of Japygia, and take on board some Japygian darters, one hundred and fifty in number, of the Messenian tribe. And having renewed a certain ancient friendship with Artas, who also, being a chief in those parts, furnished them with some darters, they then came to Metapontium in Italy.² And having prevailed upon the Metapontians, by virtue of alliance, to contribute three hundred darters and two triremes, they, with this augmentation, coasted on to Thurium. There they find the party adverse to the Athenians lately expelled. And being desirous to muster their forces there, and examine whether any had been left behind; as also to prevail on the Thurians to cooperate heartily in the expedition, and (considering the posture of affairs) to form an alliance offensive³ and defen-

¹ *Choerades*.] A name often given to such islands or promontories as just emerge from the sea, in a form bearing some rude resemblance to a hog's back.

These islands are now called the isles of St. Pelagia and St. Andrea.

² *Metapontium in Italy*.] Italy, antiently so called, was that peninsula bounded by the isthmus of Scyllæum and the Napetinus sinus, where the land contracts to the narrow space of twenty miles; this was the southern part of the Bruttii, afterwards so called. For this we have the testimony of Antiochus, son of Xenophanes, whom Aristotle does not, indeed, cite by name (*Polit.* 7, 19.), but appeals to the testimony of historians descended from that country. It is proper to observe, that the historian called *πᾶν ἀρχαῖος* by Dionys. A. 1, 12., was not *Antiochus*; for he lived in the age between Herodotus and Thucydides, and his history terminated with the year 422. B. C. In his time the boundaries of Italy extended further, though they were still terminated by an imaginary line drawn up to Metapontium from the river Laus, which, at the shore of the Tyrrhene sea, separates Lucania from the Bruttii. (Niebuhr, *Hist. Rom.* t. 1. p. 26.)

³ *Form an alliance offensive and defensive*.] Literally, "to account as friends or foes those esteemed so by the Athenians." A usual formula loquendi.

sive with the Athenians, — they waited in Thuria, and despatched this business.

XXXIV. About the same time, the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships, who had taken a station over-against the ships at Naupactus, in order to favour the passage of the transports to Sicily, having prepared themselves for battle, and equipped some more ships, so as to be little inferior in force to the Athenians, rode at anchor over-against Erineus of Achæa, in the territory of Rhypa.¹ And the place where they had their station being of the form of a crescent, the land forces of the Corinthians, and the allies of those parts, which had come to their assistance, were stationed at the jutting promontories; while the ships occupied the intermediate space, and blocked up the entrance.² The fleet was commanded by Polyantes, a Corinthian. Upon this the Athenians made sail from Naupactus with thirty-three ships³ commanded by Diphilus. At first the Corinthians lay still, but when it was thought to be the right time, and the signal was raised, they rushed upon the Athenians, and an engagement ensued. For a long time the combat was fully maintained on either side; at length, of the Corinthians three ships were destroyed; of the Athenians, not one was wholly sunk, but seven were rendered unfit for service, being struck with the opposite beak, and broken up⁴ at the part between the prow and the oars, by the

¹ *Erineus, &c.*] These were towns of Achæa, situated near the mouth of the river Meganistas, but on contrary sides, and opposite to Naupactus.

² *Of the form of a crescent, &c.*] Mitford observes, "that he chose his station judiciously; for in case of being overpowered, his retreat would be short, and protection ready."

³ *Thirty-three ships.*] Goeller notices the inconsistency of the numbers at c. 31. and this passage. From c. 31. it would appear that there could now be but twenty-eight: but, as I observed at c. 31., the two ships having gone on some expedition, so now, it should seem, had returned. How to account for the other I know not, any more than for the change of commander from Conon to Diphilus, unless that, perhaps, three ships might have been sent, under Diphilus, to reinforce the squadron at Naupactus, since it was known to be very inferior to the enemy's fleet; and it could not be contemplated that Demosthenes would send any detachment for that purpose.

⁴ *Broken up.*] So c. 59. ἀναρρήγνυσαν. Theocrit. Id. 22, 12. εἰς κοίλαν ἔρριψαν, ἀναρρήξαν δ' ἄρα τοίχους Ἀμφότερος. Pollux, 1, 24.

Corinthian ships, which had thicker beaks⁵ for this very purpose. And a drawn battle having taken place, so that each party claimed the victory (though the Athenians were masters of the wrecks⁶, both by the wind wafting them⁷ to seaward, and by the Corinthians no longer making any advance), they parted from each other. There was no pursuit, nor were any prisoners made on either side; for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians fighting near the land, easily secured their safety; while on the Athenians' side no ship was sunk. However, on the Athenians sailing off to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy in quality of victors, because they had disabled more ships of the enemy; conceiving that they were not beaten, because the other party did not claim the victory.⁸ For the Corinthians reckon themselves to have the victory unless they be utterly beaten; and the Athenians account themselves worsted when they are not decidedly the victors.⁹ On the Peloponnesians having sailed away, and the land forces being dispersed to their

⁵ *Beaks.*] The learned French translator of Strabo, cited by Goeller, explains the *ἑπωρίδας* thus: "Les *épotides* (*parotides* a un sens différent) étoient dans les vaisseaux de guerre des anciens deux solives, plus ou moins saillantes, plus ou moins larges, qui s'avançoient de chaque côté de la proue. Du milieu de ces *épotides* partoît l'éperon, en Grec *ἱμβολον*, et en Latin *rostrum*, dont l'extrémité étoit garni de fer ou de cuivre. Scheffer milit. naval. 2, 5, p. 124. Plin. 7, 57. attribue l'invention des *épotides* à un pirate d'Etrurie nommé *Pisæus*. C'est vraisemblablement d'après ce *rostrum*, qui signifie un bec, et qu'on pourroit regarder comme un sort de nez ou de museau, qui ceux qui lui ajoutèrent les deux solives laterales, ont été porté à leur donner, par suite de la même métaphore, le nom d'*épotides*, qui cependant signifieroit couvrir-oreilles plutôt qu'oreilles."

It may be added, that in some cases there were *two* of these *ἑπωρίδες*, as appears from the following passages: Eurip. *Iph. Taur.* 1361. Matth. *κοιτοῖς δὲ πρύρας εἶχον. διὰ ἑπωρίδων ἀγκύρας ἔξανῆπρον.* Philostr. *Imag.* 792. *ἡ μὲν ληστική ναὺς τὸν μάχμον πλεῖ τρόπον. ἑπωρίσι τε γὰρ κατεσκευάσται, καὶ ἱμβόλῳ, καὶ σιδῆραι αὐτῇ χεῖρες, καὶ αἰχμαὶ, καὶ δρέπανα ἐπὶ δοράτων.*

⁶ *Masters of the wrecks.*] Which was usually thought to constitute victory.

⁷ *Wafting them.*] The word *ἀπώσις* is very rare, nor have I remarked it elsewhere.

⁸ *Conceiving that, &c.*] Hobbes renders, "thought themselves not to have had the worse, for the same reason that the others thought themselves not to have had the better."

⁹ *For the Corinthians reckon, &c.*] The aorist here denotes what is customary.

This trait of the Athenian character is similar to that ascribed to them by the Corinthians, l. 1, 70. "as to whatever they may devise, and not accomplish, they regard themselves as deprived of what was their *own*."

homes, the Athenians themselves erected a trophy in Achæa, as victors, at about twenty stadia distant from Erineus, where the Corinthians had their station. Such was the event of the sea-fight.

XXXV. And now Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put themselves in readiness to join the expedition, with seven hundred heavy-armed, and three hundred darters, directed that the ships should coast along to the territory of Croton, while they themselves, having just reviewed the whole of the land forces at the river Sybaris, led them through the territory of Thuria. And as they were at the river Hylis, on the Crotoniates sending, and telling them it would not be with their consent that the army should pass through their territory, they descended and encamped at the sea-side and the mouth of the Hylis, where their ships met them. On the day following they embarked, and coasted along, touching at the cities (except Locri), until they arrived at Petra¹ in the territory of Rhegium.

XXXVI. Meanwhile, the Syracusans, hearing of their approach, were again desirous to make another trial with their fleet, and their late accessions of land forces, which they had collected for the very purpose of striking a blow before the reinforcement arrived. They equipped their navy according as, from the experience of the former sea-fight, they thought they should have the advantage; and especially they cut shorter the prows of the ships, and made them stouter, fixing thick beaks to the prows; and stretched props and stays from them, of about six cubits long, to the ribs or sides of the vessels, both inwards and outwards²; in the same way as the

¹ *Petra*.] i. e. the promontory of Leucopetra; where, too, there might be a town.

² *Props and stays, &c.*] Hoc ita factum esse intelligit Heilmann, ut fulcra ista per proræ murum in navem immitterentur, ibique ad pilam in angulum concurrerent cujus anguli quæ eminebant extra navem crura alligabantur ad epotidas, ab utroque latere proræ in obliquum prominentes, in fronte autem angularem in formam et ipsas concurrentes; quo facto opus erat, ut ἀντήριδες epotidibus pro fulcris essent. Longitudinem autem istorum fulcrorum statuit virtus fuisse senum cubitorum, totidemque extra navem. (Goeller.)

Corinthian ships had been equipped at the prows, when they engaged with the fleet from Naupactus. For the Syracusans conceived, that against the Athenian ships, which were not built with an equal defence, but having the parts about the prow slight (because they made their charges not so much *at prow* as on the *side of the vessel*, and after manœuvring round), their own could not but have the advantage; also, that to engage in the great harbour, with many ships, and in no great space, would be in their favour; for making the charges *prow to prow*, they should break up the parts about the head, striking³ with stiff and thick beaks on their hollow and weak foreparts. Whereas the Athenians, in so narrow a space, would have no means to use the *manœuvring round*, or the *cutting through the line*, on their skill in which they especially relied: for they themselves, to the utmost of their power, would not allow them to break through the line, and the narrowness of space would hinder them from manœuvring round. That mode of fighting, too, with opposite prows, which formerly had been thought to have arisen from the unskillfulness of the steersmen, they ought themselves especially to use, as they would thus gain most advantage; for, if pushed out of the line, the Athenians would have no place for recoil, or tacking, nor any place of retreat, except to the land, and that at but a short distance, and for a very small extent, opposite their camp. The rest of the port they should themselves occupy; whereas the enemy, being thronged together in a little room, and all in the same space, could not fail to run foul of each other, and fall into disorder, which, indeed, was what proved most prejudicial to the Athenians in all their sea-

Those who are better acquainted with naval architecture than myself will judge whether the above be a correct view. To me it seems that none of the prows were, properly speaking, *within* the vessel, but that two were inwards, as compared to two others which stood further out, and touched the ship's *τοίχοι* further on. The outer ones might be called *prows*, the inner ones *stays*.

³ *Striking*.] I have here followed Bekker and Goeller in adopting, from two MSS., *παλόντας*, for the perplexing *παρέχοντες*: which, formerly following, I laid the construction down as follows: (*ἐνόμισαν*) γὰρ, χρώμενοι στίς ἐμβολαῖς ἀντίπρωροι, ἀναρρήξουν τὰ πῶραθεν (μέρη) αὐτοῖς (for αὐτῶν) τειρίφοις καὶ παχέσι τοῖς ἐμβόλοις, παρέχοντες (αὐτοὺς) πρὸς κοῖλα καὶ ἀσθενή. Nec prorsus penitet.

fights, there not being to them, as to the Syracusans, a space for recoil or retreat to any part of the port, but to manœuvre round into a wider space, the enemy occupying the approaches from the sea; and retreat⁴ they would never be able to do, especially as the Plenmyrium was in the possession of the enemy, and the mouth of the port not wide.

XXXVII. Having devised such additional expedients, in aid of their skill and power, and being, moreover, more courageous since their former battle, they made their attack with both their land and sea forces. And Gylippus, leading forth the land forces a little before, brought them against the wall of the Athenians, at the part where it looked towards the city. Then those from Olympieum (both the heavy-armed who were there, and the cavalry and light-armed of the Syracusans) advanced against the wall on the other side; and immediately after this, the fleet of the Syracusans and their allies sailed forth.¹

The Athenians supposed at first that the enemy would try their attacks with the land forces only; but on seeing the ships suddenly bearing down, they were thrown into confusion; whereupon some ranged themselves upon and before the walls, to oppose the assailants; while others advanced against the troops, marching with speed from Olympieum and the parts beyond, both cavalry, in great numbers, and darters; others, again, manned the ships, and also went to give assistance at the beach. And when they were manned, the ships put off², in number seventy-five, while those of the Syracusans were about eighty.

⁴ *The enemy occupying the approaches from the sea, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases thus: "They could not press out to sea, through the narrow mouth of the harbour, without exposing a part of their fleet to certain destruction."

¹ *The fleet of the Syracusans and their allies sailed forth.*] The attack of the land forces is supposed by Mitford to have been a false attack, or feint.

² *The ships put off.*] Plutarch, Nic. 20., ascribes the determination of hazarding a battle to Menander and Euthydemus. See also Diod. Sic. But it does not appear that even Nicias could have been of any other opinion. The Athenians had nothing that could be called a separate station for their ships, and therefore they could not well refuse battle whenever it was offered by the enemy.

XXXVIII. Having for a considerable part of the day charged and retreated, and tried their attacks on each other, and neither party being able to achieve any thing worthy of mention (except that the Syracusans sunk a ship or two of the Athenians), they separated; and at the same time the land forces retired from before the walls. On the day following, the Syracusans kept still, giving no indication of what they meant to do. Nicias, however, sensible that the engagement had been a drawn battle¹, and expecting that the enemy would again attack him, made the captains refit their ships, such as had suffered injury; and moored some transports before the stockade which he had fixed down in the sea before his ships, to serve the purpose of a shut up port.² He stationed the ships about two plethra (or two hundred feet) apart from each other, that if any ship should be hard pressed, it might find a safe refuge, and the means of again sallying forth at his leisure. On these preparations the Athenians continued occupied until night.

XXXIX. On the following day, the Syracusans at an earlier hour than before engaged with the Athenians in the same attack, both of land and sea force; and being opposed fleet to fleet in the same manner, they again passed most of the day in trying their attacks on each other, until at length Ariston of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, who was the best steersman the Syracusans had, persuaded the commanders³ of the fleet to send to those in the city who had the care of such

¹ *Had been a drawn battle.*] i. e. that the Athenians had lost the superiority. Nay, they would seem to have come off with the worst, having had two ships sunk. The enemy, however, had probably more ships disabled. At all events, it had quite the effect of a defeat.

² *Moored some transports, &c.*] Something very similar is related in Appian, t. 1, 332. τὸν ἱσπλὸν ἐμφράξαι στρογγύλους πλοῖους ἐπ' ἀγκυρῶν ἐκ διαστήματος—ἐκδίονσαι τε διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ ὅτε βιάζοντο, ὑποχωροῦσαι, and Livy l. 50, 10. Intervalla fecit, qua procurrere speculatoriæ naves in hostem, ac tuto recipi possent.

³ *Aristo, &c. persuaded the commanders, &c.*] The following device is inserted by Polyænus in his Strateg. l. 5, 13, 2. He also has something extremely similar at l. 3, 32, 1., but attributes it to Telesinicus. In both passages several emendations may be suggested by this of Thucydides.

Onosander, in his Strategicus, or Directions to a General, has a whole chapter περὶ ἀριστοπορίας, in which he points out the proper time and mode of supplying dinner.

matters, ordering them as quickly as possible to remove, and bring down the market for the sale of provisions to the sea side, and whatever eatables any one had, to compel all to bring them thither for sale; in order that on disembarking the sailors, they might immediately supply them with dinner⁴ by the sides of the vessels, so that, after a short space, they might attack the Athenians unexpectedly.

XL. Induced by this representation, they sent a messenger, and the market was prepared; while the Syracusans suddenly beating to prow¹, retired to the city, and, immediately on disembarking, took their dinner on the spot. As to the Athenians, they supposing them to have rowed back as beaten, landed and leisurely attended both to other affairs, and to the preparation of their dinner, since for this day at least they thought there would be no further engagement. When suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships, and again made sail upon them. They, in much confusion, and most of them without refreshment², embarked in great disorder and with some delay, and at length stood out to meet them. For some time both parties remained on their guard, and abstained from charging each other; until the Athenians, thinking it not expedient to dally any longer, and be self-beaten by mere fatigue³, but to attack with all speed, and, cheering onward, they charged and came to action. The Syracusans met their attack, and keeping their ships, as they had contrived,

⁴ *Supply them with dinner.*] I here read, from several of the best MSS., ἀριστον ποιήσονται. The αὐτοῖς, as referred to the *sailors*, I would retain, notwithstanding that Goeller conjectures αὐτοῦ.

¹ *Beating to prow.*] i. e. retiring backward. See the explanation of this phrase at l. 1, 51.

² *Without refreshment.*] It may be thought that ἀνάριστοι would have been better than ἀστροι: but ἀστρος is often so used by Xenophon. Besides, it may be observed, that none had time for a complete dinner.

³ *Self-beaten by mere fatigue.*] Which was, perhaps, what the Syracusans chiefly aimed at; knowing that their men, who had dined, could hold out much longer than the Athenians.

It is remarkable that the antients should never, when it was possible to avoid it, have encumbered their ships with even a single meal's provision. This, indeed, may be traced back even to the time of the Trojan war. Thus, Homer *Odys.* 12, 282., Ulysses addresses the sailors as follows: οὐκ ἴαρος γαίης ἐπιβήμεναι, ἔνθα κεν αὐτὲ Νῆσφ ἀμφιρύτῃ λαρὸν τετυχόμεθα δόρπον.

with beaks foremost, broke down the Athenian vessels for a considerable way of the forecastles; whilst those from the decks much annoyed the Athenians by galling volleys of darts; but yet more those in the light boats, by sailing round them, and falling foul of the blades of the rows of oars⁴, and sailing by them at flank⁵, and thence annoying the sailors with darts.

XLI. Having fought the battle in this manner with all energy, the Syracusans at length gained the victory; while the Athenians, passing between the transports, sought refuge in their own station. And the Syracusan ships chased them as far as the transports; but there long beams⁶ armed with

⁴ *Falling foul of the blades of the rows of oars.*] 'Ες τοὺς ταρσοὺς ὑποπίπτοντες. So Dio Cass. 627, 52. ἐς τοὺς ταρσοὺς τῶν νεῶν ὑποπίπτοντες. Herod. 8, 12. καὶ ἐτάρασσον τοὺς ταρσοὺς τῶν κωπίων. Hence may be illustrated Æschyl. Pers. 421. Also Polyæn. 5, 22. p. 506. where for ἐπαράμενος I conjecture ἐτ' ἀρπύμενος.

⁵ *Sailing by them at flank.*] Such is the usual sense of πλάγιον, and that, it should seem, here intended. Mitford, however, renders, "under the lateral galleries of the Athenian vessels; a mode of understanding the words," he says, "suggested by an attentive examination of an antique piece of sculpture in the Vatican museum at Rome. These lateral galleries of the vessels," he supposes, "to have been open at bottom, or, at most, to have had only gratings, their purpose (he thinks) having been only to give projection and purchase to the upper oars. A parapet, raised on them, protected the rowers in a great degree against missile weapons from the decks of the enemy's galleys; but the open or grated bottom gave passage for weapons from boats underneath." This is not dissimilar to the manner in which I myself long ago understood the passage, taking the ταρσοὶ to denote the wooden frame-work fitted to the sides of the ship, through which orifices were made for the oars; without which frame-work the oars could never have been used to any purpose.

⁶ *Long beams.*] Called κέραται, from being somewhat of the form of yard-arms or ship-booms. It should seem, however, that these κέραται were not only so formed as to let the ponderous weights down upon any passing vessel, but, as the distance between the vessels was about two hundred feet, were also provided with some sort of machinery to project the dolphin to some little distance from the end of the beams. How formidable they were, we may imagine from a line of Pherecrates cited by our Scholiast, and thus emended by Meineke. ap. Goeller: Διακόψει γούν τοῦδαφος αὐτῶν ἐμπύπτων, καὶ καταδύων. The ἰδαφος, it may be observed, was the bottom of the hold. Besides, we find from what just follows, that two ships of the Syracusans that approached were destroyed.

Aristophanes Equit. 762. has a witty allusion to these dolphins, saying, in a metaphorical sense: Ἄλλὰ φυλάττον, καὶ τοὺς δελφίνας μετρωρίζον. where the Scholiast observes that such were made of lead, or iron.

dolphins⁷, suspended over the entrances from the transports⁸; hindered them from proceeding further. Nevertheless two ships⁹ of the Syracusans, elate with victory, approached close up to them, and were destroyed¹⁰, one of which was captured together with the crew. The Syracusans, however, having sunk seven ships of the Athenians, and damaged many, killing some of the men, and taking others prisoners, retreated, and set up two trophies for both victories. And now they had not only an assured hope of being far superior by sea, but thought that they should also defeat the land forces. Thus they set about preparations for again attacking them on both elements.

XLII. In the meantime¹, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrive with the reinforcements from Athens, being upwards of seventy-three² ships (including the foreign ones³), and with about five thousand⁴ heavy-armed, of themselves and the

⁷ *Dolphins.*] These were certain pigs of lead or iron (as we say, by a similar metaphor), so called from bearing a rude resemblance to the form of a dolphin.

⁸ *Transports.*] Here, and before, Hobbes, without any authority from his author, or any ground of probability, understands *two* ships, though it is plain that there were several of these entrances.

⁹ *Two ships.*] Mitford, by a strange inaccuracy, says *three*, of which, he adds, two were sunk, and the other taken with her crew.

¹⁰ *Destroyed.*] i. e. one utterly sunk, and the other so disabled that it could not get away.

¹ *Meantime.*] Namely (as Mitford well paraphrases), the short and critical interval between the resolution taken, and the proposed execution.

² *Seventy-three.*] Isocrates de Pace says two hundred and forty, referring to the total number employed in both expeditions, the former of which had one hundred and fifty, the other seventy-three. So that in what he says there is little or no exaggeration, only he uses a round number. In the same way, Aristides speaks of two hundred; also using a round number, which, however, is far more below the mark than the other above it. Diodorus says, πλείους τῶν τριακοσίων δέκα. where there is, doubtless, some corruption. I suspect we should read πλείους τῶν ἑξῶν. The error may be supposed to have arisen from a confusion of ΔΔΔ, 70, and ΗΗΗ, 300.

³ *Foreign ones.*] Namely, those which Demosthenes had procured from the Italian allies.

⁴ *About five thousand, &c.*] Mitford thinks that, including the attendant slaves, the land force alone would approach to two thousand men. An estimate to which I must demur, as seeming overrated. The question is, whether they brought a force of light-armed and middle-armed from Greece, in proportion to their heavy-armed. I suspect *not*. For the Thracian mercenaries, as we have seen, arrived too late. They seem to have

allies; also of darters, Barbarian and Grecian, a small number, besides slingers and bowmen, and other forces to a considerable amount.⁵

And now the Syracusans and their allies were for the moment thrown into no little fear, wondering if there were thus to be no end of their toils, nor any deliverance from peril⁶; seeing that, notwithstanding the fortifying of Decelea, another armament equal, or nearly so, to the former one, should have come over, and that the power of the Athenians should in all quarters seem so vast. On the other hand, to the former armament of the Athenians, this was as it were a strengthening out of weakness and calamity.⁷

And now Demosthenes, seeing how affairs stood, conceived that it would not be expedient to dally, nor fall into the error which Nicias had committed⁸; for whereas⁹, on his first

depended much, for that kind of force, on their allies in Italy and Sicily. As to the number of attending slaves (on which Mitford frequently dwells), it does not seem to me that *many* were ever taken by *Athenian* troops. And surely, in a service like the present, where it was so difficult to furnish the troops with regular supplies of provisions, it is not likely that very many slaves would be allowed to be taken.

⁵ *Darters, &c., a small number — slingers and bowmen, and other forces to a considerable amount.*] Plutarch has preserved the exact number, namely, "not fewer than three thousand." A particular which, it is certain, he derived from some other historian, and not Thucydides; probably from Philistus. Plutarch moreover adds that they were also provided with *pipers*, for a sort of theatrical pomp, and to strike terror into the enemy. For the very same reason, probably, Sir Francis Drake and most of our early navigators were (as we find from Hackluyt and others) well provided with trumpeters and other musicians.

⁶ *If there were to be, &c.*] It should seem that in the original there is a blending of two constructions; though Matthiæ, in his Greek Grammar, 321., adduces this passage as an example of the use of the genitive for illustration of a word or preposition. There is here, also, an ellipsis of *συνμάζω*, which is not unfrequent in the best writers.

⁷ *As it were a strengthening out of weakness and calamity.*] An expression of almost lyric boldness, for "it seemed that, from being weak, they had been made strong." So St. Paul (between whom and our author there is much resemblance) says, Hebr. 11, 34. *ἐνεδυναμώσθησαν ἀπὸ ἀσθενείας*.

⁸ *Dally, nor fall into the error which Nicias had committed.*] So Hesych. *Μελλοντικῶν. ἐπιβραδύς καὶ μελλήτης ὁ Νικίας ἔδωκετο*. I conjecture *δριβραδύς*, κ. τ. λ.

⁹ *For whereas, &c.*] Here we have, I think, clearly the opinion of *Thucydides* (and not that of Demosthenes only), that a spirited attack on Syracuse, at the outset of the business, would have very probably led to the subjugation of that power. Had not a year been wasted in petty enterprise, the Athenians could scarcely have missed of success. And here we may remark on the want of judgment shown by the Athenians in not at

coming he had been an object of fear, when he did not immediately attack Syracuse, but wintered at Catana, he fell into contempt, and was prevented by the coming of Gylippus with an army out of Peloponnesus, which, if he had immediately attacked Syracuse, would not have been sent for; as the Syracusans, supposing themselves to be a match for the enemy, would have learnt their inability to compete with them, and at the same time been completely blocked up, so that even though they had sent for any aid, it could have been of no adequate benefit. Considering, I say, this, and knowing that he himself would be on the first day the greatest object of fear to the enemy, Demosthenes was desirous, as speedily as possible, to profit by the present awe inspired by his force. And seeing the cross wall of the Syracusans, by which they hindered the Athenians from circumvallating them, to be but single, and considering that if the Athenians could again be masters of the ascent to Epipolæ, and get possession of the camp there, it would easily be taken (as the enemy would not withstand them), he was in haste to set about the attempt. To him it seemed to be the shortest way of despatching the war; for either, if successful, he should have Syracuse in his power, or else he would draw off the forces, and not have both the Athenians at home, and those in the expedition, nay, indeed, the whole state, consumed to no purpose.

first selecting *Demosthenes* for the commander-in-chief. He, with Alcibiades and Lamachus, would, no doubt, have accomplished the conquest of Syracuse. As things now were, there was, even *with* this powerful reinforcement, far less chance of success; and so Demosthenes must himself have thought, otherwise he would not have been so anxious to take advantage of the first terror of the Syracusans. "In his younger days (says Mitford) he had been enterprising, even to rashness. Now, in mature age, undazzled by the near view of glorious conquest, unawed by the apprehension of popular rage, neither the hope of profit, nor the prospect of fame, nor the fear of a tyrannical multitude, could move him from what he thought the welfare of his country required. The safety of the Sicilian army was not to be staked against any hope of conquest: the gain would be a precarious advantage to the commonwealth; the loss, almost certain ruin. His first resolution, therefore, was to avoid the error of Nicias, losing opportunity by delay; his next, to fix upon some one undertaking in which success might be in some degree decisive, and failure not fatal; and, finally, he determined that, should such a first attempt be defeated, it would be improper to risk farther so large a portion of the strength of the commonwealth, and, whatever indignation he might incur from the Athenian people, he would lead the armament home."

First, therefore, the Athenians went forth and ravaged ¹⁰ the territory of the Syracusans about the Anapus, and were masters, as at first, both by sea and land. For the Syracusans went not forth in either way, except with some cavalry and darters from Olympieum.

XLIII. After this it was thought proper by Demosthenes to make an attempt on the cross wall.¹ But when, on his approaching it, the battering engines were burnt by the enemy defending the wall, and when, after making assaults on various quarters, they were repulsed, he thought they ought no longer to delay, but (having prevailed upon Nicias and his other colleagues) to make the attempt on Epipolæ which he had contrived.

And now by daytime, indeed, it seemed impossible to go forth and secure the ascent unobserved. Having, therefore, ordered the troops to take five days' provisions, and all the stone-masons and carpenters to be ready, and a store of arrows and whatever necessities for building² they would require on securing this purpose, he himself and Eurymedon and Menander, about the time of the first sleep³, went with all the forces, and marched towards Epipolæ; Nicias being left behind in the fortifications.

Having come to Epipolæ, at Euryalus⁴ (where the former

¹⁰ *First, therefore, the Athenians went forth and ravaged, &c.*] Thus they recommenced offensive operations; yet not in the way which Demosthenes recommended, namely, by an attack on Epipolæ. It should seem, therefore (though such is not expressly mentioned by our author), that the proposal was neglected by Nicias and Eurymedon, as too bold. Cautious measures, then, were pursued, which were, however, not ill judged; for, as Mitford observes, "a double object seems to have been proposed. Possibly, the enemy might be provoked to risk a battle; of all things, perhaps, for the Athenians the most desirable. Should they avoid it, the Athenian army, besides being gratified with booty, would derive encouragement from the experienced acknowledgment of their superiority."

¹ *Cross wall.*] I here read (with Bekker and Goeller) παρατείχιματος, from almost all the MSS. The common reading, ἀποτείχιματος, yields no tolerable sense.

² *Stone-masons and carpenters, &c.*] He had in view the erection of a fortress on Epipolæ.

³ *First sleep.*] Or, first watch, as Goeller explains.

⁴ *Having come to Epipolæ at Euryalus.*] Mitford inaccurately renders, "ascending by the way of Euryalus," deceived, it should seem, by the version of Smith. On inspection of the plan it will appear that the Athenians,

army had first ascended), they gained the ascent unobserved by the watch, and carried the Syracusan port there, killing some of the garrison, the greater part, however, escaping to the camps (of which there were three on Epipolæ, one of the Syracusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one of the allies), carried thither tidings of the attack, as also to the six hundred Syracusans who had at first been appointed as guards at this quarter of Epipolæ. These immediately gave their aid; but Demosthenes and the Athenians met with and routed them, after they had made a brave stand. They then immediately rushed forward, in order that by improving the present ardour to accomplish what they came for, they might not be too late.⁵ Meanwhile, others carried, at the first assault⁶ (the garrison abandoning, its defence), the cross wall of the Syracusans, and threw down the battlements. But the Syracusans and their allies, with Gylippus and his corps, brought up aid from the foreguard (or outworks); yet this daring attack being made upon them in the night, and unexpectedly, they charged the Athenians in some trepidation, and, unable to withstand the shock, at first retreated. While, however, the Athenians were proceeding (as victors) in somewhat of disorder, being desirous to pass as quickly as possible through that part of the enemy's forces, that they had not yet engaged with (lest, by any remissness of ardour, they should rally) the Bœotians⁷ first made a stand, and charging home, routed and put them to flight.

situated as they *then* were, could not ascend Epipolæ by the way of Euryalus. The sense simply is, that being arrived at the highest part of Epipolæ, and close by the hill of Euryalus, &c.

⁵ *By improving the present ardour, &c.*] I agree with Goeller that the genitive, τοῦ περαινέσθαι, belongs to ὁρμῇ rather than to βραδείας, with which the Scholiast and most interpreters connect it.

Here we may recall to mind the words of Shakspeare, that "there is a tide in the affairs of men," &c.

⁶ *At the first assault*] At πρώτης, as Goeller observes, must be supplied ὁρμῆς, from the preceding. I agree with him that the true reading is ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης τὸ παρατίξιμα: for otherwise the τὸ can hardly be taken with παρατίξιμα.

⁷ *The Bœotians.*] It is remarkable that some of the rudest shocks the Athenians sustained came from their bitter and irreconcilable enemies the Bœotians.

XLIV. And here the Athenians were now in much disorder and perplexity, insomuch that ¹ it was not possible to learn from either party in what manner each of the circumstances occurred. For in the *day*, indeed, things are clearer, but not even then do those who are present know *all*, nay, scarcely what passes immediately before them; while in a *nocturnal rencounter* ² (which this, alone of all the contests of great armies in the war, was), how could any one have aught of distinct knowledge? For though the moon shone bright, they only saw each other (as it was likely they should by the moon) just so as that the appearance of a body might be discerned; but to recognise friend or foe, was an uncertainty. Moreover, there was no small number of heavy-armed on both sides engaged in a narrow space. And now of the Athenians some were already defeated, while others were marching onward, in their first impetus, unvanquished. A considerable part of the army had now ascended, and some were yet mounting the hill, so that they knew not what point to make for, for the front rank being routed, all was one medley of confusion, and it was difficult to distinguish any orders for the shouting. For the Syracusans and their allies, as they gained any advantage, were animating each other by a vast shouting (indeed, it was impossible in the night to signify their meaning any other way), and they stood to receive the charge from all that advanced upon them. As to the Athenians, they were prying about for each other, and accounted all such as came in the opposite direction ³, if even they were friends,

¹ *Insomuch that.*] If the common reading *ἥν* be correct, it must be taken for *καθ' ἥν*. But as the sense thus proceeds but lamely, I would conjecture *ῖ*, which reading I have ventured to follow.

² *A nocturnal rencounter.*] This passage is had in view by Plutarch, t. 2. 998. *οἷον εἰ τις ἐν νυκτομαχίαις στρατοπέδων*, where read *ναυμαχίαι στρατοπέδων*, the *ς* having arisen from the following *σ*. Also Gregor. Naz. t. 1. 34. *Α. ὡς ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ καὶ σελήνης ἀμυδραῖς σφίγγεσιν, ἐχθρῶν ἢ φίλων ὄψεαι οὐ διαγινώσκοντες*. See also Herod. l. 1, 74. and Polyæn. l. 6, 5.

The result of this night encounter was the greatest calamity that had yet befallen the Athenians. And many afterwards, languishing in the caverns of the Latomæ, or wearing out their best days in hopeless slavery, would probably often think of the words of Eurip. Phœn. 738. *Ἐρεοκλ. Ἴσον φέρει νύξ τοῖς δὲ τολμῶσιν πλείον. Κρ. Ἐνδυστυχῆσαι δεινὸν ἐφφρόνης κνίφας*.

³ *All such as came in the opposite direction.*] I can hardly agree with Bekker and Goeller, who edit *τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας* for *τὸ ἐναντίον*. The new

(of those who had turned and fled backwards) as enemies : also, by frequent iterations of "*the watchword*," (for there was no other means of recognition) they occasioned much mutual confusion, by all at once asking it, and thereby made it known to the enemy.⁴ While that of the *Syracusans* they had not equal means of discovering, because they, being victorious and unbroken, were better recognised.⁵ So that if any fell in with a party of the enemy, and had the superiority in number, yet they escaped them⁶ by knowing the watchword, while they themselves, if they could not answer, were slain. But what did them the greatest injury was the perpetual pæonizing ; since, being much alike from both parties, it occasioned great perplexity. For when the Argives and Corcyreans, and whatever others of the Doric race were on the side of the Athenians, sounded the pæon, they threw the Athenians into a terror equal to that inspired by the enemy. So that, at last, falling upon each other, in various quarters of the army, when they were once thrown into utter disorder, friends not only inspired fear into friends, and citizens into citizens, but even coming to blows with each other, they were with difficulty parted. And now the pursuit having begun, and the descent from Epipolæ being narrow, many⁷ rushed headlong down the precipices and perished ; while those that escaped from the height, when they got down to the plain, many of them, and such as were of the first army, by their better knowledge of the country, arrived in safety at the camp ; but of those that came last, some missing their way, wandered

reading seems to be a mere gloss ; for though that be the primitive sense of *ἰναντιος*, yet it is rare. To the examples of it in Steph. Thes. I add the following : Sappho frag. 2, 2. (Mus. Crit. 1. p. 7.) *ὅστις ἰναντιος τοι ἴσδάνει*. The common reading may also be defended by the following imitations in Joseph. p. 205, 43. *πάν τὸ προστυχὸν ἀνέρου, νομίζοντες εἶναι πολέμιον*. and 857, 25. *πολεμίοι ἡγούμενοι πάν τὸ, κ. τ. λ.*

⁴ *Made it known to the enemy.*] And consequently useless, or even prejudicial to themselves. (Mitford.)

⁵ *Better recognised.*] *ἥσσαν ἀγνοεῖσθαι* is here used by a common meiosis.

⁶ *Escaped them.*] Smith absurdly renders "they judged it best to fly ; because they were sensible that their own word was divulged."

⁷ *Many.*] For *οἱ πολλοί* I read, from conjecture, *πολλοί*. The common reading cannot be correct, since it is inconsistent with what follows.

over the country; and these, when it was day, the Syracusan horse rode about and cut down.⁶

XLV. On the day following, the Syracusans erected two trophies, one at Epipolæ, where the ascent is, the other at the place where the Bœotians made the first stand. As to the Athenians, they fetched away their dead under truce. And no small number¹ was there of themselves and their allies that were slain. Arms, however, yet more than in proportion to the slain were taken; for those light-armed who were forced to leap down the precipices were obliged to abandon their shields; and of these some perished, others escaped with their lives.²

XLVI. Afterwards the Syracusans, on this unexpected success, recovering their former courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragas, which was now labouring under intestine commotions, in order, if possible, to bring it over to the Syracusan interest. Gylippus, too, went again a land journey over Sicily, in order to collect yet other forces, as being in hopes, since things had taken this turn in Epipolæ, that he should even carry by storm the walls of the Athenians.

XLVII. In the meantime, the Athenian commanders consulted on the calamity which had befallen them, and on the present reduced state of things³ in the army. For they

⁶ *These, when it was day, the Syracusan horse, &c.*] This passage is imitated by Plutarch Camill. 23. τούτους μετ' ἡμέραν σκοπῶντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ διαφερομένους ἐπιλαίοντες οἱ ἱππεῖς διέτρεπον.

Περελάσασθαι (like *perequitate* in Latin) signifies to ride about full speed. See Livy, l. 3, 61. and Herod. l. 4, 7.

¹ *No small number.*] Plutarch says two thousand, and Diodorus two thousand five hundred, besides a considerable number wounded.

² *For the light-armed, &c.*] Such is the real sense, though not the literal version, of the oddly-phrased passage of the original.

³ *Reduced state of things.*] *Ψῶν* is elsewhere used in the same metaphor. Goeller here cites (as I had myself also done) Justin 4, 5. who says, in the narration of the affairs in question, "esse domi graviora, et forsitan infeliciora, bella, in quæ servare hos urbis apparatus oporteat;" where I conjecture *feliciora*. The *in* seems to have arisen from the *an* preceding.

both perceived *themselves* unsuccessful in their attempts, and the *soldiery* wearied with staying, — afflicted as they were with disease, and that from a twofold cause, the season of the year ⁴ being that in which men are especially liable to sickness, and the situation where they were encamped being marshy and pestilential, — and also that every other circumstance of their affairs seemed to them such as to warrant no hope. It was, therefore, the opinion of Demosthenes, that ⁵ they ought no longer to remain, but, as he had intended when he ventured on the enterprise against Epipolæ, that attempt having miscarried, he gave his vote to depart without delay, while the sea was yet practicable to be crossed, and they could accomplish the expedition ⁶ by means, at least, of the fresh accession of naval force. It was also, he said, more serviceable to the state to carry the war against those who were erecting fortresses in the country, than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to subdue; nor did he think they ought to expend large sums on a fruitless siege. Such were the sentiments of Demosthenes.

XLVIII. As for Nicias, though he thought their affairs were bad, yet he was not willing in words to expose their weakness, nor, by a departure being determined on ¹ by vote of a

⁴ *The season of the year.*] Namely, the month of August.

⁵ *The opinion of Demosthenes, &c.*] It may seem strange that Nicias, as being the commander-in-chief, should not have spoken *first*; but this may be accounted for from the temper and disposition of Nicias, who was not forward to speak himself, but wished rather to hear others offer their sentiments first. So Aristoph. Eq. 13. where we have the following dialogue between Nicias and Demosthenes: Νικ. Τίς οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν (scil. σωτήρ); λέγε συ. Δημ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν μοι λέγε, "ἵνα μὴ μάχωμαι. Νικ. Μα τὸν Ἀπόλλω γὰρ μὲν οὐκ. Ἀλλ' εἰπὲ θάρρῶν, εἴτα κίγῳ σοι φράσω.

⁶ *Could accomplish the expedition.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of the perplexing phrase τοῦ στρατεύματος κρατεῖν. Almost all commentators, indeed, refer τοῦ στρατεύματος to the Syracusan forces. But that would involve an ellipsis of unprecedented harshness. It is better to take στρατεύμα as here used for στρατεία, though the signification in question may be rare. Or, we may take τοῦ στρατεύματος to mean the armament of the Athenians. The construction and sense will thus be as follows: ἐψηφίζετο ἐξίνα — καὶ, κρατεῖν (scil. τούτου, i. e. ἐξόδου) ταῖς γοῦν ἐπελθούσαις ναυσί, "to carry this into effect, at least with the assistance of the recently-arrived ships of the armament."

¹ *By departure being determined on by vote of a public council.*] It seems to have been usual on debating so important a measure as a total retreat

public council, to have their situation disclosed to the enemy; as by so doing they would be far less able to avoid observation, when they chose to carry the counsel into execution. Besides², the affairs of the enemy, from what he knew of them, with better information than the rest, yet afforded some hope that they would be in a worse condition than their own, should they persevere in the siege (for they would wear them out by want of money), and especially as they were, by the ships now with them, decidedly masters at sea. There was, indeed, a party in Syracuse which was desirous of delivering the city up to the Athenians, and had sent a message to him on the subject, and would not allow him to abandon the siege. Conscious of which³, his mind was, in fact, held in doubt, and he kept deliberating, though he then, avowedly in words, said that "he would not withdraw the army, for he well knew that the Athenians would never approve⁴ of their departing without a decree authorizing it." Besides, those, he said, who were to sit in judgment on their conduct would not be such as could speak from actual observation of what was done, but from the invectives of others, nay, would be swayed by the calumnies of some eloquent accuser.⁵ He moreover remarked, that many, nay, most of the soldiers who were now bawling out "things are in a perilous state," would, on arriving home, change their note, and raise outcries that the commanders had betrayed the interests of the country, and taken bribes to depart. Therefore, knowing, as he did, the Athenian temper,

and abandonment of an expedition, to desire the opinions of a general council of officers, by which the responsibility of the generals was much lessened: and to this it was that Nicias here objected. It is clear that the present was only a council of the *commanders*, namely, Nicias, Demosthenes, Eurymedon, Menander, and Euthydemus.

² *Besides*] Or, partly also. See l. 1, 107.

³ *Conscious of which.*] Though, as it seems, he did not inform his colleagues.

⁴ *The Athenians would never approve, &c.*] Mitford thus paraphrases: "The temper of the Athenian people is well known to me; warm in expectation, and jealous of their authority, they will highly resent a measure so disappointing to their hopes, unauthorized by their decree."

⁵ *Those who were to sit in judgment on their conduct, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "Our conduct, then, let it be recollected, must be submitted to the judgment, and our fate must be decided by the vote, not of those who have seen and who know what we know, but of those who will be persuaded of any thing by any eloquent accuser."

he for his part would wish not so much to be put to death on a base though unjust charge, as to encounter the hazard of suffering death, if it must be so, at the hands of the enemy.⁶

The affairs of the Syracusans, he said, were in a worse condition than theirs; for, what with the expences of paying foreign troops, and the charges of maintaining fortresses, and those of supporting a large navy now for a year, they were reduced to great straits, and knew not which way to turn themselves; for they had already expended two ~~hundred~~ talents, and incurred a debt for a yet greater sum; and if they should fail ever so little of their punctuality in paying their present forces, their affairs were ruined, being maintained rather by auxiliary troops, who might serve or not, than (as in the case of the Athenians) troops who must serve.

They ought, therefore, he said, to wait a while⁷ and persevere in the siege, and not to go off beaten in funds, wherein they are much superior.

XLIX. In saying this Nicias had chiefly relied on the exact information he had received of the state of affairs at Syracuse, of their extreme want of money, and because there was there a party desirous to put the state into the hands of the Athenians, and who were sending messages to him, not to abandon the siege: and moreover, as feeling a reliance, at least on the fleet, stronger than before.¹

⁶ *The hands of the enemy.*] The translators have not well represented the sense of *ἰδίᾳ*, and the commentators give no account of it. Perhaps, the words *τοῦτο παθεῖν* correspond to the *ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολεσθαι*, just as *ἰδίᾳ* and *δημοσίᾳ* are often opposed. This is confirmed by a kindred passage of Eurip. *Orest.* 439. *Μεν. Ἰδίᾳ πρὸς ἐχθρῶν ἢ πρὸς Ἀργείας χθόνος; Ὁρ. Πάντων πρὸς δούλων, ὡς θανά.*

⁷ *Wait a while.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of *ῥέλειν*, which is omitted by the translators, from ignorance, it should seem, of its sense. As the best writers (Aristophanes and Sophocles ap. Steph. Thes.) use the phrases *βίον ῥέλειν*, and *αἰῶνα ῥέλειν*, so there is no doubt but that they used *χρόνον ῥέλειν*, and probably *ῥέλειν* by itself. The sense, then, is *tempus terere*; and we may aptly compare our own phrase *to rub on*, which seems to be founded on a Latinism. Both the Greek and Latin phrases were used, in an unfavourable sense, of *what is unpleasant*. So Soph. *Elect.* 602. *δυστυχῇ βίον ῥέλειν*. to rub on, in a miserable life.

Since writing the above, I find that the Scholiast nearly perceived the sense, by explaining it *παρίδειν*. And so Malchus Rhetor. ap. Corp. Byz. Paris. p. 89. A. *οὐ δὲ ἔτι ῥέλειν τὴν μάχην.*

¹ *Feeling reliance, &c.*] Such seems to be the true representation of the

On the other hand, *Demosthenes*, as to the proposal of continuing at the siege, could not by any means² approve of it. If, however, it were thought proper not to withdraw the army without the authority of a decree of the Athenians, but to wait a while, they ought, he said, to do this after removing to Thapsus, or to Catana, from whence they might, by going forth with their land forces, subsist themselves³, and annoy their enemies, by plundering their country, and might carry on the contest by sea, with their ships, not in a confined spot (which was rather in favour of the ~~country~~ ^{country}), but in a wide space with plenty of sea-room, wherein their skill would be serviceable to them, and they would not have to make their retreats and advances by coming on and falling back in a circumscribed space. Upon the whole, he by no means, he said, approved of remaining any longer where they were, but thought they ought now, as quickly as possible, to be gone, and no longer delay.

The very same counsel was given by Eurymedon. But upon Nicias making some objections, a hesitation and demur⁴

sense, if, at least, the passage be correct: but the ellipsis of *μᾶλλον* in this context is somewhat harsh. I am, therefore, inclined to adopt the emendation of Goeller, ᾧ for ἧ, who renders the passage thus: "And at least he had now as much confidence in the fleet as before;" adding the following explanation: "Hoc est, nondum postrema clade pugnae navalis ita animo fractus erat, ut salutem in navibus positam desperaret, aut sese, si omnia destituissent, iis abire posse diffideret." Yet I see no difficulty in the *πρότερον*, which must be referred to the time before the arrival of the reinforcement.

Whichever mode be adopted, *κρατηθεῖς* is for *κρατυνθεῖς* (as Bauer takes it); or, perhaps, for *κραταιωθεῖς*, as in Psalm 51, 7. (Sept.) ἰδοὺ ἄνθρωπος θεός οὗτε ἔθετο τὸν θεὸν βοηθὸν αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' ἐπήλπισεν ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος (I would read, from two MSS., τῇ πλήθει) τοῦ πλοῦτος αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἰδυναμώθη (Aquil. ἐκραταιώθη) ἐπὶ τῇ ματαιότητι αὐτοῦ.

Finally, *θαρσῆσει* is for *ἐπὶ θαρσῆσει*, or *ὑπὸ θαρσῆσεως*.

² Not by any means.] So the translators render; but that sense cannot be elicited from ὅπως οὖν, which signifies *quomodocunque*. For ὅπως οὖν (which indeed is, as T. Magister tells us, not Attic) I would read ὁπωστίουν, which occurs elsewhere in our author, l. 7. and l. 8, 71. οὐδ' ὁπωστίουν ἐνίκησαν. Xen. Mem. 1, 6, 11. σόφον δὲ σε οὐδ' ὁπωστίουν (νομίζω.) Lucian 3, 287. οὐδ' ὁπωστίουν ὑπερηλάχθη. Anom. ap. Suid. in ἀνθρ. οὐδ' ὁπωστίουν στασιάζοντας ἔσχει.

³ Subsist themselves.] I have here followed *ἐρίψονται*, the reading of two MSS., edited by Bekker and Goeller, and which is required by the sense.

⁴ A hesitation and demur.] Not sloth, as Hobbes renders: the words, too, have solely a reference to Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

arose, and moreover a suspicion that Nicias rested his opinion upon some further knowledge⁵ than they possessed. In this manner there was a suspension of measures, and a continuance on the spot.

L. Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus arrived at Syracuse, Sicanus having miscarried in his attempt on Acragas; for while he was yet in Gela, the party which was friendly to the Syracusans had been expelled.¹ Gylippus came with another considerable army raised from Sicily, and with the heavily-armed sent in the spring from Peloponnesus in transports, which had come from Libya to Selinus. For being carried out of their course to Libya, and the Cyrenæans having supplied them with two triremes, and guides for the voyage; in their passage along shore², they had given assistance to the Euesperitæ³, besieged by the Libyans, and conquered the latter. From thence having gone to Neapolis, a mart town of the Carthaginians (distant from Sicily, by the shortest course, only two days' sail), they arrived at Selinus. — Immediately on their arrival the Syracusans made preparations for again attacking the Athenians on both elements, both with land and sea forces.

The Athenian commanders, however, finding that they had received an accession of forces, and moreover that their own affairs were not bettering, but every day growing in all respects worse, especially in the sickness with which the army was afflicted, repented that they had not before taken their

⁵ *Some greater knowledge, &c.*] So l. 5, 29. νομισάντες πλείον τι εἰδότες μεταστῆναι αὐτούς. Pausan. 1, 18, 2. πλείον τι εἰδέναι. Hence may be illustrated Herod. 9, 41, 18. τοῦτον μὲν νῦν ἢ αὐτὴ ἐγένετο καὶ Θεαίων γνώμη, ὡς προειδότες πλεῖν τι καὶ τούτων. and Eurip. Alcest. 1116. See the note on l. 5, 29, 5.

¹ *The party which was, &c.*] The sense of the original has best been seen by Bauer; but I suspect that the words are not correct, and that the true reading is ἡ τοῖς Σ. φίλια ἔκκ.

² *Along shore.*] Namely, that of the coast of Africa.

³ *Euesperitæ.*] A city on the verge of Cyrene; on which see the commentators on Pausan. 4, 26. Weesseling on Herod. 4, 171. It was afterwards called Berenice, and bears now the name of Bengasi.

Singularly illustrative is it of the impediments to navigation in antient times, and the tardiness and uncertainty with which voyages were made, when what would have occupied a modern vessel, with any tolerably fair wind, scarcely a week, should have extended from spring to autumn,

departure. And as even Nicias was now not adverse to the measure, otherwise than he desired that it might not be put to the vote in public council, they gave orders, as secretly as possible, for all to prepare themselves to put to sea from the camp, on a signal given. And when, after every thing was ready⁴, they were about to sail away, the moon was eclipsed⁵, for it happened to be full moon. And now the greater part of the Athenian army, regarding the thing as ominous⁶, urged the generals to stop; and Nicias (for, in truth, he was too much addicted to superstition⁷ and such sort of scruples) declared that he would not even have it deliberated *whether* or *how* they should remove, until the expiration of the thrice nine days⁸ which the soothsayers directed. And this was the cause why the Athenians delayed and remained on the spot.

⁴ *After every thing was ready.*] Hence it is clear that some time elapsed between the departure being resolved upon and the period at which it was on the point of being put into execution. Now, it need not be supposed that they were detained till the eclipse solely by the necessary preparations. I suspect that they had waited some short time for the period when the full moon should be past.

⁵ *The moon was eclipsed.*] The day is calculated to have been the 27th of August, 413 B. C., in the fourth year of the 91st Olympiad.

⁶ *Regarding the thing as ominous.*] i. e. as a portent boding ill. 'Ενδύμιον ποιεῖσθαι signifies primarily to revolve a thing in mind, and dwell upon; a sense very rare, but which occurs at Appian t. 1, 602. It more frequently signifies (as here) ominosum habere, in religione trahere, to regard as ominous. Sometimes it merely signifies to make a scruple of, or at, any thing.

"None," says Mitford, "had then science to foresee the regular return of that phenomenon; few could be persuaded that the cause was in the order of nature." It is true that there was nothing in the omen which showed that it boded ill to the *Athenians* rather than to the *Syracusans*; but it is justly remarked by Mitford, "that omens of undecided import, such is the nature of superstitious fear, commonly were taken as unfavourable by those in adverse circumstances. On the other hand, the knowledge that the Athenians held themselves to be the objects of the divine displeasure portended, sufficed for the Syracusans to derive encouragement from the portent." In fact, it was with omens as with prophecies, which latter have in all ages almost invariably been predictive of evil.

⁷ *Addicted to superstition.*] *Συαμὸς* denotes especially that kind of superstition which deals in soothsaying, &c. So Theophylact on Titus 1, 12. *Συαμῶις προσέχοντα καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν κατορδύσαντα.*

⁸ *Thrice nine days.*] Wasse, Goeller, and others suspect the *ἑννία* to have been foisted in by the scribes. That only the *three* days after lunar or solar eclipses were thought unlucky, Wesseling says, is clear from the *Exegetica* of Autoclide, referred to by Plutarch in his *Nicias*. And this, he thinks, is confirmed by the testimony of Diodorus, and is supported by the *fact*; for the Athenians remained no such time. But I can hardly

LI. But the Syracusans, having had intelligence of this, were much more excited not to slacken in their efforts against the Athenians, as now bearing testimony that they thought themselves no longer superior to them either by sea or land : for, otherwise, they would not have projected a departure. They were, moreover, unwilling that they should fix themselves in any other part of Sicily¹ ; by which they would be harder to make war upon ; but had rather *there*, and in a place advantageous to themselves, compel them to battle.

They, therefore, manned their ships, and exercised the crews as many days as seemed sufficient. And when the proper time arrived, they, on the first day, attempted to storm the Athenian fortifications ; and, upon a small detachment of heavy-armed and cavalry making a sally from certain posterns, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routing, held them in chase ; but the entrance being narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses², and some inconsiderable number of heavy-armed.

LII. And for this day the Syracusan army retreated ; but on the following, they at once sailed forth with their ships, seventy-six in number, and with their land forces marched against the walls. On which the Athenians launched forth against them with eighty-six ships, and, closing with each other,

consent to abandon the *ἑννία*, as being found in *all* the MSS. Besides, *thrice nine* was a favourite number with the soothsayers. Vide *supra*, l. 5, 26. And so Soph. Œd. col. 483. *τρίς ἑννία αὐτῇ κλῶνας ἐξ ἀμφοῖν χειρῶν Τιδίς ἐλαίας, τασδ' ἐπεύχεσθαι λιτάς*. Horat. Carm. 3, 19, 12. *tribus autem novem miscentur cyathis pocula commodis*. Moreover, *three* is as much too small a number as *thrice nine* may seem too large. And Plutarch must have read *τρίς ἑννία*, since he says that Nicias thought they ought to wait another revolution of the moon.

Mitford, too, (I find) rejects the conjecture of Wesseling and Dodwell. "The latter has (he thinks) given either not due attention, or not due credit, to the narrative of Thucydides, which, without such minute accuracy, is consistent and clear."

¹ *Fix themselves in some other part of Sicily.*] Either Naxos, or Catana ; for the Syracusans had, perhaps, heard of what was mentioned in council, or had anticipated the measure in their minds.

² *Horses.*] Not *horsemen*, as Hobbes renders ; a sense not permitted by *ἵππους* : for though in the singular the word signifies *cavalry*, yet never, I think, in the plural.

The horses were lost by the narrowness of the entrance, though the riders, it seems, contrived to get in.

they came to battle: and as Eurymedon¹ was leading on the right wing of the Athenians, and being desirous to surround the enemy's ships, had therefore drawn out his line too near the shore, the Syracusans and their allies, who had then first defeated the centre of the Athenians, also cut off and intercepted *him* in the bottom and inmost recess of the port, and destroyed both him and the ships that followed him. Then the Syracusans made chase after all the Athenian ships, and drove them on shore.

LIII. And now Gylippus, on seeing the enemy's ships defeated, and carried farther than the piles (or stockade) and their camp, went with intent to kill such as disembarked, and in order that the Syracusans should more easily drag off the enemy's ships from the part of the shore which was theirs, led a detachment of the army down to the jetty.² Seeing these, the

¹ *And as Eurymedon, &c.*] Eurymedon, who commanded the right, to use that advantage which superiority of numbers gave, stretched away with a view to surround the left of the enemy. The centre spreading, to obviate the danger of too great an interval between the divisions, weakened itself by making the intervals too great between ship and ship. In this state it was attacked by the enemy in close order, and presently defeated. The Syracusans then directing their principal effort against the division of Eurymedon, now cut off from the rest of the fleet, took, destroyed, or drove aground every ship, and Eurymedon himself was killed. The left wing, thus wholly without support, fled pursued to the shore. (Mitford.)

² *The jetty.*] Or, according to Goeller, a *promontory*, namely, that jutting out below Olympieum, in the way from the mouth of the Anapus to the bottom or inmost recess of the port called Dascon. Thus (he adds) the name is applied to the horns of a bay or port in Dio Cass. p. 845. A., and perhaps in Thucyd. i. 8, 90. To this interpretation, however, of τὴν χηλὴν I must take exception; for, as no such χηλὴ has been before mentioned, or could be supposed known to the reader, thus there would be an unparalleled harshness. I must, therefore, still regard it as denoting that end of the Athenian stockade forming their naval station, which was opposite Syracuse, and which, from jutting out like a pier, is called by that name. The article at τὴν χηλὴν has reference to the τῶν σταυρωμάτων just before, where the plural number is used, because the kind of port for the Athenian ships was formed by two hooked stockades, each terminating in a jetty. The χηλὴ cannot apply to the promontory mentioned by Goeller, for thus the marsh Lysimelia would be much too far off, and they would have to cross the Anapus; which, as the bridge was broken down, would be impossible, for, as Swinburne tells us, the river is very deep. In fact, what Goeller here writes is inconsistent with his own plan, where he makes the Athenian naval station to have been still a little below the Plemmyrium: whereas, it is clear that their *present* station was on the other side of the port, somewhere between the mouth of the Anapus and the end of the

Tyrsenians (who were then on guard for the Athenians) hurried forwards ~~in disorder~~, and falling upon the first that came up, routed and drove them into the marsh called the Lysimelia. But, afterwards, a greater force of the Syracusans and their allies having come up, the Athenians, also alarmed for their ships, went to give assistance, and, engaging with the enemy, defeated and chased them off, killing some inconsiderable number³; and also saved the greater part of the ships, and brought them to the camp. Eighteen, however, the Syracusans and their allies captured, putting to death all the men.⁴ They also proceeded against the rest of the ships, intending to burn them; for which purpose they filled an old merchant-ship with faggots and torch-wood⁵; and, setting fire to the combustibles, let her drive against the Athenians, the wind setting right that way. The Athenians, on the contrary, alarmed for their ships, contrived all sorts of means for checking and quenching the flame; having effected which, and hindered the further approach of the fire-ship, they were thus delivered from the danger.

LIV. After this, the Syracusans erected a trophy for the sea-fight, and for the interception of the heavy-armed at the wall above¹, where also they took the horses. The Athe-

wall of circumvallation. This, indeed, seems to have been their station ever since the capture of the forts of Plemmyrium; and, probably, immediately after that event the stockades and jetties were formed.

³ *Some inconsiderable number.*] I have here followed the reading of some of the best MSS., adopted in the editions of Bekker and Goeller, by which a negative is inserted before πολλούς. This, as Goeller observes, is confirmed by Diodorus.

⁴ *All the men.*] Namely, all the men found on board the ships when captured; for two hundred, the number stated by Diodorus as the amount of the Athenian loss, could not be near that of the crews of eighteen triremes. Indeed, for διακοσίων, I suspect we should read τρισχιλίων. The two numbers are perpetually confounded.

⁵ *Faggots and torch-wood.*] Κληματίδων και δαδός. Of these terms the former occurs in Aristoph. Thesm. 728. Appian 2, 72, 87. and Eustath. ap. Biset. in Arist. 854. Τ. φανός. ἢ ἐκ κληματίδων λαμπάς. and κλήματα in Polyæn. 7, 21, 4. By κλημάτις is denoted *fire-wood*, and by δαίς what we call *kindling*.

¹ *The wall above.*] It should seem that the walls of the Athenians, of which we have lately had frequent mention, were the lower end of the line of circumvallation and contravallation, some time before finished. When the rest of the wall in question became useless, and was abandoned, the

nians, on their part, erected one, for the rout of those infantry whom the Tyrsenians drove into the marsh, and for such other advantages as they obtained with the rest of the army.

LV. On the Syracusans having now obtained a decided victory even at sea (for before they had stood in awe of the ships that had come with Demosthenes), the Athenians were in utter dejection of spirits, as the reverse was both unexpected and heavy. But far greater was their repentance for having undertaken the expedition; for, having come against these states¹, the only ones hitherto with similar institutions and manners, under a democratical form of government like themselves, and possessing shipping, horses, and power², without being able to introduce any dissension among them about change of polity, whereby they might have been brought over, nor could bring them to submit³ by means of their forces, though therein much superior; but being mostly defeated, they were, even before the last affair, in great straits as to what course to take; and since they had been mastered also at sea (which they would never have thought), they were much more at a loss what course to take.

LVI. And now the Syracusans immediately went around

lower end, it should seem, was still retained and fitted up as a fortification to defend their camp.

¹ These states.] Namely, those of Sicily.

² Possessing shipping, &c.] Duker would read *καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ μεγάλαις ἰσχύουσαις*. And this conjecture he confirms and illustrates from l. 1, 2, 3, 46 and 104. To which may be added Eurip. *Orest.* 901. *Θράσιος ἰσχυεῖν*. Philostr. V. Ap. l. 8, 9. *ἡ πόλις οὐχ ἵππῳ μυρίασαι δὲ ἀνδρώπων ἰσχύει*. A similar emendation was made by Reiske on Dinarchus p. 93, 23. There is also a kindred passage in Lucian, t. 3, 518, 41. *ὥς εἰ τοῦτον τὸν ἀνδρωπον δπλων ἀπέφηναν καὶ νεῶν, καὶ στρατοπέδων, καὶ καιρῶν, καὶ χρημάτων κύριον*. where, for *καιρῶν*, I would conjecture *χείρων*, *forces*; a signification of frequent occurrence in Polybius.

After all, however, the common reading may be defended, and was, perhaps, read by Dio Cassius, since at p. 619. we have the following imitation of this passage: *αἰσχιστον τοσούτους καὶ τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ὅπλα καὶ χρήματα καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους ἔχοντας*. Whichever reading be adopted, there will be nearly the same difficulty in phraseology.

³ Nor could bring them to submit.] For (though the commentators omit to notice it) *προσῆγον* is to be taken from the preceding *προσῆγοντο*.

the harbour without fear¹, and began to meditate blocking up its mouth, that the Athenians should no longer, even if they wished it, be able to steal off. For it was no longer their study and aim only how to *save themselves*, but also how they might hinder the enemy from being saved, since they conceived (as was really the case) that as to present power they were far superior to them; and thought, that if they should conquer the Athenians and their allies, both by land and by sea, it would appear to the Greeks a glorious achievement, as the rest of the Greeks would be part of them immediately restored to freedom, and part liberated from fear of enslavement. For it would no longer be possible for the remaining strength of the Athenians to sustain the war that should be brought upon them. And themselves being accounted the authors of it, would be held in great admiration both by men now living, and by those that should come after. Indeed, it was a contest worthy of their labour both on those accounts, and because they had not gained the mastery over the *Athenians only*, but also of the many other allies; nor, again, had they alone achieved it², but jointly with those that combined to succour them, being leaders in conjunction with the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, exposing their city to peril³ for the rest, and contributing chiefly to the amount of the naval force.⁴ Never, indeed, were so many nations brought together to one city, with the exception of the comprehensive roll of those who, in this war, were collected either at Athens or at Lacedæmon.

LVII. For *thus many* (as will now be shown) were, on either side, engaged *against* Sicily, and for its *defence*; the

¹ *Went around the harbour without fear*] Which they had never before done, being always in awe of the Athenian fleet.

² *Nor again, had they alone achieved it, &c.*] This would not seem much to the present purpose; but it must be taken in conjunction with what follows; and the argument is, that though it was done with the cooperation of allies, yet they *themselves* held the command at least in conjunction with the two principal states of Greece.

³ *Exposing their city to peril for the rest.*] Namely, as something to run danger. Such is the sense of *ὑπαράσχοντες τὴν πόλιν προσκινδυνεύσαι*, which words are imitated by Dionys. Hal. Ant. 149, 44. *τὰς ταυτῶν ψυχὰς προκινδυνεύσαι τῶν κοινῶν παρίσχον.*

⁴ *Contributing chiefly, &c.*] I agree with the Scholiast and Goeller, that *προκόπτω* must here be taken in an active sense.

former helping to acquire its dominion, the latter aiding to preserve its liberty. These (I say) came to the war at Syracuse, and took their side¹, not so much from a regard for justice, nor through affinity, but as each happened to stand affected, either in respect of interest or necessity.²

The Athenians themselves, as Ionians, willingly went against the Syracusans, as Dorians. With them, using the same language and customs, went the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Æginetes (who then occupied Ægina), and moreover the Hestians, who colonised Hestiaea. These joined their forces, as being allies. Of the rest part went as subject allies, part, though independent, yet as allies, and some merely as mercenaries. And of the subject and tributary states were the Eretrians, Chalcideans, Styrians, and Carystians of Euboea; from the islands were the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians³; from Ionia, the Milesians, Samians, and Chians. Of these the Chians, being not tributary, but furnishing ships, followed as independent allies.

And those being, for the most part, Ionians, descended of the Athenians (except the Carystians, for they are Dryopes), and being subjects and under constraint, yet followed as Ionians against Dorians.⁴ Besides them went Æolians, namely the Methymnæans, with ships, and not tributary subjects, the

¹ *Took their side.*] Literally, stood on the side of one or other. So l. 3, 39, μετὰ πολεμιωτάτων σπάντες. See my note on St. Matt. 12, 36.

² *But as each happened, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of the perplexing passage of the original, where Goeller edits, ὡς ἕκαστος τις τῆς ξυντυχίας ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἐνυμφέρον ἢ ἀνάγκης ἔσχεν. But the alteration is merely conjectural, and, however specious, is unnecessary, not to say uncritical. The reading of Bekker, though difficult, is not inexplicable. The construction is: ὡς ἕκαστος ἔσχεν (πράγμα περὶ) ξυντυχίας, for ὡς ἕκαστος ἐνέτυχε. Here ἔσχεν and ἀνάγκη are by Bekker rightly edited, from several MSS. There will, indeed, be no difference in sense between this and Goeller's reading; but the more difficult one is to be regarded as the more genuine.

³ *Tenians.*] I here follow the conjecture of Valckn., which has been approved by most recent critics; and, being found in one of the MSS., has been with reason edited by Bekker and Goeller. The common reading cannot well be defended.

⁴ *Yet followed, &c.*] The sense (which is rather hinted at than expressed) is, that "though they went as dependents, indeed, and by constraint, yet they had also the inducement of going, as Ionians against Dorians;" the enmity between the two races being such, that they willingly went one against the other.

Tenedians and Ænians as tributary. Those, the Æolians, were obliged to fight with Æolians, namely the Bœotians, their founders, who were on the side of the Syracusans. The Plateans, too, fought openly, as Bœotians, against Bœotians, and those only from the justifiable cause of enmity. The Rhodians and Cytherians, both Dorians, the latter colonists of the Lacedæmonians, yet bore arms with the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians with Gylippus.⁵ The Rhodians, Argives by race, were compelled to bear arms against the Syracusans, as Dorians, and the Geloans their own colonists, who were on the side of the Syracusans.⁶ Also of the islanders around Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians were indeed independent, but because of their insular situation (the Athenians having the dominion of the sea) followed rather by constraint. The Corcyræans, not only Dorians, but clearly Corinthians⁷, followed against the Corinthians and Syracusans, though the colonists of one, and the kindred of the other : and that, indeed, under a specious colour of necessity, but not less from inclination, through their hatred of the Corinthians. Thus, also, the Messenians (as they were now called) at Naupactus were taken from thence, and from Pylus (then in the possession of the Athenians) to the war ; as also some few exiles of the Megareans were compelled, through their calamity, to turn their arms against the Selinuntians, though Megareans.

As to the rest, their participation in the expedition was more voluntary. For the Argives, not so much for alliance sake, as out of enmity towards the Lacedæmonians, and individually for their private advantage, went, Dorians against Dorians, with the Athenians, Ionians.

⁵ *The Rhodians and Cytherians, &c.*] Hence it appears that Cythera was never restored to the Lacedæmonians at the peace. The Cytherians, we may suppose, followed the Athenians so much the more willingly, as having been treated with unusual lenity by the Athenians, on their conquest of the island.

⁶ *Who were on the side of the Syracusans.*] I here read, from the conjecture of Lindau, τοῖς μερὶ Συρ., as being required by propriety. Μαχομένοις is to be supplied from ἡμάχοντο.

⁷ *Clearly Corinthians.*] The σαφῶς must be referred, not to εἶποντο, with Hobbes and others, but to Κορινθιοί.

. The Mantineans, and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed ever to go against whoever are pointed out to them as foes, now, for gain, accounted as such the Arcadians who went with the Corinthians. The Cretans and Ætoliars, too, went by the impulse of lucre. But it happened that the Cretans went, however unwillingly, for lucre, not *with* their colonists, but *against* those who *with* the Rhodians founded Gela. Some Acarnanians, too, partly for lucre, but more through friendship for Demosthenes, and good-will to the Athenians, and as their allies, went as auxiliaries.

. Thus far for those situated within the confines of the Ionian gulf. Next came, of Italiots, the Thuriars and Metapontians, who (hemmed in by such necessity, amidst times of sedition and violence, as to be compelled thereto) formed the expedition^a; as also of Siceliots, the Naxians and Cataneans; of Barbarians the Egestæans, who also brought over the greater part of the Siculi; finally, of those beyond Sicily some Tyrsenians (on account of a difference with the Syracusans), and Japygians as mercenaries. Such and so many were the nations which took part in the expedition with the Athenians.

LVIII. On the other side, the Syracusans were supported by the Camarinæans, whose territory bordered on their own, and the Geloans, who inhabited next beyond them, and again (the Acragantines taking no part), who were situated in the same direction, the Selinuntians. These occupied that part of Sicily which is opposite to Libya. The Himeræans were of that part which is turned to the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only Greek inhabitants. And they in that quarter were the only auxiliaries of the Syracusans.

^a *Hemmed in by such necessity, &c.*] The construction of the passage is not a little perplexed. Goeller adopts the following: ἐν τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις τότε στασιωτικῶν καιρῶν κατελημμένων. and supplies αὐτῶν. He also renders the whole passage thus: "ex Italicis vero populis Thurii et Metapontii, qui in hujusmodi temporum angustis et in reipublicæ seditione intercepti essent, eandem militiam sunt secuti." In supplying αὐτῶν he seems perfectly right; but otherwise his mode of construction is too complicated. There will be little difficulty if the passage be printed thus: Μεταπόντων ἐν τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις τότε στασιωτικῶν καιρῶν κατελημμένων, ἐνιστράτειον. The τοιαύταις has reference to some words omitted, such as Bauer supplies, ὥστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι στρατεύειν.

Such were the Grecian nations of those in Sicily (all Dorians and independent) who were allies of Syracuse. Of the Barbarians were the Siculi, such as had not revolted to the Athenians. Of the Greeks out of Sicily were the Lacedæmonians, who furnished a Spartan leader, and some others, Neodamodes⁹ (or newly enfranchised) and Helots. The Corinthians come with sea and land forces (alone of the allies *with both*); as also the Leucadians and Ambraciots, for kindred's sake¹⁰; some mercenaries from Arcadia sent by the Corinthians; some Sicyonians who joined the expedition from constraint; and, of those beyond Peloponnesus, the Bœotians.

In addition to these auxiliary troops, the Siceliots themselves, inasmuch as they were potent states, furnished a number in all respects greater; for there were collected together of heavy-armed, ships, and horse, considerable numbers, and of other kinds of force a great abundance.

But the Syracusans themselves contributed a number, I may say, more considerable than all¹¹ the rest, both because of the greatness of their state, and the imminent peril in which they were placed.

LIX. Such and so great were the forces collected on both sides; for the whole were then present to each, nor was there any further accession to either side.

The Syracusans, then, with reason, thought it would be a noble achievement, if, in addition to the recent victory at sea, they could capture the whole armament, considerable as it was, of the Athenians, and prevent their escape by any way, whether by sea or by land. They therefore immediately proceeded to block up the mouth¹ of the great port (which is about eight stadia across), with triremes placed broadside, to-

⁹ *Neodamodes.*] See l. 5, 34 and 67. and the notes. Also Plutarch Ages. c. 6. init.

¹⁰ *For kindred's sake.*] Not with the Syracusans, as Smith understands, but the Corinthians.

¹¹ *More considerable than all.*] The *πρὸς* here, and just before, denotes, not *addition* (as Hobbes supposes), but *comparison*.

¹ *Block up the mouth.*] Diodorus says that this work was effected in three days. Certainly, the *one* allowed by Dodwell is too short a time.

gether with vessels and barges, mooring them fast at anchor ; besides making other preparations, in case the Athenians should venture another sea-fight ; and nothing in any respect trivial did they meditate.²

LX. And now the Athenians, on seeing this blocking up of the port, and perceiving what the enemy aimed at, thought proper to take counsel on what was to be done. Accordingly both the commanders and the taxiarchs³ being convened to consult upon the present difficulty of their affairs, as well in other respects, as because they had not provision for their immediate supply (for, expecting they should sail away, they had sent forward to Catana, and forbade any further importation), nor would have any in future, unless they should obtain the mastery at sea — they therefore resolved to evacuate the upper fortifications⁴, and wall in such a space⁵ (the smallest possible) as should be sufficient for their baggage and the sick, and having established a garrison there, then the whole of the rest of the land force to embark, and man all the ships, both those that were fit for service, and even those that were somewhat damaged⁶, and fighting it out, if victors, to steer

² *Nothing in any respect trivial, &c.*] See an altogether kindred sentiment at l. 2, 8. init.

³ *Taxiarchs.*] Corresponding, some say, to our *colonels* ; others, more properly, our *captains*. See the note of Duker, who truly remarks that it was not unusual for these, at a perilous crisis, to be called into council, as in the Roman armies the *centurions* were sometimes summoned to a council of war. No example is cited by Duker from our author, though something similar is mentioned at l. 4, 4.

The rank of taxiarch cannot well be paralleled with any in modern armies, and it varied in different ages. The most exact account of the taxiarchs, as they existed in the time of Thucydides, may be found in Schœmann de Comit. Athen. p. 315., from which work Goeller adduces the following quotation : " Proximi imperatoribus dignitate erant decem Taxiarchi, ex tribubus et ipsi singulis singuli a populo creati. Hi et in delecto habendo imperatoribus aderant, et indices (*καταλόγους*) juniorum, quibus adhuc merenda erant stipendia, ex sua quisque tribu conscriptos in potestate habebant, et in bello tribulibus suis, sed hoplitis tantum præerant, ordines instruebant, in prælium ducebant. Nam tribuum illa descriptio non minus militiæ quam domi valebat."

⁴ *Upper fortifications.*] Namely, those of the circumvallation which they had last erected on the west side of Syracuse.

⁵ *A space.*] This was not circular (as Smith supposes), but rather square ; and I suspect it to have been at the mouth of the Anapus.

⁶ *Those that were somewhat damaged.*] Or, less serviceable, though still

See
note 11

if vanquished, to burn their ships, and a retreat in battle array to such a place, as they could reach.

determined, so they acted; for they privily on the upper walls, and manned all the ships, and to embark that was of suitable age, and ice. And there were manned to the number of one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which they embarked numbers of archers and dartmen of the Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries; besides making all other provision as far as it was possible, under their present distresses, and with the designs which they meditated.⁸

Every thing being now mostly in readiness, Nicias, perceiving the soldiers⁹ to be much dejected at this great and unusual defeat at sea, and, by reason of the scarcity of provisions, anxious, as speedily as possible, to try the fortune of battle, called them together, and first¹⁰ addressed them in an exhortation to the following effect¹¹:

LXI. "Soldiers, whether Athenians, or auxiliaries, the

of some use. Such is the sense, and not that assigned by the Scholiast and Smith, "laid up for want of hands," which is not inherent in the words; nor is it true that the ships wanted hands. Kistemaker has seen the true sense, which, indeed, had been discerned by Hobbes.

⁷ *Privily descended.*] For that is implied in the ὑπὸ.

⁸ *Under their present, &c.*] Goeller very well render thus: "in solcher nothdurft, prout ipsis in eas angustias compulsis, et hujusmodi cogitationes in animo volventibus, licebat."

⁹ *The soldiers.*] Στρατιώτης was indifferently applied to naval as well as land forces.

¹⁰ *First.*] i. e. before they went to battle. Hobbes renders, "then, for the first time;" Smith, "the first of the kind he had ever made." But that sense is solely founded on a false reading; nor, indeed, is it at all satisfactory. The recent editors seem rightly to have adopted παρὲς αὐτοὺς τε πρώτον.

¹¹ *Addressed them in an exhortation, &c.*] Diodorus tells us that "it was addressed from on board a ship, and while sailing along the lines of triremes:" but he seems to have been thinking of that mentioned at c. 69. See Hack.

It is truly observed by Mitford, that "as the spirits of those under his command sunk, the animation, and, indeed, the whole character, of Nicias seemed to rise. His behaviour on the occasion was truly great. Little ambitious, under favouring fortune rather deficient in exertion, and sometimes culpably remiss in his command, his activity and animation increased as evils pressed and dangers threatened."

combat we are about to engage in will be alike common to all ; and to each of us, as well as the enemy, it will be for our preservation, and that of our country. For if we do but now gain the superiority by sea, every one may again be blessed with a sight of his native country. And now be ye not dispirited, nor feel like raw recruits, who, being frustrated in their first trials, ever entertain a fearful expectation assimilated to their previous calamities.¹ But such of you as are Athenians, having already had the experience of many wars, and you, allies, who have all along fought under our banners, call to your minds the unexpected events of war, and expecting that fortune may even yet be on our side, prepare yourselves to again encounter² the foe, in a manner worthy of such a multitude as ye see yourselves to consist of.

LXII. "As to what we have thought would be advantageous, amidst the narrowness of the port, against the crowd of ships that will be mingled together, and against the enemy's disposition of troops on their decks (in all which we were heretofore injured), these points have been now, as far as our means would permit, considered with the ship-masters, and due preparation made. For many darters and archers will be placed on the decks, and such a multitude as, had we been going to engage in the open sea, we should not have used, because our skill would have been impeded³ by the heaviness of our ships ;

¹ *Entertain a fearful expectation, &c.*] The Scholiast has well explained this passage, with which Duker compares one of Lucian, t. 2, 299, 3. To which may be added Onosand. p. 85, 6. ὑπολαμβάνουσαι γὰρ (scil. αἱ ψυχαὶ) τι χεῖρον ὧν πίθονται, φοβερώτερον ἐκδέχονται τὸ μέλλον. and p. 119, 1. ὁ γὰρ φόβος, ψευδὴς μάντις, ἣ δίδουκε, ταῦτα διήσεται καὶ γίνεσθαι. Pausan. l. 1, 25, 2. φρόνημα ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρασχόμενος συνεχῶς ἑπτακόσκι καὶ δι' αὐτὸ οὐδὲ ἐν χρηστὸν οὐδὲ ἐς τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκπίζουσι. Æschyl. Agam. 965.

The use of ἐκπίζω, respecting *evil*, is deserving of attention. The most remarkable example of which is in Aristoph. Av. 956. τοῦτι — τὸ κακὸν οὐ ποτ' ἤλπιστ' ἂν. Soph. Trach. 111. κακὰν Δύστανον ἐκπίζουσιν αἰσαν. Hence is illustrated Eurip. Orest. 849. οἶμοι, προσῆλθεν ἐλπεις, ἥ φοβουμένη πάλοι.

² *Again encounter.*] Or, fight up your defeat. So Xen. Cyr. 3, 1, 20. ὁ κρατῆς εἰς ψῆθῃ ἀναμαχεῖσθαι — πόλεις ἀλοῦσαι δοῦναι ἀναμαχεῖσθαι ἂν. Dio Cass. 305, 17. ἀναμάχεσθαι ῥαδίως ἰδόντο.

³ *Impeded.*] The translators and commentators have not seen that βλάπτειν is used in the sense *retardare*, *impedire*, of which see the examples adduced by Dr. Blomfield on Æschyl. 117. βλαβέντα λουσίων δρόμων.

whereas, in the present *land-fight* we must maintain from our ships, they will be useful. Whatever counter-devices, too, seemed expedient (and especially against the thickness of their beaks), have been contrived by us, such as the fixing of iron harpoons⁴, which, when thrown out, will hinder the recoil of the boarding ship, if, as to what follows, the marines will do their duty. For to this, in fact, we are compelled — to make a land-fight from our ships; wherefore it will be expedient for us neither ourselves to back our ships, nor suffer the enemy so to do; especially as the whole shore is hostile, except so far as it is occupied by our land forces.

LXIII. “ Bearing these things in mind, it behoves you to maintain the combat to the uttermost¹ of your power, and no to suffer yourselves to be driven out to the shore, but when ship falls on board ship, to never think of loosing your grapple before you have swept² the heavy-armed from the enemy’s deck.

“ Now these exhortations are meant not less for the soldiers than the seamen, inasmuch as this last is the province rather of those above deck.³ It is even now in your *power* to gain the superiority by the use of your forces. The seamen, too, I admonish, and at the same time entreat, not to be too much

⁴ *Iron harpoons.*] Or, *grappling irons*. See l. 4, 25. and note. The use of *ἐπιβολαί* here is somewhat harsh, and only suited to poetry. Thus Æschyl. Suppl. 447. πολυμίτωγ πέπλων τ’ ἐπιλαβὺς ἱμῶν. Eurip. Iph. Taur. 872. χειρῶν περιβολὰς εἰκὸς λαβεῖν. Yet I have remarked a similar use (no doubt from imitation) in Polyæn. 1, 40, 9. τὰς (ναῦς) χειρῶν σιδηρῶν ἐπιβολαῖς ἐφείλκε. Dionys. Hal. Ant. 441, 31. ὠδισμοὶ τε καὶ χειρῶν ἐπιβολαί. Joseph. p. 171. σανίδων ἐπιβολαῖς.

¹ *Maintain the combat to the uttermost.*] Literally, “ fight it out to the last.”

² *Swept.*] Literally, “ mown down.” There is a phrase very similar in Herod. l. 8, 90, 11. τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ἀπὸ τῆς κ. νηὸς βάλλοντες ἀπήραξαν. and 5, 112, 12. ἐρεπάνῃ πλῆξας ἀναράσσει τοῦ ἵππου τοῦ πόδας. Dionys. Hal. Ant. 494, 10. ἀντίχον ἀπομαχόμενοι γενναίως, καὶ πόλλακις ἐπιβαίνοντας τοῦ τείχους τοὺς πολεμίους ἀπήραξαν. And there is a similar use of the word (but with a similar error) at p. 551, 25. and 553, 16. Perhaps the expression was originally derived from Hom. Il. x. 497. ἱρυσσάμενος ἕϊφος δέξθ’, Αὐχίνα μέσσον Ἰλασσον, ἀπήραξε δὲ χαμᾶζε, Αὐτῇ σὺν πῆληκι, κάρη.

³ *Above deck.*] Such is the sense of τῶν ἀνωθεν, which have been passed over by Smith. According to the structure of the row-galleys of the ancients, the rowers were chiefly *below* deck; and ὑπὸν the deck were stationed the marines.

dismayed by recent calamities, having now a greater number of ships, and a much larger force on deck.

“ Think, too, of that pleasure how worthy it is of being preserved, even that of being (as ye have hitherto been) accounted *Athenians*, even such of you as are *not* so⁴; and by your knowledge of the language, and your imitation of our manners, have been both admired throughout Greece; and, in respect of being benefited from our empire, have derived no less advantage than ourselves; nay, as regards being objects of fear to the subject states, and in not being unjustly treated, have enjoyed a far *greater*.⁵ So that, being freely partakers with us alone of empire, you would not now with any justice betray the same to ruin.⁶ Nay, rather, despising the Corinthians, whom ye have often vanquished, and the Siceliots, not a soul of whom dare withstand us, as long as our fleet was in unimpaired vigour — drive them before you, and show that, even under weakness and calamity, our *knowledge* is better than the fortunate strength of others.

LXIV. “ Such of you, too, as are Athenians, I must yet further remind, that you have neither left in your docks any other ships equal to these, nor an army in the flower of youth and strength.¹ And that, if aught shall befall you but victory, your enemies here will presently be upon you at home, and you will be unable to repel both those already there and those that shall come in addition. And, thus, part of you will immediately

⁴ *Such of you as are not so.*] Here are meant the *μέτοικοι*, on the condition and rights of whom Goeller refers to Boeckh. Staatsh. d. Ath. t. 1. pp. 30. 48. 279, 280. 285. sq., as also Schoemann de Comit. Athen. p. 81. F., from whom he gives the following quotation: — “Dicebantur iidem *ισοτελεῖς*, quia populi beneficio pari fere cum civibus jure fruebantur. Itaque inquilini percussor non minori poena affectus est, quam civem qui interfecerat. V. Meier. de bonis damnat. p. 23. *Ἰσοτελεῖς* tamen non omnes inquilini erant, sed tantum qui *μετοικίῳ* sive annuo inquilinorum tributo soluti idem atque cives tributum solvebant, et eodem cum civibus adscriptitiis jure ac conditione erant.”

⁵ *Nay, as regards, &c.*] The sense is somewhat obscure; but the orator refers to that odium and injury to which those in rule are exposed; alluding to the ingratitude which the Athenians often suffered from those whom they had benefited.

⁶ *Betray to ruin.*] The *κατὰ* in *καταπρόδοιτε* is intensive.

¹ *An army in the flower, &c.*] Literally, “a flower of soldiery;” namely, like the present.

be at the mercy of the Syracusans (against whom ye know with what intent ye came hither), and the rest at home will become subject to the Lacedæmonians. Now then, having, in this battle, to fight to avert both these calamities, exert all your courage, now if ever, and reflect both individually, and collectively, that those of you who are now to man the fleet, are both the land force, and the navy of the Athenians, yea, the whole surviving state, and THE GREAT NAME OF ATHENS, in behalf of which, if any one in aught excel another, whether in skill or in bravery, he can never have any better time wherein he may show it, and thereby be both the means of saving himself, and contributing to the salvation of the state!"

LXV. Having addressed these exhortations, Nicias immediately ordered them to man the ships. Now, Gylippus and the Syracusans, seeing this bustle of preparation, could well discern that the Athenians meant to come to a battle; they had also received previous information of their intention to throw out iron grapplings. For which, and every thing else, they had made preparatory equipments accordingly; having cased the prows, and to a considerable distance of the upper part of the ships, with raw hides, in order that the grapplings when thrown out, might have no hold. And, when all things were ready, the commanders and Gylippus addressed an exhortation to them to the following effect:

LXVI. "That your former achievements, Syracusans and allies, have been honourable, and that the present combat will be for glorious future results, ye most of you seem to be well aware, for, otherwise, ye would not with such alacrity have undertaken it. And if any should not be sensible of it, as he ought, we will make it clearly appear. Now, whereas the Athenians came into this country first for the subjugation of Sicily, and then, if they should prove successful, for that of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and whereas they possessed the greatest dominion of any Greeks past or present, ye have been the first of mortals to withstand their navy, by which they obtained and held every thing, and have already defeated them in some sea-fights, and in all probability will do

so in the present. For, after men have been worsted ¹ in that wherein they thought they excelled, their self-opinion is henceforward lower than it would have been if they had never thought so highly of themselves; and by coming short of their expectation in that wherein they prided themselves, they fall short in their efforts of the real strength they could exert.² Such is, probably, now the case with the Athenians.

LXVII. "Whereas, with us it happens that our former opinion of ourselves³ being now confirmed and stable, and there being added to it the inference⁴ that we must be the best, since we have conquered the best, the hope of every one is doubled. And, in most enterprises, the greatest hope supplies the greatest courage and alacrity. As to the points wherein they have employed imitation of our equipments and disposition, they are methods familiar to our practice, and we shall not be unprepared against each of them. Whereas *they*, when (they have on deck (contrary to their custom) many heavy-armed⁵, and many (so to speak) *landsmen* darters⁶, Acarnanians and others, who will not even know how to launch their weapons sitting, — how should they do aught else but sway the ship about⁷, and (being all in confusion among themselves,

¹ *Have been worsted.*] Literally, "have been cut short, or come short."

² *In their efforts, &c.*] Literally, "beyond the force of their strength." A sort of pleonasm. But, indeed, *ισχύς* is properly a vox mediæ significationis, as in Soph. Philoct. 104.

³ *Opinion of ourselves.*] Not *strength*, as the translators and commentators explain; for, in the neuter τὸ ὑπάρχον there is a reference to the τὸ γ' ὑπόλοιπον τῆς δόξης a little before.

⁴ *Inference.*] This is a rare signification, and not observed by the interpreters, but it occurs also at l. 4, 87.

⁵ *Have on deck many heavy-armed.*] See Polyæn. Strat. l. 6, 145.

⁶ *Landsmen darters.*] The Scholiast, Bauer, and others, do not see the force of *χερσαῖος*, which is used contemptuously, as when we ourselves speak of *landsmen*, or *land-lubbers*. So Eurip. Androm. 457. ναύτην ἐξῆκεν ἀντὶ χερσαίου κακόν. Lucian, t. l. 687 and 3, 115. χερσαῖον βατράχου ἐκὶν ἐκκεκραγῖναι. Lycoph. Cass. 480, ἀγρότης χερσαῖος. where, perhaps, Lycophron had in mind a kindred passage of our author, l. 1, 142. (of the Peloponnesians) ἄνδρες γεωργοί, καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, mere clowns, not seamen. There Pericles might have said χερσαῖοι. In fact, the primary signification of χέρσος is the *dry land* as opposed to the *sea* (from χέρω cognate with χίω, *hisco*). Thus χέρσος and θάλασσα are opposed in Æschyl. Eum. 706.

⁷ *Sway the ship about.*] For *landsmen* on board of ship, being uneasy, seldom can keep still, and, by moving about, impede the progress of a bark.

and moving in a manner not their own ⁸) fall into disorder? And as for the *number of their ships* (if any of you be apprehensive, as not fighting on an equality), *that* will profit them nothing; for being many in a small compass, they will be the slower to accomplish whatever may be intended, and the easier to be annoyed by the measures we have prepared against them.

“ Know, too, this for very truth, and founded on what we esteem certain information. Misfortunes multiplying around them, and having no way to provide for their present wants, they are driven by desperation to run the hazard of ⁹ battle just as they may, and not in reliance on their forces or their fortune; in order, that, either by forcing their passage, they may make sail away; or else, after this trial, may make their retreat overland, since, under existing circumstances, they could not change their situation for the worse.

LXVIII. “ Against such a confused rabble ¹, then, of inveterate foes, whose fortune betrays ² them into our hands, let us engage with vehement resentment ³; fully convinced, both that it is most lawful with respect to one’s enemies, for any to desire, for the avenging himself on an aggressor, to satiate the fury of his wrath; and especially as we shall, more-

Thus old Charon is designated, in a well-known composition, as exclaiming to his landsmen passengers, “ Trim, trim, the boat, and keep steady!”

⁸ *Moving in a manner not their own.*] i. e. not as they have been used to do on terra firma, but tottering on a ship’s deck.

⁹ *They are driven by desperation to run the hazard of.*] I have here followed the reading of the Scholiast, ἀποκινδυνεύσαι for ἀποκινδυνεύσει, which is approved by Acacius and Duker. The alteration is so slight as scarcely to require MS. authority.

¹ *A confused rabble.*] Ἀταξίαν is here, by a bold hypallage of thing for person, put for ἀνθρώπους ἀτάκτους. Of which idiom the following are illustrations: Æschyl. p. 59. Edit. Steph. εἰς τοιαύτην ἀταξίαν τῶν νόμων προβαίητε. which passage is imitated by Æschin. C. Ctes. § 15. μηδ’ ὑμεῖς πότε εἰς τοιαύτην ἀταξίαν τῶν νόμων προβαίητε. So ἀναρχία is used by Æschyl. Suppl. 913. and Eurip. Hec. 611. ἐν τοῖς μυρίῳ στρατεύματι Ἀκόλαστος ὄχλος, ναυτική τ’ ἀναρχία. where Dio Chrysostom reads ἀταξία, which I should be inclined to think the true reading, but for the following imitation (as it seems) in Philostr. Vit. Ap. l. 3, 31. ἀνδράς ὑβριστάς τε καὶ ἐυγλύδας ἀναρχίαν πάσαν.

² *Whose fortune betrays.*] Such is the real, though not the literal, sense of the passage, which is phrased too harshly for our language.

³ *Let us engage with vehement resentment.*] Bauer aptly compares Livy, l. 21, 41. itaque vos ego, milites, non eo solum animo, quo adversus alios hostes soletis, pugnare velim; sed cum indignatione quadam atque ira.

over, attain what is usually called the sweetest of all gratifications, revenge on an enemy.⁴ That they *are* enemies, and our bitterest ones, you all know; since they came to our country in order to enslave it; wherein, had they succeeded, they would have subjected the men to the most cruel, and the women and children to the most shameful⁵ fate, and imposed on the city the most ignominious appellation.⁶ This being the case, it would become no one to suffer his anger to evaporate, nor to think it advantageous⁷ for us to let them go without putting ourselves to further danger; for *that* they will equally do, should they gain the victory: but after having done, in all probability, what we wish, to avenge ourselves of these, and to deliver to all Sicily a freedom before enjoyed, but then more secure and stable;—that were an achievement worthy of all honour. And surely of all dangers the rarest are those which, inflicting very little injury from failure, confer much advantage from success.”

LXIX.* The Syracusan generals and Gylippus, having addressed these exhortations to their soldiers, immediately had the ships manned, on perceiving that the Athenians had done so. As to Nicias, being in much perturbation at the present state of affairs, and seeing how great was the danger, and how imminent; thinking, too (as is usually the case in contests so momentous), that in *deeds* the dispositions were even yet defective, and, as far as *words* were concerned, enough had not been said, he again summoned every one of the captains, and calling each by the name of his father¹, and by their own proper

⁴ *That it must be lawful, &c.*] Few passages are to be found more perplexing in the construction than this. Perhaps the mode pursued by Goeller, who treats it as a blending of two constructions, is the most effectual.

⁵ *The men to the most cruel, &c.*] Those who know the enormities which were practised by the heathens on the sacking of cities, will need no explanation of this sentence, in which is so briefly, yet forcibly, depicted the fate of a conquered place.

The *αλαχίστην* is employed *verecundè*.

⁶ *Ignominious appellation.*] Namely, that of *subject*.

⁷ *Think it advantageous.*] Literally, “clear gain.” See l. 2, 44. fin. and note.

¹ *Calling each by the name of his father.*] Heyne on Hom. Il. 10, 68. (cited by Goeller) remarks, “id enim benevolentiam declarare putabatur.

their tribes, entreated each one that had
 y, not to betray it; also those whose fore-
 not to tarnish their hereditary virtues;
 high degree of liberty in their country,
 power to all therein in regard to their
 d saying whatever else persons in such
 ay, who are little studious to avoid ad-
 and hackneyed (though they repeat what is
 forward on such occasions, respecting their
 children and country's gods), but whatever they
 useful, in the present alarming emergency, sound forth
 in their ears."¹⁰

After having addressed to them admonitions, not so much
 what he thought *sufficient*, as all that the time would permit,
 he left them, and led the land forces to the sea side, and
 ranged them along as large a space as possible, so as to be of
 the greatest benefit in confirming the courage of those on
 board the ships. And now Demosthenes, Menander, and
 Euthydemus (for those were the commanders of the Athenian
 fleet) went on board, and unmooring, immediately made sail

Causæ tamen plures esse potuere, ut discerneretur alter ab altero, etiam honoris causa, cum pater esset clarus." It may be added, that there is something very similar in Herod. 6, 14, 15. ἐν στήλῃ ἀναγραφῆναι πατρόθεν. Xen. Cyr. 1, 4, 15. καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ὀνομαστί ἕκαστον. Pausan. 3, 14, 1. στήλη πατρόθεν ὀνόματα ἔχουσα. Plutarch Brut. 49. and Symp. πατρόθεν ὀνομάζων. Ælian V. H. 6, 2. πατρόθεν τὸν νεανίαν προσεῖπον. Soph. Œd. Col. 215. τινὸς εἰ σπέρματος, ἔειπε, φώνει πατρόθεν. Pollux 3, 10. πατρόθεν τινὰ καλεῖν.

¹⁰ *Uncontrolled power, &c.*] So Pericles in his Funeral Oration, l. 2, 37. says, "Thus liberally are our public affairs administered; thus liberally, too, do we conduct ourselves as to mutual suspicions in our private and every-day intercourse; not bearing animosity towards our neighbour for following his own humour, nor darkening our countenance with the scowl of censure, which pains though it cannot punish." All this, however, appears to have been more in words than deeds; at least, the higher ranks had even less of it than the lower; Athens being certainly the very paradise of the mob, the very lowest of which could at any time make those endowed with merit, virtue, and wealth tremble.

¹¹ *Who are little studious to avoid, &c.*] See Goeller, who has very well explained this somewhat intricate passage; also compare Livy l. 33, 3. multa jam sæpe memorata de majorum virtutibus, simul de militari laude Macedonum quum diservisset, ad ea quæ tum maxime animos terrebant, quibusque erigi ad aliquam spem poterant, venit, and Heliod. Æthiop. l. p. 53, 21. Bourdel. He also truly remarks, that by the *τὰ ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων παραπλήσια* are meant *common-places*. See Lucian l. 2, 337, 66. Isocr. Nicocl. p. 40. Also, the note on l. 1, 130, 7.

for the barrier ⁴ of the port, and the passage yet left not completely closed, intending to force their way out.

LXX. But the Syracusans and their allies had previously weighed anchor with about the same number of ships as before; and with part of them kept guard at the outlet ¹, and the rest of them round the other part ² of the harbour, that they might fall upon the Athenians from all sides at once, and their land force, at the same time, draw down to their assistance where the ships occupied their stations.

The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanius and Agatharchus, each stationed at a wing: and Pythen and the Corinthians maintained the centre.

When the Athenians had approached to the barrier, they made right for it, and at the first charge overpowered the ships stationed there, and endeavoured to remove the barricade. Whereupon the Syracusans and their allies rushing upon them from every side, the battle was no longer off the barrier, but also in the port itself. It was stiffly maintained, and such as was not any of the former battles.³ For much spirit was evinced by the seamen on either side, in advancing to the charge when ordered ⁴; there was also much counter-manceuvring of the ship-masters, one striving against another. The

¹ *Barrier.*] Namely, that barricade across the port's mouth composed of triremes turned broadside, &c. mentioned supra, c. 59. As the commentators here adduce no classical examples, the following may be not unacceptable: Plutarch Marcell. c. 14. c. in. ὑπὲρ δὲ μεγάλου ζεύγματος νεῶν, ὁκτώ πρὸς ἀλλήλας συνδεδεμένων. Compare also c. 15.

² *Kept guard at the outlet.*] So Æschyl. Pers. 370. ἰσποῦς φυλάσσειν καὶ πόρον ἀνιέρχοντες.

³ *Round the other part.*] Smith renders, "quite round," &c.; which is, however, more than Thucydides says, or, I think, means. The harbour was too extensive for that, neither would such a manœuvre have been of the least service. The remaining ships seem to have been ranged on each side of the mouth as far as they could reach.

⁴ *Such as was not any of the former battles.*] Hobbes wrongly renders, "such as there had never before been the like." There had been battles as obstinately disputed, but not any of the preceding, between the Syracusans and Athenians. There have, however, been few like it in any age. The late battle of Navarino was, in all respects, strikingly similar.

⁵ *When ordered.*] Namely, by the sound of the κελύστει, who were like our boatswains. See Dr. Blomfield on Æschyl. Pers. 403. From Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1125—6, it may, I think, be inferred that that was done by a pipe, such as our boatswains use.

marines, too, were studious, when ship fell on board ship, not to be outdone in any points of skill which could be shown from deck; and each at the post where he was stationed strained every nerve to appear the foremost.

Many ships, however, grappling together in a narrow compass (for they were indeed the greatest number that had ever combated in so small a space, both fleets together falling little short of two hundred sail), the *charges with beak* were few, because there was no power of recoiling and then dashing through the line; but of *assaults*⁵, as ship chanced to fall foul of ship, either in flying or in chasing another, there were very many. And while ship was brought against ship, those stationed on the decks launched darts, arrows, and stones in abundance at her; but when they had closed, the marines coming to close combat, endeavoured to board each other's vessels. And it often happened⁶, that, by reason of the narrowness of room, they partly charged upon others, and partly were themselves charged; and that two, or sometimes more, ships were by compulsion closely locked together, insomuch that the steersmen had to take care, not on one quarter alone, but on all sides to *guard against* some and *contrive against* others; and great was the shouting, and such as at once to stupify, and preclude all hearing of the orders of the celeustæ [or boat-swains]. Frequent, indeed, and loud was the sound of the celeustæ on both sides, not only according as their art required, but as incited by the ardour of rivalry; the Athenians shouting out "to force the passage, and now, if ever again, to zealously strive to attain⁷ a safe return to their country;" the Syracusans and their allies, "that it were glorious to hinder their escape, and for each, by conquering, to increase the

⁵ *Charges with beak, &c.*] Such is the distinction between *ἐμβολαί* and *προσβολαί*, on which Goeller annotates thus: "Differt προσβολή, *conkursus adversus* ab ἐμβολῇ, quæ modo est impetus quivis, modo *impetus in latera*. Vid. 2, 89. 7, 36." It may be added, that the terms are carefully distinguished in Dio Cass. 616, 69.

⁶ *It often happened that, &c.*] The whole of this passage is imitated by Plutarch Nic. c. 25. and Dio Cass. p. 627. δύο τε γὰρ ἢ καὶ τεσσάρα τῇ αὐτῇ νηὶ προσάπτουσαι, κ. τ. λ.

⁷ *Strive to attain, &c.*] Such is the sense of ἀντλάεσθαι, which is not well perceived by the interpreters. The word is so used by Arrian E. A. 4, 29, 14. ἀντ. τοῦ ἔργου.

glory of his own country." And moreover the commanders on both sides, if they any where saw one rowing to poop⁸ without necessity, calling upon the captain by name, the *Athenians* would ask him "if they retreated because they esteemed the most hostile land more their own than the sea, of which by no small trouble they had gained the dominion;" the *Syracusans*, "if they would flinch from those whom they well knew to be striving by every means to escape, and thus fly from the fliers."

LXXI. Meantime the land forces of each side, which were drawn up along the beach¹, while the battle was yet undecided², sustained a mighty conflict and commotion of mind³,

⁸ *Rowing to poop.*] Or retreating.

¹ *Along the beach.*] Drawn up each to give aid to such of their ships as should be hard pressed, and driven on shore.

² *Undecided.*] Literally, "was maintained on equal terms, the balance of the scales inclining neither way."

³ *Sustained a mighty conflict and commotion of mind.*] Even that of sympathy with their friends on the water, and of alternate hope and fear.

There has, however, been no little perplexity experienced by editors and critics to determine the true reading and sense of this passage. They remark that the Scholiast must have read *ξύντασις*, by which Goeller understands *cruciatus animi*: but it would rather signify *animi contentio*. It may be added that *ξύντασις* seems to have been read by Valla, and is found in almost a transcript of this passage in Dio Cass. p. 367. *ἀντίπαλον γὰρ τῆς μάχης—τῆς ψυχῆς σύντασι, συνέναι εἶλοντο*. Yet, strange to say, the common reading, *ξύστασις*, is found in another equally close imitation at p. 575 and 576. *ὁ πίζος—σύστασι τῆς γνώμης συνέσχοντο*. There can be no doubt, too, but that Plutarch read *ξύστασις*: for, in the reference which he makes to this passage at p. 347, B. (quoted by Duker), he writes, *ἀλαστον ἄγωνα καὶ σύστασιν τῆς γνώμης ἔχων*. where the common reading *σύνταξιν* is indefensible; and *ἀλαστον* points to *σύστασιν* rather than to *σύντασιν*: nor do I remember one instance of *σύντασις* in a *metaphorical* sense. The whole of that passage is thus emended by Goeller: *καὶ οἱ πεζομαχοῦντες μὲν ἐκ θαλάττης Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ναυμαχοῦντες δὲ ἀπὸ γῆς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ἐν τοῖς Σικελικοῖς ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων, ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀθεσθηκυίας, ἀλαστον ἄγωνα καὶ σύστασιν τῆς γνώμης ἔχων διὰ τὸ ἀκρίτως συνεχὲς τῆς ἀμύλλης, καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεδῶς συμπνύνων μετὰ τῇ διαδίσει καὶ τῇ διατυπώσει τῶν γινομένων γραφικῆς ἐναργείας ἰστί*. where *τὸ ἀκρίτως* is undoubtedly the true reading; and, indeed, the same emendation I myself made many years ago. I also emended *συναπονέων*, which Goeller only timidly proposes as a *quare*. As to the last emendation *μετὰ—ἰστί*, it is far too bold; for how is it possible to account for the omission of two words which might seem essential to the sense? I say *seem*, for they are not really so. It may suffice to subaud *ἔργον ἰστί*, a very common ellipsis, on which see Bos.

Finally, *ξύστασις* is also supported by Plutarch Vit. Hom. § 207. *ἡ σύστασις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνίσταται καὶ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος λίσταται*. Also by Eurip.

those of the country being eager for an increase of the credit already gained; the invaders fearing lest they should fall into a yet worse condition than their present one. For, indeed, affairs being with the Athenians wholly centred in ⁴ the ships, their fear for the future was unparalleled.⁵ And by reason of the fluctuating inconsistency of fortune, they were also compelled to view the combat from land with fluctuating feelings.⁶ For the scene being at but a short distance, and all not looking at one and the same part, upon their own side prevailing, they would take courage, and would fall to invoking the gods not to deprive them of their safety; while those who saw their friends defeated, broke out into a shout of lament-

Hippol. 987. Πάτερ, μένος μὲν ζύστασις τε τῶν φρενῶν Δεινῇ. And the passage is imitated by Philostratus Vit. Ap. 5, 35. thus: τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ βασιλεως ἀγῶνα ἐπιδήλον τῆς γνώμης. Our author, it may be observed, plays upon the double sense of ἀγών, and hints that those on shore had also a contest, though of another kind. So Dio Cass. 575, 86. ὁ ἀγών ἔδοξε μὲν τῶν ναυμαχούντων μόνων εἶναι, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰγέμετο. Dionys. Hal. Ant. 155, 24. ἔλαθον αὐτοὺς τοῦ τῶν κινδυνεύοντων μεταλαμβάνοντες πάθους, ἀγωνισταὶ τε μᾶλλον ἐβούλοντο ἢ θάταται τῶν ὁρμμένων γεγονέναι.

⁴ Wholly centred in.] Or dependent on.

⁵ Unparalleled.] Literally, "equal to none (before)," i. e. greater than any heretofore; for there is a *meiosis*.

⁶ And by reason of, &c.] There are not many passages, even in Thucydides, more perplexing than the one in the original, which is so obscurely worded that critics have long been at issue on the sense. The difficulty centres in the διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον, where the Scholiast, Stephens, Reiz, and Herman take the τὸ for τοῦτο: but it is truly observed by Goeller, that Thucydides could never have used τὸ for τοῦτο in *such* a position, where it could scarcely be taken otherwise than as the article, and joined with ἀνώμαλον. Krueger notices with approbation the following interpretation of Kaltwasser: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον und bei der so ungleichen und schwankenden Lage ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἐποψιν mussten sie auch noch das Seegefecht vom lande her mit ansehen. But this is with reason rejected by Goeller, who finally acquiesces in the conjecture of Bekker, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ ἀνώμαλον, though he does not explain the sense arising. It must be this: "and by reason of this (fear) they were compelled," &c. To which sense there is no objection. Yet the emendation requires the support of MS. authority; and the καὶ before τὴν ἐποψιν is thus worse than useless. I would, therefore, retain the common reading, and take the ἀνώμαλον twice, as Bauer directs, and as did also Valla, unless he read in his copy διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον, ἀνώμαλον: a reading, however, not necessary, for the καὶ plainly has reference to the ἀνώμαλον to be repeated. Finally, at τὸ ἀνώμαλον I would subaud τῆς τύχης, or the like. And so the phrase seems to have been taken by Libanius, who, in his Orat. p. 716. D. writes: τῷ ἀνωμάλῳ τῆς τύχης πιστεύσαντες. So also the Schol. on Eurip. Hippol. 1102. Σαυμάζω τοῦ βίου τὸ ἀνώμαλον.

ation⁷, nay, at the very *sight* of what was *done*, they were even more agitated in spirit than those engaged in the action.⁸ Others, again, having their view fixed on some quarter where the battle was yet equal, by reason of the continual undecidedness of the contest, anxiously bending forward, and moving with their bodies, according to the opinion they formed,⁹ passed the interval in the most miserable torment of suspense. For the combatants were continually within a little either of escaping, or perishing. And so long as the battle was yet undecided, one might hear in the same army of the Athenians all sounds at once, lamentations—shouts—“they conquer!”—“they are beaten!”¹⁰ and such other multifarious exclamations as a great army situated in extreme peril may be found to utter. As to those on board the ships, they were affected in nearly the same manner¹¹, until at length, after the battle had lasted a considerable time, the Syracusans and their allies decidedly routed¹² the Athenians, and pressing upon them

⁷ *A shout of lamentation.*] Literally, “lamentation mingled with shouting.”

⁸ *Nay, at the very sight, &c.*] This, and most of the remaining part of this description, is imitated by Dionys. Hal. Ant. p. 155. Had Sylburg been aware of this, he would not have proposed to alter *πρὸς τὰ δρωμένα* into *πρὸς τὰ ὑφωρμήνα*. Possibly, Thucydides had in mind the fine description of the combat between Eteocles and Polynices in Eurip. Phœn. 1403.

⁹ *Anxiously bending forward, &c.*] With this graphic description Goeller compares Sallust, B. J. 6, 60. and Livy, l. 1, 25. To which passages may be added the following far closer imitations: Appian, t. 1. 497, 1. *καὶ ἐς τὰς φαντασίας τῶν λεγομένων τῇ σχήματι τοῦ σώματος συνέφερον*. Liban. Epist. 584. *ἔπερ οἱ τοὺς ἐν χειμῶνι πλείοντας ἀπὸ γῆς ὀρώντες πάσχουσι, καὶ τὰ κύματα τοῖς αὐτῶν ἡγούνται προσπίπτειν σώμασι*. Philostr. Icon. p. 864. *ἡ κόρη—ὀρμήσαντος δὲ ἀτακῆσειεν συναπονεύουσα ταῖς τοῦ θεμοῦ κινήσειεν*. Max. Tyr. Diss. 11, 1, 198. *ἡ εἰμαρμένη βίᾳ σπᾶ καὶ προσαναγκάζει συναπονεύειν ταῖς αὐτῆς ἀγωγαῖς*. The word *συναπονεύω* (which is a very rare one) also occurs in Max. Tyr. Diss. 10. t. 1, 181. and in Pollux, 4, 95.

¹⁰ *One might hear, &c.*] This passage has been deservedly admired. It is strange that the commentators should have failed to remark how much it was the object of imitation by the later writers, ex. gr. Charit. p. 66, 10. *πάντα ἦν ὁμοῦ, δάκρυα, χάρα, θάμβος, ἔλεος, κ. τ. λ.* Perhaps our historian had in mind that sublime passage of Æschyl. Agam. 312. *Οἶμαι βόην ἀμικτον ἐν πόλει πρίτειν*.—*Καὶ τῶν ἀλόωντων καὶ κρατησάντων διχα Φθογγὰς ἀκούειν ἰστί, συμφορὰς διπλῆς*. where Dr. Blomfield compares Hom. Il. Δ. 430. So also Æschyl. Pers. 407. *καὶ παρῆν ὁμοῦ κλύειν πολλὴν βόην*. See also Pers. 433. Eur. Phœn. 1208. Diod. Sic. t. 7, 262, 6. Bip. Arrian E. A. 3. 14, 3.

¹¹ *Affected in much the same manner.*] i. e. suffered the same tortures of suspense.

¹² *Decidedly routed.*] The *λαμπρῶς*, by the usual transposition, belongs to *ἔτρεψεν*, not (as the translators take it) to *ἱπικείμενοι*. Thus it is hinted that there was no longer the agony of suspense, for the rout was manifest.

with much shouting and mutual hurraing, pursued them to the land. Then the crews of such ships as were not taken in the deep water, being driven to shore, rushed some one way, some another, towards the camp.¹³ And now the land army was no longer variously affected, but with one simultaneous impulse, all by groans and wailings expressing their overpowering emotion at the catastrophe, some of them went to give succour to the ships, others to stand guard at the various quarters of the wall; others, again (and those the greater part) fell presently to considering for themselves, how they might best provide for their own preservation. There was, indeed, at the moment, a consternation such as has been never exceeded. And, in truth, they were similarly circumstanced and affected with those at Pylus; for, as on the Lacedæmonian ships being destroyed, the men, who had crossed over to the island on board of them, were lost to their country, so now the Athenians were in despair of saving themselves by land, unless some event contrary to all expectation should take place.

LXXII. After this battle (thus obstinately disputed, and with much loss of ships and men on both sides), the Syracusans and their allies, coming off the victors, took up the wrecks and the dead, and, sailing off to the city, erected a trophy. As to the Athenians, overwhelmed with the greatness of their present misfortunes, they never thought of demanding permission to take up the dead or the wrecks¹, and immediately began to consult on measures for retreat during the night. Demosthenes, however, going to Nicias, gave it as his opinion that they should man the yet remaining ships, and, at break of day, try, if possible, to force the passage.² He alleged, that the

¹³ *Rushed, &c.*] Ἐκίπτεον seems to be a vox prægnans, denoting that they *stranded* their ships, and *made for* the camp. This second signification is suggested by the preposition following, which denotes *motion* to a place. So Joseph. B. J. 7, 11, 1. διαπείων εἰς Κυρίην.

¹ *Never thought of demanding, &c.*] An effect of extreme calamity, such as we have noticed at l. 3, 113.

² *Gave it as his opinion that, &c.*] A counsel worthy of the unconquerable courage and presence of mind of Demosthenes, and which was successfully adopted by Antigonus, as related by Polyæn. 4, 6, 8. Such, however, is scarcely proper to be adopted in the case of an army which has been repeatedly beaten, since, to use the words of Thucydides, l. 2, 89. fin. "when

over, attain what is usually called the sweetest of all gratifications, revenge on an enemy.⁴ That they *are* enemies, and our bitterest ones, you all know; since they came to our country in order to enslave it; wherein, had they succeeded, they would have subjected the men to the most cruel, and the women and children to the most shameful⁵ fate, and imposed on the city the most ignominious appellation.⁶ This being the case, it would become no one to suffer his anger to evaporate, nor to think it advantageous⁷ for us to let them go without putting ourselves to further danger; for *that* they will equally do, should they gain the victory: but after having done, in all probability, what we wish, to avenge ourselves of these, and to deliver to all Sicily a freedom before enjoyed, but then more secure and stable;—that were an achievement worthy of all honour. And surely of all dangers the rarest are those which, inflicting very little injury from failure, confer much advantage from success.”

LXIX.* The Syracusan generals and Gylippus, having addressed these exhortations to their soldiers, immediately had the ships manned, on perceiving that the Athenians had done so. As to Nicias, being in much perturbation at the present state of affairs, and seeing how great was the danger, and how imminent; thinking, too (as is usually the case in contests so momentous), that in *deeds* the dispositions were even yet defective, and, as far as *words* were concerned, enough had not been said, he again summoned every one of the captains, and calling each by the name of his father¹, and by their own proper

⁴ *That it must be lawful, &c.*] Few passages are to be found more perplexing in the construction than this. Perhaps the mode pursued by Goeller, who treats it as a blending of two constructions, is the most effectual.

⁵ *The men to the most cruel, &c.*] Those who know the enormities which were practised by the heathens on the sacking of cities, will need no explanation of this sentence, in which is so briefly, yet forcibly, depicted the fate of a conquered place.

The *αἰσχίον* is employed *verecundè*.

⁶ *Ignominious appellation.*] Namely, that of *subject*.

⁷ *Think it advantageous.*] Literally, “clear gain.” See l. 2, 44. fin. and note.

¹ *Calling each by the name of his father.*] Heyne on Hom. Il. 10, 68. (cited by Goeller) remarks, “id enim benevolentiam declarare putabatur.

names, and that of their tribes, entreated each one that had any thing of celebrity, not to betray it; also those whose forefathers were eminent, not to tarnish their hereditary virtues; reminding them of the high degree of liberty in their country, and of the uncontrolled power to all therein in regard to their manner of living⁹; and saying whatever else persons in such a conjuncture would say, who are little studious to avoid adducing topics trite and hackneyed (though they repeat what is usually brought forward on such occasions, respecting their wives and children and country's gods), but whatever they think useful, in the present alarming emergency, sound forth in their ears."¹⁰

After having addressed to them admonitions, not so much what he thought *sufficient*, as all that the time would permit, he left them, and led the land forces to the sea side, and ranged them along as large a space as possible, so as to be of the greatest benefit in confirming the courage of those on board the ships. And now Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus (for those were the commanders of the Athenian fleet) went on board, and unmooring, immediately made sail

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⁹ *Uncontrolled power, &c.*] So Pericles in his Funeral Oration, l. 2, 37. says, "Thus liberally are our public affairs administered; thus liberally, too, do we conduct ourselves as to mutual suspicions in our private and every-day intercourse; not bearing animosity towards our neighbour for following his own humour, nor darkening our countenance with the scowl of censure, which pains though it cannot punish." All this, however, appears to have been more in words than deeds; at least, the higher ranks had even less of it than the lower; Athens being certainly the very paradise of the mob, the very lowest of which could at any time make those endued with merit, virtue, and wealth tremble.

¹⁰ *Who are little studious to avoid, &c.*] See Goeller, who has very well explained this somewhat intricate passage; also compare Livy l. 33, 3. multa jam sæpe memorata de majorum virtutibus, simul de militari laude Macedonum quum disseruisset, ad ea quæ tum maxime animos terrebant, quibusque erigi ad aliquam spem poterant, venit, and Heliod. Æthiop. 1. p. 53, 21. Bourdel. He also truly remarks, that by the τὰ ὑπὲρ πάντων παραπλήσια are meant *common-places*. See Lucian l. 2, 337, 66. Isocr. Nicocl. p. 40. Also, the note on l. 1, 130, 7.

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² *Undecided.*] Literally, "was maintained on equal terms, the balance of the scales inclining neither way."

³ *Sustained a mighty conflict and commotion of mind.*] Even that of sympathy with their friends on the water, and of alternate hope and fear.

There has, however, been no little perplexity experienced by editors and critics to determine the true reading and sense of this passage. They remark that the Scholiast must have read *ξύττασις*, by which Goeller understands *cruciatus animi*: but it would rather signify *animi contentio*. It may be added that *ξύττασις* seems to have been read by Valla, and is found in almost a transcript of this passage in Dio Cass. p. 367. *ἀντίπαλον γὰρ τῆς μάχης—τῆς ψυχῆς σύντασι, συνίναί εἰλοντο*. Yet, strange to say, the common reading, *ξύστασις*, is found in another equally close imitation at p. 575 and 576. *ὁ πίζος—σύστασις τῆς γνώμης συνέσχοντο*. There can be no doubt, too, but that Plutarch read *ξύστασις*: for, in the reference which he makes to this passage at p. 347, B. (quoted by Duker), he writes, *ἄλαστον ἀγῶνα καὶ σύστασιν τῆς γνώμης ἔχων*. where the common reading *σύνταξιν* is indefensible; and *ἄλαστον* points to *σύστασιν* rather than to *σύντασιν*: nor do I remember one instance of *σύντασις* in a *metaphorical* sense. The whole of that passage is thus emended by Goeller: *καὶ οἱ πεζομαχοῦντες μὲν ἐκ θαλάττης Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ναυμαχοῦντες δὲ ἀπὸ γῆς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ἐν τοῖς Σικελικοῖς ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων, ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας καθέστηκυίας, ἄλαστον ἀγῶνα καὶ σύστασιν τῆς γνώμης ἔχων διὰ τὸ ἀκρίτως συνεχῆς τῆς ἀμύλλης, καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδύως συμπεπνῶν μετὰ τῇ διατίθει καὶ τῇ διατυπώσει τῶν γινόμενων γραφικῆς ἐναργείας ἔστι*. where τὸ ἀκρίτως is undoubtedly the true reading; and, indeed, the same emendation I myself made many years ago. I also emended *συναπνεύων*, which Goeller only timidly proposes as a quære. As to the last emendation *μετὰ—ἔστι*, it is far too bold; for how is it possible to account for the omission of two words which might seem essential to the sense? I say *seem*, for they are not really so. It may suffice to subaud *ἔργον ἔστι*, a very common ellipsis, on which see Bos.

Finally, *ξύστασις* is also supported by Plutarch Vit. Hom. § 207. *ἡ σύστασις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνίσταται καὶ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος λίσσεται*. Also by Eurip.

those of the country being eager for an increase of the credit already gained; the invaders fearing lest they should fall into a yet worse condition than their present one. For, indeed, affairs being with the Athenians wholly centred in ⁴ the ships, their fear for the future was unparalleled.⁵ And by reason of the fluctuating inconsistency of fortune, they were also compelled to view the combat from land with fluctuating feelings.⁶ For the scene being at but a short distance, and all not looking at one and the same part, upon their own side prevailing, they would take courage, and would fall to invoking the gods not to deprive them of their safety; while those who saw their friends defeated, broke out into a shout of lament-

Hippol. 987. Πάτερ, μένος μὲν ξύστασις τε τῶν φρενῶν Δεινὴ. And the passage is imitated by Philostratus Vit. Ap. 5, 35. thus: τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ βασιλέως ἀγῶνα ἐπιδήλον τῆς γνώμης. Our author, it may be observed, plays upon the double sense of ἀγών, and hints that those on shore had also a contest, though of another kind. So Dio Cass. 575, 86. ὁ ἀγὼν ἔδοξε μὲν τῶν ναυμαχοῦντων μόνων εἶναι, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐγένετο. Dionys. Hal. Ant. 155, 24. ἔλαθον αὐτοὺς τοῦ τῶν κινδυνεύοντων μεταλαμβάνοντες πάθους, ἀγωνισταὶ τε μᾶλλον ἐβούλοντο ἢ θεαταὶ τῶν δρωμένων γεγονέναι.

⁴ Wholly centred in.] Or dependent on.

⁵ Unparalleled.] Literally, "equal to none (before)," i. e. greater than any heretofore; for there is a meiosis.

⁶ And by reason of, &c.] There are not many passages, even in Thucydides, more perplexing than the one in the original, which is so obscurely worded that critics have long been at issue on the sense. The difficulty centres in the διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον, where the Scholiast, Stephens, Reiz, and Herman take the τὸ for τοῦτο: but it is truly observed by Goeller, that Thucydides could never have used τὸ for τοῦτο in such a position, where it could scarcely be taken otherwise than as the article, and joined with ἀνώμαλον. Krueger notices with approbation the following interpretation of Kaltwasser: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον und bei der so ungleichen und schwankenden Lage ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἐποψιν μῆσεν sie auch noch das Seegefecht vom lande her mit ansehen. But this is with reason rejected by Goeller, who finally acquiesces in the conjecture of Bekker, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ ἀνώμαλον, though he does not explain the sense arising. It must be this: "and by reason of this (fear) they were compelled," &c. To which sense there is no objection. Yet the emendation requires the support of MS. authority; and the καὶ before τὴν ἐποψιν is thus worse than useless. I would, therefore, retain the common reading, and take the ἀνώμαλον twice, as Bauer directs, and as did also Valla, unless he read in his copy διὰ τὸ ἀνώμαλον, ἀνώμαλον: a reading, however, not necessary, for the καὶ plainly has reference to the ἀνώμαλον to be repeated. Finally, at τὸ ἀνώμαλον I would subaud τῆς τύχης, or the like. And so the phrase seems to have been taken by Libanius, who, in his Orat. p. 716. D. writes: τῷ ἀνωμάλῳ τῆς τύχης πιστεύσαντες. So also the Schol. on Eurip. Hippol. 1102. θανατῶ τοῦ βίου τὸ ἀνώμαλον.

ation⁷, nay, at the very *sight* of what was *done*, they were even more agitated in spirit than those engaged in the action.⁸ Others, again, having their view fixed on some quarter where the battle was yet equal, by reason of the continual undecidedness of the contest, anxiously bending forward, and moving with their bodies, according to the opinion they formed,⁹ passed the interval in the most miserable torment of suspense. For the combatants were continually within a little either of escaping, or perishing. And so long as the battle was yet undecided, one might hear in the same army of the Athenians all sounds at once, lamentations—shouts—“they conquer!”—“they are beaten!”¹⁰ and such other multifarious exclamations as a great army situated in extreme peril may be found to utter. As to those on board the ships, they were affected in nearly the same manner¹¹, until at length, after the battle had lasted a considerable time, the Syracusans and their allies decidedly routed¹² the Athenians, and pressing upon them

⁷ *A shout of lamentation.*] Literally, “lamentation mingled with shouting.”

⁸ *Nay, at the very sight, &c.*] This, and most of the remaining part of this description, is imitated by Dionys. Hal. Ant. p. 155. Had Sylburg been aware of this, he would not have proposed to alter *πρὸς τὰ δρωμένα* into *πρὸς τὰ ὑφορωμένα*. Possibly, Thucydides had in mind the fine description of the combat between Eteocles and Polynices in Eurip. Phœn. 1403.

⁹ *Anxiously bending forward, &c.*] With this graphic description Goeller compares Sallust, B. J. 6, 60. and Livy, l. 1, 25. To which passages may be added the following far closer imitations: Appian, t. 1. 497, 1. *καὶ ἐς τὰς φαντασίας τῶν λισσομένων τῇ σχήματι τοῦ σώματος συνήφρον.* Liban. Epist. 584. *ἔπερ οἱ τοὺς ἐν χειμῶνι πλείοντας ἀπὸ γῆς ὀρώντες πάσχουσι, καὶ τὰ κύματα τοῖς αὐτῶν ἡγοῦνται προσπίπτειν σώμασι.* Philostr. Icon. p. 864. *ἡ κόμη—ὀρμήσαντος δὲ ἀτακτῆσειν συναπονεύουσα ταῖς τοῦ θυμοῦ κινήσεισιν.* Max. Tyr. Diss. 11, 1, 198. *ἡ εἰμαρμένη βίᾳ σπᾷ καὶ προσαναγκάζει συναπονεύειν ταῖς αὐτῆς ἀγωγαῖς.* The word *συναπονεύω* (which is a very rare one) also occurs in Max. Tyr. Diss. 10. t. 1, 181. and in Pollux, 4, 95.

¹⁰ *One might hear, &c.*] This passage has been deservedly admired. It is strange that the commentators should have failed to remark how much it was the object of *imitation* by the later writers, ex. gr. Charit. p. 66, 10. *πάντα ἦν ὁμοῦ, δάκρυα, χάρα, θάμβος, ἔλεος, κ. τ. λ.* Perhaps our historian had in mind that sublime passage of Æschyl. Agam. 312. *Οἶμαι βόην ἀμικτον ἐν πόλει πρίπειν.*—*Καὶ τῶν ἀλάντων καὶ κρατησάντων ῥίχα Φθογγὰς ἀκούειν ἐστὶ, συμφορᾶς διπλῆς.* where Dr. Blomfield compares Hom. Il. Δ. 430. So also Æschyl. Pers. 407. *καὶ παρὴν ὁμοῦ κλύειν πολλὴν βόην.* See also Pers. 433. Eur. Phœn. 1208. Diod. Sic. t. 7, 262, 6. Bip. Arrian E. A. 3. 14, 3.

¹¹ *Affected in much the same manner.*] i. e. suffered the same tortures of suspense.

¹² *Decidedly routed.*] The *λαμπρῶς*, by the usual transposition, belongs to *ἔρρεψεν*, not (as the translators take it) to *ἵπικείμενοι*. Thus it is hinted that there was no longer the agony of *suspense*, for the rout was manifest.

with much shouting and mutual hurraing, pursued them to the land. Then the crews of such ships as were not taken in the deep water, being driven to shore, rushed some one way, some another, towards the camp.¹³ And now the land army was no longer variously affected, but with one simultaneous impulse, all by groans and wailings expressing their overpowering emotion at the catastrophe, some of them went to give succour to the ships, others to stand guard at the various quarters of the wall; others, again (and those the greater part) fell presently to considering for themselves, how they might best provide for their own preservation. There was, indeed, at the moment, a consternation such as has been never exceeded. And, in truth, they were similarly circumstanced and affected with those at Pylus; for, as on the Lacedæmonian ships being destroyed, the men, who had crossed over to the island on board of them, were lost to their country, so now the Athenians were in despair of saving themselves by land, unless some event contrary to all expectation should take place.

LXXII. After this battle (thus obstinately disputed, and with much loss of ships and men on both sides), the Syracusans and their allies, coming off the victors, took up the wrecks and the dead, and, sailing off to the city, erected a trophy. As to the Athenians, overwhelmed with the greatness of their present misfortunes, they never thought of demanding permission to take up the dead or the wrecks¹, and immediately began to consult on measures for retreat during the night. Demosthenes, however, going to Nicias, gave it as his opinion that they should man the yet remaining ships, and, at break of day, try, if possible, to force the passage.² He alleged, that the

¹³ *Rushed, &c.*] ἑτίπτεον seems to be a vox prægnans, denoting that they *stranded* their ships, and *made for* the camp. This second signification is suggested by the preposition following, which denotes *motion* to a place. So Joseph. B. J. 7, 11, 1. διαπείσων εἰς Κυρήνην.

¹ *Never thought of demanding, &c.*] An effect of extreme calamity, such as we have noticed at l. 3, 113.

² *Gave it as his opinion that, &c.*] A counsel worthy of the unconquerable courage and presence of mind of Demosthenes, and which was successfully adopted by Antigonus, as related by Polyæn. 4, 6, 8. Such, however, is scarcely proper to be adopted in the case of an army which has been repeatedly beaten, since, to use the words of Thucydides, l. 2, 89. fin. "when

ships fit for service still remaining to them were more in number than the enemy's; for the Athenians had yet left about sixty, while those of the Syracusans were less than fifty. And when Nicias acceded to the opinion, and both would have manned the ships, the seamen were unwilling to embark, by reason of their consternation at the defeat, and their persuasion that they had no longer any chance of victory.

LXXIII. And now they were all fully bent to make their retreat by land. But Hermocrates, the Syracusan, suspecting their intention, and conceiving that there was danger lest so large an army, after retreating by land, and fixing itself at some part or other of Sicily, should again make war on Syracuse, went and suggested to those in office, that it would not be proper to permit the enemy to retreat by night, but that all the Syracusans and allies should now go forth and block up the roads, and occupy and guard the defiles. They were of the same opinion as himself, and it was readily granted that the thing ought to be done; but they conceived that the men, now gladly resting from the labours of so great a battle, it being, too, a festival, (for it chanced that on this day¹ sacrifice was offered to Hercules,²) would not easily be induced to obey the order; for that, through joy at the victory, they had mostly betaken themselves to drinking, and it might be expected they would acquiesce in any thing sooner than, at the present, to take up arms and go forth. Now, when, on these considerations, the project seemed to the commanders impracticable, and he could not prevail upon³ them to try it, Hermocrates proceeded to devise the following stratagem. — Fearing lest the Athenians should, without molestation, in the night, anticipate them by passing over the most difficult part of the road, he sends some of his own companions, with a party

men are once vanquished, their minds do not feel an equal alacrity towards the same dangers."

¹ *This day.*] Not the day after, as Mitford narrates.

² *To Hercules.*] A hero-god with whom they, as being of the Dorian race, were closely connected.

³ *Seemed to the commanders impracticable, &c.*] Mitford narrates as if they had consented to the measure, but had failed to induce the men to quit the religious revel for nocturnal military enterprise.

thenian camp, when it grew dark ; who riding they might be heard, and calling for certain they had been in the interest of the Athenians are some who had given Nicias information⁵ of what (within), desired them to tell Nicias not to draw off the *by night*, since the Syracusans were besetting the roads, to retreat *by day*, after leisurely preparation. Having delivered this message, they departed, and those who heard it made report to the Athenian generals.

LXXIV. They, on receiving this intimation, which they never suspected to be a deceit, deferred their departure for that night. And since, by this means, they were prevented from setting out, it was determined to wait¹ also the day following, that the soldiers might pack up their baggage to the best advantage they could ; also to leave behind them every thing else, and set forward, taking nothing but what was necessary to the body, for food and clothing.²

As to the Syracusans and Gylippus, they went forth with the land forces, and blocked up the roads over such parts of the country as it was probable the Athenians would go, and stationed guards at the crossings of the brooks and rivers, and ranged themselves at suitable places for the reception and hinderance of the enemy's force. With their fleet they made sail to the Athenian ships, and dragged them from the shore ; for, except some few³ which the Athenians themselves burnt

⁴ *Certain persons.*] Namely, some who had been the medium of communication with the generals.

It will be observed that they went in the dusk, that they might not be distinctly seen.

⁵ *Had given Nicias information.*] Literally, "had been internuntii," or the medium through whom information was conveyed.

¹ *It was determined to wait, &c.*] There were certainly advantages resulting from this counsel, but by no means such as to counterbalance the disadvantages. Yet how could so miserable, wretched, and starving a set of people take their departure without some preparation ? Had they started in the night, or even the next morning, the strong must have abandoned the weak and less prepared. As to a night-march, indeed, the generals might well be deterred from it by the recent calamity which had befallen them, from the nocturnal rencounter.

² *Necessary to the body, &c.*] Both seem to be included in *διαστροφ*, as at l. 6, 15.

³ *For except some few, &c.*] I have here followed the judicious punc-

(and they had intended to destroy *all*), the rest they were allowed to take, without molestation, just as they found each stranded, and thus they hauled them off to the city.

LXXV.¹ After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged that sufficient preparation had been made, the army took their departure, on the third day after the sea-fight. And a wretched departure it was², not only for the peculiar circumstances of it, as that they were retreating with the loss of all their ships, and, instead of the lofty hopes³ they had formed, were both themselves and the state in peril; nay, also, because it happened, that, in the abandonment of the camp, many mournful objects presented themselves to the sight, and struck home to the heart of every one. For, as the dead lay unburied, when any one saw a friend stretched out, he was struck at once with grief and fear. Nay, the living objects, the wounded and the sick who were left behind, were objects of greater grief and pity than the dead⁴: for by resorting to supplica-

tuation of Haack. It were as improbable that the *Syracusans* should, under existing circumstances, burn the ships, as it was probable that the *Athenians* would do so. Besides, Diodorus testifies that the Athenians burnt some of them. Aristides, indeed, t. 2, 131., reckons this burning of the triremes among the other misfortunes of the Athenians. But it may be supposed, that he only considers the *necessity* for their being burnt as the real calamity.

¹ This whole chapter is closely imitated by Dio Cass. p. 269 and 270.

On the third day.] Namely, according to the usual mode of reckoning among not only the Greeks but the Hebrews, and all the antients, who reckoned the day on which any action occurred as the first day, the next as the second, and so forth. Of this, examples are frequent in the New Testament.

² *And a wretched departure it was, &c.*] It is truly remarked by Mitford, that "the pen of Thucydides and the language of Athens are wanting to describe adequately the scene presenting itself upon that occasion; when, in the bitterness of antient warfare, every horror offered itself to expectation, that the human body can suffer, or the human mind conceive." The present recital may, indeed, be reckoned among the most pathetic and touching that were ever penned.

³ *Instead of the lofty hopes, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "No light distress arose from the reflection that, instead of fulfilling the lofty hopes of their enterprise, the whole of so powerful a fleet was destroyed; that, through their failure, ruin threatened their country; and that, instead of returning, as they had so lately, with reason, expected, conquerors of Sicily, an ignominious flight was their only, and that almost a hopeless, resource for avoiding slavery or death."

⁴ *Objects of greater pity than the dead.*] This may easily be conceived, when we consider the peculiar bitterness and atrocity of antient warfare.

tions and wailings they threw them into utter perplexity, entreating to be taken, and crying aloud to such of their friends or acquaintances as they saw; hanging, too, by their departing comrades⁵, or following them as far as their powers enabled them; and then, just as they were deserted by strength of body, were left behind, not without a few entreaties⁶ and wailing and moans. Insomuch that the whole army was dissolved in tears, and thrown into such irresolution, that it could with difficulty depart, though from an enemy's country; and after having already suffered (and fearing, for the unseen future, yet to suffer) more than tears could adequately bewail.⁷

How different in modern and especially recent times, when war (thanks to the spirit of His religion who came to preach peace on earth) is stripped of half its horrors!

Mitford depicts the present scene in the following words: "Yet the voices and actions of the many living, whom wounds or sickness disabled for the march — their complaints, their expostulations, their prayers, their embraces, and the painful yet fruitless endeavours of some to follow their friends, were still more distressing than the compunction which arose from the neglect, impious as it was deemed, but so far excusable as it was unavoidable, of the still and silent dead."

⁵ *Hanging, too, by, &c.*] I know not why the translators should understand this of hanging by their necks, "throwing their arms about their necks," as Smith renders. It may be understood in a far more general sense, that of clinging by their vestments.

This passage is imitated by Dio Cass. 270, 36-89. and Appian, t. 1, 201, 10. And hence may be emended Athenæus, p. 257. τοῦ νεανίσκου τὴν χεὶρὰ παρείκοτος — ἐκρεμάμενος αὐτῇ, κατέψυχε. where read ταυτῆς and κατέψυχε.

⁶ *Entreaties.*] Literally, "obtestations," conjuring them by the gods. The ἐπιδειασμῶν is wrongly rendered by Hobbes, *imprecations*; and by Smith, "a shower of curses." Such a sense is neither supported by usage nor agreeable to what follows. Though the expression was so understood by Dio Cass. 270, 57. seqq. Goeller has well discerned the sense; and he appeals to Suidas ἐπιδειασμοὶ πρὸς θεὸν ἱκεσίαι, who, after citing these words of Thucydides, adds τοῖσι θεῶν ἐπικλήσειν.*

I have not thought proper to adopt the conjecture of the critics, πολλῶν for ὀλίγων: it is both destitute of authority, and unnecessary. The sense is "a few;" namely, such as their strength would allow, and the time permit.

⁷ *Suffer more than, &c.*] This elegance (a kindred one to another in Herodotus, cited by Wasse) has been imitated by several writers, very many passages from whom I shall adduce in my edition. Suffice it for the present to advert to the Shakspearian dict, "Light sorrows speak, great grief is dumb," which seems founded on that of Seneca, "Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent."

* It is strange that Goeller should not have perceived that in that Lexicographer, for θεῶν should be θεῶν, and probably for θεῶν, θεῶν.

There was, moreover, a deep dejection⁸ and extreme self-reproach. Indeed, they were like nought else but the population (and that not small) of a city reduced by siege, and making their escape⁹; for the whole multitude that went on the march¹⁰ amounted to not less than forty thousand.¹¹ And of these not only the great bulk carried what each was able that would be useful, but the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to custom, themselves carried their provisions under their armour, partly through want of servants, partly through distrust; for some had before deserted to the enemy, and at present the greater part left them. However, even thus, they carried scarcely sufficient for their supply; for there were no longer any stores of provisions¹² in the camp. No, nor was the circumstance that *others* were suffering also¹³, and that there was an equal participation of evil¹⁴ (which however brings some alleviation, namely, that it is borne with many¹⁵), even *thus*, at

⁸ *Deep dejection.*] Hobbes and Smith render *κατάρψια*, "a hanging down of the head:" but that is being needlessly literal. Indeed, the word properly denotes a casting down of the *eyes*. So Hippocrates says *κατάρψες ὀφθαλμοί*, and *κατάρψια τὰ ὄμματα*. See Foesii Cc. Hippocr. So also Eurip. Heracl. 633. *τί χρήμα κείσαι, καὶ κατάρψες ὄμμι' ἔχειν*. But it is used in a metaphorical sense by Homer Il. π. 498. *σοὶ γὰρ ἰγὼ — κατάρψειν καὶ θνείδος ἴσσομαι*, as also by many of the historians, as Dionys. Hal., Josephus, and Procopius, who have imitated this fine passage.

⁹ *Like naught else, &c.*] Of this passage Goeller has noticed imitations in Nicol. Damasc. and others. To which may be added closer ones in Joseph. 129, 21. *οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ἢ πόλει μετανοστομένη καὶ καθυδρομένη ἔκει*. Dio Cass. 370, 46. Dionys. Hal. 376, 15. Plutarch Phoc. c. 38. Livy l. 5, 3. "cursus clamorque haud multum a pavore captæ urbis abesse."

¹⁰ *That went on the march.*] This is said in exclusion of such as were left behind in the fortifications.

¹¹ *Forty thousand.*] The historian has been so careful to state this as the number of the *whole multitude* (*ὄχλος*), including the very numerous camp-followers of every kind, that it is strange that Ælian Var. Hist. should be so negligent as to narrate that forty thousand *heavy-armed* perished in Sicily. The same error, indeed, has been committed by Isocrates de Pace, § 29. p. 280. Lang. and Libanius Orat. p. 399. B., in both which cases the speakers caught at the *number* in Thucydides, and founded on it an oratorical exaggeration.

¹² *Stores of provisions.*] Such seems to be the sense of *οἶτος ἦν*: for provisions, it is clear, there were. Hobbes renders: "for not a jot more of provisions was left remaining in the camp."

¹³ *Others were suffering also.*] "Ἄλλῃ is here used in a manner, I conceive, unprecedented.

¹⁴ *Participation of evil.*] Dionys. Hal. p. 433. has *κακῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἰσομοῖα*. He, indeed, often uses the word *ἰσομοῖα*.

¹⁵ *Brings some alleviation, &c.*] This is imitated by Dio Cass. p. 322, 64. *ἢ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς δημοπαθεῖς συννοσῖα ἑπὶ τινὰ αὐτοῖς κοῦφισιν*. So also

... thought to be tolerable ; especially when they considered from how great an original splendour and glory they had at a catastrophe and lowly estate they were reduced. For this, truly, was the greatest reverse that ever happened to a Grecian army, inasmuch as they had to depart, instead of enslaving others (for which they came), with the fear rather themselves to suffer the same¹⁶; and instead of the prayers and pæans with which they sailed, to set out in return with omens and presages¹⁷ the very contrary; that they were going as landmen instead of seamen, and relied, not on their navy, but their land forces. However, through the greatness of the danger¹⁸ yet suspended over their heads, even all these afflictive circumstances seemed to be tolerable.

LXXVI. And now Nicias, perceiving the army to be exceedingly dispirited, and considering the reverse of fortune in which it was situated¹, went up to them, heartening and comforting them as far as circumstances would permit²; and as he advanced along the line, through zeal and earnestness, used a louder tone of voice than usual, desirous that the sound of his words might produce the most extensive benefit.

Joseph. 766, 31. φέρειν καὶ κόψισιν. With the sentiment I would compare Soph. Aj. 654. παραμυθία γὰρ τις ἐστὶ τὸ μετέχειν τινὰ τῶν τοῦ γένους τῶν αὐτῶν κακῶν.

¹⁶ *Inasmuch as they had to depart, &c.*] I know not whether it be possible to come nearer to the original. Hobbes renders thus: "For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves themselves."

¹⁷ *Omens and presages.*] Not *maledictions*, as Hobbes renders. Duker aptly cites the Hesychian gloss, *ὀωνίσματα*. It may be added, that *ἐπιφήμισμα* is used in a good sense by Dio Cass. 210, 10. 764, 30. Joseph. 1305, 27. παντοῖς ἐπιφημίσμασι χρώμενοι. and Liban. Orat. 309. B.

¹⁸ *However, through the, &c.*] The passage is imitated by Dio Cass. 56, 75. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐκείνα καίπερ χαλεπώτατα ὄντα — ὅσα ἰδόκει. There is also a similar one in Dionys. Hal. Ant. 585, 8. ὁ πόλεμος καίτοι μέγας καὶ χαλεπὸς χρηστὸς ἐφαίνετο παρὰ τὸν (I read τὰ) ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους ἑσταζόμενος.

¹ *Considering the reverse of fortune, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ μεταβολῇ ὄν, though a different one is assigned by the translators.

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LXXVII. "Even *yet*, Athenians and allies, even in our *present* situation, we may nourish hope — for some have been saved under still more perilous circumstances.¹ Nor should you too much blame yourselves, either for your calamitous condition, or for the miseries which you now undeservedly² suffer. For my own part, I, who have as little bodily strength to bear up as any of you (*nay*, ye see to what a condition sickness has reduced me!³), I, who was once thought fortunate⁴ and in prosperity, both in private life and otherwise, inferior to none, am now exposed to⁵ the same danger as the meanest of you!

"And yet my life has been habitually occupied in all accustomed devout observances towards the gods, and actions just and irreproachable towards men.⁶ Hence, however, I

¹ *For some have been saved, &c.*] Hence may be seen the sense of a passage of Euripides, which has been wrongly treated by the commentators, Hippol. 702. ἀλλ' ἰστί κάκ τῶνδε ὥστε σωθῆναι. The τῶνδε is emphatical.

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This, indeed, would not seem to be a good topic of consolation; for Pausanias 4, 11, 2. has truly said, πεφύκασι δὲ πῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα ἔχειν ἀκρατῶς πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἄξιαν. But, in fact, the orator only adverts to it indirectly, and does not make it a topic, or argument.

³ *Nay, ye see, &c.*] With the sentiment I would compare Soph. Trach. 1081. ἴδου θεῖσθε πάντες ἄθλιον δέμας, δρᾶτε τὸν δύστηνον, ὡς οἰκτρῶς ἔχω. Eurip. Hippol. 1393 ὁρᾷς με ὡς ἔχω, τὸν ἄθλιον. Eurip. Troad. 113. δύστηνος ἔγω τῆς βαρυνδαίμονος Ἀρθρων κλίσσιος, ὡς διάκειμαι. Herodian l. 1, 4, 2. ἄχθεσθαι ἐφ' οἷς ὁρᾶτε με διακείμενον.

⁴ *Fortunate.*] Nicias was always esteemed fortunate. So Alcibiades l. 6, 17. says, ἔως ἐγὼ τε ἐτι ἀεμάζω μετ' αὐτῆς, καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχῆς δοκεῖ εἶναι.

⁵ *Exposed to.*] Or, *tossed out*. So, in a physical sense, Eurip. Cycl. πόλιν Σάλασσα χρόνον ἐνιυρούμενον. The passage is imitated by Dio Cass. 1348, 49. οἱ πάνιν εὖ πράττοντες ἐξ ἰσοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθύνονται.

⁶ *And yet my life, &c.*] He might have truly added, "and liberally charitable." To his devotional exercises we have the testimony of Aristoph. Eq. 30. Νικίας — κράτιστα τοῖνυν τῶν παρόντων ἰστί νῦν, θεῶν ὄντε προσπείνῃσι πρὸς βριτάς. Δημ. Βριτάς; ποῖον βριτάς; ἰτεὸν ἡγέῃ γὰρ θεούς; Νικ. Ἐγώ γε. Δημ. Ποῖω χρώμενος τεκμηρίω; Νικ. Ὅτι θεοῖσιν ἐχθρὸς εἰμ' οὐκ ἀεσέως.

It is well observed by Mitford, "that this passage is highly interesting, as marking the opinion entertained of the Divine Providence by a man of exalted rank, of extensive information and experience, just, and religiously disposed, but never taught to consider this life as a state of probation, and to expect, in futurity, the reward of good or the punishment of evil deeds." Such, it may be added, was the general spirit and sentiment of the heathens. Thus Virg. Æn. 2, 689. Jupiter omnipotens — hoc tantum — et, si pietate.

entertain a confident hope of the future — though, indeed, misfortunes so unmerited may well cast us down. But, perhaps, they may even cease; for our enemies have had sufficient good fortune; and if by this expedition we have incurred the displeasure⁷ of any of the gods, we have been already sufficiently punished. Thus others⁸ elsewhere have heretofore attacked their neighbours, and, having done what men are accustomed to do, have suffered what men are able to bear.⁹ We therefore may justly hope that we shall receive milder treatment at the hands of the gods; for surely we are objects rather of their pity, than their wrath, or envy.¹⁰ And truly, when you

meremur, Da deinde auxilium, &c. Dorville Charit. p. 492. remarks: "Non raro sacrificia et alia merita dūs quasi *exprobrant*." We cannot, therefore, expect that Nicias should have risen above his age; though, at the same time, his words need not be too rigorously interpreted.* We ought not surely, as Mitford seems inclined to do, to account the sentiment as one of *Thucydides's*.

⁷ *Displeasure*.] Or, "envy and displeasure;" for *ἐνρίδονοι* denotes as much. It is well known that the antients did not scruple to ascribe to their gods, among other human passions, that of envy, and even envy of men and their too great success. Of this Homer, Herodotus, and Virgil supply abundant examples.

It is probable, however, though Nicias so spoke, that he did not believe any such envious *νέμεσις* of the gods existed in this case; but really thought that the injustice of their cause had provoked the wrath and drawn down the judgments of the gods: and we may suppose he only uses the words he does to avoid giving offence to his Athenian hearers. That such was his real meaning is clear from what follows.

⁸ *Thus others, &c.*] Mitford ably paraphrases thus: "We are not the first who have drawn our swords in the attempt, unjustifiable be it confessed, to subjugate and reduce to slavery our fellow-creatures, and seize to ourselves their possessions. In doing thus, doing only what is ordinary among men, others have suffered for it only what men may bear."

⁹ *What men are able to bear.*] Thus in Genesis 4, 15. "my punishment is greater than I can bear."

¹⁰ *We are objects rather, &c.*] These and the words following, "ye need not feel utter dependency," may, perhaps, justly be thought to savour too much of that drooping spirit which it was the professed object of the orator to raise. Such language it was especially injudicious to use, since it was, by the superstition of the antients, regarded as *ominous*. It has been truly observed by Æschylus Suppl. 530. Schutz. *ἀνὶ δ' ἀνάντων ἐστὶ δαίμ' ἐξαισίων* (*inaustum*).

* Especially the *δρασεῖα ἐλπίς* of the recent editors; *δρασεῖα* being for *δραπέα*. And indeed Goeller, though he adopts *δρασεῖα* (from Bekker), seems to incline to *δραπέα*. But though neither he nor Bekker has adduced any reasons for the preference of *δραπέα*, yet it is undoubtedly more Attic: thus Æschyl. Choeph. 1409. *ἐν δ' ἀλκῆς δραπέα ἐλπίς*. Eurip. Androm. 444. *οὐκοῦν δραπέα γ' αὐτὸν ἐλπίς ἀναμένει*. Æschyl. 965. *οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἔχων ἐλπίδος φίλον δράσας*; and 1412; so also *δράσας* for *δράπος* occurs frequently in the Tragedians.

(and they had intended to destroy *all*), the rest they were allowed to take, without molestation, just as they found each stranded, and thus they hauled them off to the city.

LXXV.¹ After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged that sufficient preparation had been made, the army took their departure, on the third day after the sea-fight. And a wretched departure it was², not only for the peculiar circumstances of it, as that they were retreating with the loss of all their ships, and, instead of the lofty hopes³ they had formed, were both themselves and the state in peril; nay, also, because it happened, that, in the abandonment of the camp, many mournful objects presented themselves to the sight, and struck home to the heart of every one. For, as the dead lay unburied, when any one saw a friend stretched out, he was struck at once with grief and fear. Nay, the living objects, the wounded and the sick who were left behind, were objects of greater grief and pity than the dead⁴: for by resorting to supplica-

tuation of Haack. It were as improbable that the *Syracusans* should, under existing circumstances, burn the ships, as it was probable that the *Athenians* would do so. Besides, Diodorus testifies that the Athenians burnt some of them. Aristides, indeed, t. 2, 131., reckons this burning of the triremes among the other misfortunes of the Athenians. But it may be supposed, that he only considers the *necessity* for their being burnt as the real calamity.

¹ This whole chapter is closely imitated by Dio Cass. p. 269 and 270.

On the third day.] Namely, according to the usual mode of reckoning among not only the Greeks but the Hebrews, and all the antients, who reckoned the day on which any action occurred as the first day, the next as the second, and so forth. Of this, examples are frequent in the New Testament.

² *And a wretched departure it was, &c.*] It is truly remarked by Mitford, that "the pen of Thucydides and the language of Athens are wanting to describe adequately the scene presenting itself upon that occasion; when, in the bitterness of antient warfare, every horror offered itself to expectation, that the human body can suffer, or the human mind conceive." The present recital may, indeed, be reckoned among the most pathetic and touching that were ever penned.

³ *Instead of the lofty hopes, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "No light distress arose from the reflection that, instead of fulfilling the lofty hopes of their enterprise, the whole of so powerful a fleet was destroyed; that, through their failure, ruin threatened their country; and that, instead of returning, as they had so lately, with reason, expected, conquerors of Sicily, an ignominious flight was their only, and that almost a hopeless, resource for avoiding slavery or death."

⁴ *Objects of greater pity than the dead.*] This may easily be conceived, when we consider the peculiar bitterness and atrocity of antient warfare.

tions and wailings they threw them into utter perplexity, entreating to be taken, and crying aloud to such of their friends or acquaintances as they saw; hanging, too, by their departing comrades⁵, or following them as far as their powers enabled them; and then, just as they were deserted by strength of body, were left behind, not without a few entreaties⁶ and wailing and moans. Insomuch that the whole army was dissolved in tears, and thrown into such irresolution, that it could with difficulty depart, though from an enemy's country; and after having already suffered (and fearing, for the unseen future, yet to suffer) more than tears could adequately bewail.⁷

How different in modern and especially recent times, when war (thanks to the spirit of His religion who came to preach peace on earth) is stripped of half its horrors!

Mitford depicts the present scene in the following words: "Yet the voices and actions of the many living, whom wounds or sickness disabled for the march — their complaints, their expostulations, their prayers, their embraces, and the painful yet fruitless endeavours of some to follow their friends, were still more distressing than the compunction which arose from the neglect, impious as it was deemed, but so far excusable as it was unavoidable, of the still and silent dead."

⁵ *Hanging, too, by, &c.*] I know not why the translators should understand this of hanging by their necks, "throwing their arms about their necks," as Smith renders. It may be understood in a far more general sense, that of clinging by their vestments.

This passage is imitated by Dio Cass. 270, 36-89. and Appian, t. 1, 201, 10. And hence may be emended Athenæus, p. 257. τοῦ νεανίσκου τὴν χεῖρά παρείκοτος — ἐκπρεμύμενος ταύτῃ, κατέψυχε, where read ταυτῆς and κατέψυχε.

⁶ *Entreaties.*] Literally, "obtestations," conjuring them by the gods. The ἐκδυσασμῶν is wrongly rendered by Hobbes, *imprecations*; and by Smith, "a shower of curses." Such a sense is neither supported by usage nor agreeable to what follows. Though the expression was so understood by Dio Cass. 270, 57. seqq. Goeller has well discerned the sense; and he appeals to Suidas ἐκδυσασμοὶ πρὸς θεὸν ἱκεσίαι, who, after citing these words of Thucydides, adds τοῦτέστι θείων ἐπικλήσεων.*

I have not thought proper to adopt the conjecture of the critics, πολλῶν for ὀλίγων: it is both destitute of authority, and unnecessary. The sense is "a few;" namely, such as their strength would allow, and the time permit.

⁷ *Suffer more than, &c.*] This elegance (a kindred one to another in Herodotus, cited by Wasse) has been imitated by several writers, very many passages from whom I shall adduce in my edition. Suffice it for the present to advert to the Shakspearian dict, "Light sorrows speak, great grief is dumb," which seems founded on that of Seneca, "Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent."

* It is strange that Goeller should not have perceived that in that Lexicographer, for θεὸν should be θεῶν, and probably for θείων, θεῶν.

There was, moreover, a deep dejection⁸ and extreme self-reproach. Indeed, they were like nought else but the population (and that not small) of a city reduced by siege, and making their escape⁹; for the whole multitude that went on the march¹⁰ amounted to not less than forty thousand.¹¹ And of these not only the great bulk carried what each was able that would be useful, but the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to custom, themselves carried their provisions under their armour, partly through want of servants, partly through distrust; for some had before deserted to the enemy, and at present the greater part left them. However, even thus, they carried scarcely sufficient for their supply; for there were no longer any stores of provisions¹² in the camp. No, nor was the circumstance that *others* were suffering also¹³, and that there was an equal participation of evil¹⁴ (which however brings some alleviation, namely, that it is borne with many¹⁵), even *thus*, at

⁸ *Deep dejection.*] Hobbes and Smith render *κατάρψια*, "a hanging down of the head:" but that is being needlessly literal. Indeed, the word properly denotes a casting down of the *eyes*. So Hippocrates says *κατάρψεις ὀφθαλμοί*, and *κατάρψια τὰ ὄμματα*. See Foesii Œc. Hippocr. So also Eurip. Heracl. 633. *τὶ χροῖμα κείσαι, καὶ κατάρψεις ὄμμι' ἔχειν*. But it is used in a metaphorical sense by Homer Il. π. 498. *σοὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ — κατάρψειν καὶ ὄνειδος ἴσσομαι*, as also by many of the historians, as Dionys. Hal., Josephus, and Procopius, who have imitated this fine passage.

⁹ *Like naught else, &c.*] Of this passage Goeller has noticed imitations in Nicol. Damasc. and others. To which may be added closer ones in Joseph. 129, 21. *οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλῳ ἢ πόλει μετανισταμένη καὶ καθυδρομένη ἴκει*. Dio Cass. 270, 46. Dionys. Hal. 376, 15. Plutarch Phoc. c. 28. Livy l. 5, 3. "*cursus clamorque haud multum a pavore captæ urbis abesse.*"

¹⁰ *That went on the march.*] This is said in exclusion of such as were left behind in the fortifications.

¹¹ *Forty thousand.*] The historian has been so careful to state this as the number of the *whole multitude* (ὄχλος), including the very numerous camp-followers of every kind, that it is strange that Ælian Var. Hist. should be so negligent as to narrate that forty thousand *heavy-armed* perished in Sicily. The same error, indeed, has been committed by Isocrates de Pace, § 29. p. 280. Lang. and Libanius Orat. p. 399. B., in both which cases the speakers caught at the number in Thucydides, and founded on it an oratorical exaggeration.

¹² *Stores of provisions.*] Such seems to be the sense of *οἵοις ἦν*: for provisions, it is clear, there were. Hobbes renders: "for not a jot more of provisions was left remaining in the camp."

¹³ *Others were suffering also.*] Ἄλλῃ is here used in a manner, I conceive, unperceived.

¹⁴ *Participation of evil.*] Dionys. Hal. p. 435. has *κακῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἰσομοῖα*. He, indeed, often uses the word *ἰσομοῖα*.

¹⁵ *Brings some alleviation, &c.*] This is imitated by Dio Cass. p. 322, 64. *ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοπαθεῖς συνουσία ἱερὴ τῶν αὐτοῖς κοίφισιν*. So also

the present thought to be tolerable ; especially when they considered *from* how great an original splendour and glory *to* what a catastrophe and lowly estate they were reduced. For this, truly, was the greatest reverse that ever happened to a Grecian army, inasmuch as they had to depart, instead of enslaving others (for which they came), with the fear rather themselves to suffer the same ¹⁶; and instead of the prayers and pæans with which they sailed, to set out in return with omens and presages ¹⁷ the very contrary; that they were going as landmen instead of seamen, and relied, not on their navy, but their land forces. However, through the greatness of the danger ¹⁸ yet suspended over their heads, even all these afflictive circumstances seemed to be tolerable.

LXXVI. And now Nicias, perceiving the army to be exceedingly dispirited, and considering the reverse of fortune in which it was situated ¹, went up to them, heartening and comforting them as far as circumstances would permit ²; and as he advanced along the line, through zeal and earnestness, used a louder tone of voice than usual, desirous that the sound of his words might produce the most extensive benefit.

Joseph. 766, 51. φέρειν καὶ κόβεισιν. With the sentiment I would compare Soph. Aj. 654. παραμυθία γὰρ τις ἐστὶ τὸ μετίζειν τινὰ τῶν τοῦ γένους τῶν αὐτῶν κακῶν.

¹⁶ *Inasmuch as they had to depart, &c.*] I know not whether it be possible to come nearer to the original. Hobbes renders thus: "For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves themselves."

¹⁷ *Omens and presages.*] Not *maledictions*, as Hobbes renders. Duker aptly cites the Hesychian gloss, *ολωνισμοί*. It may be added, that *ἐπιφήμισμα* is used in a good sense by Dio Cass. 210, 10. 764, 30. Joseph. 1303, 27. παντοίους ἐπιφημίσμασι χρώμενοι. Orat. 309. B.

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* Especially the *δρασεῖα* *ἐλπίς* of the recent editors; *δρασεῖα* being for *δρασεῖα*. And indeed Goeller, though he adopts *δρασεῖα* (from Bekker), seems to incline to *δρασεῖα*. But though neither he nor Bekker has adduced any reasons for the preference of *δρασεῖα*, yet it is undoubtedly more Attic: thus Æschyl. Choeph. 1409. *ἐπ' ἀληθῆς δρασεῖα ἐλπίς*. Eurip. Androm. 444. *οὐκοῦν δρασεῖα γ' αἰτὸν ἐλπίς ἀναμένει*. Æschyl. 965. *οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἔχων ἐλπίδος φίλον δράσας*, and 1412; so also *δράσας* for *δράσας* occurs frequently in the Tragedians.

survey¹¹ yourselves, and see how numerous and brave are the embattled squadrons of heavy-armed in which we march forth, ye need not feel utter despondency; but may reflect that wherever you may fix yourselves, you are yourselves a state¹², and such as no other in Sicily could easily withstand when coming upon¹³ them, nor remove when settled. Now as to your march, that it may be secure and orderly, be that your own watchful care, thinking each of you of nothing but, in whatever place he may be compelled to fight, to lay hold of and occupy *that* as his country and castle. You must, however, press forward with all diligence, alike by night and by day (for our stock of provisions is but scanty), by which if we reach some friendly part of the country of the Siculi (for they, through fear of the Syracusans, are yet faithful to us), then account yourselves in safety. A message has been sent to them¹⁴, both to meet us at an appointed place, and withal¹⁵ to bring provisions. Upon the whole, be assured, comrades, that it is necessary for you to act the part of brave men, since there is no place whither, should you give way, you can save yourselves. Whereas, if you now escape your enemies, both the *rest* of you will obtain what you desire again to see, and

¹¹ *And truly when you survey, &c.*] It is plain that this commences a new sentence, though all the editions connect it with the foregoing. This Mitford seems to have been aware of, and he skilfully introduces it in his paraphrase thus: "Confiding thus far in the divine mercy, let us look to what, mere human things considered, our circumstances are, and surely we ought not to despond. Such a force," &c.

¹² *A state.*] i. e. not merely an army, but a commonwealth. So Zonaras Lex. 1565. πόλις. σύστημα· ἱδρυμένον κατὰ νόμον διοικούμενον. Herodian 1, 6, 14. ἐκεῖ τε ἡ 'Ρώμη, ὅπου ποτ' ἄν ὁ βασιλεὺς ᾗ. Ovid. "omne solum forti patria est." Liv. 9, 4. "Sed hic patriam video, hic quidquid Romanarum legionum est."

¹³ *Coming upon.*] i. e. with the view of occupying a situation.

¹⁴ *A message has been sent to them.*] I have here followed the reading of three MSS. προτίπεμπται, which has been edited by Hack, Bekker, and Goeller. Such, indeed, I many years ago considered as the true reading.

The time at which the messengers had been sent off was, doubtless, the night of the last fatal defeat.

¹⁵ *Withal.*] The reading of all the MSS. is ἄλλα, i. e. *other* provisions. But though the commentators make no objection to it, it really cannot be tolerated; and when it is considered how trifling is the difference between 'AAAA' and 'AMA, few will hesitate to believe that I have rightly conjectured. The air of the sentence, it may be observed, is very much like that of the Apostle to Philemon, ver. 22. "Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἐτοιμαζώ μοι ξενίαν."

the *Athenians* will re-erect the mighty power of their state, however fallen; for the strength of a city consists in *men*, not walls, nor ships, destitute of defenders." ¹⁶

LXXVIII. Nicias, having addressed this exhortation, at the same time advanced to the army, and where he saw any party straggling, or not marching in rank, he brought it into compact form, and put it in array. And Demosthenes did the same towards his own men ¹, after having addressed them ² to much the same effect. And now marched forward ranged in a hollow square (or long parallelogram ³), first the division of Nicias, which formed the van, and after it that of Demosthenes, which brought up the rear.⁴ The baggage-bearers and rest of the multitude ⁵ the heavy-armed received within the square.

¹⁶ *The strength of a city, &c.*] Wasse compares a very similar sentiment in Soph. (Ed. t. 53., and Duker one from Justin. 2, 12. To which passages may be added the following close imitations: Dio Cass. 811, 49. ἀνδρῶποι γὰρ πον πόλις ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκία οὐδὲ στρατ, οὐδὲ ἀγοραί, ἀνδρῶ εἶναι. where for ἔστιν I conjecture εἶναι, which is required by propriety of language and by the sense. Lucian t. 2. 900, 13. Themist. p. 184. Α. εἰ γε ἀνδρες ἡ πόλις. See also Philostr. Vit. Ap. 1. 8, 18. Anonym. ap. Suid. Eurip. Phryx. frag. 9. Æschyl. Pers. 355. Alcæi frag. 9. (Mus. Crit. 1, 426.) Plutarch Lycurg. c. 19. Lycurg. Contr. L. p. 153, 41. Philostr. Vit. Ap. 1, 39, and 4, 7. This passage was had in view by Aristid. t. 2. 371. c. Aristides t. 3. 339. A. says, that the sentiment brought forward by so many writers was borrowed from Alcæus.

¹ *His own men.*] Namely, those of his own division; for though nothing has been said of any such division being made, yet in all great armies it was usual, as we have lately seen in the case of the first Athenian expedition to Sicily.

² *Addressed them.*] From the specimens we have had of the spirit-stirring oratory of this heroic officer and truly great man, one cannot but wish the harangue in question had been preserved.

³ *A long parallelogram.*] See note on l. 6, 67., to which may be added the following illustrations: Xen. Anab. 3, 2, 36. ἀσφαλίστερον ἡμῖν πορεύεσθαι πλαισίων ποιησαμένους τῶν ὅπλων, ἵνα τὰ σκευόφρα καὶ ὁ πολλὸς ὄχλος ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ ᾖ. Polyæn. 3, 10, 7. ἔταξε τὸ στρατόπεδον εἰς ἐτερόμηνες πλινθίων, τὰ μὲν σκευόφρα, καὶ τὴν ἵππον εἰς τὸ μέσον λαβῶν. Arrian Tact. p. 69. Πλαίσιον δὲ ὀνομάζεται, ὅπταν πρὸς πάσας τὰς πλευρὰς παρατάηται τὰς ἐν ἐτερομήκει σχήματι. Πλινθίων δὲ, κ. τ. λ.

⁴ *The van, &c., the rear.*] In this arrangement there was much judgment shown; for the command of the rear division was a much more arduous office, and therefore fittest for the youth, strength, and energy of Demosthenes.

⁵ *Multitude.*] Namely, light-armed of every class, and also camp-followers of every description.

When they were arrived at the ford of the river Anapus⁶, they found there a party of the Syracusans and allies drawn up in battle-array against them. These they routed, and having gained the passage, they went forward. The Syracusans, however, pressed hard upon them, the cavalry riding alongside of them, and the light-armed⁷ pouring in their missiles. Having this day proceeded about forty stadia, the Athenians encamped for the night on a hill.⁸ On the following day, they were on their march early in the morning, and after proceeding about twenty stadia, having descended into a champaign spot, they there encamped, with the intention of procuring some eatables at the houses (for the country was inhabited), and of carrying some water⁹ with them from thence; for, further on, it was, for many stadia of the way they had to pass, not abundant. But in the meantime the Syracusans going forwards, obstructed the passage in the way before them. This was a hill difficult of access, on each side of which was a rocky ravine; and the place was called the Acræum Lepas.¹⁰ On the day following the Athenians went forwards, and the cavalry and darters of the Syracusans and their allies, who were numerous, impeded their progress by launching missiles and riding alongside.¹¹ And for a considerable time the Athenians maintained the combat, but at

⁶ *Ford of the Anapus.*] This must have been near at hand, unless they traversed the river bank in order to find a ford higher up; for, according to Swinburne, the river is very deep towards the mouth.

⁷ *The cavalry, &c.*] These bodies usually acted together in harassing the march of a retreating army.

⁸ *On a hill.*] This may distinctly be fixed by the excellent map of Captain Smyth.

⁹ *Water.*] This, in the fainting heat of a Sicilian autumn, was one of the most essential necessities.

¹⁰ *Acræum Lepas.*] i. e. the peak of the heights. 'Αρπαῖον is merely an adjective from ἀρπα; and λίπας denotes a rough, bare heath. So Hesych. explains it ἀσπόρατον, Suidas ἀσπορήμιον, and the Scholiast on Theocritus, cited by Vales. on Hesych., ἀκρον τοῦ ὄρους. This sense λίπας derives from λίπω, to strip bare, peel off. Hence may be seen the sense of the controverted expression, πύρα λίπας, in Theocrit. Idyll. 1, 40. It undoubtedly signifies a rough rock.

The appellation may, therefore, be compared with that of the Swiss mountain, the *Schrick horn* (i. e. cleft horn). Now this Acræum Lepas, Thucydides says, was difficult of access; not inaccessible, as Smith renders.

¹¹ *Riding alongside.*] Thus gradually confining the line within narrower and narrower limits, and consequently disordering the ranks.

last were obliged to retreat back to the same camp, where they had no longer an equal supply of provisions¹²; for it was impracticable to go far from the main body, because of the cavalry.

LXXIX. Early in the morning they decamped, and again proceeding, forced their way to the fortified hill.¹ There they found in their front, above the embattled wall, the enemy's infantry, ranged many deep, for the place was narrow. And the Athenians making a charge endeavoured to storm the wall, but, being assailed with numerous missiles from the hill (which was steep, and made the weapons sure of their aim), and being unable to force the work, they again retreated and took some rest. There happened, too, to come on a storm of thunder and rain, such as at the autumn (which was now coming on) is usual. At this, however, the Athenians were yet more dispirited, and thought that all these things were in combination for their destruction.² While they were resting themselves, Gylippus and the Syracusans send a detachment of the army to again block them up on the rear and on the road which they had before come. But they too made a counter-movement of some forces, and prevented its execution. And after, the Athenians, retreating with their whole force further into the plain, there encamped for the night. The next day they went forward, and the Syracusans made attacks on every side, wounding many; and when the Athenians advanced

¹² *An equal supply of provisions.*] Smith wrongly renders: "all further supplies of provisions were totally cut off."

¹ *The fortified hill.*] Mitford makes them *now* only approach the Acræum Lepas, whereas they had attempted it the *day before*. He also speaks of "errors of conduct having occurred in the opinion of Thucydides." The historian has, however, given no opinion. "By their slowness," Mitford observes, "the generals lost the opportunity of gaining the Acræum Lepas." And, indeed, it does seem that they lost the only chance of carrying the hill in question, by not going forward when they had descended to the plain mentioned. But the stopping there was rather their *misfortune* than their *fault*; for it seems they were in great want of provisions, and water it was indispensably necessary to procure *here*.

² *All these things were, &c.*] Or, were ominous of their destruction. It is here sensibly remarked by Mitford, that "as constant exertion tends to maintain the animation which success has raised, so new and unexpected opposition commonly enhances the depression of the unfortunate." This had before happened in the case of the Syracusans. See c. 6, 70.

upon them, they retreated, but when the other party retreated, they pressed upon them, especially falling upon the hindmost, thus trying, by routing them in detail, to throw the whole army into alarm.³ And for a considerable time the Athenians held out in this sort of combat, but after proceeding five or six stadia, they rested in the plain; the Syracusans, too, having retired from them to their own camp.

LXXX. At night, it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes, since the army was now in a wretched condition for want of provisions, and many were disabled by wounds in the numerous charges made upon them by the enemy, to draw off the forces, (after kindling numerous fires,) not, indeed, by the way they had intended to go¹, but the contrary to that which the Syracusans were guarding, namely, towards the sea. Now, the whole of that course for the army was not in the direction of Catana², but towards the other side of Sicily, by Camarina and Gela, and the cities there, both Grecian and Barbarian. Having therefore lighted numerous fires, they marched off in the night. And (as it is usual for all armies, especially very large ones, to be seized with affright and panic

³ *Thus trying, by, &c.*] Smith renders, "if at any time they put small parties to flight, they struck a consternation into the whole army." Such, however, is certainly not the sense; and though the Latin translators vary, yet no one of them gives the least countenance to *this*. It can be no other than that above assigned. On this sense of *ἐπειράω* see Matthiæ's Greek Grammar, § 526. and my note on Acts 27, 12., where I render *ἐπειράω δύναντο*, "to try whether they could." Indeed, some such verb is constantly to be understood.

¹ *The way they had intended to go.*] Namely, to the inland parts occupied by the Siculi; for, by the latter part of Nicias's speech, it is plain that such was their intention.

² *Not in the direction of Catana.*] This is merely mentioned to instruct the less-informed reader what was the direction of the course they were now going to pursue. It was *not* to Catana, but in the opposite direction. And as most knew how Catana was situated in respect of Syracuse, they would also know what was the course the Athenians were now about to take. Yet some antients, as Diodorus and Pausanias, and several moderns, maintain from this passage, that their route had hitherto been in the direction of Catana; which is impossible, from what Thucydides has just said. Their route, he tells us, had been in the opposite direction to the sea-coast: but such could not take them to Catana. It may, however, be true, that their final destination was Catana: and this deceived the writers in question.

terrors ³, particularly when marching by night, and through a hostile country, and with the enemy near at hand), they were thrown into disorder. The division of Nicias, indeed, as it led the way, kept more together and was far in advance; but that of Demosthenes, which was the half or more, was separated from ⁴ the rest, and marched in disorder.

About daybreak, however, they arrived at the sea-coast, and entering upon what is called the Helorine road ⁵, they went along in order, that when they should be at the river Cacyparis, they might pass along its bank upwards, and so to the inland country ⁶; for they expected that the Siculi whom they had sent for would meet them thereabouts. When they had arrived at the river, they found there likewise a guard of Syracusans blocking up the passage by planting a palisade. Having, however, forced the guard, they passed the river, and again marched on to another river, the Erineus ⁷; for that direction their guides told them to take.

LXXXI. In the meantime the Syracusans and their allies, when it was day, and they found the Athenians had decamped, most of them accused Gylippus ¹ of having knowingly permitted the Athenians to depart. Losing, however, no time in pursuing, by the course which, it was not difficult to find, they had gone, they overtook them about dinner-time. And as soon as they came up with those under Demosthenes, who were the hindmost, and marching more slowly, and in

³ *Panic terrors.*] The term *δέιματα* is a very strong one, and may be illustrated by the following passages: Dionys. Hal. 472, 24. *ταραχαὶ ἐνέπικτον ἐκ δειγμάτων δαιμονίων.* and 628, 8. *δέιματα συνήπτερο δὲ τοῖς ἀνδρωπίνους λογισμοῖς καὶ τὰ θεῖα δέιματα προσγενόμενα.* Soph. El. 411. *ἐκ δέιματος τοῦ νυκτερίου.* Sæpiens. 17, 8. *δέιματα καὶ ταραχὰς ἀπιδάσκειν ψυχῆς νοσοῦσης.* Onosand. p. 92. *τὰ δ' ὁβριῶς δέιγματα προεμπέπτοντα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ταραττεῖ, τ. α.* See also Valckn. on Herod. 4, 103, 5.

⁴ *Was separated from.*] See my note on Luke, 22, 41. and Hemsterhus. on Lucian, t. 1. 256.

⁵ *The Helorine road.*] i. e. the road to Helorus.

⁶ *Upwards, and to the inland country.*] It is plain that they never intended to proceed along the coast to Camarina, or had abandoned that intention.

⁷ *The Erineus.*] Or, fig-tree river. This is a mere rivulet compared with the Cacyparis, and about three miles further on.

¹ *Accused Gylippus.*] In the usual temper of democratical jealousy. (Mitford.)

less order, as having been thrown into confusion in the night, they immediately charged and fought them. And the Syracusan horse the more closely surrounded them, as being separated from the rest, and hemmed them up together.² As to the division of Nicias, it was distant in advance about five stadia; for Nicias led his men more rapidly on³ than Demosthenes, conceiving that their safety consisted in not remaining, as far as in them lay, in such a situation, or fighting, but in retreating as quickly as possible, and fighting only just as far as they were compelled. Demosthenes, however, was involved in more frequent, nay, continual toil, because on him, as he marched on the rear, the enemy chiefly pressed; and now when he saw the Syracusans pursuing him, he did not hold on his way, but⁴ ranged his troops in order of battle⁵, until, by the delay arising from that disposition, he was surrounded by the enemy, and himself and his forces thrown into great disorder; for being hemmed in at a certain spot which was encircled by a wall, and⁶ had approaches at either end (with

² *Hemmed them up together.*] A common expedient to create disorder.

³ *Nicias led his men more rapidly on.*] From the first there seems to have been some difference of opinion, between the Athenian generals, concerning the manner of conducting the retreat. Nicias thought the safety of the army depended, above all things, upon the rapidity of its march; the insult of assault should, therefore, be borne, and halts made to repel attacks, only when they threatened very important injury. This evidently was what Thucydides approved. But Demosthenes was more disposed, on every occasion, to revenge, with the view to deter annoyance. (Mitford.)

⁴ *Did not hold on his way, but, &c.*] This was, undoubtedly, under all circumstances, a blunder, though one into which his characteristic bravery was likely to hurry him. Yet in proportion as he was encompassed with greater difficulties, so should his prudence have been the greater.

It may be proper to remark, that the distance at which the divisions were separated seems partly to have been occasioned by the misinformation of Demosthenes' guides, who took him on to the river Erineus, when he should have turned up by the right bank of the Cacyparis. Thucydides, indeed, does not say so much, but we are left to infer it.

⁵ *Ranged his troops in order of battle.*] Thus changing the order of march, by column in long, hollow parallelogram, into a regular line, with the heavy-armed in front, the light-armed and few cavalry on the flanks, and the baggage-bearers and inefficient multitude in the rear. Now this disposition must have consumed no little time, which gave the enemy leisure to bring round more troops and finally surround him.

⁶ *A certain spot which was encircled by a wall, and, &c.*] The sense is not very clear, but cannot well be that assigned by Smith. Thucydides does not say that the olive trees were at the issues or accesses; and it is very

abundance of olive trees), they were assailed with missiles from every quarter.⁷ Such sort of attacks, and not close combats, the Syracusans, with reason, employed; for to jeopardy their lives against desperate men⁸ like the Athenians, was not so much for *their's* as the *enemy's* advantage; and moreover, each began, upon so decided a success, to feel a sort of parsimony of life, lest he should be destroyed before the end of the business; and they thought that even thus, they might subdue the enemy in this way, and take their prisoners.

LXXXII. Whereupon, after they had poured in their missiles from every quarter on the Athenians and their allies, throughout the day, and saw that they were now much distressed from wounds and various hardships, Gylippus and the Syracusans and their allies first made proclamation, that whoever of the islanders chooses to come to them, and depart¹ with

improbable that they should, for the accesses were probably very narrow. The olive trees, it should seem, were scattered over the whole enclosure, and were probably the chief produce of the ground; and the wall was meant to defend the trees from the browsing of cattle. Now that there were inclosures, sometimes by walls, and sometimes by deep ditches (see l. 1, 106.), we know from various authorities. But what, it may be asked, have the olive trees to do with the matter in question? Probably nothing; and the circumstance only serves to mark the accurate observation of an eye-witness, just as the insertion at St. John, 6, 10. "now there was much grass in the place." But the words seem also to imply that there was something in the situation which particularly exposed the Athenians to missiles. Now this could not be, that the place was walled, and had approaches at either end; but it must have been that the inclosure was a very long parallelogram, so that they were on both, nay, on all sides within reach of the missiles.

⁷ *From every quarter.*] Literally, "by those who stood around." As the phrase βάλλειν περιστάδων is unnoticed by the commentators, the following illustrations may be not unacceptable: Hesych. περιστάδων. περιστάντες. Arrian. E. A. 5, 17, 4. τὰ θήρια περιστάδων βάλλοντες. Dionys. Hal. Ant. 67, 25. περιστάντες ἐβάλλον. Herodot. 7, 225. περιελθόντες περιστάδων. which last passage shows what the sense of περιστάδων properly is.

⁸ *To jeopardy their lives against desperate men, &c.*] A maxim of the antients. Thus the dict σφαλερὸν συμπλέεσθαι τοῖς ἐξ ἀπονοίας ἀναμαχομένοις. And so Xen. Hist. 7, 5, 12. τοῖς ἀπονεινομένοις οὐδεὶς ἀν' ὑποσταίη. Hence is illustrated Joseph. p. 540, 9. δέισας αὐτῶν τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν ὡς ἰσχυρ.

¹ *Depart.*] Not "come over," as the translators render; for ἀπέρχαι can have no such meaning. Besides, had the persons in question come over to the Syracusans, they would have been at once deserters, and no condition as to retaining their freedom would have been necessary. All that was held out was, that if they chose to depart, they should retain their freedom, and consequently be at liberty to return home, or where they pleased. Yet, as

the condition of retaining his freedom, may do so. An offer which was accepted by some few cities², then afterwards, a capitulation was concluded for *all* those under Demosthenes, the conditions being, "that they should surrender their arms, but that no one should be put to death, either by violence, or by severity of bonds, or by want of necessary sustenance."³ Then all surrendered themselves, to the number of six thousand, and the whole of the money in their possession they threw down, and deposited on shields laid on their backs⁴, and they filled four shields.⁵ Then the prisoners were immediately removed to the city. As to Nicias and those under his command, they arrived the same day at the river Erineus, and having crossed it, took post on some high ground.⁶

LXXXIII. The Syracusans having the next day overtaken him, told him that those under Demosthenes had surrendered themselves, and bade *him* do the same. He, however, distrusting the intelligence, requests a safe conduct for sending a horseman to ascertain the truth. And on his return with the report, that they had surrendered themselves, he sends a message by herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, that "he is willing to treat on the basis of this condition, that the

the words ὡς σφᾶς are subjoined, we must regard ἀπύειναι as a *verbum pragnans*, two clauses being here, as often, blended into one.

² *Some few cities.*] Not many, even in so hopeless a situation, when all the evils, that the barbarity of antient warfare could inflict, were impending, would forsake their general and their comrades; an instance of fidelity deserving notice the more, as the common conduct of the Athenians would not seem to merit such attachment from their subjects; and while it does honour to Demosthenes, it certainly reflects some credit on the government of Athens. (Mitford.)

³ *Necessary sustenance.*] Or, as the superlative is used, "absolutely necessary sustenance", "the common necessities of life."

⁴ *Shields laid on their backs.*] Thus ἔντρον χεῖρ signifies the *back* of the hand; and ἔντρον μίση the *back*, as compared with the belly. This I mention, because the force of the word seems to have been misunderstood by the translators.

⁵ *Filled four shields.*] This, again, is a circumstance which marks the minute observation of an eye-witness.

⁶ *Arrived the same day at the river Erineus, &c.*] The following satisfactory solution is given by Mitford of a difficulty which will readily occur to the reader: "Nicias, having ascended some way by the course of the Cacyparis, crossed to the Erineus, passed that stream, considerably above the scene of Demosthenes's fate, and encamped on some high ground near the farther bank."

Athenians shall pay down whatever sum the Syracusans had expended on the war, and that until the money shall be paid he will deliver to them certain Athenians as hostages, one for each talent." ⁷ But the Syracusans and Gylippus rejected the proposals, and, proceeding to the attack, they stationed their troops around, and assailed with missiles these as they had done the other division, until the evening. By that time the Athenians were in a wretched condition, through want of food and other necessaries. However ⁸, waiting for the dead of night, they were going to pursue their march, and were taking up their arms, when the Syracusans perceiving it, sounded the pæan (or alarum). On which the Athenians, finding that they were discovered, laid down their arms again, with the exception of three hundred, who, forcing their way through the guards, marched by night just how and whither they could.

LXXXIV. When it was day, Nicias led the army forward; the Syracusans and their allies still pressing upon them in the same manner, and launching darts and missiles from all sides. And now the Athenians hastened on to the river Assinarus ¹, partly as being urged on every side by the attacks of the numerous horse, and the other multitude (of light-armed), and thinking they should there be more at ease ²; and partly

⁷ *One for each talent.*] See note on l. 3, 70. med. Goeller states from Dorville on Charito p. 286. that in the time of Hermocrates a talent was a medium price for a slave of either sex. From Charito l. 8, 28. and Herod. l. 6, 79. he infers that the price of captives by the lump was much lower. Indeed, upon the whole, the price varied, as in every thing else, according to the rank or station of the person to be redeemed.

Here Nicias (who all along, indeed, did every thing that man could do) acted with the greatest prudence imaginable. His offers to treat on any condition but surrender were, indeed, rejected; but had Demosthenes occupied a post as strong as himself, and made the same proposal, there would have been a tolerable chance of its being accepted. But, indeed, the Syracusans had now fixed their minds on plans of vast extent, and the ruin of Athens was necessary to their accomplishment. It was not likely, therefore, that any such proposals would *now* be accepted.

⁸ *However.*] i. e. notwithstanding their weakness. One cannot but wonder at the daring and activity evinced by Nicias, hardly inferior to that of Demosthenes himself.

¹ *The Assinarus.*] By no means a petty river, and next to the Erineus.

² *Should there be more at ease.*] Literally, "it would be easier for them," "be better for them."

through weariness and desire to drink. When, therefore, they were at the bank, they rushed on, no longer observant of order, but every one anxious himself to pass first; while the enemy pressing hard upon them, made the passage difficult.³ For, being compelled to march on crowded together in a mass, they fell upon and trod each⁴ other under foot; and part perished on the spot from the spears⁵ and utensils⁶, while part, entangled together⁷, were hurried down the stream.⁸ On the other side of the river (whose banks were steep) were posted the Syracusans, who assailed with missiles from above the wretched Athenians, most of them, greedily drinking of the stream, and confusedly huddled together in the

³ *Made the passage difficult.*] What added to the difficulty was the extreme steepness of the banks, and the deepness and rockiness of the channel. "Indeed, Sicily," to use the words of Mitsford, "through the greatest part of its extent is high land, intersected with numerous valleys whose sides are commonly steep, and the banks of the streams flowing through them often craggy."

⁴ *They fell and trod upon, &c.*] So Æschyl. Pers. 512. ἐπιπτον ἀλλήλοιςιν. A similar calamity is recorded by Diod. Sic. t. 7. 190. Bip. See also my note on St. Luke 11, 17.

⁵ *Perished on the spot from the spears.*] The commentators have failed to remark that *περὶ τοῖς δορατίοις διεφθίροντο* is for *διεφθίροντο πεπρόμενοι περὶ τοῖς δορατίοις*: as Diod. Sic. 7, 190. *ἔφθεισε καὶ λόγχοις περιπεπρόμενοι*. and Agath. 100, 9. *τοῖς τῶν φιλτάτων ἔφθεισε περιπταίνοντες*.

⁶ *Utensils.*] Partly, I imagine, for cooking, and partly poles, &c. for tents.

⁷ *Entangled together.*] Such is the sense of *ἐμπαλασσύμενοι*, which is so little understood by the commentators, that the following illustrations may be not unacceptable:

Now, *παλάσσω* and *ἐμπαλάσσω* were Ionic and old Attic. Thus *παλάσσω* in Hesiod Opp. 733. and Hom. Il. A. 169. and l. 5, 55.; and *ἐμπαλάσσω* in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Ælius Dionysius ap. Eustath. In process of time was used by Polybius, Ælian, and Plutarch *ἐμπλάσσεισθαι*; as Polyb. frag. Hist. 11. Plutarch Symp. 2, 683. A. μεθ' ἣν ἐμπλάσσειμενα καὶ παραμένοντα. Sometimes, however, was used *ἐμπλάξισθαι* (so answering to ζ); as Plutarch in Oth. 12. and Dio Cass. 1014. Also *ἐμπελάξισθαι*, as Dio Cass. 105, 40. We have, too, *ἐμπελάω* in Phalar. Ep. 34. *ἐμπελασθεὶς λίουσιν*. and Stob. Ei. Ph. 2, 680. Hence in a passage of Democritus ap. Stob. Ei. Ph. 2, 408. for *ἀμπελάζουσι*, which is a vox nihili, I conjecture *ἐμπελάζουσι*, or *ἐμπλάζουσι*.

In all these words, *παλάσσω*, *ἐμπαλάσσω*, *ἐμπλάω*, *ἐμπελάω*, the ruling signification is *πλέκω* and *ἐμπλέκω*. In *παλάσσω* the various significations arose thus: *necto*, *connecto*, *misceo*, *commisceo*, *conspergo*, *inquino* (and the same may be said of *πλάσσω*, viz. *necto*, *texo*, *struo*, *machinor*, *fingo*, *confinigo*).

⁸ *Hurried down the stream.*] So Aristoph. Acharn. 26. *ἀθροικαταρβύοντες*, where the Scholiast remarks that there is a metaphor *ἀπὸ τῶν ποταμῶν βενυμάτων*.

This is elegantly imitated by Liv. 4, 53. "*alios in aquam compulsoe gurgites ferunt.*"

hollow of the river. And the Peloponnesians⁹ descending, butchered them, especially those in the river, and the water was immediately discoloured; yet it was not the less drunk, mud and all, bloody, too, as it was; nay, to most it was an object of contest.¹⁰

LXXXV. At length, after numerous corpses were now heaped one upon another in the river, and when the army was one scene of carnage, part being slain in the river, and part, if they made their escape thence, by the horse; Nicias surrenders himself to Gylippus (having more confidence in him than in the Syracusans), and bids him and the Lacedæmonians to do what they pleased with himself, but to cease slaughtering the rest of his troops.¹ Whereupon Gylippus gave

⁹ *Peloponnesians.*] Longinus, in citing this passage, reads *Syracusans*, which Düker thinks the true reading, "since nothing was before said of the *Peloponnesians*, and the *Syracusans* are again mentioned: nor can it be seen why the *Peloponnesians* should be mentioned." But this criticism, though approved by some editors, seems to be very unsound. Their not having been mentioned of late, is no reason why they should not be mentioned *here*. The present service was a dangerous one (namely, attacking men driven to despair), and, therefore, the *Peloponnesians* (being by far the best and steadiest troops) were the fittest for it: and as we before have learned that the *Syracusans* began to be chary of their personal safety, they would gladly put *them* upon it. Besides, as Gylippus is just afterwards mentioned, we can hardly doubt but that he was there at the head of the *Peloponnesians*: and when Nicias was induced, for security, to surrender himself to *Gylippus*, and not to the *Syracusans*, it must have been because Gylippus had a strong corps of *Peloponnesians*, who could defend the prisoners from the fury of the *Syracusans*. As to the reading of Longinus, it may very well be accounted for: the passage seems to have been cited from memory, or, at least, with very cursory inspection; and certainly, in such a case, any one would be inclined to write *Syracusans* rather than *Peloponnesians*. And when it is added, that not a single MS. has *Συρακοῖσι*, a case is made out for the common reading so strong that no reasonable doubt can be entertained of its correctness.

¹⁰ *Object of contest.*] It is remarkable that *περὶμάχης* is almost always used in a *metaphorical* sense, to denote what is highly desirable. I have, however, noted the *natural* sense in Plato de Legg. 815. *περὶμάχης ἦν αὐτοῖς ἡ τροφή*. Procop. de Edif. p. 27, 17. Aristot. Eth. l. 9, 8. See Hemsterhus on Lucian, t. 1, 540. and Wesseling on Diod. Sic. t. 2, 196, 1.

¹ *Surrenders himself to Gylippus, &c.*] It is strange that Mitford should omit to narrate the heroic and moving manner in which the surrender was made by Nicias. Throughout, indeed, the whole of the extreme distresses of the Athenians, this general had acted a most noble part; and though sinking under sickness and fatigue, he acquitted himself as heroically as his colleague had ever done at any period. It is therefore surprising that the

orders "to make prisoners." And the rest, such as had not concealed themselves (who were many), they collected together. They sent also a party in pursuit of those three hundred who made their way through the guards by night, and they apprehended them. However, what was collected together in common of the army was not considerable, but what was privately secreted ² was great, insomuch that the whole of Sicily was filled with them, since they were not taken on capitulation, as those with Demosthenes. But no inconsiderable portion was slain; for the carnage was very great, and inferior to none in this Sicilian ³ [or Grecian] war. No inconsiderable number had

Athenians (as appears from Pausan 1, 29, 9.) should have refused to permit his name to be inserted on the column with those that had fallen in the service of their country in Sicily: *καταγνώσθεις*, Pausanias says, *αἰχμάλωτος ἐθελοντὴς εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνὴρ πολέμῳ πρέπων*. Nothing, however, could be more unjust, not to say ungrateful. From the strong expression *διεφθαρμένου τοῦ στρατεύματος* it is quite clear that the army was utterly broken and destroyed *as an army*, and that therefore a *capitulation* was out of the question, and nothing remained but to surrender at discretion, which Nicias effected in the most prudent manner; and his conduct shows the most anxious interest for the safety of his countrymen. Inasmuch that his words and manner bear some faint resemblance to the great model of perfection when (as we learn from St. John 17, 8.) he exclaimed, "If, then, ye seek me, let these go their way."

This will be no improper place to introduce and consider an anecdote preserved to us by Pausanias, and founded, perhaps, on the authority of Philistus, or Timæus, or Ephorus. It occurs in l. 7, 16, 3. where he records the magnanimous conduct of Καλλίστρατος ὁ Ἐμπίδου πρὸς Ἀθηναίους: *τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἱππαρχήσαντι ἐν Σικελίᾳ, οἳ τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τοῦ στόλου μετισχέκισαν, ἀπώλλυντο πρὸς τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Ἀσινάρῳ. τότε τῷ Καλλίστρατῳ παρίσχετο τόλμα διεκπύσαι διὰ τῶν πολεμίων, ἄγοντι τοὺς ἱππίας. ὥς δὲ τὸ πολὺ ἀπίσσωσεν αὐτῶν ἐς Κατάνην, ἀνίστρεφεν ὀπίσω τὴν αὐτὴν αὖθις ὁδὸν ἐς Συρακούσας, διαρπάζοντας περὶ τὸ Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, καταβάλλει τε ὅσον πέντε ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ τραύματα ἱππικαῖρα αὐτοῖς καὶ ὀπίσσω λαβόντες ἀφίαισι τὴν ψυχὴν. οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἀγαθὴν δόξαν Ἀθηναίους καὶ αὐτῷ κτώμενος, περιεποιήσθαι τε, ὣν ἤρχε, καὶ ἐτελεύτησεν αὐτὸς ἐκουσίως.*

I must not omit to observe, that the estimate made by Diodorus Siculus of the slain on the occasion, namely, eighteen thousand, seems incredibly large. He says, besides, that seven thousand were made prisoners. But if we take into the account the considerable number that *escaped*, or were concealed by private persons, it will raise the amount of this division to something near thirty thousand, which is inconsistent with the words of Thucydides, that the division of Nicias was the *half*, or *more*. I suspect, then, that Diodorus wrote *ὀκτακίχλους*: and that the *μυρίους* (written *μυρ.*) arose from the *μὲν* preceding.

² *Privately secreted.*] Or, "embezzled;" namely, by the individual captors, for the purpose of being sold as slaves.

³ *Sicilian.*] The Scholiast and many critics read *Grecian*. And there is great reason to think this the true reading, inasmuch as it is the more diffi-

fallen in the various attacks, which were frequent, made on them during the march. Many, however, too, escaped, some immediately, and others afterwards, when in slavery, contrived to effect their escape. To all these Catana was constantly a place of refuge.

LXXXVI. The Syracusans and their allies being collected together, and having taken as many prisoners as they could, returned with them and the spoils to the city. And the rest of the Athenians and their allies whom they took they thrust down into Latomia (or stone quarries¹), considering that as the surest custody; but Nicias and Demosthenes they put to death², though against the will of Gylippus; for he conceived

cult one, and was more likely to be altered into the other than *vice versa*.

¹ *Latomia, or stone-quarries.*] Namely, those from whence the city had been built; called at the present day *le tagliate*. Goeller de Situ. refers to Breval. itin. t. 1. p. 22. Cluver. S. A. p. 180. seqq. L. B. Cic. 2. Verr. 5, 27. Fazell. de reb. Sic. Dec. 1, 1, 4. c. 1. p. 82. Wass on Thucyd. 7, 87. Perizon. on Ælian Var. Hist. 12, 44. Letronne p. 99. Dorville Sicul. p. 178. seq. 181. seq. 194. seq. Brydone, t. 1. p. 251. seqq.

From Aristid. t. 3, 381. A. it appears that the place was afterwards converted into the public prison. See also Polyæn. 5, 37. and Athen. p. 7. A. It appears, too, from Livy, l. 32, 26. that the word Latomia came to be a common name for a prison.

Much to the present purpose is the following passage of Cicero on the Lautumia, cited by Goeller: Lautumias Syracusanas omnes audistis, plerique nôstis. Opus est ingens, magnificum regum ac tyrannorum. Totum est ex saxo in mirandam altitudinem depresso et multorum operis penitus exciso, ideoque quanquam *δορυαστον* nihil tam clausum ad exitus, nihil tam septum undique, nihil tam tutum ad custodias nec fieri, nec cogitari potest. In has lautumias, si qui publice custodiendi sunt, etiam ex ceteris oppidis Siciliæ deduci imperantur.

² *Nicias and Demosthenes they put to death.*] This was certainly one of the most atrocious deeds ever perpetrated, of which the base violation of faith was equal to the ingratitude. From Diodorus and Plutarch it appears to have been done by a decree of the sovereign people, at the suggestion, Diodorus tells us, of Diocles, the leader of a democratical party and the perpetual opponent of Hermocrates; for, though Timæus charges it upon Hermocrates, yet that is justly supposed to have been a mere calumny arising from the party politics of his time. It may seem strange that such an atrocity should be sanctioned by the people at large; but, doubtless, their indignation was excited and their fears worked upon by artful demagogues. Thus at the time of the surrender of Napoleon Buonaparte to the English people, no inconsiderable part of the multitude of this kingdom demanded that he should be put to death. It is, too, well observed by Mitford, that, "in the antient democracies, the most worthless individual, touching at any time a chord in consonance with popular passion, could

it would be a glorious distinction for him, if, in addition to his other achievements, he should bring home to Lacedæmon the enemy's commanders.³ Now it so happened that *one* (Demosthenes) was the most hostile to them by reason of the occurrences at the island and at Pylus; while the other was in that very respect their greatest friend. For Nicias had zealously promoted the liberation of the men from the island, by persuading the Athenians to make a treaty. On which account the Lacedæmonians were very kindly disposed towards him.⁴ Indeed for this reason he had been especially induced to surrender himself to Gylippus. But certain of the Syracusans (so it was said), part of them as being in fear⁵ lest, as they had held correspondence with him, he might, on being put to torture on that account, throw the city into disorder amidst the present success; others of them, and likewise the Corinthians, apprehensive, lest by bribery somehow or other (as he was rich), he should effect his escape, and then some harm might befall them from him⁶ — prevailed upon their allies, and had

procure the sanction of sovereign authority for any villainy. For where neither one person nor a select body was responsible, but the whole people, truly despotic, were the common authors of every public act, the shame of flagitious measures was so divided that it was disregarded."

It is, indeed, affirmed by Justin that Demosthenes *slew himself*: but this is so contrary to the testimony of Thucydides, that it cannot be admitted. The report seems to have arisen from the *fact* mentioned by Plutarch Nic. § 27. and Philistus ap. Pausanias p. 29, 4. (though omitted by Thucydides) that after concluding the unfortunate capitulation which he was obliged to make, he attempted to kill himself, but the wound did not prove mortal.

³ *Bring home, &c.*] In antient times, the capture of an enemy's commanders was always thought a glorious exploit, as seeming to imply the *annihilation* of the army.

⁴ *Kindly disposed towards him.*] But knowing this, it was so much the baser in Gylippus to permit *his* prisoners to be touched; and as this measure was clearly brought about by the coalition of the ultra democrats and the party which had before held correspondence with Nicias, so, as Gylippus was afterwards convicted of the basest dishonesty in embezzling the treasure committed to his charge by the Peloponnesians, there is little doubt but that his *avarice* was in this affair worked upon by those who were prepared to carry the thing through, *per fas et nefas*.

⁵ *In fear.*] Namely, lest Nicias should, on torture, disclose the names of the persons with whom he had held correspondence.

⁶ *And then some harm, &c.*] It should seem by this that Nicias had always been ill disposed towards the Corinthians; and, probably, he had been the promoter of the expedition sent against the Corinthian territory, recorded in l. iv.

him put to death.⁷ On this account, then, or something very like it, was Nicias put to death, the least deserving of all the Grecians of my time to have fallen into such a calamity, inasmuch as his whole conduct was regulated by the rules of approved virtue.⁸

LXXXVII. Those in the stone-quarries, the Syracusans at the first treated very harshly.¹ For being in a hollow place, and many crowded within a small compass, the suffocating heats² at first annoyed them, unsheltered as they were from the sun; and then, on the contrary, the nights coming on autumnal and cold, by that change, soon brought them into a sickly condition³; especially as, by want of room, being

where is the
opportunity?

⁷ *Prevailed upon, &c.*] These words must be understood in two different ways, as applied to the Syracusans or the Corinthians. In the former case, they will denote that the Syracusans prevailed upon their allies (namely, the Lacedæmonians) to permit them to put to death Nicias and Demosthenes. In the latter, that the Corinthians persuaded the Lacedæmonians to permit the Syracusans to put them to death.

⁸ *His whole conduct, &c.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense of the passage, following the reading of Bekker and Goeller, which seems well founded. *Νενομισμένην* is to be taken with *ἀρετήν*, and the phrase denotes "what was accounted such." The *ἀρετήν* seems to have a reference as well to the duties towards God as those towards man. The *νενομισμένην*, however, appears to be meant chiefly for the former of these; by which it seems to be implied that the religion of Greece rested merely on human opinion and institutions.

¹ *Treated very harshly.*] Their whole conduct was, indeed, marked with a spirit of deliberate cruelty, the general vice, it must be confessed, of the fairest days of Greece; which yet ought not to be attributed to the disposition of the people, since it was the unavoidable result of the political state of the country. (Mitford.)

² *Heats.*] Literally, "suns;" i. e. rays of the sun. A rare use of the word, of which Duker gives an example from Ælian V. H. l. 13, 1. It may be added that Sophocles Œd. Col. 350. has *ἡλίου τε καίμασι μοχθοῦσα*, and elsewhere we have *καῦμα* without *ἡλίου*: as Genes. c. 31, 40. in a passage very similar to the present. Polyænus 8, 10, 2. uses *ἡλίον* to denote the heat of the sun; as also Euthymius Zig. t. 1, 249. *οὐ δῶσεις ὑγρὸν οὐδὲ ἡλίον, οὐδὲ πνοὰς ἀνέμων*. And so Cowper, Task 3. p. 82. speaks of "wholesome airs — clear suns."

³ *Brought them into a sickly condition.*] Literally, "altered them into;" i. e. operated such a change in the body as produced sickness. A use of *νέω* of very rare occurrence, and which may be illustrated from the note on l. 2, 49, 7., to which may be added the following passages: Philo Jud. de Vit. Mos. l. 1. *νέωτερίσαντος ὡς ὅπως πρότερον τοῦ αἵματος*. Arrian E. A. 4, 8, 3. *νέω. ἐς τὸ βαρβαρικώτερον*. and 7, 13, 5. *νέω. ἐς ὕβριν*. So also Hippocrates cited by Foesius in *ν. μεταβάλλειν*. where the body is said *μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ἀνέμων ἐν τῇσι μεταλλάγῃσιν*.

By

obliged to do every thing ⁴ in the same place; and moreover, the corpses of such as died (some of their wounds, others by the change of diet and living, or the like) being all piled together in heaps, the stench was intolerable. And, besides their other miseries, they laboured under hunger and thirst; for during eight months ⁵, they had each of them only a cotyl ⁶ of water, and two cotyls of corn. Indeed of whatever else would be likely to befall men thrown into such a place, there was nothing that they did *not* suffer. And for some seventy days they fared thus, huddled together. Afterwards the Syracusans sold all, except the Athenians and such of the Siceliots or Italiots as had joined them in the expedition. The total number of prisoners, though it is hard to say exactly, yet could not be less than seven thousand.

Such were the circumstances of this most momentous of all the events that happened in Greece during this war; nay, as it seems to me, the greatest of all on record respecting Greece,

By the *change* here spoken of is meant the change of season. On which it is truly observed by Herodotus 2, 77. *ἐν γὰρ τῇσι μεταβολαῖσι τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι αἱ νοῦσοι μάλιστα γίνονται* — τῶν ὥρων μάλιστα. where Valckn. cites Hippocrat. Aphor. 3, 1. p. 18. to which may be added Damoxenus ap. Athen. 102. C.

⁴ *Do every thing.*] This, the commentators observe, is said *honestly*. To the examples adduced by Duker may be added Plutarch Artax. 1. 16.

⁵ *Eight months.*] Namely, it seems, the whole time that they were, at least *all* of them, confined in this place.

⁶ *Cotyl.*] Said by Hobbes to be equal to our *half-a-pint*. But Schneider, in his Lexicon, more correctly fixes the cotyl of liquid at our third of a pint, and that of corn at about eight ounces. But, of course, the weight would vary according to the *kind* and the *quality* of the corn. Matthiæ and Boeckh, cited by Goeller, offer a different calculation; the former of whom says that the cotyl was half a chœnix, or the one hundred and ninety-second part of a medimnus or bushel. The latter says, the medimnus contained six hacts, forty-eight chœnixes, and one hundred and ninety-two cotyls; and consisted of two thousand six hundred and two cubic inches. (Matthiæ says two thousand five hundred and eighty-one.) Consequently, the cotyl contained one hundred and thirty cubic inches.

How scanty this portion was, we may conceive from the fact attested by Diogenes Laert. 8, 18. and Athen. 3, 29. (cited by Wesseling on Diodorus) that the chœnix was the regular quantity for a day's food. And from Plutarch Camill. it appears that the cotyl of wine was the regular allowance for a day. In Egypt, indeed, it was *four* cotyls. See Herod. 2, 168.

It must be observed that those who thus suffered were of the division under Demosthenes. Those taken with Nicias were sold for slaves, but experienced a much happier fate.

both as being to the victors the most glorious, and to the totally discomfited party the most disastrous. For they were wholly and in every respect defeated, and in nothing suffered a *trifling* loss, but both fleet and army were (so to speak) *root and branch destroyed*, nor was there aught that did *not* come to utter ruin; few out of so many returning home! Such were the events in Sicily.

BOOK VIII.

I. **W**HEN the news reached Athens, the people for a long time discredited¹ even the most respectable of the soldiery who had made their escape from the very scene of action, and gave the most accurate intelligence; nor would believe that so total a destruction had befallen them. When, however, they had ascertained the fact, they were exasperated against such of the orators² as had zealously promoted the expedition, as if they had not themselves decreed it.³ They were enraged, too, with the oracle-mongers⁴ and soothsayers, and whoever, under a professed divine impulse, had inspired them with hopes⁵ of subduing Sicily. Moreover, the state of all affairs on all

¹ *Discredited, &c.*] Plutarch relates that a foreigner, landing at Piræus, went into a barber's shop, which, like the modern coffee-house, was the usual resort of idle newsmongers in the Grecian cities (as we find afterwards in Rome), and spoke of the event as what he supposed would, of course, be well known there. The barber, with more zeal than discretion, went immediately into the city, and communicated the intelligence to the archons; who, with the natural anxiety of magistrates under the tyranny of a despotic multitude, summoned an assembly of the people, and produced the barber to declare his news. The people, in extreme agitation, demanded his authority. The incautious man could produce none; he had no previous acquaintance with the person from whom he received the information, and knew not where to find him. The indignant multitude immediately ordered the barber to the torture of the wheel (a mode of punishment nowhere exactly described to us, but which, it seems, might be borne long), and he was not released till some of the more fortunate few, who had escaped from the scene of war, arriving, confirmed the uncertain intelligence. (Mitford.)


² *Orators.*] Krueger thinks that these were Dinostratus, Pisander, and Andocides.

³ *As if they had not themselves decreed it.*] i. e. been the authors of the measure. For, indeed, as Mitford observes, the people in assembly holding the executive as well as the legislative government, every one being free to propose, and sometimes a majority, with tumultuous clamour, commanding measures, there could be no duly responsible minister.

⁴ *Oracle-mongers.*] It was, Krueger observes, from being deceived by oracles, that the people formed such magnificent hopes. He refers to Aristoph. Eq. 961, 1010. 1086. Av. 978. Plut. Nic. 12., and says, on the authority of Philochorus and Plutarch Nic. 23. that Stilbides, a famous augur, accompanied the expedition.

⁵ *Inspired them with hopes.*] Literally, "put them on hoping;" for, *ἐκπλίζω* signifies *ἐπ' ἐλπίδας ἄγειν*.

ASIA MINOR.



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sides filled them with grief⁶; and at the present conjuncture, they were beset with fear and consternation the most extreme. For they were not only suffering extreme grief at the deprivation which each individually and the state at large sustained by the loss of such numbers of heavy-armed and cavalry, and such a mass of the flower of their youth as they were conscious they had not left the like; but seeing that there was no sufficient number of ships in their docks, nor stores and equipments for a navy, nor funds in the treasury [to send forth such another fleet⁷], they were at this crisis in despair of their safety; and thought that their enemies in Sicily would presently proceed with their fleet to the Piræus (especially as having been so completely successful); and that their foes at home would now, as being doubly provided with every requisite, assail them in full force, both by land and by sea, with the aid, too, of their own revolted allies. Nevertheless, it was judged expedient not to give way, but bear up⁸ to the utmost of their power, and especially (procuring timber and money from every possible quarter⁹) to prepare a fleet; also to put affairs in a state of security among the allies, and especially Eubœa; to curtail, too, the state expenses to something more of moderation and frugality¹⁰; finally, to collect a certain

⁶ *Filled them with grief.*] Our historian shows the most intimate knowledge of the human heart, by noticing the first expressions of the popular feeling venting themselves in anger and rage; and then those violent passions subsiding into deeply-settled grief at the past, and extreme alarm for the future.

⁷ *Sufficient — to send forth such another fleet.*] These last words are implied in the rest of the sentence.

⁸ *It was judged expedient, &c.*] One cannot but admire the magnanimity of this resolution, as well as the judgment shown in carrying it into effect. It seems that the danger of the crisis gave the able and discreet that power to take the lead, of which they had been long deprived by the cabals of crafty and rash demagogues.

⁹ *Procuring timber and money from every possible quarter.*] Literally, "scraping together timber," &c. It is strange that Goeller should join ἔδεν ἂν δύνωνται with παρασκευάζεσθαι ναυτικόν. These words clearly belong to ξυμπορισάμενον, &c.

¹⁰ *To curtail the state expenses, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense of the brief, and therefore obscure, words τῶν κατὰ τὴν, πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτίλειαν σωφρονίσαι.

Duker has shown that those words do not regard *private expense*, or luxury (which, he says, by the deprivation the citizens suffered from the fortification of Decælea, was necessarily moderate), but *public expense*, as laid out on sacrifices, spectacles, judicial functions, &c. (to use the words of

board of government¹¹ composed of elderly persons, who might, as occasion should require, consult on any business that presented itself¹² for their consideration. Moreover, from their present fear, the people (as is usual with the multitude) were readily disposed to be orderly.¹³ And what was resolved to be done, that they carried into execution. And thus ended the summer.

II. The following winter, all the Greeks were presently on the alert at the severe calamity which had befallen the Athenians in Sicily. Those who before had been allies of neither party, now thought that, even if they were not called upon, they ought not to hold off from the war, but voluntarily go against the Athenians, not only as each thinking that if the Athenians had succeeded in Sicily, they would have gone against *them* too; but, moreover, conceiving that the remainder of the war would be but short, to participate in which would be honourable. Those, again, who were allies of the Lacedæmonians were more zealous than ever, longing to speedily free themselves from their heavy labours and sacrifices. But especially the subject states of the Athenians mani-

Thucydides at c. 4. *καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἶπον τι ἰδόκει ἀρχεῖον ἀναλίσκεσθαι, &c.*), the savings on which items were to be applied to the maintenance of the war.

Here I would compare Antiphanes ap. Athen. 60. C. *τὸ δεῖπνον ἐστὶ μάζα κεχαρακμένη Ἀχέροις, πρὸς εὐτέλειαν ἐξωπλισμένη.*

¹¹ *Board of government.*] I know not how the *ἀρχήν τινα* can be better expressed. Smith absurdly renders it "sovereignty."

¹² *Who might, &c.*] i. e. previously to its being introduced to the consideration of the senate, or the public assembly of the people. Here, again, Smith totally misconceives the sense. This measure was intended (as Mitford observes) to obviate the extravagancies of unbalanced democracy; though, as he adds, "this was, indeed, providing for the prudence of executive government, but not for vigour, not for secrecy, not for despatch."

On the subject of these *πρόβουλοι*, Krueger refers to Plutarch 2, 292. A., Wesseling on Herod. 6, 7. and Aristot. Polit. 6, 5, 10., from which passages it appears that the name *πρόβουλοι* was rather appropriate to an *oligarchy* than a *democracy*.

¹³ *Were readily disposed to be orderly.*] I cannot agree with Hobbes and Smith, who take *εὐτακτεῖν* to mean "order their government aright;" a sense neither supported by the *usus loquendi*, nor so agreeable to the context as that above adopted, which, moreover, is the constant signification of the word. This version, too, is confirmed and illustrated by the following most true observation of Plutarch Lucull. c. 2. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου δυσαρκότερον εὖ πράσσειν δοκοῦντος, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν δεκτικώτερον ἐπιστάσις συσταλίντος ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης.*

fested their readiness to engage in revolt, even beyond their ability to maintain it, and (that) because they formed their judgments under the influence of passionate and sanguine feelings¹, and no longer entertained a doubt but that, on the ensuing summer at least, they should gain the mastery.²

The Lacedæmonian state at all these concurring circumstances took courage³, and especially because the allies in Sicily would, in all likelihood (as there was necessarily⁴ now a great accession of nautical power), be with them at the spring with a powerful force. Full of hope, therefore, in every respect, they resolved to apply to the war with alacrity, reckoning that if it were once brought to a successful termination, they should be hereafter free from such dangers as that which would have threatened them from the Athenians, had they acquired Sicily; and that by pulling them down, they should themselves securely hold the dominion of all Greece.

III. Immediately, therefore, this winter their king, Agis, proceeding with an army from Decelea⁵, collected money

¹ *Because they formed their judgments, &c.*] With this whole chapter compare l. 4, 108.

² *No longer entertained a doubt, &c.*] i. e. would no longer allow themselves to entertain a doubt but that, &c. Such is, I conceive, the sense, which has been misconceived by Hobbes and Smith, and not thoroughly understood by the recent commentators, who have not seen that for *αὐτοῖς* should be read *αὐτοῖς*, which removes the only real difficulty; for, at *περγινεσθαι* we may easily, if it be thought necessary, supply *αὐτῶν*.

³ *Took courage.*] For there had been very serious alarm entertained by the Lacedæmonians as to the consequences to them of such an addition of power to Athens as the conquest of Sicily must have supplied. "No evil (says Mitford) that could befall the aristocracies which composed the Lacedæmonian confederacy, was so dreadful and so odious as subjugation under the tyrannous rule of the Athenian multitude. Nor was Lacedæmon itself without alarm; for, though the conquest of Sparta was not likely soon to be accomplished by the Athenian arms, yet there was no inferior evil which might not be expected, and quickly."

⁴ *Necessarily.*] Such seems to be the sense of *κατ' ἀνάγκην*, where there is reference to the naval quotas which would be sent from the other states of Sicily, now under the domination of Syracuse.

⁵ *Proceeding with an army from Decelea.*] There is reason to think, though Thucydides nowhere expressly asserts it, that King Agis, from the first erection of Decelea, had staid there in command of the large force assigned for its garrison, and to ravage the neighbouring country. Why he should have remained there, is well accounted for by Mitford. "He there attained, what none of his predecessors ever enjoyed, a perennial military command. Here he found himself really king; here he was free from the

among the allies for the formation of a navy. Then turning his course to the Malian gulf, and (excited by an old enmity), after taking considerable spoils from the Cœtæans, he exacted of them a large sum ⁶ [by way of ransom]; and the Achæans of Pthiotis and other dependants of the Thessalians in those parts (against the will of the Thessalians, who sent remonstrances), he compelled to give some hostages and money; and deposited the hostages at Corinth, which state he endeavoured to bring over to the alliance. The Lacedæmonians also issued out requisitions to the allies for the building of one hundred ships; and themselves and the Bœotians they rated at twenty-five each, the Phocians and Locrians at fifteen, the Corinthians also fifteen, the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians ten; the Megaræans, Trœzenians, and Hermionians ten. They likewise made all other preparations, as intending, immediately on the spring, to apply themselves closely to the war.

IV. The Athenians, too, in pursuance of the plans which they had formed, proceeded this winter to the building of ships with the timber which they had procured: also fortifying Sunium, that it might afford a secure shelter for their corn-ships in the coasting trade, abandoning the fortification which they had erected in Laconia, when on their voyage to Sicily, and in all other respects wherein there seemed to be any needless expense, contracting every thing within the limits of economy: but, above all, they kept a vigilant look out over their allies, that they might not revolt.

vexatious and degrading control of the ephors; here he might not only use at discretion the troops immediately under his orders, but he had authority to levy forces, raise contributions, exercise command among the allies of the commonwealth, and treat with foreign states. Thus vested with independent power, he was of course respected, and could make himself feared; so that much more deference was paid by the states of the confederacy to Agis, in his garrison at Decelea, than to any Spartan king at home, or even to the Spartan government itself."

⁶ *Exactd of them a large sum.*] Namely, by way of redeeming or ransoming the property: an expedient frequently employed by the *buccaneers* of modern times. For such is, I conceive, the sense of *χρήματα ἐκπράττειν*, and not that assigned by the translators, "made money of it;" a signification of but slender authority.

On the old enmity or grudge just before mentioned, see l. 3, 92. seq. and Valckn. on Herod. l. 7, 132.

V. As both parties were occupied in these affairs, and, in their preparation for war, seemed to be as it were but *commencing* it, the Eubœans, first of all, sent ambassadors this winter to Agis on the subject of a revolt from the Athenians.¹ He, accepting their proposals, sends for Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus, to go as governors into Eubœa. They accordingly went, accompanied by about three hundred of the Neodamodes [or newly enfranchised], and Agis prepared measures for transporting them thither. In the meantime came the Lesbians, who were desirous to revolt. And on the Bœotians aiding them² in their negotiations, Agis was induced to postpone matters concerning Eubœa, and made preparations for forwarding the revolt of Lesbos, giving them Alcamenes as harmost [or governor], who was to have gone to Eubœa; and the Bœotians promised to send ten ships, and Agis ten. Now these affairs were transacted without the authority of the Lacedæmonian state. For Agis, so long as he continued at Decelea with the forces under his command, had authority both to send off troops whither he pleased, to raise forces and levy money. Indeed the allies did at that time (it may truly be said), yield obedience much rather to *him*³ than to the Lacedæmonians at home; for having a powerful force under his command, he inspired immediate awe wherever he went. He was now forming arrangements for the aid of the Lesbians. On the other hand, the Chians and Erythræans, themselves also ready to revolt, did not have recourse to *Agis*, but resorted to the Lacedæmonians at home. With these likewise went an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who was viceroy to king Darius, son of Artaxerxes⁴, of the maritime

¹ *The Eubœans first, &c.*] This might very well have been expected; though (as Mitford observes) Eubœa was a country so important to Athens, that a better government would never have left it in the situation of a subject state, but would have given its people an interest with themselves.

² *On the Bœotians aiding them.*] Probably from the ties of affinity, they being, like themselves, of Æolian race.

The wishes of this most powerful of the allies of Lacedæmon could scarcely fail of being attended to.

³ *Yield obedience much rather to him than, &c.*] Hobbes has here misrepresented the sense, from not properly apprehending the construction.

⁴ *Viceroy.*] Or, to use the Persian term, *satrap*.

parts ⁵ [of Asia Minor]. For Tissaphernes was calling in ⁶ the Peloponnesians as auxiliaries, and he engaged to provide them support.⁷ He had lately had demanded of him ⁸ by the king the tribute of his own government, for which (not being able, by reason of the Athenians, to exact it from the *Grecian* cities) he was in arrears. He therefore thought he should be more likely to obtain that tribute by humbling the Athenians, and should, besides, bring over the Lacedæmonians into alliance with the king, and thus be able, in obedience to the king's orders, either to kill or take prisoner Amorges, who was in rebellion up and down the province of Caria. Thus the Chians and Tissaphernes were now negotiating this business in concert.

⁵ *Maritime parts.*] We are not exactly informed of the extent of the several satrapies, or of the powers, privileges, and duties of the satraps. We learn from Xenophon (Hel. 1. 3, 1, 5. et seq. and 2, 19.) that Caria was the proper satrapy of Tissaphernes, and (Anab. 1, 1, 6.) that Ionia was added to his command by the king's particular favour; but his authority, at least in the absence of other officers, was often extended over Sardis and great part of Lydia. (Mitford.)

⁶ *Calling in.*] It is strange that all the translators should have missed the true sense of ἐνέηρο.

⁷ *Provide them support.*] i. e. give them pay; for τροφή, as used of military service, has often that sense. Nothing places in a stronger light the power of Athens, than that the vast empire of Persia should require the aid of the Peloponnesians to enable them to subdue a few cities, scarcely any of them otherwise than unfortified, being so kept by Athenian jealousy. See the able and instructive remarks of Mr. Mitford, Hist. Gr. t. 4. 175-8.

⁸ *He had lately had demanded of him, &c.*] The translators have here all misrepresented the sense, by mistaking the force of πεπραγμένοι; for πεπραχθαι frequently signifies to *exact*; as 6, 51. 8, 3 and 37 and 87., and perpetually in the best Attic writers. And here (as in not a few other cases) the error of the translators (for which, however, there was the less excuse, since the Scholiast had long before pointed out the true sense, which was also seen by Acacius and Duker) has led the historians wrong, as, for instance, Mitford. (See p. 178.) There had been yet no such *remission* as he speaks of, but the cities in question were still nominally regarded as in the dominions of the empire; and the tribute which had aforetime been assessed for them was required from the satraps; who, however, it seems, contrived to *defer* the payment by representing their inability to levy them. So long as this excuse was allowed, the satraps had no reason to engage in hostilities with Athens; but when the tribute (nay, even the *arrears*) was demanded of them (they being, as the Turkish pachas now are, farmers-general of the revenue in their government), it became their own personal affair, as the whole sum would come out of their own pockets. It was likely, therefore, that they should set every machine in motion, to be rid of the only impediment to the collection of that tribute, by pulling down the Athenian power.

VI. And now Calligitus son of Laophon, a Megaræan, and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras a Cyzicene, both exiles from their own countries, and residing with Pharnabazus¹, son of Pharnaces, came about the same time to Lacedæmon. They had been sent thither by Pharnabazus, that they might procure and bring a fleet to the Hellespont, and also that he himself might, for the sake of the tribute, if possible, bring the Athenian cities in his government to revolt from them; and finally, that by his *own means*² an alliance might be brought about between the Lacedæmonians and the king: the very objects which Tissaphernes was striving for. Each, however, negotiating this business separately (both those from Pharnabazus, and those from Tissaphernes), there was great debate among the statesmen at Lacedæmon; one party desiring to prevail that a fleet and army might first be sent to *Ionia* and *Chios*, the other to the *Hellespont*. The Lacedæmonians, however, were far more generally disposed to hearken to the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes. Their suit, too, was furthered by the aid of Alcibiades, who was bound by the strictest ties of hereditary and ancestral hospitality³ with Endius, an ephor, whence also by this hospitality his family had derived the name Alcibiades, which was a Lacedæmonian one, for Endius bore the surname of "son of Alcibiades." However, the Lacedæmonians first despatched to Chios Phrynias, one of the order of the Pericæci, to examine whether they were in possession of the ships they said, and if, in other respects, the power of the state were correspondent to what it was reported. And on his sending them

¹ *Pharnabazus.*] What were the limits between the respective satrapies of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes is not very clear. See Poppo Proleg. t. 2. p. 432. and Krueger Comment. Thucyd. p. 353. It should seem, however, that Tissaphernes had Caria and Lydia, including Ionia and Doris; and Pharnabazus Mysia, including Æolis and part of Bithynia. Poppo, indeed, with much countenance from l. 8, 108., fixes the limit at Antandros, which would be giving the whole of Æolis to Pharnaces. This, too, is somewhat confirmed by what is implied in the expression τῶν κάρω, "the maritime parts."

This Pharnabazus was the great-grandson of the Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, mentioned at l. 1, 119., who had been succeeded by Pharnabazus I. and he by Pharnaces II., and he, again, by the present Pharnabazus II.

² *By his own means.*] And not that of Tissaphernes.

³ *Ancestral hospitality.*] Or, as Hobbes calls it, *guest-hood*; though it might equally as well be called *host-hood*. For a complete illustration of this subject see the note of Valcknaer on Herod. l. 8, 17.

word that "the representations they had heard were true," they immediately admitted the Chians and Erythræans as allies, and determined to send them forty ships, there being *there* (according to what the Chians said) not less than sixty sail.⁴ And of these they were about to send ten at first, with Melancridas as their commander; but afterwards, on the occurrence of an earthquake⁵, in the place of Melancridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten ships they equipped but five in Laconia; and thus ended the winter, and the nineteenth year of the war which Thucydides hath written.

YEAR XX. B. C. 412.

VII. Immediately on the subsequent summer, the Chians urging the despatch of the ships, and fearing lest the Athenians should learn what was transacting (for they had all sent the embassies without their knowledge), the Lacedæmonians despatched three Spartan citizens to Corinth, in order to urge them with all speed to transport the ships over⁶ the isthmus, from the other side to that opposite to Athens, and all to sail to Chios, both those which Agis had prepared for Lesbos, and the rest. The number of the ships of the confederacy there assembled amounted in all to thirty-nine.

VIII. Calligitus, then, and Timagoras took no part in the expedition to Chios, nor did they give the money which they had brought with them for the equipment¹, namely twenty-five

⁴ *According to what the Chians said, not less than sixty.*] The translators render, "from the facts which the Chians mentioned," &c. But this involves a too harsh ellipsis; nor am I aware of any objection to the version above proposed, the ellipsis in which is usual. As to the number of ships mentioned, that we may suppose was much exaggerated.

⁵ *On the occurrence of an earthquake, &c.*] We may suspect that the earthquake (if it did really occur; though, indeed, the very slightest shock was sufficient) was laid hold of as a pretext to make the change in question. And the whole may be regarded as the machination of political cabals which had been carrying on. The party in opposition to the proposed measure seems to have *so far* carried its point, as that only half the proposed force should go, and that under a commander more acceptable to them than the one before appointed.

⁶ *Transport the ships over.*] On the mode in which this was done see note on l. 4, 8. and the commentators on Herod. 2, 154. and 7, 24. and Manso. Spart. 2. p. 60. referred to by Krueger.

¹ *Equipment.*] Or fitting out. Literally, "sending, or setting forth." As the above signification is rare, and neglected by the commentators, the

talents, but designed to go afterwards with another fleet by themselves.

As for Agis, when he saw the Lacedæmonians bent on sending the expedition first to Chios, he was himself of no other opinion²; so that the allies assembling at Corinth, deliberated on the measures to be pursued, and determined first to sail to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was fitting out the five ships in Laconia; and thence proceed to Lesbos, under the command of Alcamenes (whom also Agis had originally designed³ for that service); and finally to proceed to the Hellespont, in which last service Clearchus, son of Ramphius, was appointed commander. Furthermore, it was resolved to convey over the isthmus half of the ships first, and that those should immediately put to sea, that the Athenians might have their attention⁴ engaged more on those than on the rest to be afterwards transported. For contemning the weakness of the Athenians, no considerable navy of theirs having as yet appeared, they resolved to make⁵ the voyage openly.

Agreeably to these resolves they immediately conveyed over twenty-one ships.

IX. But the Corinthians, on the rest hastening to put to sea, were not readily disposed to go before they had attended the celebration of the Isthmian games¹, which were at hand.

following examples may be not unacceptable: Diod. Sic. 280. *περὶ τὴν εἰς φοινίκην ἀποστολὴν τῆς νεῶν δυνάμειος ἀποστολῇ*. Polyb. 26, 7, 1. *ἡ πρὸς Ἰστροῦς ἀποστολή*.

² *He was of no other opinion.*] i. e. he assented to their views. "He had the prudence (says Mitford) not to mark any resentment at the interference with his command, or any way to irritate an administration ill disposed to him, by opposing measures on which they had a constitutional right to decide; and yielding thus in part, he carried also a part of his purpose."

³ *Whom also Agis had originally designed.*] Literally, "thought of."

⁴ *Might have their attention, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases, "thus it was hoped the Athenians, having their attention divided between the division sailing, and that remaining to sail, would act effectually against neither."

⁵ *Resolved to make.*] Literally, "were making," i. e. about to make.

¹ *Isthmian games.*] These, (Goeller says) it has been shown by Corsinus Dissert. Agon. 4, 6., were celebrated sometimes in the month Panormus, but sometimes fell on Munychium or Thargalion. They were every third year (not fourth, as Mitford says), sometimes on the first, sometimes on the third,

Whereupon Agis was ready to agree that they should, forsooth, not violate the Isthmiac truce, but offered to take the whole armament on himself.² On the Corinthians, however, not acceding to *this* proposal, but a delay intervening, the Athenians gained a readier knowledge of the plan in agitation by the Chians; and sent Aristocrates, one of the state-commanders, to Chios, to call them to account; and on the Chians denying the charge, the Athenians ordered them to send them, as a pledge, some ships, in virtue of the alliance³: and they sent seven. The reason for which compliance was, that *the many* of the Chians were ignorant of what was transacting; and that *the few*⁴, who were acquainted with the design, were not willing to incur the enmity of the multitude before they had obtained some strength, and also because they no longer ex-

of every Olympiad. Those that were celebrated on the *first*, fell on the Corinthian month Panormus, the Attic Hecatombæon, and the Roman July. But those which were celebrated on the *third* of the Olympiad fell on the Munychium or Thargalion. Now the year in question being the *first* of the ninety-second Olympiad, this celebration was in Hecatombæon." Thus far Goeller, who refers, on the subject of the superstition of the Greeks in the observance of festivals, to Drumann. *Gesch. d. Verf. d. gr. Staat.* p. 710.

The reason (I would add) why the Corinthians were unwilling to go was, as appears from what follows, not so much that they should lose the pleasure of the festival, as that they should violate the suspension of hostilities which they thought themselves bound to observe during that period; for it should seem that the festival had been *already proclaimed*, and was, therefore, become binding to those in the country. On this distinction turned the dispute between the Lacedæmonians and the Eleans, l. 5., concerning Lepreum.

² *Take the whole armament on himself.*] And thus remove it from the Corinthians as a national concern; for it should seem that *private persons* might, during the period in question, engage in the service of any other nation.

It is plain that the festival had not actually commenced, during which, under the protection of the armistice, persons might come and go in safety, and make their observations; so that the expedition could no longer be kept a secret.

³ *To send them as, &c.*] I cannot agree with Duker and Goeller, who join *ναὺς τὸ πλεον ἐς τὸ ἐνυμαχικόν*. As to the passage they appeal to at l. 3, 11., it will only prove that the words *might* be so taken, *if* the rest of the sentence and the context would permit. That, however, is not the case. To me it has always appeared (and in this I am supported by Bauer and Hack) that *ἐς τὸ ἐνυμ.* is for *κατὰ τὸ ἐνυμ.*, which is of frequent occurrence in Thucydides. This is, indeed, an unusual phrase; but it may be observed that the whole of this eighth book abounds with anomalies, and therefore requires methods of criticism peculiar to itself.

⁴ *The few.*] i. e. the oligarchical, or aristocratical party.

pected that the Lacedæmonians would come, because they so long delayed.

X. In the meantime the Isthmian games were celebrated, and the Athenians (for the truce had been proclaimed) went to participate in the spectacle; and thus the matter respecting the Chians became more apparent to them. And after they had returned home, they immediately set on foot preparations that the ships to sail from Cenchrea should not go to their destination undiscovered. The Corinthians, however, after the festival, put to sea with twenty-one sail for Chios, under the command of Alcamenes.¹ The Athenians, on the conclusion of the truce, first advanced to them with an equal number of ships, and then drew off to the main sea.² But as the Peloponnesians did not follow them far, but desisted from the voyage, the Athenians likewise drew off to port; for the seven Chian ships, which they had with them in their number, they thought were not to be trusted. But afterwards manning thirty-seven³ others, they chased the enemy as they were coasting along, and drove them into Piræus⁴ in Corinthia.

¹ *Alcamenes.*] And yet, according to the resolutions of the congress, supra, c. 8., it would seem that Chalcideus should have had the command. But it appears from c. 11. that Chalcideus was to join them on the way with the five ships he was fitting out in Laconia.

² *Drew off to the main sea.*] Namely, to draw the enemy into the open space, where Athenian skill would have the advantage.

³ *Thirty-seven.*] This would seem an incredibly large number. Hence, Krueger cancels the thirty. But this (wholly uncountenanced as it is by authority) is too bold a procedure; and Goeller rightly pronounces the conjecture to be useless, as appears from the course of the narrative. "Quot naves," says he, "de illis duodesexaginta Piræum obsidentibus demserint, alioque avocaverint, cap. 11. init. in universum significat, ipsum numerum cap. 15. exhibet; quot autem in locum demptarum submiserint, reticuit. Itaque satis erit, Thucydidi accredere c. 20. scribenti, postremo viginti pari numero Peloponnesiacarum ad Piræum oppositas fuisse."

⁴ *Piræus.*] There were two ports of this name in Corinthia, one on the Saronic, the other on the Crissæan gulf. Mueller, indeed, thinks that the Piræus in question ought to be written *Spiræus*; a conjecture which seems to be countenanced by Ptolemy and Pliny; though *there* the Σ may have arisen from the Σ preceding; or this may have only denoted the *promontory*.

The student will observe that the port in question was written Piræus, while the famous port of Athens should be written Piræneus.

Cramer, in his map, has wrongly placed Piræus in *Epidauria*, which is directly contrary to the testimony of Thucydides in this passage. It should seem that the Portus Piræus was the same with the Portus Athen. of

Now this is a desert port⁵, and the farthest on the borders towards Epidauria. And one ship, which was off to seaward, the Peloponnesians lost; they rest they drew together, and brought into port. Then the Athenians making an attack both by sea with the fleet, and by disembarkation on land, there was a vast tumult and disorder; and the greater part of the ships they damaged and disabled as they lay off shore⁶, and Alcamenes, the commander, was slain, with the loss, however, of some of their own men.

XI. On the parties separating from the contest, the Athenians appointed a competent force to maintain a blockade over the enemy's ships, and with the rest they anchored at the islet¹ not far off, on which they encamped, and sent to Athens for a reinforcement.² For on the day following the Corinthians had come up with forces to succour the fleet, and not long after the other neighbouring people did the same. Perceiving, however, that the guarding of the ships in so desert a place would be toilsome³, they were at a loss what to do, and even thought of burning them; but afterwards they determined to draw them on shore, and keep guard over them, with their land forces encamped near, until some convenient method of escape should offer itself. Agis, on hearing what had happened, sent to them a Spartan named Thermon.

Ptolemy and the Anthedon of Pliny (a name probably first given to the place on having a town built there); also, that the promontory now called C. Franco is the promont. *Spiræum* of Ptolemy: and certainly that is a very apt name for a promontory (and therefore ought to be retained), while Piræus is a good one for the *port*; which, it should seem, was a common place of embarkation for those who wanted to go from Peloponnesus to Attica, by crossing the Sinus Saronicus. The port is now called Franco-limni.

⁵ *A desert port.*] i. e. one which had no town situated on it.

⁶ *Off the shore.*] Mitford most erroneously relates that there was a battle at sea, in which the Peloponnesians lost one ship; and that, on retreating to Piræus, the Athenians would not attack them there, but blockaded them with a small squadron.

¹ *Islet.*] That, I imagine, called Haurocinisi in Arrowsmith's map.

² *Reinforcement.*] Namely, of land forces.

³ *The guarding of the ships, &c.*] It is truly observed by Mitford, "that where soldiers were citizens, not under any regular military command, but having every one a vote in the decision of all public measures, it was often more difficult for the administration to get a service of tedious inconvenience performed than one of great momentary danger."

As to the Lacedæmonians, news had first reached them that the ships had put to sea from the isthmus (for the ephors had ordered Alcamenes, when that should happen, to despatch a horseman with the news); and they resolved to immediately send the five ships which were with them, and Chalci-deus, to take the command ⁴, accompanied, too, by Alcibiades; but afterwards, as they were hastening their departure, intelligence reached them of the fleet having taken refuge at Piræus. Much discouraged at thus stumbling on the threshold of the Ionian war, they were disposed, so far from sending away those ships of their own country, to recall some which had previously sailed.⁵

XII. But on learning this, Alcibiades again persuades Endius ¹ and the other ephors not to abandon the voyage; urging that by now sailing they should reach their destination before the Chians had received tidings of the disaster respecting the fleet; and that he himself, on arriving in Ionia, should easily persuade the cities to revolt, by telling them of the weakness of the Athenians, and the zeal and energy of the Lacedæmonians; in which he would be more credited than others. To Endius himself he privately represented that it would be a high honour to *him*, by *himself* to bring about the revolt of Ionia, and make the king an ally of the Lacedæmonians; and that this should not be an achievement of *Agis*. For he happened to be at variance with *him*.² Having thus prevailed on Endius and the other ephors, he set sail with the five ships

⁴ *To take the command.*] Namely, of the whole fleet, as was above determined. See c. 8.

⁵ *Some which had previously sailed.*] What these were it is not easy to see: certainly not those collected by Calligitus and Timagoras, which were to sail *after* this fleet.

¹ *Alcibiades again persuades Endius, &c.*] It is truly observed by Mitford, "that the ascendancy of Athenian genius showed itself even in those circumstances which contributed most to the downfall of the Athenian empire. What the Lacedæmonian administration had neither foresight to plan nor spirit to execute, the illustrious but unprincipled Athenian refugee, participating, through the ephor his friend, in their closest councils, planned and executed for them."

² *To be at variance with him.*] Krueger, p. 366., refers on this subject to Xen. Hist. Gr. 3, 3, 2. Plutarch Alcib. 23. seqq. Ages. 3. Pausan. 3, 8, 3. Justin. 5, 2.

together with Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian; and they made the voyage with all speed.

XIII. About the same time there arrived back from Sicily the sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had cooperated with Gylippus in the war; and being intercepted on the way, about Leucadia, and damaged¹ by the twenty-seven Attic ships under the command of Hippocles son of Menippus (who there kept watch for such ships as came from Sicily), they however escaped the Athenians, all but one, and reached Corinth.²

XIV. Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized such vessels as they met with on their voyage, in order that intelligence of their passage might not be discovered; and having first made the continent at Corycus, where they dismissed those whom they had detained³, then, on having held previous conference with certain of the Chians who had maintained a correspondence with them, and who advised them to make the port without sending any previous message⁴ to the city, they thus came upon the Chians suddenly and unawares. By this *the many* were thrown into amazement and consternation; but by *the few* the thing had been prepared for, so that the public council was then met together, and after some addresses from Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who told them that many other ships were on their way, making, however, no mention of the blockade of the ships in Piræus, the Chians, and soon after the Erythræans, revolt from the Athenians.

They then sailed on with three ships to Clazomenæ, and drew that city also into the revolt. And the Clazomenians immediately passed over to the continent, and fortified Po-

¹ *Damaged.*] Or, as we say, cut up. Hobbes quaintly renders, "evil entreated;" but Smith, much worse, "terribly harassed."

² *They, however, escaped, &c.*] Hobbes has here strangely mistaken the sense.

³ *Dismissed those, &c.*] Very different this from the conduct of Alcidas in the former attempt on Ionia, made by the Peloponnesians, of which we read in l. iii.

⁴ *Any previous message.*] Namely, by way of asking leave to enter.

lychne⁵, as a retreat for them, in case of necessity, from the island in which they dwelt.

XV. News, however, of this affair of Chios soon reached the Athenians, who, conceiving themselves to be environed with a great and manifest peril, and that the rest of the allies would never be quiet at the revolt of so considerable a state, they therefore decreed to make use of those one thousand talents, which throughout the whole of the war they had all along desired to keep untouched; repealing, in order thereto (under their present terror), those penalties which were denounced against any who should speak of, or put to vote, such a measure. This sum they resolved to apply to the equipping of a considerable number of ships. They also now determined to send, under the command of Strombichides son of Diotimus, eight of the ships which were blockading the fleet in Piræus, and which, having left the watch, and gone in pursuit of the ships under Chalcideus, and not overtaken them, had returned back. And shortly after they resolved to reinforce them with twelve more, under Thrasycles, which were also taken from the blockading ships. Also, the seven Chian ships, which were carrying on the blockade with them, they withdrew¹, and the slaves who were on board they freed, and the freemen they put into bonds. Others, too, in the place of the ships that had departed, they speedily manned and sent to the blockade of the Peloponnesians, and resolved to fit out thirty others. Great indeed was their zeal and activity; for

⁵ *Polychne*.] It is probable that this place was then a sort of suburb to the city of Clazomenæ; indeed, it was situated so near to it, that the island of Clazomena was by Alexander joined by a mole to the continent.

¹ *They withdrew*.] Namely, to Athens, replacing them with seven others. So, at least, the interpreters and Mitford understand. But it is not likely that they would choose to withdraw so large a number from an already much weakened squadron. Perhaps, therefore, ἀπαγάγοντες may only denote "took them aside," namely, for the purpose of making the change mentioned in the next words, which was to put the freemen in fetters, and make the slaves free; for we must not suppose, with Smith, that the freemen were thrown into prison. That, indeed, is at variance with the air of the whole passage: they would be too useful as sailors to allow of that. Their services were, therefore, retained, but they worked in chains.

the matter in hand, as it respected the reinforcement of the fleet at Chios, was one of no small moment.

XVI. In the mean time Strombichides arrives, with those eight ships at Samos; and having taken one Samian trireme he sailed to Teios, and entreated them to keep quiet. From Chios to Teios Chalcideus also made sail with twenty-three ships, and the land forces¹ of the Clazomenians and Erythræans joined them. On receiving private intelligence of this, Strombichides set sail before their arrival; and when off at sea he beheld the number of the ships from Chios, he sheered off for Samos, chased by the enemy. The land forces the Teians at first would not admit, but on the flight of the Athenians they brought them in. And now the land forces remained inactive, waiting for the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit. But on his tarrying long, they themselves set about demolishing the wall which the Athenians erected around Teios, towards the continent; in which they were assisted by some inconsiderable number of the Barbarians, who came up, under the command of Otages², lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

XVII. And now Chalcideus and Alcibiades having chased Strombichides to Samos, furnished the seamen of the Peloponnesian ships with arms as foot soldiers, and left them there.

¹ *Land forces.*] I here read, with Bekker and Goeller, *οἱ πρῶτοι*.

² *Otages.*] I have here followed the reading of no one MS. or edition, since all appear to be alike erroneous. The common reading *ὁ Τάγης*, besides being otherwise liable to objection, is inconsistent with the use of the Greek article, as illustrated by Bp. Middleton. Goeller edits from one MS. *Ἐράγης*, which is also countenanced by Xen. Hist. Gr. 1, 2, 5. But this is so at variance with all other MSS., that it must be regarded as extremely precarious. All agree in the *ὁ*: and the difference between *ὁ* and *σ* is so slight, that it were a wonder if *one* MS., out of so many, did not present the variation. There is little doubt but that either *Ὀράγης* or *Ὀράνης* is the true reading; and the difference between the *γ* and *ν* is so small, that it is difficult to distinguish. I have, in deference to the authority of MSS., adopted *Ὀράγης*. It is true that *Ὀράγης* may (as Goeller affirms) occur nowhere else, and that *Ὀράνης* does: yet, even in the passages to which Goeller adverts, *Ὀράγης* may possibly be the true reading; at least, every editor will, in such a case, do better to adhere to the decided authority of his MSS., and leave the doubtful point, if such there be, to be decided by the general critic.

Embarking in their stead mariners from Chios, on board both these and twenty other ships, they made sail to Miletus, in order to bring that city over to revolt. For Alcibiades was desirous (as being on friendly terms with the principal persons of the Milesians) to be beforehand with the ships from Peloponnesus, in bringing them over, and thus secure the honour of the achievement to himself¹, and (as he had promised) to Chalcideus and Endius, who had sent them, the credit of having, with the forces of the Chians and Chalcideans, brought over very many of the cities to revolt. These, then, avoiding observation, for most of the voyage, and arriving somewhat before Strombichides and Thrasyclus (who happened now to have come up from Athens with twelve ships and joined in the chase), they bring over Miletus to revolt.

The Athenians who followed close at their heels with nineteen ships, not being admitted by the Milesians, took up their anchorage in the adjoining island of Lade.²

And now on the revolt of Miletus was concluded the first alliance of the Lacedæmonians with the king, by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, to the following effect: —

¹ *To secure the honour of the achievement to himself.*] It is acutely observed by Mitford, that, "in thus promoting the Peloponnesian cause, it was not possible that he should have the Peloponnesian interest at heart. The success of the operations which had been carried on under his direction had been so rapid, so uninterrupted, so important, and so little expected, that he could not but have great present credit for it. But one powerful party in Lacedæmon was already hostile to him; and the moment his services ceased to be necessary, he would have to apprehend more jealousy than gratitude among the other." Besides, it must be remembered that so unprincipled and heartless a man could have no real view to any thing but self-interest. Now it was surely not for his interest that Lacedæmon should completely triumph, and Athens be utterly destroyed; for then his usefulness, and, consequently, his estimation with the selfish statesmen of Lacedæmon, would be at an end; he would be "cast away like a broken vessel." Mitford, therefore, seems right in supposing that he wished to raise a *personal interest* in Ionia; and we may imagine that this was in order, at some future period, to be restored with honour and distinction to the direction of the councils of his native country. Whether, indeed, his removal of the Peloponnesian seamen to the land service, and supplying their place with Chian ones, formed any part of his plans for personal aggrandisement (as Mitford supposes), I would not venture to say.

² *The island of Lade.*] This is mentioned by Herodotus 6, 7, 10. as an island adjacent to the city of the Milesians. See also Pausan. 1, 25. and Gronov. on Arrian E. A. 1, 19.

*"Articles of Alliance between Tissaphernes and the
Lacedæmonians.*

XVIII. "On the following terms¹ the Lacedæmonians and their confederates have made an alliance with the king and Tissaphernes :

"Whatsoever territory and cities the king possesses, or his ancestors possessed, let those be considered the king's.²

"Also, whatever money or other profit³ has accrued from these cities to the Athenians, the king and the Lacedæmonians and their allies are jointly to interrupt, so that the Athenians may neither derive money nor any other advantage.

"Moreover, the war against the Athenians, the king and the Lacedæmonians and their allies are jointly to carry on; nor shall it be lawful to make an end of the war with the Athenians, unless with the consent of both parties, the king, and the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

"Furthermore, if any shall revolt from the king, let them be considered as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their allies. And if any shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their allies, let them in like manner be accounted enemies to the king."

XIX. These were the terms of the alliance; immediately after the conclusion of which, the Chians having fitted out ten triremes, sailed to Anæa, wishing to gain intelligence of what was doing at Miletus, and moreover to draw the cities to revolt. And a message having reached them from Chalcideus to go back, and an intimation that Amorges is coming upon them with a land force, they made sail to the temple of Jove. There they descried sixteen ships, with which, after Thrasyclus,

¹ *On the following terms.*] Terms perfectly accommodated to promote the purposes of Alcibiades, but not at all honourable to Lacedæmon or to Chalcideus. (Mitford.)

² *Whatsoever territory, &c.*] This was surely, as Mitford observes, a most wide and dangerous concession to Persia.

³ *Other profit.*] What this was (which is again mentioned) we are left to imagine. It seems to be the quota of naval or military aid furnished, and also the advantage of the custom, and the indirect one of commerce.

Diomedon had sailed from Athens. At sight of these they took to flight, one ship to Ephesus ¹, the rest to Teios. And four of them the Athenians captured, abandoned by their crews, who had got to land; the rest took refuge at the city of Teios. And now the Athenians sail away for Samos; while the Chians setting sail again with the rest of their ships, and the land forces ² accompanying them, bring over to revolt first Lebedos, and then Eræ. After this both the land and sea forces retired to their respective homes.

XX. About the same time, the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians at Piræus, heretofore chased thither and blockaded by the Athenians with an equal force, having made a sudden sally, and gained the advantage in an engagement, captured four ships of the Athenians, and sailing away to Cenchreæ, again made preparations for their voyage to Ionia. There came also to them from Lacedæmon Astyochus, as commander, to whom the supreme naval authority ³ was committed. On the departure of the land forces from Teios, Tissaphernes himself repairing thither with an army, and having assisted in the further demolition of what remained of the wall at Teios, departed. And not long after his departure, Diomedon arriving with ten ships from Athens, concluded a treaty with the Teians, to receive *them* also.⁴ And having coasted along to Eræ, and assaulted the city without being able to take it, he sailed away.

XXI. About this time, too, there was an insurrection ⁵ by the people of Samos, in conjunction with the Athenians, who

¹ *Ephesus.*] This city, therefore, as Krueger thinks, was now hostile to the Athenians.

² *Land forces.*] Namely, of the Erythræans and Clazomenians, spoken of at c. 16., joined with the Peloponnesians mentioned at c. 28. (Krueger.)

³ *The supreme naval authority.*] Namely, as Goeller explains, both over those officers whom he brought, and those who went with Chalcideus and Alcibiades.

⁴ *To receive them also.*] i. e. to observe a neutrality between the two parties.

⁵ *Insurrection.*] On this sense of *ἰπανάρασις* Krueger refers to Thucyd. 5, 39. 4, 56. 5, 23. 8, 63 and 73. Herod. 1, 89. 3, 39. 6, 91. Aristoph. Av. 1585. Aristot. Polit. 5, 2, 6.

happened to be present with thirty-eight ships, against the powerful.⁶ And the democratical party put to death some two hundred in all of the nobles, condemning four hundred to exile, and themselves occupied their lands⁷ and houses by partition; and (the Athenians upon this having granted them independence, as now of assured fidelity) they communicated no share of the government to the landed proprietors, nor was it any longer permitted them to intermarry with the common people, nor those with them.

XXII. After these events, this summer, the Chians, as they had begun, so they now remitted nothing of their ardour in going (even without the Lacedæmonians) in full force to bring over the cities to revolt; and being desirous, moreover, that as many as possible should participate with them in the danger, they by themselves went on an expedition to Lesbos with thirteen ships (it having been directed by the Lacedæmonians that they should go secondly to that island, and from thence to the Hellespont); and, moreover, the land forces of the Peloponnesians present, and those of the allies in those parts, went to Clazomenæ and Cyme. The commander of the land forces was Eualus, a Spartan; of the fleet, Dinadas,

Mitford accounts for the rising of the people on the higher classes, by the circumstance that the latter had been, since the reduction on the former revolt, more depressed than all others, and were seeking an opportunity, through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending their condition; but their designs were preoccupied by the democrats.

⁶ *The powerful.*] i. e. the nobility or aristocracy; called in various countries by different names, referring either to wealth or political power, as γεώμοροι, *optimates*, &c. See Duker, to whom, however, I cannot concede that γεώμοροι, which occurs just after, is exactly synonymous with δυνατοί. The term is well explained by Portus "landed proprietors:" so in Appian 2, 810, 48. the τοὺς γεωμόρους, the landed proprietors or landholders are the same as what he had called γεώργους. And we may compare Herod. 5, 77, 12. οἱ δ' ἰπποδοῦται ἐκαλίουτο οἱ παχίεις τῶν Χαλκιδίων. Æschyl. Suppl. 621. But. τὸν μὴ βοηθήσοντα τῶνδε γεμόρων, ἄτιμον εἶναι ξὺν φυγῇ δημηλάτῳ.

It is surprising (Goeller remarks) that a popular government like that of Athens, every where accustomed to support popular government, should have suffered an oligarchy to subsist in an island subject to their sway.

⁷ *Put to death some two hundred, &c.*] Nothing, Mitford observes, could ensure to Athens the dominion of that valuable island equally with this measure, though humanity shudders at it.

one of the *Periœci*.¹ And these ships sailed first to Methymna, and brought it over to revolt. Leaving there four ships, they with the rest drew Mytilene also into revolt.²

XXIII. And now Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian commander of the fleet, having set sail with four ships from Cenchreæ, arrives at Chios, whither he was bound.³ And the third day after his arrival, the Athenian ships, twenty-five in number, reached Lesbos, under the command of Leon and Diomedon; for Leon had afterwards come from Athens with a further reinforcement of ten ships. And Astyochus weighing anchor that same day at evening, and taking one more ship of Chios, sailed to Lesbos, in order, if possible, to render some service. He proceeds first to Pyrrha, and the next day to Eresus, where he hears that Mytilene was taken by the Athenians, on the first onset. For the Athenians as they were sailing, unexpectedly standing into the port, overpowered the Chian ships, and landing, conquered in battle those that resisted, and seized the city. When Astyochus had heard this, both from the Eresians and the ships of the Chians who came with Eubulus from Methymna (which having been before left there, as soon as Mytilene was taken, fled, and happened to meet with him, four in number, for *one* was captured by the Athenians), no longer held on his course to Mytilene, but having brought over Eresus to revolt, and armed the people⁴, he sends them and the heavy-

¹ *One of the Periœci.*] Not, "a nation of those parts," as Hobbes and Smith render. The Lacedæmonians consisted of two sorts: 1. The *Spartans*, who inhabited Sparta, and a certain considerable territory around it: these were considered as the descendants of the Dorians and Heraclidæ, and had the government of the state in their own hands. 2. The *Periœci*, who were those Lacedæmonians that inhabited around the district of Sparta, and the rest of the Lacedæmonian territories: these had not full political privileges, and paid a tribute to the Spartans. They were, however, sometimes raised to the higher offices, though chiefly, if not entirely, in foreign service.

² *Leaving there, &c.*] This sentence is only found in the Cod. Vallæ, and Cod. Vatican.; but it is clearly necessary, and was doubtless omitted per homœoteleuton.

³ *Whither he was bound.*] Or, had set on going.

⁴ *Armed the people, &c.*] I have here followed the emendation of this formerly corrupt passage adopted by Bekker and Goeller, from one of the best MSS.; though I have ventured to *cancel* what they only *placed between brackets*, namely, ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀντισσαν καὶ Μήθυμναν, which seem a needless repetition.

armed from his fleet to Antissa and Methymna, under the command of Eteonicus; while he himself, with his own ships and those three Chian ones, coasted along thither, hoping that the Methymnæans would take courage on seeing them, and persevere in their revolt. But when every thing in Lesbos ran counter to his wishes, he, after taking on board his own army, made sail for Chios. On which the land forces on board⁵ the ships which were to have gone to the Hellespont, returned each to their cities. After this, came to them to Chios six of the Peloponnesian confederate fleet at Cenchreæ.

And now the Athenians re-established things on their former footing in Lesbos, and proceeding from thence, and taking the fortified suburb of the Clazomenians on the continent, they brought back the people to the city in the island, with the exception of those who had been the authors of the revolt; for they had retired to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ again became subject to the Athenians.

XXIV. This same summer the Athenians, who occupied a station with twenty ships at Lade, off Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, slew Chalceus, the Lacedæmonian governor who had gone to the assistance of the inhabitants with a small party; and on the third day afterwards they passed over and erected a trophy, which the Milesians however destroyed, as not being erected with any mastery of the country.¹

And now Leon and Diomedon with the Athenian fleet from Lesbos made war upon the Chians from their ships,

It must be observed that *ὀπλίσας* has here the same sense as at l. 3, 27 *ὀπλιζει τὸν δῆμον*. Finally, *παπαίμνω* here signifies *præmitto*, *transmitto*, or simply *mitto*. See the examples in Lex. Xen.

⁵ *The land forces on board.*] These (Krueger supposes) were Peloponnesian infantry with them, and those of the country, who had assembled at Clazomenæ and Cyma, to go on an expedition to the Hellespont (see c. 22.), and who, having got over to Lesbos from the continent, were now conveyed away on board the ships. And he observes that *ἀπεκομίσθη ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός* is for *ἀπεκομίσθη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν πεζός*.

¹ *With any mastery of the country.*] By this it should seem that no trophy could lawfully be erected except where there was such an advantage as enabled an army to keep the field of battle. Otherwise, if they retreated, and afterwards only returned and erected the trophy by stealth, it was held of no avail.

sallying from the Cœnussæ islands off Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleus ² (forts which they occupied in the Erythræan territory) and from Lesbos. They also had some marines of the regular ³ heavy-armed, which had been impressed for this service.⁴ Having effected a landing at Cardamyle, and defeated with great loss such of the Chians as went forth to resist them, at Bolissus ⁵, they destroyed all the places thereabouts.⁶ And again they overcame them in another battle at Phane ⁷, and in a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians no longer ventured forth for resistance, and thus the Athenians plundered the country, which was very highly cultivated ⁸, and had suffered none of the injuries of war from the time of the Persian invasion. For, putting aside the Lacedæmonians, the Chians were (as far as I can learn), the only *people* who with prosperity have cultivated moderation, and in proportion as their state increased in consequence, regulated their plans with so much the more attention to security.⁹ Nor did

² *Sidussa and Pteleus.*] Situated, probably, on the coast of Erythræa opposite to Chius.

³ *Regular.*] Literally, "of the lists."

⁴ *Impressed for this service.*] For this impress there was occasion, since, as we have before seen, the marine service was thought much inferior to that on shore.

⁵ *Bolissus.*] Situated on the coast, at the N.W. part of the island, and yet called Bolisso.

⁶ *Destroyed all the places thereabouts.*] The sense is here completely missed by Hobbes and Smith. Ἀνάσταντα ποιεῖν is used as at l. 6, 76. ἀναστάντες ποιεῖν.

⁷ *Phane.*] A small port at the most southerly part of the island. The precise situation has not been fixed. Poppo proves that it was somewhere on the east coast. There is little doubt but that it was at the place now called Cape Blanco. See Arrowsmith's modern map.

⁸ *Cultivated.*] Bauer, indeed, affirms that κατεσκευασμένην cannot signify *cultivated*. But his assertion is disproved by a very similar passage of Xenophon, Cœcon. 4, 15. κατασκευάζειν τὴν χώραν ἀριστα. See also Æschyl. Pers. 720.

⁹ *Regulated their plans, &c.*] Such seems to be the true sense of the expression ἰσομοῦντο ἰχυρώτερον, which the translators have variously rendered. Mitford well paraphrases the whole passage thus: "Till the present conjuncture, the affairs of Chios had long been managed with a steady prudence, uncommon among the Grecian cities. Moderate in prosperity, blameless towards their neighbours, and using their increasing wealth and power for no purpose of ambition, but directing their politics merely to secure the happiness they enjoyed, their island, from the time of the Persian war, had never seen an enemy within its bounds." That the island should be in such wonderful prosperity was, perhaps, to be attributed to their form of government, which was, indeed, chiefly aristocratical, but

they venture to make *this* revolt (if that may seem to have been done contrary to their cautious system), before they were ready to have the aid of many and good allies with whom to encounter the danger, and had perceived the Athenians not even themselves any longer denying, after the disaster of Sicily, that their affairs were certainly in a very bad state.¹⁰ And if they were (as men are) somewhat deceived by the unexpected casualties of affairs¹¹, they participated in the error¹² with many others, who were of the same opinion—that the Athenian cause would speedily be brought to ruin.¹³ Being then, thus excluded from the sea, and by land their territory ravaged, some of them attempted to bring the city over to the Athenians; which, though the rulers perceived, they themselves kept quiet; but after they had received Astyochus from Erythræ, with four ships which were with him, they considered how they might most gently (either by the taking of hostages, or some other expedient), put a stop to the conspiracy.

Such was the posture of affairs at Chios.

XXV. At the close of this summer, there came from Athens one thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians, and one thousand five hundred of the Argives (for to the five hundred of

partly of that mixed nature, composed of aristocracy and democracy which forms the great excellence of our British constitution.

¹⁰ *That their affairs were certainly altogether bad.*] Such is, I conceive, the true sense. Smith surely exaggerates when he translates (or paraphrases), “were plunged into the lowest depth of impotence and distress.” *Βεβαίως* is so used in the best writers; of which I shall give examples in my edition.

¹¹ *Deceived by the unexpected, &c.*] I have here departed from the reading of all the copies, since (though the editors do not notice it) no tolerable sense can be elicited from *ἀνθρωπείως*. The true reading, I have no doubt, is *ἀνθρωπείως*, which must be pointed off. The word occurs at l. 3, 40. and 3, 103.

¹² *Participated in the error.*] Or, literally, “consented unto the error.” The construction (which the commentators do not elucidate) is: *ἐννέγνωσαν* (ἐς) τὴν ἀμαρτίαν μετὰ πολλῶν, οἷς ταῦτα (τὰ αὐτὰ) ἔδοξε (δηλόνοσι) τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ταχὺ ἐνναυπεδέσσειν. So l. 7, 73. *ἐννεγίνωσκον μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥσσαν ἐκείνου*. Dionys. Hal. 121, 35. *ἐννέγνω* (ἐς τὸ) γίνεσθαι βασιλεως.

¹³ *Brought to ruin.*] For *ἐνναυπεδέσσειν* Bekker, Dindorf, and Goeller edit, from one MS., *ἐνναυαυπεδέσσειν*. But the change is surely not justified by sufficient authority, nor is it necessary. See note on l. 2, 51.

the Argives, who were light-armed, the Athenians supplied heavy armour), and of other allies one thousand more, with forty-eight galleys (of which some conveyed soldiers ¹), under the command of Phrynicus, Onomacles, and Scironides. These after putting in at Samos, crossed over to Miletus, and there encamped. On which the Milesians, taking the field with eight hundred heavy-armed of their own, and the Peloponnesians who came with Chalcideus, as also some foreign auxiliaries of Tissaphernes (Tissaphernes, too, and his cavalry being present), engaged with the Athenians and their allies. And the Argives having moved too far forward ² with their wing, and being in some disorder, through contempt of their foes, as marching against Ionians, and such as would not withstand their attack, they were defeated by the Milesians, and nearly ³ three hundred of them were slain. As to the Athenians, after conquering the Peloponnesians first, and then routing the Barbarians and the rest of the multitude, but not engaging with the Milesians (nay they retreated into the city after routing the the Argives, on seeing the rest of their foes beaten), then fixed their camp (as masters of the field), close under the city of the Milesians. Now it happened in this battle that the Ionians on both sides conquered the Dorians; for the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the Argives. Then, after erecting a trophy, the Athenians made preparations for the circumvallation of the place (which has an isthmus ⁴), thinking that if they could reduce Miletus, the rest of the revolted states would easily be brought to submit.

¹ *Of which some conveyed soldiers.*] These were not mere transports, but triremes of a somewhat more capacious make. In the expedition to Sicily a great part of the first fleet was composed of such; where the distinction is clearly expressed.

² *Having moved too far forward.*] Or drawn out. Goeller well defends the common reading, *προελάσαντες*, against Bekker and Dindorf, who would alter it. It is, he truly observes, a military term, and used similarly to *ἐπελάγειν*.

³ *Nearly.*] Literally, "somewhat less." Hobbes wrongly renders, "no less."

⁴ *Has an isthmus.*] Not "is an isthmus," as Hobbes renders; nor "seated on an isthmus," as Smith; for how can isthmuses "be cut off?" There is a very similar passage at l. 7, 26., which must be understood in the same manner.

XXVI. In the meantime, when it was quite dusk, they received intelligence that the ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily, fifty-five in number, were all but at hand. For there had come (at the especial instigation of Hermocrates, who urged them to take part in consummating the destruction of the Athenians), twenty ships of the Syracusans, and two of the Selinuntians, as also those of Peloponnesus which had been preparing and were now ready; and both these and the others were committed to the charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus, the naval commander in chief. They came to anchor first at *Lerus*¹, the island over against Miletus; then, on learning there that the Athenians were near Miletus, they made sail to the Iasic gulf, desirous to know the state of affairs at Miletus. But on Alcibiades coming on horseback to Tichiussa in the Milesian territory, at which part of the gulf the Peloponnesians had taken up their night quarters, they learned the news of the battle. For Alcibiades was present, and had given his assistance to the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He counselled them, unless they wished to ruin the whole business in Ionia, to give aid with all speed to Miletus, and not to suffer it to be circumvallated.

XXVII. It was, therefore, determined that they should proceed to its relief at dawn of day. But Phrynichus, the commander of the Athenians, as soon as he had received from *Lerus* certain intelligence of the fleet, and when his colleagues were of opinion that they should stay, and venture a battle, he refused to do it, and, as far as his power extended, he would not suffer them, or any other, so to do. For since (he said) they were at liberty to engage with them hereafter, when they should have learnt against how many ships of the enemy, and with what addition to their own, and when it would be in their power to combat, after suitable and leisurely preparation, he would never, through fear of any base imputation, irrationally put all to hazard (though it was no disgrace, he said, for the Athenian

¹ *Lerus*.] I have here adopted the reading of Bekker and Goeller, founded on the best authorities. Such an island as Eleus, there, is unheard of.

navy to retreat at a due season; but that rather it were disgraceful, under whatever circumstances it might take place, if they should be defeated), and that the state should thus not only encounter disgrace, but also imminent peril; wherefore, since their recent losses, it was scarcely expedient that they should, even with a secure force, by choice, nay, even from evident necessity, attack first; much less then, unconstrained, to engage with voluntary dangers. He further counselled them, as speedily as possible, to embark the wounded, and such baggage and utensils as they had brought, but what they had taken from the enemy's country to leave behind, that the ships might be light, and then to make sail to Samos; and from thence (after having drawn together all the ships) to make their attack on the enemy, as opportunity might offer. The measures pursued by Phrynichus were in conformity to his counsels; and not then only, but afterwards, and not in this affair only, but in such others as he had to do with, he was esteemed a wise and prudent man.

And the Athenians immediately after evening, after an incomplete victory, decamped from Miletus, and the Argives hastily, and in dudgeon at their disaster, sailed away from Samos homeward.

XXVIII. But the Peloponnesians weighing anchor at dawn of day from Tichiussa, came into port after ¹ the departure of the Athenians, and after remaining one day, they on the following, taking with them the ships before chased, under Chalcideus, resolved to sail back to Tichiussa, for the baggage which they unloaded there. ² On their arrival, Tissaphernes coming up with his land forces, prevails upon

¹ *Came into port after, &c.*] 'Επικαράγονται. This is a rare word, of which the commentators adduce no examples. It occurs, however, in Dio Cass. 310, 8. *ἕως πάσαι αἱ νῆες επικατήχθησαν.*

² *Resolved to sail, &c.*] Such is the plain sense of the passage, at which Bauer causelessly stumbles. 'Ελαφρῆσθαι is a vox solennis de hac re; as 8, 90. Herod. 4, 196. Xen. Anab. 5. τὰ ἀγώγισμα ἐλαφρῆσθαι. Strabo, p. 954. 35. ἔμπορε, κατὰ πλεονσόν, ἐξελού, πάντα πέπραται. Polysen. p. 509.

The baggage had been removed to make the ships fit for action; for so much did the antients esteem *lightness* for such a purpose, that (as appears from Xen. Anab. 1, 13, 2, 27 and 29.) they sometimes *ἐξέιδοντο τὰ μεγάλα ἱστία.*

them to sail for Iasus, where Amorges (who was his enemy) then resided. And making a sudden assault on the place (the inhabitants not expecting that the ships were other than Athenian), they took it; and in the action the Syracusans especially signalized themselves. Having taken prisoner Amorges, an illegitimate son of Pissuthnes, and a rebel to the king, they delivered him to Tissaphernes, to carry him, if he pleased, to the king, agreeably to his orders. Iasus they plundered, and the army gained a large booty, for the place was one of ancient wealth.³ And the mercenaries they took to themselves, without doing them any harm, for most of them were from Peloponnesus.⁴ The city they delivered up to Tissaphernes, and all the captives, both bond and free, for whom they agreed to receive from him one Daric stater⁵ a head; and then they returned to Miletus. And Pedaritus son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians sent to Chios as governor⁶, they transported to Erythræ with the mercenaries that had been in the service of Amorges; and at Miletus they establish Philip. Thus ended the summer.

³ *Of ancient wealth.*] Παλαιόπλουτον. Of this expression (neglected by the commentators) the following are examples: Ælian V. Hist. 6, 9. παλαιόπλουτον χωρίον. Dio Cass. 41, 32. τὸ χωρίον παλαιόπλουτον ἦν. Liv. 4, 59. Oppidum veteri fortuna opulentum. and 9, 39. fortuna veteri abundantes Etruscorum opes.

⁴ *Most of them were from Peloponnesus.*] This is one of the earliest instances of the use of Grecian auxiliaries by the Persian princes. It became, however, in the next generation, very frequent.

⁵ *Daric stater.*] The Daric staters, and also those of Philip of Macedon, Alexander, and Lysimachus, were of equal value with the Attic golden stater, or the Attic didrachma. Now the value of the didrachma was twenty drachmas of silver; so that there were five staters in a mina, and three hundred in a talent, since the value of gold was ten times greater than that of silver. Boeckh. Staatsh. d. Ath. t. 1. p. 23.

⁶ *Governor.*] Or, Harmostes; though Thucydides does not here use that term. See more in Krueger, p. 280. On this office of Harmostes Mitford has the following remarks: "The internal divisions of every little state, far more than any consideration for the confederacy at large, induced the subordinate governments not only to admit readily, but often to desire, the controlling interference of the imperial people. The Lacedæmonian government accordingly sent superintending officers of their own, with the title of harmost, regulator, to reside in all the cities of their confederacy, beyond proper Greece. The authority of these officers would depend much upon the power of the superintending state at the time, and the weakness of the subordinate, whether the weakness of scanty numbers and property, or weakness superinduced by internal divisions."

XXIX. In the subsequent winter, Tissaphernes, after having put a garrison into Iasus, repaired to Miletus, and distributed a month's pay to all the ships, at an Attic drachma a day each, agreeably to his engagement¹ at Lacedæmon; but henceforward he was disposed to give only a triobole², until he should have enquired the king's pleasure; and, if he ordered it, would, he said, give the whole drachma. But on Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, remonstrating (for *Theramenes*, not being the nauarch [or admiral] but only sailing with the fleet to deliver it to Astyochus, was too easy and timid respecting the pay), it was, however³, agreed on that *more* should be given each man than three oboli, and that by five ships' pay; for to fifty-five ships thirty talents were allowed per month; and to all other ships, as the number of such should increase, was to be given pay in the same proportion.⁴

¹ *Agreeably to his engagement.*] i. e. by the medium of this ambassador.

² *Triobole.*] i. e. half a drachma.

³ *However.*] Or, *nevertheless*, i. e. though it was more than he at first intended. Such is plainly the sense of ὅμως, and not that assigned by Goeller, "quamquam Theramenes non adversabatur."

⁴ *It was, however, agreed on that, &c.*] There is, perhaps, no passage in our author that has occasioned greater difficulty than this*; and in whatever way it be considered, we are surrounded with perplexities. I cannot, however, enter into a detail of the various opinions of the commentators and critics. It is admitted by all that the passage is *corrupt*, since no tolerable sense has ever yet been elicited from it without making some *alteration*, though the MSS. present no variety. The most prevalent opinion, since the time of Duker, has been, that the words καὶ πεντήκοντα have crept in from the margin, and they are placed between brackets by all the recent editors, who, however, are not agreed on the *sense*; Hack and Goeller make it as follows: "Nevertheless, to five ships, more were agreed on than five obols a man; for to five ships were given three talents a month, and to the rest," &c.; which would be three obols and three-fifths a day. But it must be confessed that there is something exceedingly awkward in this sense. Why the pay should be reckoned at a certain sum for *each five ships*, it is difficult to see. Besides, to make the words καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσῳ πλείους νῆες ἦσαν τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ denote the other *fifty ships*, involves extreme harshness: and Duker's notion concerning the *first five* is absurd. There is also great objection to taking παρὰ for ἐς, since the signification is very unusual, nor can it thus seem otherwise than strange that the author should have used παρὰ and ἐς so close together. Finally, to *cancel*

* On which Bauer quaintly annotates thus: — "Difficillimum huncce Nostri locum, veluti scopulos terræ jam imminentes, in extremo fere opere offendimus. Laboravimus in quibusdam; in nonnullis fortasse æstaverimus: at hic obhæsimus plane, nec dum extricavimus quidquam aut promovimus: nec pudet, ubi tales Viri obhæserint, Palmer. Meibom., Duker."

XXX. This same winter, the Athenians at Samos (for there had come to them from home thirty-five more ships, and Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, as commanders ¹) having drawn together the ships from Chios, and the rest elsewhere ², after the commanders had cast lots for their respective services ³, determined to blockade Miletus with the fleet, and to send against Chios both a fleet and army. And the plan was accordingly put in execution. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon with thirty ships, and a part of those one thousand heavy-armed which went to

two words without any authority, is too bold, and not to be tolerated unless it could remove all difficulty; which we see is far from being the case. Under these circumstances I have thought it proper to retain the signification commonly assigned to *παρά*. Though, as the passage is undoubtedly corrupt, I have adopted the very mild *conjecture* of Meibomius, for *ῥπια*, *ῥπιάκοντα* (i. e. for γ, λ); though not his *interpretation*. I am not aware that the sense I have assigned is liable to any well-founded objection. It proceeds, indeed, upon the supposition that two hundred was the regular number of the crew of a trireme; but so does the interpretation of Hack and Goeller. And though that has been denied by Duker, yet the point has been made out by Meibomius, and all the recent editors admit it. To the passages adduced by Meibomius in proof, may be added the following: Plutarch Lysand. 20. Thucyd. 6, 8. where the Egestians are said to have sent sixty talents for a month's pay (namely, a drachma per diem, as we find from 6, 31.) for sixty ships, and l. 4, 5. (where Demosthenes is said to have been left at Pylus with five ships) compared with Themist. 138. A., who, though Thucydides has there omitted to give the number of men, estimates them at one thousand; i. e. two hundred a ship. Demosth. Phil. 1. who reckons the half of a ship's pay at twenty minæ each ship for a month; which makes two hundred a ship. Triremes then mostly carried two hundred men; as a Mytilenæan trireme, mentioned by Herod 3, 13. and universally the Persian triremes, 7, 184, 7. *ὡς ἀνα διηκοσίους ἀνδρας λογιζόμενοι ἐν ἑκάστῃ νηϊ — ἐπιβάτευσεν δὲ — τρήκοντα ἄνδρες*. See also 7, 185, 13. & 186, 5. 8, 17, 7. *ἐσπάρευσεν ἄνδράσι διηκοσίοισι καὶ οἰκλήτῃ νηϊ*.

It may, indeed, seem strange that the computation should be by *ship's pay*; but the reason why that method was used seems to have been that, as the pay of a ship came to exactly half a talent per month, so, from the *even sum*, it was more convenient to reckon by *ship's pay*. For the same reason, we find, in all the Greek historians, more frequent mention made of *month's pay* (as here) than *day's pay*. Thus it appears that all that Tissaphernes did was to make the payment (which otherwise would have been twenty-seven talents and a half) *even money*, by which the pay would be three obols and about three elevenths a day.

¹ *As commanders.*] Namely, of the whole combined fleet, not of this squadron only.

² *The rest elsewhere.*] Namely, small detachments sent out for minor purposes.

³ *Cast lots for their respective services.*] This was usually done. So we find at l. 6, 42. and 62. the fleet was divided by lot among the three commanders.

Miletus⁴, an allotted portion of each being conveyed on board of the transport-triremes⁵, sailed for Chios. The rest remaining in Samos, being seventy-four ships, held the mastery of the sea, and made cruizes⁶ upon Miletus.

XXXI. And Astyochus, who happened to be now at Chios, taking hostages, on account of the meditated treason, desisted from his purpose when he had heard¹ of the ships that had come with Theramenes, and that the affairs of the confederacy were in a better condition: and taking ten ships of the Peloponnesians and ten Chian ones, he puts to sea, and after assaulting Ptelem, without taking it, he coasted along to Clazomenæ, where he ordered such of the people as favoured the Athenian interest, to remove up² to Daphnus, and submit themselves³. Tamos, too, the lieutenant [or sub-satrap] of Ionia, made the same demand. But they not listening to it, he makes an attack on the city, which was unwall'd. Not being able, however, to take it, he sails off with a hard gale of wind, and himself is carried to Phocæa, and [then to] Cyme; while the rest of the ships put in at the islands off Clazomenæ, Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. After remaining there eight days (on account of the stormy weather) ravaging the country, partly plundering and partly putting aboard what property of the Clazomenians lay outside of the place, they then proceeded to Phocæa and Cyme to Astyochus.

XXXII. While Astyochus was there, there came some ambassadors from the Lesbians, to signify their wishes to

⁴ *Those heavy-armed which went to Miletus.*] Namely, those which had been conveyed thither the preceding summer. See c. 25.

⁵ *The transport-triremes.*] Not transports, as Smith and others render. See l. 6, 43. and the note.

⁶ *Made cruizes.*] I here read, with Krueger, for *ἐπιπλοῦν, ἐπιπλοῦς*. See c. 27. s. f. and 38.

¹ *Desisted from his purpose when he had heard, &c.*] As thinking the Peloponnesian interest in the island strong enough, without recourse being had to any harsh measures.

² *Remove up.*] i. e. as Krueger explains, "up the country, into the interior." It may, however, be observed, that the situation of Daphnus is very uncertain.

³ *Submit themselves.*] Namely, to the Peloponnesians. The sense is here quite mistaken by Smith.

again revolt. And him they brought to listen to them; but as both the Corinthians and the other allies were indisposed to co-operate, on account of their former disaster, he put to sea and proceeded to Chios. Thither, too, his ships, though tossed by a tempest, at length arrived, some from one quarter and some from another. And after this, Pedaritus, who was advancing with the land forces from Miletus, having come to Erythræa, crossed over from thence with his army to Chios. He had also the soldiers, to the number of about five hundred, from those five ships¹ which were left there by Chalcideus with arms and armour.

But certain Lesbians having engaged to revolt, Astyochus makes a representation to Pedaritus and the Chians, that they ought to go with the fleet and bring about the revolt of Lesbos; for that either they should increase the number of their allies, or, at least, if unsuccessful, should annoy the Athenians. But they would not listen to this suggestion, and Pedaritus declared that he would not give up to him the Chian ships.

XXXIII. He then, taking taking the five ships which were Corinthian², and a sixth which was of Megaris, and one of Hermione, together with those Laconian ships which he had brought with him, sails for Miletus, to assume the supreme naval command; after having used much threatening language to the Chians, that "verily he would never help them, whatever might be their need." And on making Corycus³ in Erythræa, he there took up his quarters for the night. And now the Athenians sailing from Samos to Chios with the forces, were themselves, in their own anchorage, only

¹ *Five ships.*] Namely, those on board of which Chalcideus and Alcibiades had come thither. See c. 11. and 12.

² *The five ships which were Corinthian.*] For though our author told us, at c. 23., that the ships set out from Cenchræ, he did not say that five of them were Corinthian ones. (Goeller.)

³ *Corycus.*] This was (notwithstanding what is expressed in Duker's map) not a town but a promontory: so called, I believe, from its form, for κόρυκος is explained by Hesychius a purse or bag, also a certain shell-fish.

separated by the hill ⁴, and each party was ignorant of the proximity of the other. A message, however, having by night reached him from Pedaritus, that some Erythræan captives dismissed from Samos are come to Erythræa, with intention to betray the place, Astyochus immediately sails back to Erythræa; so little did he miss falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus having passed over to him, and they having made inquisition on the matter respecting the supposed traitors, and found that the whole was but a pretence devised by the men for their liberation from Samos, they pronounced their acquittal and then departed, the one to Chios, the other to his original destination, Miletus.

XXXIV. In the meantime, the forces of the Athenians, coasting round from Corcyra, met off Arginus ¹, with three long ships ² of the Chians, and on descrying them made chase. And now a violent storm came on, and the Chian vessels with difficulty gained the refuge of the port; while the Athenian ones, those that were farthest advanced in the pursuit, were three of them destroyed, and bulged at the city of Chios (where the crews were partly taken prisoners, and partly slain); the rest took refuge at the port under Mount Mimas ³, called Phœnicus, from whence they afterwards got off to Lesbos, and made preparations for fortifying.

XXXV. This same winter Hippocrates, the Lacedæmonian, having set sail from Peloponnesus with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus, son of Diagoras, and

⁴ *Were themselves, &c.*] It is truly observed by Goeller, that the construction here is for *kai avroi ek tou epi tharipa lophon katormosamēnoi deiργοντο τῷ λόφῳ*. And he compares l. 3, 68. and 112.; further remarking, "*Tò epi tharipa nobis est die andere seite, at genetivus lophon pendet ex tharipa, sicut genet. tou epi tharipa regitur ab ek.*" *Ek, quod nos exprimimus voculis nach etwas hin, significat, velut tò ek tou isdμου τειχος* l. 64.; *Latini ab isthmo.*"

¹ *Arginus.*] Called Argenus by Strabo, Ptolemy, and Steph. Byz. It seems to have had its appellation, like our Albion, from the whiteness of its cliffs. It is now called C. Blanco.

² *Long ships.*] i. e. ships of war.

³ *Mimas.*] A lofty mountain of Erythræa, in what part is uncertain; probably the northern one, and what is called, in Arrowsmith's modern map, Capo Koryni.

two others, also with one Laconian and one Syracusan ship, arrived at Cnidus. Now that city had revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes¹: and when those in Miletus had heard of their coming, they required them, with the half of the ships to garrison Cnidus, and with the rest, stationed at Triopium², to seize the vessels of burden³, which touched there in their way from Ægypt. Now the Triopium is a promontory jutting out from Cnidia, and sacred to Apollo. On learning this, the Athenians, likewise sailing from Samos, took the six ships watching off Triopium, but the crew escaped from them. After this, anchoring at Cnidus and assaulting the city, which was unwalled, they nearly took it; and on the next day again assaulted it. But as the inhabitants had, during the night, put the place into a better state of defence, and the men who had escaped from the ships at Triopium had contrived to throw themselves into the place, the Athenians were less able to make any impression upon it; but, departing and ravaging the territory of the Cnidians, they sailed off to Samos.

XXXVI. About the same time, Astyochus, having come to Miletus to the fleet, the Peloponnesians had now all things in abundance⁴ at the camp. For a sufficient pay was given them, and the great wealth obtained by the plunder of Iasus

¹ *At the instigation of Tissaphernes.*] I here read, with Palmer and Goeller, *ὅτι*: for it plainly appears that Cnidus was friendly to the Peloponnesians, and hostile to the Athenians.

² *Triopium.*] So called, I imagine, from its having three faces. See the view of it in Clarke's Travels ii. p. 214. So Hesych. *Τριόπιος. τριόψαλμος*. There might, indeed, be a temple of Apollo; which is confirmed by Hesych. *Τριόπιον. ἡ Κνίδος, καὶ περὶ ἐνθα τεράζουσιν*. where I conjecture *ἡ Κνιδίας ἄκρα καὶ ἱερόν*. That lexicographer seems to have copied from some very ancient scholiast on Thucydides. How usual it was to build temples on promontories, I have elsewhere noticed. It seems to have been done to excite the devotion of the passing mariner.

³ *Vessels of burden.*] Namely, corn-bulks of the Athenians; there being always a constant corn trade with Egypt, which was from the earliest ages famous for its abundance of corn, as we know from the Scriptures.

Smith absurdly renders, "take under their convoy the," &c.

⁴ *The Peloponnesians had now all things in abundance.*] It is truly observed by Mitford, "that the use at this time made by the Peloponnesians of the advantages of Persian pay and Asiatic plunder, seems to have been to indulge themselves in the large and wealthy city of Miletus, under the fine sky of Ionia."

was yet in possession of the soldiery, and the Milesians carried on the war with great zeal and alacrity. The former treaty, however, made with Tissaphernes by Chalcideus, was thought by the Peloponnesians to be defective, and rather unfavourable to them⁵; and while Theramenes was yet with them⁶, they formed others as follows:—

“ The second Treaty of Alliance between the Lacedæmonians and the King of Persia.

XXXVII. “ The articles of agreement¹ between the Lacedæmonians and their allies, and King Darius and the king’s sons and Tissaphernes. There shall be peace and friendship on the following terms :

“ Whatever country, territory, and cities are King Darius’s, or were his father’s, or ancestors’, against these neither the Lacedæmonians, nor the allies of the Lacedæmonians, shall go, for the purpose of war, or other injury ; nor shall the Lacedæmonians, or the allies of the Lacedæmonians, exact any tribute from those cities ; neither shall king Darius, or any states subject to him, go against the Lacedæmonians or their allies, for the purpose of war or other injury.

“ If the Lacedæmonians, or their allies, shall stand in need of any assistance from the king, or the king from the Lacedæmonians or their allies, whatever they may induce each other to do, that shall be right for them to do.

“ That both parties shall jointly carry on the war against the Athenians and their allies ; and if they shall make any peace, it shall be done jointly.

“ Whatever army may be in the king’s territory sent for by the king, the king shall furnish the expense of it.

⁵ *Defective and rather, &c.*] The conjecture here of Bauer is unnecessary, as will appear from the following kindred passage of Eurip. Phœn. 713. πολλῶ γὰρ εὖρον ἐνόςσις διαλλαγᾶς. where the conjecture πολλῶν may be dispensed with.

⁶ *Yet with them.*] I here read, with Bekker and Goeller, for ἐνὶ παρόντος, from MS. B., ἐν παρόντος, which I had myself previously conjectured.

¹ *Articles of agreement.*] In this treaty the sovereignty of the Persian king over the Grecian cities in Asia was rather less explicitly acknowledged, but yet was acknowledged. (Mitford.)

“ If any of the cities which have entered into league with the king shall invade the king’s territory, the rest shall hinder them, and render assistance to the utmost of their power.

“ And if any of those in the king’s territory, or such as the king rules, shall invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and render assistance to the utmost of his power.”

XXXVIII. After the conclusion of this treaty, Theramenes having delivered the fleet to Astyochus, accordingly disappears ¹ in a barge. And now the Athenians at Lesbos, crossing over to Chios with their forces, and making themselves masters of both the land and sea, fortified Delphinium ², a place otherwise strong to the landward, and having a port, and not far distant from the city of Chios.

As to the Chians, being beaten ³ in many engagements and otherwise not very well disposed one to another ⁴ (for though Tydeus, an Ionian, and his adherents had been now put to death for Atticizing, and the rest of the city been held to oligarchy ⁵ by compulsion, yet entertaining suspicions one of another ⁶, they remained inactive); on these accounts, neither they nor the auxiliaries under Pedaritus conceived themselves a match for the enemy. They therefore sent to Miletus, requesting Astyochus to give them aid. Which when he had refused them, Pedaritus sends a letter on the subject to Lacedæmonians.

¹ *Disappears.*] i. e. takes himself off. The term ἀφανίζεσθαι hints at the suddenness of his departure, doubtless from pique at being only thought worthy to bring a fleet over, not to command it. This sense of ἀφανίζεσθαι is found in Xen. Ages. 9. and Philostratus cited by Budæus in his Comment. Græc. See more on the term in my note on St. Luke 24, 31.

² *Delphinium.*] See the Lex. Xenoph.

³ *Beaten.*] It is strange that Hobbes and Smith should render “disheartened,” or “dispirited.” It might have been expected that translators of the most difficult of all the Greek authors should be acquainted with so common an idiom as that by which πλήσσειν corresponds to our verb, to be beaten.

⁴ *Not perfectly well disposed, &c.*] An elegant way of expressing their being at faction one with another. There was a strong democratical party.

⁵ *Held to oligarchy.*] I prefer, with Hack and Goeller, and the Scholiast, to take ἐς ὀλίγον for ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν, rather than assign to it the feeble sense given by Hobbes and others; which, too, would require ἐπ’ ὀλίγον.

⁶ *Entertaining suspicions one of another.*] Literally, “being suspiciously affected.” So l. 1, 75. τοῖς Ἕλλησι ἐπιφθόνως διακίεσθαι. Isæus p. 3, 2. οὐχ ὁμοίως — διακίεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

dæmon, representing the wrong he had done. Such was the state of affairs at Chios as respected the Athenians. Their ships, too, from Samos made cruizes against those at Miletus ; but when they would not come out to encounter them, they returned back to Samos and kept still.

XXXIX. This same winter, about the solstice, left Peloponnesus for Ionia the twenty-seven ships which, at the instigation of Calligitus the Megaræan, and Timagoras the Cyzicæan, were fitted out by the Lacedæmonians for the service of Pharnabazus. They were commanded by Antisthenes, a Spartan. The Lacedæmonians also sent out eleven persons of the Spartans, as counsellors ¹ to Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas ², son of Arcesilaus. They had received orders, on arriving at Miletus, to jointly take charge of other affairs, as should be best for the public service, and to send off either these ships, or more or less at their discretion, to the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, appointing Clearchus, son of Ramphius, who went with them, as governor ; also (if it seemed expedient to the eleven), to deprive Astyochus of the command of the fleet, and appoint Antisthenes to it ; for, by reason of the letters from Pedaritus, they held him in some suspicion.

The ships therefore setting sail from Malea, on the main

¹ *Sent out eleven persons, &c.*] These ξύμβουλοι they used to send when the admiral (to whom, however, the σύμβουλοι were not *ισόψηφοι* see Thucyd. 3, 79.), managed things ill. See Thucyd. 2, 85. 3, 69 and 76. In the same manner, king Agis, by a custom at that time new, had assigned him ten σύμβουλοι, on his not having, when he might, conquered the Argives. See Thucyd. 5, 63. Diod. 12, 78. And from this time it became usual for kings, when sent against an enemy, to be accompanied by a *συμβούλων συνίδριον*. (Krueger.)

It may be added, that the appointment of this board arose from the change of councils occasioned by the expiration of Endius's magistracy ; with which, too, the influence of Alcibiades had much declined. "The men in command," says Mitford, "and the measures pursuing on the Asiatic coast, were looked upon with a jealous eye. The newly-prepared squadron, placed under the command of Antisthenes, was ordered, not to the Hellespont or any port of the satrapy of Pharnabazus, but to Miletus, to join the fleet already there ; and eleven commissioners were embarked in it, to enquire concerning men and things, and, as a council, to assume, in a great degree, the direction of affairs on the Asiatic station."

² *Lichas.*] He is *specified*, because already well known to the reader as being the Lacedæmonian who received such ignominious treatment from the Eleans, at the Olympic games, mentioned at l. 5, 50.

sea, made the coast of Melos ; and meeting with ten Athenian ships, captured three (but without the men³) and burnt the ships. After this, fearing (what really took place) lest the Athenian ships which had escaped from Melos should give information of their approach to those at Samos⁴, they took their course to Crete, and making their voyage (through caution) the longer, they came to land at Caunus in Asia. From thence, as being now in security, they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus, to desire to be convoyed by them thither.

XL. But the Chians and Pedaritus, about the same time, sent messages to Astyochus, notwithstanding his backwardness, entreating him to come with his whole fleet and succour them, besieged as they were, and not to permit the most important of the allied states to be excluded from the *sea*, and on the *land* side be exposed to depredation. For the domestic servants (or slaves) of the Chians being many, and indeed the most numerous possessed by any state except that of the Lacedæmonians, and, moreover, by reason of their numbers, the more severely punished for their offences, no sooner did the Athenians seem to be firmly established in a fortress, than most of them deserted to the enemy, and, by their knowledge of the country, did it exceeding injury. The Chians therefore urged that he ought to succour them while there was yet hope, and a possibility to check the enemy, for Delphinium was as yet only a building and then unfinished, greater defences were perpetually erecting round their fleet. Astyochus, though he had not intended it, by reason of his former threatening, yet, when he saw the allies to be anxious for their relief, was disposed to succour them.

XLI. But in the meantime a message is brought from Caunus, that the twenty-seven ships and the Lacedæmonian counsellors are arrived. Astyochus, therefore, deeming every thing of inferior importance to the bringing together such a

³ *But without the men.*] The crews, it should seem, escaped to Melos : by which we may gather that it was in the possession of the Athenians ; never, it should seem, having been restored at the peace.

⁴ *Samos.*] I have here followed the reading of Bekker and Goeller, for *νηον, Σάμω*. "Samos," Goeller observes, "was a seat of war to the Athenians, and the station for their ships."

number of ships as to obtain somewhat of superiority by sea, and to the safe convoy of those Lacedæmonians who were come as inspectors of his actions, immediately abandoning the voyage to Chios, took his course to Caunus. And in his passage making a descent upon Cos Meropis ¹, he sacked the city, which was unwall'd, and had experienced an earthquake (the greatest ever remembered to have befallen them); the inhabitants having taken refuge on the mountains ², he plundered the territory, making spoil of all the persons he could meet with, except the freemen ³, whom he dismissed. From Cos having passed by night to Cnidus, he was persuaded ⁴ by the counsels of the Cnidians not to disembark the sailors, but to immediately make sail after those twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus, one of the commanders from Samos, was watching the approach of those twenty-seven ships from Peloponnesus to which Astyochus also was directing his course. Now those at Samos had received intelligence from Melos ⁵ of their voyage, and there was a guard squadron with Charminus about Syme, Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia; for he had now heard that they were arrived at Caunus.

XLII. Astyochus, then, made sail forthwith to Syme, in order that by outgoing the report of his coming he might meet with them somewhere at sea. But rain and foggy

¹ *Cos Meropis.*] This island is said by Hyginus to have been so called from Merops, a very antient king of the island, and Cos, a daughter of Merops. It is more probable, however, that the name has some connection with *μείρον*, a mortal. The *city*, it may be observed, was called by the name of the island. Hack is quite mistaken in saying that it was called Astypalea: *that* was the name of a small island of the Cyclades, S.S.W. of Cos.

² *Having taken refuge on the mountains.*] See my note on Matth. 24, 16.

³ *Making spoil of, &c.*] Such seems to be the full sense of the too briefly expressed words *λείαν ἐποιεῖτο πλὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων*. It should seem that the slaves were seized for the sea service, to do the drudgery on board the fleet.

⁴ *Persuaded.*] On this sense of *ἀναγκάζεσθαι*, by which it denotes moral compulsion, I have before treated. See also my note on Matth. 14, 22.

⁵ *From Melos.*] I have here followed, instead of *Μιλήτου*, the reading of one of the best MSS., edited by Bekker and Goeller, *Μήλου*: the truth of which is manifest from c. 59. See the note of Goeller.

weather¹ made his ships deviate from their course, and fall into disorder.² And at dawn of day, the fleet being somewhat scattered, and the left wing being now discernible to the Athenians, while the rest of the line was yet wandering around the island; Charminus and the Athenians launched forth against them with less than those twenty ships³; thinking that these were the ships from Caunus that they were watching for. And immediately attacking them, they sunk three, and damaged others, and had the better in the engagement until the greater part of the ships unexpectedly made their appearance, and thus they were hemmed in on all sides. Then taking to flight, they lost six ships, but with the rest effected their escape to the island of Teutlussa⁴, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this, the Peloponnesians taking their course to Cnidus, and those twenty-seven ships from Caunus having formed a junction with them, they went with their whole force, and after erecting a trophy on Syme, returned and took up their station at Cnidus.

XLIII. And now the Athenians, on hearing of the battle, sailed with all their ships from Samos to Syme; not, however, making any attack on the fleet at Cnidus, nor they against them; but taking on board the ships' tackling and luggage⁵

¹ *Foggy weather.*] Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ξυννίφελα ὄντα. There is an exactly similar expression in Herod. 7, 37, 8. ὁ ἥλιος ἐκλιπὼν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἔδρην, ἀφανὴς ἦν, οὗτ' ἐπινεφίλων ἰόντων scil. τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. where Wesseling compares Aristot. Probl. 24. § 17. Διὰ τί τῆς αἰθρίας μᾶλλον ψύχος γίνεται ἢ ἐπινεφίλων ὄντων. Now ξυννίφελος is a very rare word; but it occurs, besides, in Alciphron ap. Steph. Thes., and συννεφής in Polyb. 9, 16, 5. Aristot. Rhet. 140, 30.; as also in Artemidorus, Herodian, and Deuter. 23, 28. both words are noticed by Pollux 1, 115.

² *Disorder.*] Or, *confusion*. And no wonder; for, in very foggy weather, the ancient mariners had nothing to guide them in their course.

³ *Less than those twenty ships.*] Hobbes renders as if the words ἐλάσσωσιν ἦ were not here; and Portus and Smith, as if there were no article to ναυσί. How it happened that there were *fewer* than twenty ships, we are not told; but we may suppose that it arose from there being some that had been carried out to sea in the fog.

⁴ *Teutlussa.*] So the recent editors read for *Teuglussa*. The *t* is also supported by Steph. Byz., and indeed by the ratio appellationis; for Heunsterhusius on Lucian 1, 314. has acutely seen that the island was so called from its abounding in the τεύρλος, *beet-root*, or *mangel-wurzel*.

⁵ *Tackling and luggage.*] By this is designated whatever was necessary to keep the ships in repair, namely, fresh masts, yards, &c., to supply any

which had been left at Syme, and having touched at the continental Loryma⁶, they sailed off to Samos.

As to the Peloponnesian ships, being all together at Cnidus, such repairs and refitments were made as were thought necessary; and the eleven Lacedæmonian counsellors held conferences with Tissaphernes (for he was present) respecting past transactions, if any thing did not meet their pleasure, and concerning the future war, in what way it should be administered best and most advantageously for both of them. But Lichas scrutinized most¹ closely what had been done, and declared that *neither* of the treaties, neither that of Chalcideus nor that of Theramenes, were fairly drawn up; nay, it were a hard condition, indeed, if whatever territory the king or his ancestors had aforetime ruled, that he should now require to occupy. For thus he would be at liberty² to again subdue all the islands, as also Thessaly and Locri, and as far as Bœotia. And thus, instead of *freedom*, the Lacedæmonians would draw around the Greeks the chains of Median slavery. He, therefore, demanded that another and better treaty should be concluded, or the present be disannulled, for they did not want pay on such conditions. Tissaphernes indignant at this³, went away in a rage, and without any settlement of the matters in consideration.

want, as also cordage and rigging of every kind; and, moreover, all sorts of heavy utensils.

Of such sort of removal we had before an example at c. 28.

⁶ *Continental Loryma.*] For there was also an *island* of that name. To the proofs adduced by the commentators may be added Appian t. 2, 623.

¹ *Scrutinized most.*] Mitford says that Lichas was the chief commissioner: and though he has no authority from Thucydides, it seems probable.

² *Would be at liberty.*] This was not expressly asserted in the treaty, but it might be collected from thence. "The Lacedæmonians did not, indeed," says Mitford, "bind themselves to put Persia in possession of the countries so in general terms ceded; and had their leaders being wily politicians, they might perhaps, after profiting from Persian assistance to serve their own purposes against Athens, have easily prevented Persia from making any advantage of those articles, which seemed so to militate with the common cause of Greece: but Lichas and his colleagues would not, for any temporary interest of their country, surrender its honour."

³ *Indignant at this.*] Not only, we may suppose, at the unreasonableness of wanting a *third* treaty in so short a time, but also disgusted with that authoritative tone and unbending manner which the Lacedæmonians so much affected.

XLIV. And now, having messages from the most powerful persons in Rhodes, they meditated to go thither, hoping that, with their numerous seamen and the land forces, it would be not impossible to bring over that island, and, moreover, conceiving that they should be able to support the fleet from the present confederacy, without asking Tissaphernes for any pay. Sailing, therefore, immediately, this same winter, from Cnidus with ninety-four ships, and making the Rhodian coast first at Caminus, they exceedingly terrified the great bulk of the people, who knew nothing of what had been done. They, therefore, fled to the mountains, especially as the city was un-walled. The Lacedæmonians, however, calling together these and the inhabitants from the two cities, Lindus and Ielus, persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians. Thus Rhodes came over to the Peloponnesians. But about this time the Athenians, hearing of their design, and desirous to preoccupy the island, set sail with the fleet at Samos, and made their appearance off at sea.¹ Being, however, too late by a little, they sailed away for Chalce, and from thence to Samos; but afterwards making cruizes from Chalce, Cos, and Samos, they carried on hostilities against Rhodes. As to the Peloponnesians, they levied², indeed, money from the Rhodians to the amount of thirty-two talents, but in other respects they lay quiet³ for eighty days, having drawn their ships on shore.⁴

XLV. In the meantime, or even before the Peloponnesians went on this expedition to Rhodes, the following occurrences took place.

¹ *Made their appearance off at sea.*] With the expression ἐφάνησαν πελάγῳ I would compare Plutarch Pomp. 80. πνεῦμα λαμπρόν ἐβόηθει πελάγῳ ὑπερδύουσιν. Xen. Hist., 2, 1, 17. ἀνήγοντο δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τῆς Χίου πελάγῳ.

² *Levied.*] Or, "made a requisition." Of this rare signification of ἐκέλευ (unnoticed by the commentators) the following are illustrations: Demosth. 435, 7. εἰκοσὶ δραχμὰς ἐκέλεξε παρ' ἐκάστῳ. and p. 49 and 715, 4. 1199, 5. Æschin. p. 504. τέλη τοῦς καταπλέοντας ἐκέλεγον.

³ *In other respects they lay quiet.*] i. e. they made no attempt to check the Athenian cruisers.

⁴ *Having drawn their ships on shore.*] Pollux 7, 190. gives the following as the three operations of laying a ship up, which he accurately distinguishes: καὶ ἡ μὲν οὐκίτι πλίουσα ναῦς, νειωλημένη, διαψυχομένη, ἀνείλκυσμένη.

After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades becoming an object of suspicion¹ to the Lacedæmonians, and a letter having come from them to Astyochus, to put him to death (for he was at enmity with Agis², and otherwise appeared unfit to be trusted); he first, through fear³, withdrew himself to Tissaphernes; then in his court did all the injury he could to the officers of the Peloponnesians, and being the suggester of all the satrap's measures⁴, he cut down the pay, so that, instead of an Attic drachma, only three obols were given, and that not regularly. He bid Tissaphernes say to them that "the Athenians, though so long versed in nautical affairs, gave their seamen only three obols; and that not so much through poverty, but that their seamen might not (becoming insolent from superfluity) some of them

¹ *Becoming an object of suspicion.*] Since the expiration of the magistracy of Endius, the party of Agis had been gaining strength in Lacedæmon; and not only Alcibiades could no longer lead measures, as before, on the coast of Asia, but his designs became more and more suspected in Peloponnesus. In thwarting Alcibiades, however, the Lacedæmonian administration feared him. What precisely to expect they knew not; but they apprehended some great stroke in politics to their disadvantage; and, according to the concurrent testimony of historians, too unquestionable when Thucydides is in the list, private instructions were sent to Astyochus to have Alcibiades assassinated. (Mitford.)

This unprincipled man had, indeed, been playing a double game; and, as has been before observed, he aimed at leading the Ionians, and thereby at length securing his restoration to his own country. The shrewdness of the Lacedæmonians, however (sharpened in the case of Agis and others, by personal enmity), enabled them to fathom his designs.

² *At enmity with Agis.*] How he came to be so is not certainly known; for, as to the story of late historians and anecdote-mongers respecting Alcibiades' connection with the queen of Agis, it seems (as Mitford observes) to merit little credit. Alcibiades was at first thrown into connection with the party in opposition to Agis, whose dislike and enmity he provoked by his zeal and ability in serving Agis's adversaries; and it is no wonder that, on the decline of the power of his party, Alcibiades should be marked out for ruin. But the cool and deliberate counsel of assassinating a man who had received the protection of Sparta, had deserved well of it, and against whom nothing of crime could be proved, was an atrocity worthy of a people who scrupled at no means to effect their purposes.

³ *Through fear.*] And, perhaps, disgust at the neglect he experienced; uneasy, too, he must have been with the treatment he experienced in the dependent and contemptible character of a busy, plotting fugitive.

⁴ *The suggester of all the satrap's measures.*] He took advantage of the interests of Persia and Lacedæmon being not the same, to sow dissension by artful insinuations, and paid his court to the satrap so adroitly, as (creeping on from indirect suggestion to actual counsel) to become not only agreeable but necessary to him. He especially took advantage of the pecuniary necessities, and worked on the characteristic avarice, of an Asiatic satrap.

be in worse bodily condition, by spending their money on such things as only tended to weakness⁵; or others leave their ships, laying out the arrears of wages on procuring substitutes.⁶ He moreover, instructed him to prevail upon the trierarchs and commanders of the several states except those of Syracuse, to give way to him in this respect. For of these Hermocrates was the only one who, in behalf of the whole

⁵ *Spending their money on such things as only tended to weakness.*] Namely, luxury and drunkenness. Thus the witty epigram in Athenæus, which may be thus rendered:—

“Wine, women, baths, against our lives combine;
But what is life without baths, women, wine?”

Most truly is it observed by Isocrates de Pace: ἐπιδείκεν ἂν τις πολλοὺς χαίροντας καὶ τῶν ἰδεσμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδεύματων τοῖς καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βλάπτουσι.

⁶ *Or others leave, &c.*] Such is the only sense that I can assign to the perplexing words of the original, if the authority of MSS. is to be considered; for it is very many years since I came to the conclusion that ἀπολείπωσι should be read, from two MSS., in the place of ἀπολιπόντες. At the same time, I was inclined to conjecture the true reading to be οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσι, ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμ. τ. π. μ. And this is supported by the Marg. A. M. D., too, have the same reading, though with an οὐχ inserted; and this reading is edited by Goeller: but the sense yielded by it is far less suitable; and the authority for it is so slender, that I greatly prefer the former reading. The meaning will thus be, “that they contrived to desert their ships by obtaining leave of their officers to go on shore, they supposing that the arrears of pay left in hand would be a kind of security (ὀμηρεία) for their return.” According to the common reading, ὀμηρεία will denote the procuring of a substitute who shall discharge the duties of the principal; and such a person was called an ὀμηρος. See Tacit. Hist. 1, 46. and Annal. 1, 18. This very procuring of substitutes, it may be observed, is alluded to by Nicias, l. 7, 93. in his Epistle to the Athenians: εἰσι δ' (ναῦται) οἱ ἀνδράποδα Ἰσκαρικὰ ἀντεμειβέσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους.

The word ὀμηρεία is somewhat rare; but it is found several times in Polybius. Also the very phrase ἐς ὀμηρείαν in Dionys. Hal. Ant. 361, 9. and 34, 47. Appian 1, 405, 83 and 821. and ἐφ' ὀμηρείαν in Dionys. Hal. t. 1, 101. 44. Joseph. 796, 9.

That the seamen did not receive their whole pay while on actual service is plain: and such, indeed, is the case with English sailors. What proportion was detained and held in hand is not quite certain. It should seem that three obols were paid, and another held in hand. So Polyæn. Stratag. 3, 9, 51. Ἰφικράτης ἦρξε τοῦ πλείστου στρατεύματος πεζοῦ καὶ ναυτικοῦ, καθ' ἑκάστον μῆνα ὑφαίρων τὸ τέταρτον μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρον ἑκάστου κατέχων, ἵνα μὴ λίποιεν τὸ στρατόπεδον. where Casaubon proves that such, too, was the custom of the Roman soldiery.

The προσφευδόμενον μισθὸν denotes these *arrears of pay*. A signification so little known, or at least attended to, by the editors and critics, that I am induced to subjoin the following examples: Thucyd. l. 7, 48. καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ προσφεύλει. Xenoph. Econ. 20, 1. Dionys. Hal. t. 1, 19. Lucian 1, 529, 72. Polyb. 1, 66, 3 and 11. 5, 50, 1. 11, 23, 5. 21, 14, 6. 22, 25, 7. 32, 13, 5.

confederacy, opposed the thing.⁷ As to the states that came to ask for money, Alcibiades used to repulse them himself, on the part of Tissaphernes returning a denial, saying that "the Chians were shameless, who being the richest of the Greeks⁸, yet though preserved by paid soldiery, thought it right for others to run hazards of their lives, and expend money for *their* freedom." As to the rest of the states, he said they were guilty of injustice, if after expending their money on the Athenians before they revolted, they would not contribute as much, or even more, for themselves. As to Tissaphernes, he represented "that now he was making war at his own expense, he was with reason economical; but whenever funds should come from the king, he would give them the full pay, and would show the states such good offices as were fitting."

XLVI. He moreover counselled¹ Tissaphernes not to be in too great haste to bring the war to a conclusion, nor to choose either by bringing up the Phœnician fleet, which he had fitted out, or by taking more Greeks into pay, to give the same persons the power both of the land and the sea; but to suffer both to hold dominion separately, so that the king might be always at liberty to bring forward the one party against the

⁷ *For Hermocrates, &c.*] This was the greatest commendation that could be passed on Hermocrates, as showing him to be alone wholly inaccessible to bribery.

⁸ *The richest of the Greeks.*] And no wonder, considering the fertility of their territory, and its favourable situation for bringing every commodity to a good market. Dr. Clarke calls the country the *paradise of modern Greece*, and represents the population as very considerable. Alas! how changed the present state of this ill-fated country, doomed in our own days to become the seat of, perhaps, the most atrocious cruelty that history has yet had to record!

¹ *He moreover counselled, &c.*] The whole is thus elegantly paraphrased by Justin l. 5, 2. : Igitur persuadet Tisaferni, ne tanta stipendia classi Lacedæmoniorum præberet. Vocandos enim in portionem muneris Ionios, quorum pro libertate, cum tributa Atheniensibus penderent, bellum susceptum sit. Sed nec auxiliis nimis enixe Lacedæmonios juvandos: quippe memorem esse debere, alienam se victoriam, non suam instruere: et eatenus bellum sustinendum, ne inopia deseratur. Nam regem Persarum, dissentientibus Græcis, arbitrum pacis ac belli fore; et quos suis non possit, ipsorum armis victurum; perfecto autem bello, statim ei cum victoribus dimicandum. Domesticis itaque bellis Græciam atterendam, ne externis vacet; exæquandasque vires partium, et inferiores auxilio levandos. Non enim quieturos post hanc victoriam Spartanos, qui vindices se libertatis Græciæ professi sint.

other, when it should be troublesome to him.² Whereas, when the empire both of land and sea is centred in one, he will be at a loss to find those who should assist to pull down the conquerors, unless *he* would choose, with great expense and danger, to go and try a contest with them. But *thus* the danger would be cheaper³, with but a small expense, and moreover with security to himself, to wear out⁴ the Grecians one against another. He represented, too, that the Athenians would be fitter to participate dominion with him; for they less aimed at power by land; and that the cause and reason for which the Athenians were carrying on war were more calculated to promote his interests. For that they would unite with him in subduing, for *themselves* as far as regarded the sea, and for *him* such Greeks as resided in the king's territories⁵; whereas *those*, on the contrary, came to liberate them. It was not reasonable, he said, that the Lacedæmonians should now free Greeks from Greeks, and should not, if even they conquered those (i. e. the Athenians), deliver Greeks from Barbarians.⁶ He, therefore, counselled him to first wear them both out, and, when he had cut down the Athenian dominion⁷ as much as possible, then to send the Peloponnesians packing from the country.

² *When it should be troublesome to him.*] I here read, with Duker and many recent editors, *αβρῶ*. To the passage cited by Duker from l. 6, 18. I add the following, l. 6, 84. Xen. Anab. 2, 5, 2. Th. Μόσους ἡμῖν λυπηροῦς ὄντας. Eurip. Hipp. 796. λυπηρὸς ἡμῖν.

³ *Cheaper.*] Or, the slighter; as Xen. Hipp. 1, 16.

⁴ *Wear out.*] The word *τρίβειν* in this sense, and other synonymous ones, as also the policy here recommended, are of frequent occurrence in the classics.

⁵ *The Athenians would be fitter, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: — "The Athenians were the more commodious allies for the king: they had no land force capable of coping with his land force: they were powerful and rich only by holding other states in subjection; and, through their fear of revolts and of foreign interference, they might be kept always in some degree dependent. At any rate, they would always be glad to share with the king and his satraps the tributary cities of Asia."

⁶ *It was not reasonable, &c.*] Such seems to be the real sense, and the most literal version possible, of this perplexed sentence. Goeller renders thus: *si quando Athenienses devicerint Spartani, non consentaneum esse, victores qui Græci a Persis subjecti sunt, eos non liberaturos.*" He therefore, with Æmil. Portus, would cancel the two *μὴς*. But, perhaps, the sense is the same with the two negatives as without them, one destroying the other; however, I conjecture ἢν δὴ ποτε α. ε.

⁷ *Cut down the Athenian dominion.*] Or, territory. The sense here is not well perceived by the translators. *Απορίμνεσθαι* is a vox solennis de

Accordingly, it became the chief intention of Tissaphernes to act thus, as far as can be conjectured by his actions. And to Alcibiades, thereupon, as to one who had counselled him well in these matters, he gave his entire confidence⁸; and he supplied pay to the Peloponnesians very ill⁹, and would not suffer them to fight by sea, but alleging that Phœnician ships¹⁰ would come, and then they might contend with a great superiority of force¹¹, he thus ruined the business, and wore down the vigour of¹² their navy, which had been very powerful, and in other respects too manifestly to escape observation, assisted in the war with great backwardness.

XLVII. The above counsel Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the king, when in conference with them, both as thinking he was advising them for the best, and moreover as aiming at bringing about¹³ his own restoration to his country;

hac re, and signifies to take away from another, and apply to one's own benefit. So Plato: οὐκουν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτηγνέον. Pausan. οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῆς Ἀρκადίης ἀεὶ ἀπετίμνοντο. Polyb. 9, 28, 7. ἀποτεμόμενος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑμῶν. Herod. 1, 82. τῆς Οὐρέης οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀποτεμόμενοι ἴσχον.

⁸ *Gave his entire confidence.*] The expression of the original προσθεῖς ἑαυτὸν εἰς πίστον is a very strong one, and is somewhat akin to that of Proverbs 23, 26. "my son, give me thy heart."

⁹ *Very ill.*] Κακῶς. Justin elegantly renders it *maligne*. It might be rendered *irregularly*.

¹⁰ *Phœnician ships.*] These, I find from Plutarch in Alexand., amounted to one hundred and fifty in number.

¹¹ *With a great superiority of force.*] Ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος. for I cannot agree with the late editors that the article should be cancelled. The phrase occurs with the article *supra*, c. 6, 55. πολλῶ τῷ περιόντι. Also Phil. Jud. 642. E. Lucian 2, 433. Stob. Serm. p. 152. Isidor. Epist. 2, 271. Joseph. 166. 1, 646, 6. Procop. p. 13, 27. Arrian 94. Sext. Emp. p. 14. J. Chrysostom frequently. On the contrary, I scarcely know one unimpeachable example, from any good author, of the phrase *without* the article. Yet the kindred phrase ἀπὸ or ἐκ περιουσίας never (I think) *has* the article.

¹² *Wore down the vigour of.*] i. e. suffered it to moulder away; for delay in such a case (as we find by the example of the Athenians in Sicily) is almost as pernicious as active war; and, moreover, as Nicias says in his Epistle (l. 7, 14.) βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος.

¹³ *Aiming at bringing about.*] More literally, "taking care to bring about." Ἐπιδραπέυειν is a very rare word, nor do I know more than one example elsewhere, Dio Cass. p. 68, 66. πρὸς τῶν ἀεὶ πολεμούντων σφισιν ἐπιδραπέωνται. The ἀπὸ has an intensive force.

With respect to the thing itself, Mitford observes, that "the idea was bold even to extravagance, but was in character for Alcibiades, and the times were favourable. The Athenians had been making vast exertions,

knowing, that if he destroyed it not, it would be some time in his power to prevail on his countrymen to recall him. And persuade them he thought he should best do, by making it appear that Tissaphernes was his friend; as, indeed, proved the case. For, after the Athenian army in Samos understood that he had great influence, partly also by Alcibiades sending messages to the most influential persons of them, to remember him to the respectable people, and say that "he should be willing to return to his country, on condition of its having an oligarchy, and not a wretched mob-rule, nor the democracy which had driven him away; thus he would join his cares with theirs in administering the commonwealth, and procure them the friendship of Tissaphernes." But yet more, and of their own accord, were the trierarchs, and the most powerful of the Athenians, become inclined towards abolishing democracy.¹⁴

XLVIII. And the matter was first agitated in the *camp*; afterwards it was debated in the *city*. Certain persons went from Samos, and had conferences with Alcibiades; and, on his holding out hopes¹ that he could make *Tissaphernes* first their friend, and after that the *king* also, if they would not be under democratical government; for thus the king could place more reliance upon them: then they that were most powerful (who also suffered most inconvenience²) were in great hopes

but those had nearly exhausted them; and to hold out long against the Peloponnesian power, supported by Persian wealth, would be impracticable. Well aware both of the weakness of the commonwealth and the dispositions of the people, he thought things so much in his power, that he might demand a change of government as the price of the eminent services he could render it."

¹⁴ *The most powerful, &c.*] No wonder; for, as Mitford observes, the proposal held out to them the prospect, at the same time, of an advantageous conclusion of the war, and of a change of government, favourable both to the power of those who were ambitious of power, and to the ease of those who only desired ease.

¹ *Holding out hopes.*] At ὑποτίθωντος subaud ἑλπίδα, which is supplied by the Scholiast. Goeller refers to Valckn. on Herod. 7, 158. where ὑπόσχεσιν is to be supplied. It may be added, that the complete phrase occurs in Dionys. Hal. Ant. 245, 43. and in Philostr. ap. Suid. ἑλπίδα πικρὰν ὑποτίθειν τοῦ μέλλοντος. which words occur verbatim in Synes. Epist. 105. There is the same elliptical use of ὑποτίθω in Aristoph. Acharn. 657. Eurip. Orest. 905. and Xiphilin, p. 1234.

² *Suffered most inconvenience.*] For, according to the democratical constitution of Athens, the rich were exposed to numerous burdens, and

that they should get the administration of public affairs into their own hands, and should gain the victory over their enemies. On returning to Samos, they drew together such persons as were their friends, by a solemn bond of union³, and openly said to the people at large, that the king would be their friend, and supply them with money, on the recall of Alcibiades, and on their being no longer under a democracy. And the multitude, though they were at the instant somewhat displeased at what was doing, yet because of the readiness⁴ of the hope held out of pay from the king, they kept quiet.⁵ But those who were combined to set up oligarchy, after they had communicated the matter to the people, again took into consideration the proposals from Alcibiades, both among themselves and with the greater part of their adherents. And the thing appeared to them all very practicable, and to be relied on; except to Phrynicus, who was yet commander in chief, to whom it by no means approved itself. It appeared to him (as was really the case) that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than for democracy; nor did he imagine him to have any other view, than merely how, by changing the constitution of the state from its present form, he might, at the solicitation of his friends, obtain his recall. But *their* great care should be⁶ especially this—not to fall into factions. It would be by no means easy, he said, now that the Peloponnesians were their equals at sea, and occupied many cities in his dominions, and those not the least considerable, to attach the king to the Athenian interests, nor induce him to take trouble about those on whom he placed little reliance, when it was in his power to have the Peloponnesians for his friends, from whom he had suffered no

might, indeed, be said to live in great misery. And now their property was principally resorted to, to supply the increased exigencies of an exhausted treasury.

³ *Solemn bond of union.*] Namely, one confirmed by a form of oath to be administered to all who participated in the project, by which they engaged to mutually stand by each other: a precaution, Mitford observes, common among the factions of the antient republics.

⁴ *Readiness.*] i. e. the practicability of bringing the thing about: a rare sense of εὐπορία.

⁵ *Kept quiet.*] Consoling themselves for loss of power, by increase of security and profit.

⁶ *Their great care should be.*] This is a very rare sense of περίπρονται. As to the var. lect. περισκεπτόν, it is a gloss.

injury. Also, that the confederate cities, to which, forsooth, oligarchy was held out, because they themselves would not be under democracy, he well knew, he said, that neither those which had revolted would be the more disposed to return, nor those that remained true, be the firmer in their obedience. For they, he said, did not so much wish, whether under an oligarchy or a democracy, to be in subjection; but, under whichever of these forms they might be, to be free; but would think that those who were called the respectable sort of people⁷ would give them not less trouble than the common people, being new contrivers⁸ and introducers of evil projects to the people, from which they themselves were the most benefited. And well he knew the allies would think that this was being thrown in their power, and that they should then be put to death without trial, and even more violently; whereas, now the people was their refuge, and the moderator of the violence of the others. Moreover, he assuredly knew that the cities, having learnt this from the actions themselves, are of this opinion. Therefore, as to himself, nothing of what was proposed by Alcibiades, or at present carrying on, met his approbation.

XLIX. But those of the association¹ who were assembled together, agreeably to their former determinations, approved

⁷ *Respectable sort of people.*] Or, the better sort of people. Krueger renders *optimates*. See Lex. Xen. Hobbes has here the following curious note: "The best men of aristocracy, a difference from the oligarchy, which was of the richest sort only. For the good men who, in the democracy, are the people's minions, and put the people upon all they do, will do the same things themselves when they have the sovereignty in their hands."

⁸ *Contrivers.*] The word *πομπισται* is explained by Suidas: *οι τοις πόποις εισηγούμενοι δημαγωγοί επί τῷ λατῶν*. As we should say, *financiers*; but here the term is used, in a figurative sense, to denote *projectors*. The *εισηγηται* is exegetical of the preceding.

The whole of this passage is thus paraphrased by Mitford: "Neither was the supposition less unfounded, that person and property could be more secure under the rule of those called the better people; for those better people, in the exercise of power, commonly sought their own in preference to the public benefit. Nowhere, indeed, were men in public service so liable to oppression of every kind, even to capital punishment without trial, as where the power of the people, the refuge of the innocent, and the moderator of the excesses of the great, was done away."

¹ *Association.*] Or rather, conspiracy; for Krueger seems to have rightly conjectured *συνομοσία*, which had also occurred to Hobbes. Perhaps, however, the wound is more deeply seated. I suspect that the true reading

of the present proposal, and prepared to send Pisander and others, as ambassadors to Athens, that they might treat concerning the recall of Alcibiades, and the abolition of democracy there, and on the methods of procuring the friendship of Tissaphernes to the Athenians.

L. And now Phrynichus, knowing that there would be an overture made for the recall of Alcibiades, and that the people would embrace it, and alarmed at the opposition made by himself in his speech, lest, if he should return, he would do him some mischief, as a hinderer of his recall, he resorts to the following scheme¹: He secretly sends to Astyochus, who was then still at Miletus, in the command of the Lacedæmonian fleet, informing him, by letter, that Alcibiades is ruining their affairs, by negotiating the friendship of Tissaphernes to the Athenians; writing therein also the rest of the business distinctly; remarking, that "it was excusable in him to work evil to a bitter enemy, even with some prejudice to the welfare of his country."

But Astyochus had not now any intention of bringing Alcibiades to punishment, especially as he no longer came so much within his reach. And going up to Magnesia to him and Tissaphernes, he moreover declares to them both the intelligence which had been sent him from Samos, and turns informer to them; and, as was reported, he (for the sake of private lucre) gave himself up to Tissaphernes' purposes, and communicated with him both on this and other affairs. Wherefore he the more faintly remonstrated respecting the pay not being paid in full. Thereupon Alcibiades immediately writes letters to Samos, to those in office, against Phrynichus, informing them of what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to

is τῆς συννομίας, the ε being absorbed by the ξ following: then the δative seemed to require a preposition, and εἰς was marked in the margin, and afterwards passed into the text.

¹ *Scheme.* Which Mitford pronounces extremely hazardous, but still more unjustifiable; and certainly it was little accordant with that prudence and ability which Thucydides, on another occasion, ascribes to Phrynichus. It is true he was placed in very awkward circumstances; and having taken his party, he could not appease the enmity he had excited, and he hurried blindly forward to the destruction of him whom he most feared, and to whom he seems before to have been bitterly inimical.

death. Phrynichus, in great consternation, and being brought into the most imminent peril by the information, sends again to Astyochus, complaining of his former conduct, that the communication had not, as in honour it ought², been kept secret. And now that he is ready to put it into their power to destroy the whole of the Athenian armament at Samos; writing each particular at large, and (especially as Samos was unwall'd) in what manner the thing might be effected; adding, "that it was excusable for him, who was now in peril of his life, on their account, to do this, or any thing else, rather than himself fall a sacrifice to his bitterest foes." This communication also Astyochus reveals to Alcibiades.

LI. But Phrynichus having had previous intelligence of his treachery, and that a letter from Alcibiades on this subject is all but arrived, himself anticipating the blow, he makes a discovery to the army, "that, by reason of Samos being unfortified, and, moreover, all the ships not having moorings within the harbour, the enemy is about to make an attack. That he had received full intelligence of the matter, and that they ought to fortify Samos as quickly as possible, and put every thing else in a posture of defence." Now he was commander in chief, and for doing this he had full authority.³ So they set themselves about the walling; and thus it was that Samos, which, indeed, was about to be walled, was walled the quicker.

Not long after, came the letter from Alcibiades, "that the army is betrayed by Phrynichus, and the enemy is about to attack them." But Alcibiades, being thought not worthy of credit, nay, rather suspected, from knowledge of the enemy's designs, to have endeavoured to fasten on Phrynichus (through enmity to him) a charge⁴ of criminal consciousness, therefore

² *As in honour it ought.*] Such must be the sense of *καλῶς*, and not that assigned to it by the translators.

³ *For doing this he had full authority.*] Abresch notices it as an unprecedented construction for *τὸ κύριον εἶναι* to be followed by a participle (instead of an infinitive); but an example is adduced by Goeller at l. 5, 34.

⁴ *Fasten on Phrynichus, &c.*] Here is to be understood *αἰτίαν*. The complete phrase occurs in Demosth. de Corona: *οἷς ἂν αἰτίαν ἀναδείαν ἔπαινεσθαι*. Polyb. 5, 1, 6. *α. τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπὶ τίνα*. Isocrat. ad Demon. *σοι τὰς αἰτίας ἀναδείουσαι*.

he did him no injury, but rather bare witness to the truth of what Phrynichus had before told them.

LII. After this, Alcibiades influences and persuades Tissaphernes to be a friend to the Athenians. Tissaphernes, indeed, was in awe of the Peloponnesians, because they were present with more ships than the Athenians; yet he was willing, if it were possible, to be prevailed upon⁵, especially after he heard of the dissension in Cnidus about the treaty made by Theramenes. For that disagreement had taken place at the very time when Alcibiades was persuading Tissaphernes, and when now the Peloponnesians were at Rhodes⁶, in which the former saying of Alcibiades, concerning the Lacedæmonians liberating all the cities, had been made good by Lichas, when he declared it was a condition not to be endured, that the king should hold those cities which either himself or his ancestors had ruled aforetime. And thus Alcibiades, inasmuch as he was striving for momentous interests, laboured earnestly to ingratiate himself with Tissaphernes.

LIII. And now the ambassadors of the Athenians, who were sent from Samos with Pisander, arriving at Athens, made their representations to the people, comprising much that might be said into a summary¹, and principally: "That if they would recall Alcibiades, and not continue to be in the same manner

The whole passage is thus paraphrased by Mitford: "The intelligence now only appeared to confirm that communicated by Phrynichus, and to justify his measures: so that the accusation accompanying it was wholly ineffectual, being considered merely as the scheme of a man, enough known to be little scrupulous, to ruin a political enemy."

⁵ *Was willing to be prevailed upon.*] Or, to grant his request. I retain the common reading, though several critics prefer *πιστευθῆναι*, from almost half the MSS.; which, however, involves too harsh an ellipsis. The reading I have followed is well defended and explained by Goeller.

⁶ *For that disagreement, &c.*] I know not what other sense to assign to the awkwardly-written passage of the original, which Goeller thus paraphrases: "jam ea dissensio acciderat hoc tempore, cum hoc ipso impore, quo hæc Alcibiades, in Rhodo essent Peloponnesii. Cnidi enim dissidium factum erat, et ex Cnido Rhodum navigaverant. 5, 44."

¹ *Drawing much that, &c.*] Such seems to be the closest representation of the expression *κεφαλαιούτως ἐκ πολλῶν*, with which I would compare Herod. 9, 73, 31. ἀπεκράνθου σφι τάδε.

under democracy², they might have the king for their ally, and gain the superiority over the Peloponnesians." But many spoke against the matter respecting democracy, and especially the enemies of Alcibiades, who vociferated "that it would be shameful indeed if he should be recalled by a violation of the laws;" and the Eumolpidæ and the Ceryces³ testified against him for the violation of the mysteries, for which he absconded, and adjured⁴ them by every sacred tie not to recall him. At this great opposition and vehement complaint⁵, Pisander, stepping forward, asked each one of the opposers, taking them aside, "what hope they had of saving their country, seeing that the Peloponnesians had now ships ranged against them, not fewer in number than their own, and more confederate cities, and were supplied with money by the king and Tissaphernes, unless some one could persuade the king to come over to their side." But when, on being interrogated, they made no answer, then, indeed, he flatly told them, "This therefore is not in our power, unless we will adopt a more moderate form of government, and will place the magistracies more in the hands of a few⁶, in order that the king may place

² *Continue to be, &c.*] Or, not continue under a democratical government of the same form. The commentators have failed to remark the caution discernible in these ambiguous terms, which do not import a *dissolution* of democracy, but a *modification* of it. It was, indeed (as Mitford observes), a bold undertaking to propose to a sovereign people to surrender their power, and submit to be governed by the men of superior birth and wealth, over whom they had so long been accustomed to tyrannize.

³ *Eumolpidæ and the Ceryces.*] The *Eumolpidæ* were a family descended from Eumolpus, the founder of the mysteries of Ceres at Athens. Hence the family had the chief authority in matters that concerned those rites. The *Ceryces* were heralds in war, ambassadors in peace. See Suidas. They pronounced all formal words in the ceremonies of their religion, and were a family descended from Ceryx, the son of Mercury. (Hobbes.)

These were families who inherited the right of the Eleusinian priesthood. Of such tribes and families, inheriting, as their own, certain public sacred rites (for each tribe had, respectively, its private sacred rites), there are many on record, as the Eteobutadæ, Thaulonidæ, Hesychidæ. (Goeller.)

⁴ *Adjured.*] There is a similar use of *ἐπιδάω* in Joseph. 850, 40. *ἐπιδάοντες καὶ ποτνωμένοι*.

⁵ *Great opposition and vehement complaint.*] Goeller renders *bey villem unwilligen, zornigen widerspruch*.

⁶ *More in the hands of a few.*] Hobbes and Smith have omitted to render the *μᾶλλον*. But that is destroying the *finesse* of the orator, who does not propose a total change, but a government somewhat more attempered with aristocracy. The force of the *σωφρονιστερον* will best be

more confidence in us; and will choose to consult, at the present, not so much on forms of government, as for the preservation of the country. And hereafter, if it should not please us, we shall be at liberty to alter it.⁷ Let us but recall Alcibiades, who is the only person now existing that can accomplish this."

LIV. As to the people, they at first were indignant at hearing of the proposal respecting an oligarchy; but being thoroughly convinced by Pisander that there was no other means of preservation,— what with fear, and what with a hope that the thing might hereafter be altered, — they gave way to his solicitations, and decreed "that Pisander should go with ten colleagues, and negotiate affairs both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, as might seem to them most expedient." And as Pisander, at the same time, preferred accusations against Phrynichus, the people removed him, and his colleague Scironides, from their commands, and sent on board the ships Diomedon and Leon in their place. Now Pisander had thus impeached Phrynichus, affirming that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges¹, because he thought him not well affected to the matter in hand with Alcibiades. And Pisander, after having gone about to those combinations² which had afore-

understood by the words of Alcibiades himself (the mover of the present project) in his speech at 7, 89. *τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης ἀκολασίας ἐπιφώμεθα μετρώτεροι ἐς τὰ πολιτικά εἶναι.* It may be observed, that Pisander does not venture to say *τοὺς ὀλίγους*, because that would suggest a disagreeable association, but *ὀλίγους*.

¹ *And hereafter, &c.*] To soften the zealous partisans of democracy, he urged that they had only to choose between certain ruin, and what would be at worst a passing evil. (Mitford.)

¹ *Betrayed Amorges.*] Namely, by not going to his assistance. See *supra*, c. 27. (Goeller.)

² *Combinations.*] Or, clubs. Goeller compares a similar use of *ἐταιρεία* in Plato *Theætet.* p. 173. D. *σπουδαὶ ἐταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς.* The term, Krueger observes, meant originally a club of persons of the same age, but at length came to denote a *faction*. Goeller here, moreover, cites from Meier and Schæmann the following apposite remark: "Erant Athenis quædam sodalitates, quibus adscripti cives mutuam inter se operam dabant consequendis magistratibus et in judiciis sibi invicem aderant, quo referendum videtur etiam *ἐργαστήριον συκοφαντῶν* ap. Demosth. *contr. Boeot.* d. dot. p. 1010, 24. *Conf. or. contr. Theocrin.* p. 1335." A yet better account is given of these associations by Mitford in the following words: "There were at Athens societies called *Synomosies*, which bore considerable re-

time existed in the city, for the obtaining of offices of judicature and magistracies; and having exhorted them, by close union, and common counsel, to put down democracy, and having made all other preparations so as no longer to be delayed for the present affairs, he takes his voyage, with his two colleagues, to Tissaphernes.

LV. And now Leon and Diomedon, having this same winter arrived at the Athenian fleet, made a cruize against Rhodes; and finding some ships of the Peloponnesians drawn up on shore, made a descent on the coast, and having defeated some of the Rhodians, who went to their defence, retired to Chalce, and there carried on the war rather from Cos; for it seemed to them better adapted for watching, if the navy of the Peloponnesians should put to sea any where. Meanwhile, there arrived at Rhodes Xenophontidas, a Lacedæmonian, from Pedaritus at Chios, informing them that "the wall of the Athenians is now completed, and unless they bring assistance with the whole fleet, affairs at Chios will be utterly ruined." Whereupon it was resolved to go to their relief. But, in the mean time, Pedaritus himself, with the auxiliaries under his command, and the Chians, making an assault in full force on the fortification of the Athenians near the shipping, takes a part of it, and captures also some ships drawn upon shore. The Athenians, however, sallying forth upon them, and routing the Chians first, then the rest of the forces with Pedaritus were de-

semblance to our political clubs, with this difference principally, that as property, liberty, and life itself were incomparably less secure there than under the mild firmness of our mixed government, the interests of individuals, which bound them to those societies were much more pressing than what commonly lead to any similar establishments among us. The sanction of a solemn oath to their engagements was, therefore, always required of the members; whence the societies obtained their names, signifying sworn brotherhoods. The objects proposed were principally two; private security and political power; and for the sake of one or both of these, most men of rank or substance in Athens were members of some Synomosy. Against the oppression of democratical despotism, which was often, as we shall see more particularly hereafter, very severely exercised against the rich, the collected influence of a body of noble and wealthy citizens might give protection, when the most respectable individual, standing single on his merits, would be overwhelmed: and the same union of influence which could provide security against oppression, with a little increase of force, would dispose of the principal offices of the state."

feated, and he himself was slain, and many of the Chians, and arms were captured in great abundance.

LVI. After this event, the Chians were more closely besieged than ever, both by land and by sea, and an extreme famine arose in the place.

As to Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors from Athens, they having reached their destination, held conferences with Tissaphernes on the proposed treaty. But Alcibiades (for he had not complete reliance on Tissaphernes, who stood rather in awe of the Peloponnesians, and moreover was willing, as he had been taught by himself, to wear out both parties) resorts to this device, that Tissaphernes, by making exorbitant demands from the Athenians, should conclude no treaty. It seems to me, too, that Tissaphernes had the same view, he through fear, but Alcibiades, because after he saw him even thus (i. e. even on the high terms he demanded) not desirous of coming to a treaty, he was unwilling to be thought by the Athenians unable to persuade him, but rather wished it to appear that the Athenians had not granted enough to Tissaphernes, though already persuaded and willing to come to terms.¹ For indeed Alcibiades himself speaking for Tissaphernes, though present², made the demands with such exaggeration, that the fault of the breaking off the treaty must rest with the *Athenians*, though they should concede most of his demands. For he required that the whole of Ionia should be ceded, and, again, the islands adjacent; and made other demands, to which the Athenians showed no repugnance, until at length, at the third conference, fearing lest his want of influence should be utterly detected³, he required them to per-

¹ *But rather wished, &c.*] In this clause εβούλετο δοκῆν must be supplied from the preceding. The above sense of προσχωρῶ is somewhat rare, but very agreeable to the general force of the verb.

² *Speaking for Tissaphernes, though present.*] Alcibiades seems to have acted not merely as manager of the conference for Tissaphernes (which the translators and Mitford suppose), but *interpreter* for him, since he probably spoke Greek very imperfectly. Unless we suppose this, we cannot account for the *exaggeration* spoken of.

³ *Fearing lest his want, &c.*] Mitford thinks that the conduct of the wily politician is not sufficiently accounted for by Thucydides, and he represents it as follows: "It could never be his intention to establish at Athens an

mit the king to build ships and coast along his territory⁴ wherever and with as many as he pleased. Upon which the Athenians would make no more concessions, but, conceiving that they were deceived by Alcibiades, left the conference in anger, and departed to Samos.

LVII. Immediately after this conference, and during the same winter, Tissaphernes repairs to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus; and also, having formed such a treaty as he could procure, to give out the pay, and be entirely on terms of hostility with the Peloponnesians, fearing lest, if they should be in want of support for so many ships,

unbalanced oligarchy, the most adverse of all constitutions to that supremacy of one person which he had, like many others before him, enjoyed under the democracy, and which it was certainly his purpose to regain. Neither he, nor probably any other, had supposed that the democracy could have been overthrown, and such a government established on its ruin, by so sudden and so quiet a revolution as that managed by Pisander. As he then would be disappointed, so Pisander and his principal associates would be elated; and those terms, which he expected to have commanded from the oligarchical and democratical parties balanced, would not be conceded to him by the established oligarchy. Hence, apparently, it became his purpose now to render the conference abortive, by making demands for the satrap to which the Athenian commissioners could not consent."

⁴ *Permit the king to, &c.*] It may seem strange that the king should need permission to build ships; but it is rightly remarked by Krueger, that *ποιῶσαι καὶ παραπλεῖν* are put for *ποιησάμενον παραπλεῖν*. A greater difficulty may be started at the *ἑαυτοῦ* (his own), though the reading is found in almost all the best MSS., and is edited by Bekker and Goeller. It has been shown by Benedict from Diodorus, that there had been a treaty made with the king thirty-eight years before, that no ship of war should sail between Phaselis and the Cyanæ islands.* This testimony, indeed, Hack endeavours, but unsuccessfully, to destroy. He battles hard for *ἑαυτῶν*, to be taken for *αὐτῶν*. But that reading is liable to two objections; one grammatical, that *ἑαυτοῦ* is not used for *αὐτοῦ* in any good writer; the other what the Germans call *realis*, namely, that this would have been a piece of effrontery too great even for Alcibiades. I would, therefore, retain *ἑαυτοῦ* (and in this Goeller in his Appendix finally acquiesces), which, I suppose, Alcibiades meant with reference chiefly to Asia Minor. And certainly, as Goeller observes, it was of consequence to the Athenians, even if they gave up the coast of Asia, whether the king should or not be permitted to navigate that part of the sea with as many ships as he pleased.

* On which Krueger refers to Wesseling on Diodor. 12, 4. Mitford, Hist. Gr. t. 2. p. 431. t. 4. p. 239. Bredov. Hist. Ant. p. 323. ; and Goeller cites Livy, 33, 30. (e Cod. Bamberg.) Rhodii legatos ad regem miserunt, ne Chelidonias (promontorium Ciliciæ est inclutum fœdere antiquo Atheniensium cum regibus Persarum) superaret; si eo fine non contineret classem copiasque suas, se obviam ituros.

they might either be compelled to come to battle and be defeated, or, the ships being emptied of men¹, the Athenians should gain what they wish without his assistance. He had, too, yet another and greater fear, lest, when in quest of subsistence, they should ravage the continent. Reflecting, therefore, and forecasting for all these contingencies, he (conformably to his wish of counter-poising² the Greeks one against another) sends for the Peloponnesians, and giving them their pay³, concludes a third treaty as follows :

“ The third Treaty of Alliance between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians.

LVIII. “ In the fifteenth year of the reign of Darius, and under the ephorship of Alcippidas at Lacedæmon, a convention was concluded, in the plain of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and their allies on the one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramene⁴ and the sons of Pharnaces, on the other part, concerning the affairs of the king, and those of the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

“ That whatever country is the king’s in Asia shall be the king’s ; and concerning his own territory, that the king adopt such measures as he chooses.

¹ *Emptied of men.*] The men having abandoned the ships for want of pay.

² *Counter-poising.*] Goeller renders *das gleichgewicht herstellen*. And he observes that this use of *ἵπανισοῦν* is found in Herodotus and Isocrates, and refers to Valckn. on Herod. 8, 13. I would add the following imitation in Polyæn. 7, 16, 2. τὸν πόλεμον ἡγωνοῦντο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, αἱ προστιθέμενος τοῖς ἡττωμένοις. αἱ γὰρ ἵπανισῶν τὸ ἱλαττοῦμενον, τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ νικῶντος κατέλυν.

³ *Their pay.*] i. e. the arrears due ; a great part of it having, no doubt, been regularly paid ; for it is only said that Tissaphernes paid the fleet *κακῶς, maligne, irregularly*.

⁴ *Hieramene.*] Not, I think, Hieramenes, as the translators write ; for though the commentators make no remark on the name, it seems probable from the words following, *Φαρνάκου παῖδας*, that this was a *female* (and therefore ought not to be written *Hieramenes*), the widow of Pharnaces, who is mentioned at 1, 127. and 2, 67. and 5, 1., from which passages it is plain that there was a *son*. See note *supra*, c. 6. This Hieramene, then, it seems, was permitted to hold the satrapy of her late husband for his children ; in the same way as many of the pachaships in the empire of Turkey are held hereditarily, and, consequently, are sometimes held by a woman. It is the very same with the jaghireships in Hindostan.

“ That the Lacedæmonians, and their allies, shall not enter into any country of the king's, to injure it in any way whatsoever; nor the king enter any of the Lacedæmonians and their allies, to injure it in any way whatsoever.

“ If, however, any of the Lacedæmonians, or their allies, shall enter into the king's territory for harm, that the Lacedæmonians, and their allies, shall hinder it; and if any from the king's territory shall enter into that of the Lacedæmonians and their allies for harm, the king shall hinder it.

“ That Tissaphernes shall furnish support to the ships now present, according to the rate of pay agreed on, until the king's ships shall arrive. But that when the king's ships shall have arrived, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall, if they please, support their own fleet, to be at their own disposal. If, however, they wish to receive the support from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall furnish it; but that the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall, at the conclusion of the war, pay back to Tissaphernes whatever sum they may have received. When, too, the king's ships shall arrive, the ships of the Lacedæmonians and their allies, and those of the king, shall carry on war jointly in such a manner as may seem good to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

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that, while in the hands of the Athenians, it must annoy Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. The Eretrians, therefore, being now in possession of Oropus, they went to Rhodes, calling the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. They, however, were more inclined to succour Chios, now in great distress, and putting to sea with their whole fleet, they made sail for Rhodes.² And when they were come over against the Triopium, they descried the Athenian fleet at sea, sailing from Chalce; and as neither side advanced upon the other, they each reached their destination, one going to Samos, the other to Miletus, who also saw that without a battle it was impossible for them to give succour to Chios. And thus ended the winter, and terminated the twentieth year of the war which Thucydides hath written.

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While Astyochus was yet at Rhodes, they had, after the death of Pedaritus, received from Miletus, as governor, Leon, a Spartan (who had sailed out with Antisthenes, as supernumerary¹), and with him twelve ships from the squadron

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But Strombichides, having intelligence thereof, went in all haste thither, with twenty-four ships of the Athenians, of which some were soldiers' ships³ transporting heavy-armed. And having defeated in battle the Lampsacenes, who had made a sally, and taken Lampsacus (which was unfortified) at the first onset⁴, and made spoil of the moveable property and slaves, but established the free prisoners again in the place, he then went against Abydus. And when the city would neither submit, nor could he take it by assault, he then went to Sestus, a city of Chersonesus, opposite to Abydus (once⁵ occupied by the Medes), and there established a fort and garrison for the whole of the Hellespont.

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These *σπαρτωρίδες* were not mere transports (as Smith's version expresses), but triremes, somewhat more capacious, and strongly built.

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LXIII. Meanwhile, the Chians and those at Miletus had rather the better at sea; and Astyochus hearing tidings of the sea-fight, and that Strombichides and the fleet were departed, took courage.¹ And coasting along with two ships to Chios, he fetches from thence the ships there², and with the whole force makes sail towards Samos. And when those there, by reason of the mutual suspicions of the two factions, went not out against him, he sailed back to Miletus. For it was about this time, or even before, that the democracy at Athens was in the course of being put down.³ For after Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors had gone from Tissaphernes to Samos, they confirmed their faction in the army, drawing together the association by closer bonds⁴ (even the Samians themselves exhorting the great men⁵ to endeavour with them to establish an oligarchy, though they had themselves before taken up arms one against another, that they might not be under an oligarchy): and moreover, among themselves, the Athenians who were in Samos, holding a conference, considered⁶ to let

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⁴ *Confirmed their faction, &c.*] Such is, I think, with Duker and Goeller, the full sense of *τά τε — κατέλαβον*: though it may be more literally and briefly expressed by “had bound things more firmly in the army.” It is rightly observed by Goeller, that the words *τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι* answer to the ones *καὶ ἐν σφίσι αὐτοῖς ἐκείναντο*.

⁵ *Great men.*] Literally, “the powerful.” By these, Krueger would understand those of the *Athenians*. Goeller, however, urges that those of the *Samians* must be included. Yet, as a partition was so lately made of the property of the wealthy, it is difficult to imagine how any persons could now answer to such a character. I would observe, too, that the words *ἀναστάντες αὐτοὶ ἀλλήλους* need not be pressed on, but may merely mean “rushed into a civil war.”

⁶ *Considered.*] Or, *determined*. Goeller renders *reputabant*. Hobbes wrongly translates, *deliberated*. Our word *consider* has sometimes the very sense here required.

Alcibiades alone, since he was unwilling to join them (for, indeed, they thought him no fit person to come to an oligarchy⁷), but themselves and of their own strength, as they were now embarked in the danger, to see and take care that the business should not fall into a relapse⁸; and moreover to sustain⁹ the war, and contribute freely, from their own private fortunes, both money and whatever else might be necessary, since they would be no longer labouring for others, but rather for themselves.

LXIV. Having come to these resolutions¹, they immediately sent Pisander, and half of the ambassadors, home, in order to manage the business there; and it was ordered them to establish oligarchy in whatever of the subject states they should touch at by the way. The other half they despatched up and down among the rest of the dependencies. And Diotrephe², who was about Chios, but chose to take the command in the parts of Thrace, they sent off to his government. And he arriving at Thasus abolished democracy. About two months after his departure, the Thasians fortified their city, as having no longer any need of aristocracy, but expecting every day freedom at the hands of the Lacedæmonians. For indeed there had also been a party of exiles from thence with the Peloponnesians, and these strenuously contrived, by means of their friends in the city, to introduce ships, and bring Thasus to revolt. Thus matters took the very course for them they could have wished, for the city was righted without any danger to them, and the democracy, which would have opposed their

⁷ *No fit person to come to an oligarchy.*] Because he would want to be at the head, and from *oligarch* to become *monarch*.

⁸ *Fall into a relapse.*] So that there might be what we call a *reaction*.

⁹ *Sustain.*] Or, hold up, bear up, maintain. Such is plainly the sense. Yet this is hardly consistent with *ἀνέχουσιν*: and, therefore, I suspect that *ἀνέχουσιν* is the true reading. So l. 1, 141. *αἱ δὲ περισσίαι τοὺς πολέμους μᾶλλον, ἢ αἱ βίαοι ἱσχυραὶ, ἀνέχουσι*. It may, indeed, be thought that to *stick* or *apply* to may be the sense; but that would require the *middle* voice instead of the active, and the *genitive* instead of the accusative.

¹ *Having come to these resolutions.*] Mitford paraphrases, "having established this ground-work for future proceedings."

² *Diotrephe.*] The same person, Krueger thinks, with the *Diutrephe* (or, as some MSS. read, *Diotrephe*), mentioned at l. 7, 29., and the son of Nicostratus, who, after holding various commands (see l. 3, 73. 4, 53. and 119.), was slain at Mantinea.

attempts, was abolished. As far as regards Thasus, therefore, the contrary took place to what the Athenians thought, who established the oligarchy, as also was the case in many of the subject states. For the cities having now conceived prudence, and a fearlessness about their proceedings, made for direct liberty, not caring a whit for that hollow shadow of independence³ they had enjoyed under the Athenians.

LXV. As to Pisander and his colleagues, they, as they coasted along, abolished (as had been determined) every where democracy in the cities, and, moreover, taking from some places heavy-armed as auxiliaries to them, they came with them to Athens. There they found most part of their business done by their friends. For one Androcles, a principal supporter of democracy, and one who had a chief hand in banishing Alcibiades, certain of the younger ones, uniting together, had privily assassinated. Him they were the rather induced to destroy, on two accounts; for his influence with the people, and as thinking that they should thus gratify Alcibiades, as if he would return from banishment and procure them the friendship of Tissaphernes. Some others, too, who were unfavourable to their cause¹ they in the same manner privily made away with. An oration², moreover, for public delivery had been previously prepared by them, in which it was said that "no others ought to receive pay but such as were engaged in military service, nor ought the management of affairs to be participated by more than five thousand, and those such purses and persons as could best serve the state."

³ *Shadow of independence.*] I here read, from many MSS. and the editions of Bekker, Duker, and Goeller, *αὐτονομίαν*. The *ὑπουλον* is ill rendered by Hobbes "outside," and by Smith "precarious." The term is properly applied to flesh which is hollow, having an ulcer underneath, and therefore unsound at the bottom. Hence it comes to mean *deceitful, false*, &c. Goeller refers to Wyttenb. on Plut. Morel. 1, 292. and 2, 169.

¹ *Unfavourable to their cause.*] Such seems to be the sense of *ἀνεπιτηδείους*, and not that assigned to it by the translators. If *ἐπιτηδεύειος* signifies *friendly, favourable*, why should not *ἀνεπιτηδ.* have the contrary sense?

² *An oration.*] This was meant to make known the change of constitution which they had before hinted at.

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³ *In the course of being put down.*] Such is the sense, if the common reading be the true one; though many good MSS. have *κατελέλυτο*. Goeller, however, retains the former, observing that from c. 64. it appears that the popular government was not yet abolished, but was only begun to be abolished; and this very thing (he adds) is signified by the next sentence beginning with *γάρ*, to hint that this change of the form of government originated in Samos: so that that change could not *precede* the events at Samos, but must *follow* them.

⁴ *Confirmed their faction, &c.*] Such is, I think, with Duker and Goeller, the full sense of *τά τε — κατέλαβον*: though it may be more literally and briefly expressed by “had bound things more firmly in the army.” It is rightly observed by Goeller, that the words *τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι* answer to the ones *καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐσκέψαντο*.

⁵ *Great men.*] Literally, “the powerful.” By these, Krueger would understand those of the *Athenians*. Goeller, however, urges that those of the *Samians* must be included. Yet, as a partition was so lately made of the property of the wealthy, it is difficult to imagine how any persons could now answer to such a character. I would observe, too, that the words *ἀναστάντες αὐτοὶ ἀλλήλους* need not be pressed on, but may merely mean “rushed into a civil war.”

⁶ *Considered.*] Or, *determined*. Goeller renders *reputabant*. Hobbes wrongly translates, *deliberated*. Our word *consider* has sometimes the very sense here required.

Alcibiades alone, since he was unwilling to join them (for, indeed, they thought him no fit person to come to an oligarchy ⁷), but themselves and of their own strength, as they were now embarked in the danger, to see and take care that the business should not fall into a relapse ⁸; and moreover to sustain ⁹ the war, and contribute freely, from their own private fortunes, both money and whatever else might be necessary, since they would be no longer labouring for others, but rather for themselves.

LXIV. Having come to these resolutions ¹, they immediately sent Pisander, and half of the ambassadors, home, in order to manage the business there; and it was ordered them to establish oligarchy in whatever of the subject states they should touch at by the way. The other half they despatched up and down among the rest of the dependencies. And Diotrepes ², who was about Chios, but chose to take the command in the parts of Thrace, they sent off to his government. And he arriving at Thasus abolished democracy. About two months after his departure, the Thasians fortified their city, as having no longer any need of aristocracy, but expecting every day freedom at the hands of the Lacedæmonians. For indeed there had also been a party of exiles from thence with the Peloponnesians, and these strenuously contrived, by means of their friends in the city, to introduce ships, and bring Thasus to revolt. Thus matters took the very course for them they could have wished, for the city was righted without any danger to them, and the democracy, which would have opposed their

⁷ *No fit person to come to an oligarchy.*] Because he would want to be at the head, and from *oligarch* to become *monarch*.

⁸ *Fall into a relapse.*] So that there might be what we call a *reaction*.

⁹ *Sustain.*] Or, hold up, bear up, maintain. Such is plainly the sense. Yet this is hardly consistent with *ἀντίχειν*: and, therefore, I suspect that *ἀνέχειν* is the true reading. So l. 1, 141. *αἱ δὲ περὶ τοὺς πολέμους μάλλον, ἢ αἱ βίαιαι ἰσχυροὶ, ἀνέχουσι*. It may, indeed, be thought that *to stick or apply to* may be the sense; but that would require the *middle* voice instead of the active, and the *genitive* instead of the accusative.

¹ *Having come to these resolutions.*] Mitford paraphrases, "having established this ground-work for future proceedings."

² *Diotrepes.*] The same person, Krueger thinks, with the *Diitrephes* (or, as some MSS. read, *Diotrepes*), mentioned at l. 7, 29., and the son of Nicostratus, who, after holding various commands (see l. 3, 73. 4, 53. and 119.), was slain at Mantinea.

attempts, was abolished. As far as regards Thasus, therefore, the contrary took place to what the Athenians thought, who established the oligarchy, as also was the case in many of the subject states. For the cities having now conceived prudence, and a fearlessness about their proceedings, made for direct liberty, not caring a whit for that hollow shadow of independence³ they had enjoyed under the Athenians.

LXV. As to Pisander and his colleagues, they, as they coasted along, abolished (as had been determined) every where democracy in the cities, and, moreover, taking from some places heavy-armed as auxiliaries to them, they came with them to Athens. There they found most part of their business done by their friends. For one Androcles, a principal supporter of democracy, and one who had a chief hand in banishing Alcibiades, certain of the younger ones, uniting together, had privily assassinated. Him they were the rather induced to destroy, on two accounts; for his influence with the people, and as thinking that they should thus gratify Alcibiades, as if he would return from banishment and procure them the friendship of Tissaphernes. Some others, too, who were unfavourable to their cause¹ they in the same manner privily made away with. An oration², moreover, for public delivery had been previously prepared by them, in which it was said that "no others ought to receive pay but such as were engaged in military service, nor ought the management of affairs to be participated by more than five thousand, and those such purses and persons as could best serve the state."

³ *Shadow of independence.*] I here read, from many MSS. and the editions of Bekker, Duker, and Goeller, ἀπονομίαν. The ὑπουλον is ill rendered by Hobbes "outside," and by Smith "precarious." The term is properly applied to flesh which is hollow, having an ulcer underneath, and therefore unsound at the bottom. Hence it comes to mean *deceitful, false*, &c. Goeller refers to Wyttenb. on Plut. Morel. 1, 292. and 2, 169.

¹ *Unfavourable to their cause.*] Such seems to be the sense of ἀνεπιτηδείους, and not that assigned to it by the translators. If ἐπιτηδείος signifies *friendly, favourable*, why should not ἀνεπιτηδ. have the contrary sense?

² *An oration.*] This was meant to make known the change of constitution which they had before hinted at.

LXVI. This, too, wore a specious show with the many, since those who should change the form of the state were to administer it.¹ The public assembly, however, and the council of ballot² still met together; but they deliberated on nothing except what was approved by the cabal; nay, even the speakers were of that number, and what was to be said had been previously considered by them. No one of the rest any longer ventured at opposition, through fear, and seeing the combination to be great. If, however, any one did contradict, he was immediately made away with³ in some opportune manner; and there was no inquisition after the perpetrators, nor, if any were suspected, was there any judicial process; yet the people kept quiet, and were in such consternation that he who suffered no violence, even though he was silent, thought himself fortunate; and, imagining the association much more numerous than it was, they cowered in their minds, and were unable to fathom its extent, by reason of the greatness of the city, and their ignorance of each other.⁴ On this very account, too, it was impossible for any who felt indignation to bewail himself to another⁵, and thus contrive for mutual defence; for either he would have had to find a stranger to speak to, or, if one known, yet unworthy of

¹ *Since those who should, &c.*] A very different sense is assigned by Mitford and others; but it has been shown by Krueger that that cannot be tolerated. The words, indeed, will not admit any other than that above expressed, and which is confirmed by Portus and Hobbes. Goeller truly remarks that *ἐμελλον* must be taken twice, at *ἔξειν*, and at *μεθιστάναί*. *ἔχειν τὴν πόλιν* stands for *οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν*.

² *Council of ballot.*] Namely, the Senate of Five Hundred, elected by ballot, or the *βαν*: a mode of election adopted among magistrates as well as senators. See Potter and the other writers on Grecian antiquities.

³ *He was immediately made away with, &c.*] It may truly be said, with Mitford, that the means employed by the oligarchical party were such as do no honour to the Athenian character. In fact, the following finely-drawn picture would be no ill representation of the state of things at Paris during the French revolution; periods which show human nature in its worst character and most disgusting traits.

⁴ *And imagining the association, &c.*] Mitford well paraphrases thus: "The friends of democracy, without equal union among themselves, ignorant of the numbers of the oligarchical party, and supposing them much greater than they really were, scarcely dared complain of enormities practised; every one thinking himself fortunate if, with the utmost caution to avoid offending, he avoided suffering."

⁵ *To bewail himself to another.*] Bekker aptly compares Horat. Ep. 2, 12. *querebar applorans tibi*.

confidence (for all the friends of democracy approached each other with suspicion), as one who participated in what was going in. For, indeed, there were such among them as no one would have thought would ever have gone over to the oligarchy. And those occasioned the greatest distrust amongst the many, and, by confirming their self-distrust, promoted the security of *the few*.

LXVII. At this crisis, then, Pisander and his colleagues arriving, immediately applied themselves to the accomplishment of the remainder of the business. And first convening the people, they gave their opinion, that ten persons should be chosen as secretaries¹, with absolute power, and that those should write down their mind as to the form of government which should be best for the state, and present it to the people on an appointed day. Afterwards, when the day arrived, they convened the assembly to Colonus.² Now this is a temple of Poseidon outside of the city, and distant about ten stadia.³ And the secretaries brought forward nothing else but this, "that it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatever opinion he might choose; and that if any should either impeach the speaker of breach of the law⁴, or in any other way injure him, they denounced heavy punishments." And now it was in plain terms proposed "that there should be

¹ *Secretaries.*] We have no term which exactly corresponds to *ἐγγραφίαις*. These persons are supposed by the commentators to have had the power of preparing drafts of laws to be proposed to the people, and therefore (as doubtless being good jurists) were thought proper persons to form a project for a new constitution. By the lexicographers we find that these were also called *πρόβουλοι* and *καταλογεῖς*, plainly from the kind of duties they had to perform. They also speak of *thirty*; but, as Goeller remarks, the number may have varied at different times.

² *Colonus.*] Hudson remarks that the *ordinary* places of assembly were the agora, the pryx, and the temple of Bacchus; the extraordinary, the Piræus, the Colonus, and Munychia.

³ *Ten stadia.*] Meursius, for *δεκά*, would read *δ* (i. e. four): but the conjecture is unnecessary. See Poppo Proleg. 2, 255. and Elmsley on Soph. Œd. col. init.

⁴ *Impeach the speaker of breach of the law.*] For it is remarked by Hack, from Wolf's Proleg. on Demosth., that whoever proposed a law repugnant to any former one, even in part or in some head, was liable to a *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, or indictment for breach of law, which any one who chose might bring forward within one year. See Schœmann de Comit. p. 170., referred to by Krueger.

no longer any magistracy of the same form, nor any receiving of emolument therefrom; also, that they should choose five persons as Prædri, and those choose one hundred others, and each of the hundred take unto himself three more. Moreover, that these four hundred should go into the council chamber, and have absolute power to govern as they judged best, and to assemble the five hundred⁵ when they thought good."

LXVIII. The proposer of this motion was Pisander¹, who also was he who manifestly took the most active part in abolishing democracy. He, however, who contrived the whole business, and how it was to be brought about, and who had for a long time given his attention to it, was Antipho², a man for virtue second to none of the Athenians of his time, the ablest, too, both in profundity of thought, and in the faculty of expressing his conceptions in words³; one who, indeed, came not forward to the assemblies of the people, nor willingly to any other place of public debate⁴, nay, was re-

⁵ *Assemble the five hundred.*] These were, it seems, to be assembled *en dernier ressort*. Mitford here observes, "that the distinction of the legislative and executive powers appears in some degree implied, but is not expressed by the historian: nor, indeed, does it seem to have been fully and clearly conceived by any of the antient politicians."

¹ *Pisander.*] On whom see Aristophanes *Lysist.* 489. Certainly, whatever might be his vices, he was a man by no means destitute of ability, though an instrument in the hands of Antipho.

² *Antipho.*] The instructor of Thucydides, according to Suidas and Marcellinus. Others, indeed, say that he was the *pupil* of Thucydides; but that is very improbable. It appears from Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1270. that he was very poor; and if we may believe the same writer, *Vesp.* 1501., *sobriety* was not one of the virtues for which Thucydides commends him. But, indeed, *virtue* (*ἀρετή*) may here be taken, in a more *special* sense, to denote *public* virtue, i. e. *integrity*. So in a passage of Horace *Od.* 3, 2, 17. (which might be placed under a picture of Antipho) "*Virtus, repulsæ nescia sordidæ, Intaminatis fulget honoribus: Nec sumit aut ponit securus Arbitrio popularis auræ.*"

It is very probable that Thucydides derived his fondness for aristocracy from his tutor.

³ *The ablest, too, &c.*] The sentiment is very similar to one at l. 2, 60. med. "inferior to none of you, whether in knowing what is expedient to be done, or in expressing my conceptions in words." Perhaps, Pope had in mind one or other of these passages in his celebrated definition of wit,—

"What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express."

⁴ *Came not forward, &c.*] A circumstance not uncommon among the

garded with jealousy and suspicion⁵ by the multitude on account of his reputation for ability and eloquence; and yet he was of all men most able to benefit by his counsel those who had any suits in the courts of judicature, or before the assembly of the people.⁶ He, too, when the government of the four hundred afterwards was on the downfall⁷, and was harassed by the people [or the democratical party], appears, of all the men up to my time, to have best defended himself when tried for his life on those matters, upon an accusation of having contributed to set up that government.⁸ Phrynichus, too, showed himself, beyond all⁹, zealously active for the establishment of oligarchy, through fear of Alcibiades, and knowing him to be acquainted with all his correspondences with Astyochus; supposing, too, that he would, in all pro-

antient democracies, and which probably contributed to increase the aversion of Antiphon to that form of government. (Mitford.)

⁵ *Regarded with jealousy and suspicion.*] Such was the fate of talent and superiority of every kind under the Athenian democracy. See the oration of Cleon, l. 3. and especially c. 57. They would ascribe to him *δεινότης* in the bad sense, as *δεισιότης*. Indeed, the low and ignorant naturally look with suspicion and hatred at talents and knowledge, which they cannot fail to see give power, which may, they fear, be exercised against them. Besides, the Athenian multitude was perpetually maddened by the demagogues with alarms of plots for the establishment of tyranny: and injuriously treated as the higher classes were, they might well harbour thoughts of some change in the constitution.

⁶ *He was of all men most able, &c.*] Mitford paraphrases thus: "But in any private cause, whether in the inferior courts of judicature, or before the assembled people, no man was equally capable of serving his friends, either by his advice or by his eloquence." Here, however, as in several other instances, the historian has been misled by *Smith*. There is nothing said in the original of his serving his friends in such cases by his *eloquence*. Besides, that is at variance with what went before, *οὐδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα παριών*.

⁷ *Was on the downfall.*] *Smith* wrongly renders, "was quite demolished." In *μεταπίπτω* there is a metaphor taken from something which is just *toppling*. As the term is neglected by the commentators, I shall subjoin a few illustrations: Aristoph. Av. 626. Dinarch. 98, 25. *μεταπεσούσης τῆς τύχης*. Lycurg. C. L. 154, 14. *τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐς δουλείαν μετέπεισιν*. And Herodian often has *ἀρχὴ* or *δυναστεία μεταπίσυνται* ἐς, κ. τ. λ.

⁸ *Appears of all the men, &c.*] Krueger aptly cites Cicero Brut. 12. "Huic Antiphontem Rhamnasium similia quædam habuisse conscripta; quo neminem unquam melius ullam oravisse capitis causam, quum se ipse defenderet, se audiente, locuples auctor scripsit Thucydides."

⁹ *Beyond all.*] According to the usual custom of renegades and deserters; for such he was, having been not, like Antipho and Theramenes, originally of the oligarchical party, but one who had passed over to it, with many other eminent persons, from the democratical party.

bability, never return to his country, to live under an oligarchy.¹⁰ He, moreover, after he had once engaged in the business, showed himself by far the most to be depended upon at the hour of danger.¹¹ Theramenes¹², too, son of Agnon, a man of no ordinary powers both of thought and elocution, was a primary mover of the plan for abolishing democracy. So that it is no wonder that the business, though difficult, yet being managed by so many and able men, should have succeeded. An arduous undertaking, however, was it¹³ to put a stop to the liberty of the Athenian people (at about the hundredth year after the expulsion of the tyrants) who had not only known no subjection, but had for above the half of that time been accustomed themselves to rule over others.

LXIX. When the assembly, after having sanctioned these measures, no one contradicting¹, was dissolved, then they afterwards brought the four hundred into the council-hall in the following manner: The Athenians were all continually partly stationed at the walls, and partly drawn up in arms, because of the enemy at Decelea. On that day, then, they suffered such as were not in the secret to depart, as they were accus-

¹⁰ *He would never return, &c.*] Such is the sense assigned by all the translators. But may it not be this: "thinking that he would never be recalled by an oligarchy?" The true reason why Alcibiades could not be expected to return was, that he had broken with the oligarchical party: and having become the object of their aversion, could expect no recall from them.

¹¹ *After he had once engaged, &c.*] On this passage the translators differ in their views. The question turns upon the sense of *περιγγώτατος*: that which I have assigned is most agreeable to the primitive signification of the word, and is confirmed by Dio Cass. 269, 16. *οὐ περιγγύψ πισται Σαρδόνων*: and so Smith, though his authority is but slender.

The following are illustrations of the expression: Soph. Elect. 942. *τί γάρ κελύεις, ὦν ἐγὼ περιγγυος*. Æschyl. Theb. 392. *τίς—προσταταῖν περιγγυος*; and 445. *περιγγυον φρούρημα*. 466. and 799. *πύλαις περιγγυοῖς ἑφραξάμεθα προσταταῖς*.

¹² *Theramenes.*] On this person see the references in Goeller.

¹³ *An arduous undertaking, &c.*] Such is plainly the sense of *χάλεπον ἦν*, and not that assigned by Hobbes, "it were sore with the people;" or "grievous it was," as Smith renders. The Latin version of Portus might have taught them better. Thucydides does not mean to deplore their loss of liberty, or that it was hard to lose it; he only adverts to the difficulty of the undertaking.

¹ *No one contradicting.*] As we say, *nem. con.* The Latin phrase seems borrowed from the Greek one.

tomed; but to those who were of the combination it was quietly ordered, not to repair to the place of arms³, but to wait at a distance⁴, and if any should hinder what was to be done, to take up arms, and permit no interference. There were also provided some Andrians and Tenians⁵, as also three hundred of Carystians, and those Æginetes who had been sent by the Athenians to colonise that island, and came on purpose for this business with their own arms. Matters being thus arranged, the four hundred going each with a small concealed sword, and one hundred and twenty youths with them, whose hands they employed whenever there were occasion to despatch any one⁶, came upon the *counsellors by ballot* who were in the council-chamber, and bid them take their wages and be gone. These they had brought with them, for the whole of the time that was behind⁶, and they gave them the money as they went out.

LXX. As in this manner the council sneaked off without the least opposition, and the rest of the citizens attempted no change, but kept quiet, the four hundred then entering into the council-chamber, created Prytanes amongst them by lot, and whatever were the customary observances of the Greeks,

² *Place of arms.*] Not camp, as Hobbes and Smith render. This seems to have been an open square in some central part of the city, where there was room to draw up and exercise a considerable body of infantry, and, no doubt, provided with places of shelter for bad weather, and for the night.

³ *Wait at a distance.*] It is clear that the place of arms was situated at no great distance from the council-hall.

⁴ *Tenians.*] These seem to have been *εληνοῦχοι* of the Athenians, as being mentioned with the Carystians and Æginetes, who were such. Hudros had been partly settled with such, as we find from Plutarch Pericl. c. 11. (Goeller.)

⁵ *Despatch any one.*] *Χειρουργεῖν* is here used, by an Attic euphemism, for *ἀναπεῖν*.

These youths were probably those young men of family before mentioned, who were especially zealous and active in bringing in oligarchy.

⁶ *The whole of the time that was behind.*] The sense of this expression *τοῦ ὑπολοίπου χρόνου* is dubious. Boeckh., referred to by Goeller, takes it to denote the pay for the rest of the year. But Krueger objects to the great and needless expense that would suppose, and understands it of the arrears. Goeller, however, is inclined to agree with Boeckh., and thinks that, perhaps, no very considerable part of the year remained. For my own part, I would use the words of a well-known prudent character, "There is much to be said on both sides."

by prayers and sacrifices, they used on entering into office ; but afterwards making many alterations from that form of administration which was pursued under the democracy, except that they did not recall the exiles, on account of Alcibiades, in other respects they administered the state imperiously. And certain persons, not many in number, who seemed convenient to be made away with, they put to death.¹ Others they threw into prison, and some also they sent abroad.² They also send messages, by herald, to Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was at Decelea, saying that they were willing to come to terms of peace³, and telling him he ought to treat with them rather than with the fickle and faithless multitude.

LXXI. But he supposing the state was not yet quiet, and that the people would not immediately yield up their antient freedom, and that if they should see him coming in great force, they would never keep still ; nor, at the present, thoroughly relying on their no longer rising in tumult ; he returned no pacific answer to the messengers from the four hundred, but sending for a considerable additional force from Peloponnesus, not long after descended himself with the garrison from Decelea, and the fresh reinforcements, to the walls of Athens, hoping that, either through tumult, they would submit on whatever terms he wished, or, in all probability, be subdued at the first onset, because of the confusion both within and without the city. For the long walls he thought he could not fail of taking, by reason of the destitution of defence. But

¹ *Certain persons, not many in number, &c.*] Upon the whole, this revolution, considering the amazing change which it involved, and as compared with most others of the Greeks, was mild and bloodless. "In the general conduct of the business," says Mitford, "we see something very different from the tumultuous revolutions so numerous among the Grecian republics. Nowhere else, in the accounts remaining to us, can we discover such a regard for all the forms of an established constitution. None of those public massacres took place, which were so usual in Grecian revolutions : public executions, with the pretence of law or popular judgment, were also avoided. Yet," adds the same historian, "even in this revolution at Athens, we find strong relics of barbarism (I must risk the expression), and very defective notions of policy."

² *Sent abroad.*] Or, as we say, *transported*, and the French used to say, *deported*.

³ *Come to terms of peace.*] This signification of *εὐκλειαν* also occurs at l. 3, 27.

when he approached close, and the Athenians within the city fell into no commotion whatever, but had sent forth the cavalry, and a detachment of heavy and of light-armed, and bowmen, and, by reason of the enemy's near approach, had beaten down certain of them, and got possession of some bodies and arms; then, indeed, finding how matters stood, he led his army back. And himself and the force under him remained stationary at Decelea; but the new comers, after some days' stay in the country, he sent home. Afterwards the four hundred again sent ambassadors to Agis; and upon his now receiving them better, they, at his recommendation, sent an embassy to Lacedæmon to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of coming to some accommodation.

LXXII. They also sent ten persons to Samos, to comfort and encourage the army ¹, and give them to understand "that the oligarchy was not established to the injury of the city and its inhabitants, but for the safety of the state at large, and that those who had the conduct of affairs were not four hundred alone, but five hundred. Notwithstanding that the Athenians had never, by reason of expeditions, and busy employments abroad, assembled for consultation upon any affair, however important, with five hundred present." Giving, also, directions us to what was proper to be said, they despatched the messengers, immediately after the settlement of their present constitution ², fearing lest (what really came to pass) the seafaring multitude would not only *not* be willing to abide by the oligarchical constitution, but (the evil commencing from thence) might be the means of turning *them* out of their places.

LXXIII. For in Samos there had been already a commotion respecting a change to oligarchy, and the following occurrences took place about the same time that the four hundred were established at Athens. Those Samians that had risen upon the powerful, and were of the *popular* party, changing

¹ *To comfort and encourage the army.*] So the expression "speak comfortably to," in 2 Sam. 19, 7. 2 Chron. 30, 22. 3, 26. Is. 40, 2. Hos. 2, 14.

² *Settlement of, &c.*] Acacius and Hobbes render, "after the change in government." But this is rather an exposition than a version.

again, and being persuaded by Pisander when he went, and by the Athenians of the association, became also members of that cabal, to the number of three hundred, and were ready to make an attack on the rest of the people, as being of the democratical party. And Hyperbolus¹, a certain Athenian, a mean person, ostracized not from any fear of his power or consequence, but for his villany and the disgrace he was to the city; him they put to death, with the countenance of Charminus, one of the generals, and certain of the Athenians there², having given them their faith. Other such actions, too, they committed by their connivance, and were bent on making an attack on the many (i. e. the popular party). But they having had intelligence of their design, make known what was in agitation to Leon and Diomedon (for they, by reason of their favour with the people, bore the oligarchy but unwillingly), and to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, one a commander of a trireme, the other an officer of heavy-armed, also to others who were supposed to have been ever most opposed to the cabal. These they intreated not to look on and see *themselves* destroyed, and Samos alienated from the Athenians, by which alone their dominion had been kept together as it was. On hearing this, they went to the soldiery, and urged them, one by one, not to suffer it; and especially they canvassed the Paralians, who were Athenians, and all the crew freemen³, such having ever before been opposed to oligarchy. And Leon and Diomedon, when they went on any cruize, left them some ships as a guard. So that on the three hundred making their attack on them, all those crews going to their help, and especially the Paralians⁴, the popular party of the Samians got the

¹ *Hyperbolus.*] On this person Goeller refers to Photius, Harpocrat., Suidas, Schol. on Lucian. Tim. t. 1. p. 100. Plutarch Vit. Alcib. c. 13. Nic. c. 11. Scholiasts on Aristoph. Eq. 851. 1301. 1360. Acharn. 846. Vesp. 1001. Pac. 680. 691. 1319. Thesm. 847. Plut. 1038. Nub. 619, 873. Plutarch de Herod. malign. 3. He was the last that suffered banishment by ostracism, on which Goeller refers to Meier and Schœmann.

² *With the countenance of, &c.*] Mitford takes the sense to be, that "they killed Charminus and others." But no translator has assigned such a sense, as being at variance with what follows. The signification of *μετὰ*, by which it implies *countenance* and *abetting*, has been illustrated by Duker.

³ *All the crew freemen.*] Not, as in the case of the other ships (except, perhaps, the *Salaminia*), composed partly of slaves, who worked in chains.

⁴ *Paralians.*] i. e. those of the ship *Paralus*.

better, and killed some thirty of the three hundred, and thirty-eight of the ringleaders they banished. For the rest they declared an amnesty, and afterwards they were governed by a democracy.

LXXIV. But the Paralus, and on board of it Chæreas son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had been active for the late change, the Samians sent in haste to Athens, to announce what had happened; for they knew not as yet of the four hundred archons.¹ Immediately on their making the harbour, the four hundred threw into prison some two or three of the Paraliens, and taking away the ship from the rest, removed them into another vessel, made to receive soldiers², and appointed them to keep guard about Eubœa. But Chæreas, immediately on seeing what happened, contrived to secrete himself, and going back to Eubœa, tells the soldiery what had been done by the Athenians, exaggerating and painting every thing in dreadful colours; as that "they punished all with stripes³, and that no opposition could be made to those that held the government; and that their wives and children at home are insulted⁴; also, that it is their intention to apprehend and put in confinement the relations of such of the soldiery on service at Samos as are not of their party, in order, if they would submit to their authority, to put the hostages to death." And many stories he told, adding falsities of his own.

LXXV. On hearing this, the men at first were going to throw their missiles at those who had had most hand in the

¹ *Knew not as yet of the four hundred archons.*] Or, governors. In this there is something sarcastic; q. d. there had been before ten archons, now there were four hundred.

² *Made to receive soldiers.*] And, consequently, of a larger and stronger make. The difference I have before pointed out.

³ *Punished all with stripes.*] i. e. all that disobeyed them. Smith well renders (or rather *paraphrases*), "every citizen was kept in awe by whips and scourges."

⁴ *Insulted.*] Smith strangely understands this of the "insolence of whips and scourges;" a piece of judgment much on a par with the school-master's interpretation of the Horatian "*Sublimi flagello Tange* Chloem semel arrogantem."

oligarchy, and at such others as had taken part in it; when, however, being hindered by some who were of neither party¹, and being admonished not to ruin affairs, the enemy's ships lying so near in hostile array, they desisted. After this, Thrasybulus son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus (for those were the principal authors of the change), being earnestly bent on turning the government into a democracy, swore all the soldiers (especially those of the oligarchy), by the most solemn oaths, "that verily they would be governed by democracy, and would preserve concord, and actively carry on the war against the Peloponnesians, and would be enemies to the four hundred, and hold no correspondence with them." All the Samians, too, who were of military age took the same oath; and the soldiery communicated the whole matter, and the probable results of the dangers, to the Samians, conceiving that neither those nor themselves had any other refuge of safety², but that whether the four hundred should gain the upper hand, or the enemies at Miletus, perish they must.

LXXVI. To such an eagerness of contention had they at this time arrived; the one party compelling the city to be under democracy, the other forcing the army to be under

¹ *Of neither party.*] i. e. neutrals, or modérés. So I, with Goeller, understand the *διὰ μέσου*. The translators take it to mean "*interposed* to part them;" but that sense would require *γενομένων*. I must not omit to observe that the *βάλλειν* just before seems not rightly to be confined to *darts*, but may be extended to missiles of every kind, such as rage is likely to resort to, stones, sticks, &c.

² *Had any other refuge of safety.*] Namely, but in their assistance. The phrase *ἀποστροφή σωτηρίας* (which also occurs at l. 4, 76.) is very rare, nor have I met with any other example. Josephus, however, Bell. Jud. l. 2, 11, 4., has *ἀποστροφήν σωτήριον*, by which he seems to have here taken the genitive for an adjective. *Ἀποστροφή κακῶν* occurs in Eurip. Med. 795. Soph. frag. incert. 27. and Liban. Or. 501. B. and 509. B. The term is used with *ζήτησις* by Eurip. Med. 1220., and with *τύχης* by Æschyl. Prom. 794. It, however, more frequently occurs without any genitive, in the sense *refuge*, where *σωτηρίας* is understood. Herodotus 2, 13. has the strange phrase *ὁ γὰρ δὴ σφί ἐστι ὕδατος οὐδεμίη ἄλλη ἀποστροφή*. where at *ὕδ.* I would subaud *περί*.

The whole passage is well paraphrased by Mitford thus: "Henceforward the Samians were admitted to all councils, as men engaged in the same cause with the Athenians, and bound by the same interest, whose assistance was necessary to *their* welfare, and whose welfare depended upon *their* success."

oligarchy. And presently the army held an assembly¹, wherein they deposed the former commanders², and chose others, and also trierarchs, of whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. They also rose up, one among another, and addressed, among other counsels and exhortations, the following: — that “there was no need to be dispirited because the city had revolted from them; for that the lesser number had seceded from the greater, and that in all respects better provided.³ For themselves having the whole of the navy, could compel the rest of the subject states to contribute money, equally as if they set out for that purpose from Athens.⁴ For they had in their possession Samos, a state of no despicable strength, but which came within a little of depriving the Athenians, when it was with them, of the empire of the sea. That they were resisting the enemy from the same place as before⁵; and that they were better able, by the possession of the fleet, to provide themselves with necessaries than those in the city. That it was through their being stationed to oppose the enemy at Samos, that they (i. e. the Athenians at home) kept themselves masters of the entrance to the Piræus; and now they would be brought to that pass, unless they would choose to give them back the constitution; and that themselves were better able to exclude those from the use of the sea than to be excluded by them. That the assistance which the city rendered them towards overcoming the enemy was trifling, and not worth mentioning; and that they (i. e. those of Samos) had lost nothing, since they (i. e. those at Athens) had no more money to send them (but the soldiers had to provide it for themselves), nor wholesome counsel, for which a state exercises command over armies. Nay, that in

¹ *Held an assembly.*] Thus taking upon themselves to be the commonwealth.

² *Deposed the former commanders.*] Not, it seems, thinking them sufficiently zealous; for they appear to have been moderate men.

³ *Better provided.*] The word πρόμιος is rare, but it occurs in Æschyl. Eum. and Aristophanes. See Dr. Blomfield on Æschyl. P. V. 939.

⁴ *Equally as if they, &c.*] This alludes to the squadrons sent to collect the tribute, &c. from the allies.

⁵ *They were resisting, &c.*] Hobbes, “that the seat of war was the same as before.”

this respect *those* had erred, by abrogating the laws of their country, while *they* preserved them, and would endeavour to compel *them* to do the same. So that those in the camp who should give counsel were not inferior to those in the city. Also that Alcibiades would, if they should grant him security and safe return, gladly procure them the alliance of the king. And what was most of all, if they should be altogether unsuccessful in their attempt, to those possessed of so powerful a navy there were numerous retreats and places of refuge, in which they should find both cities and lands.”⁶

LXXVII. Having thus discussed affairs in the assembly, and encouraged each other, they not the less vigorously set about preparations for the war. As to the ten ambassadors sent to Samos by the four hundred, they, on hearing of these proceedings, while yet at Delus, kept quiet.

LXXVIII. About the same time also the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus clamoured among themselves that affairs were ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes; the former being neither heretofore willing to come to battle, while yet they themselves were in full strength and the navy of the Athenians inconsiderable, nor now, when they are said to be at faction,

⁶ *That there were numerous retreats, &c.*] In the then thinly settled state of some of the finest parts of what is now the civilised world, opportunities for colonisation abounded, and were always looked to with hope by the oppressed or unfortunate at home, whether states or individuals. It was this sort of feeling that wrung from Johnson the fine apostrophe in his “London” (170):—

“Has Heav’n reserved, in pity to the poor,
No pathless waste or undiscover’d shore?
No secret island in the boundless main?
No peaceful desert yet unclaim’d by Spain?
Quick let us rise, the happy seats explore,
And bear oppression’s insolence no more!”

Goeller remarks that this whole passage, expressed in *oratione obliqua*, contains (like many others) the seeds of orations, which were intended to be worked up in that form when the whole was completed. A remark, indeed, very applicable to this eighth book, which manifestly appears to have been left in a very rough and incomplete state. But there are many such indirect passages, containing the germ of orations, in all parts of the history; and those may be regarded as the most difficult, and certainly least attractive parts.

and their ships are not yet brought together; but, waiting for the Phœnician ships from Tissaphernes, a mere name¹, and nothing real, they are in danger of being ruined by procrastination²: also that *Tissaphernes*, by not bringing up the ships, and by not giving out the pay regularly nor in full, is spoiling the navy. Therefore, they said, they ought no longer to procrastinate, but to hazard a battle. In this meeting the Syracusans were the chief instigators.

LXXIX. And now the allies and Astyochus having heard of this murmuring, and it being in council determined to come to battle, especially after they had received intelligence of the tumult at Samos, weighed anchor with all their ships, to the number of one hundred and twelve; and having ordered the Milesians to go by land to Mycale, they proceeded to the same place by sea. The Athenians, with the eighty ships from Samos, which happened to be riding at anchor at Glauce near Mycale (Samos being there but a little distance³ from the continent, fronting Mycale), as soon as they saw the Peloponnesian ships making sail towards them, retreated to Samos; not conceiving themselves to be in sufficient strength to hazard the event of battle; and moreover (though they saw that those from Miletus were desirous to fight), they were expecting Strombichides, from the Hellespont, to come to their assistance with the ships which had gone from Chios to Abydos, for a message had been before despatched to him to that effect; and thus these retreated to Samos: while the Peloponnesians, making port at Mycale, there encamped, as did the

¹ *A mere name.*] Or, as we say, *sham*. Krueger compares, from Plato, τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ' ἔργῳ, &c. This use of ἄλλως is remarkable: it is said by Goeller to stand for non nisi. Indeed, it almost becomes an adjective. Toup on Longinus compares Aristid. 1, 135. ὄνομα ἄλλως ὄντας, and 2, 502. ἄλλως ὄνομα. To which may be added Eurip. Troad. 476. Philo Jud. p. 541. ἀριζμόν ἄλλως. Dio Cass. 1101, 38. καλλώπισμα ἄλλως ἦν.

² *Ruined by procrastination.*] Such seems to be the sense, which is that assigned by the Scholiast, Hesychius, Duker, and others. To the single example from Thucyd. 8, 87. of this extraordinary use of the word, may be added Herod. 7, 120. διατριβήναι, where, had Wasse remarked this passage of Thucydides, he would have seen that the var. lect. ἐκτριβ. is a mere gloss, or a παραδιόρθωσις.

³ *Little distance.*] Only about three or four miles, being separated by what is now called the Little Boccaze, or channel.

land forces of the Milesians and the neighbouring people; and on the day following, as they were about to make sail for Samos, news reached them of the arrival of Strombichides with the fleet from the Hellespont, wherefore they immediately sailed away to Miletus.

And now the Athenians, on the accession of this fleet, themselves make sail to Miletus with one hundred and eight ships, meaning to come to an engagement. But when no force came out against them, they sailed away back to Samos.

LXXX. Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians, after they had refused to go forth to meet the enemy, as thinking themselves, even in full force¹, not a match for them, being in great straits whence they should procure money for so many ships, especially as Tissaphernes supplied the pay irregularly; they, therefore, send Clearchus son of Ramphius, with forty ships, to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the order at first received from Peloponnesus. Indeed, Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was ready to furnish them with support; and, moreover, Byzantium had sent a message to them respecting a revolt. Then those ships of the Peloponnesians having put out into the main sea, that they might escape the notice of the Athenians on the voyage, were tempest-tossed, and some (the greater part) with Clearchus having reached Delos, afterwards come back to Miletus (Clearchus, however, again going thence to the Hellespont by land, as being appointed governor there), while the rest, under the command of Elixus, the Megaræan, ten in number, having arrived in safety at the Hellespont, bring over Byzantium to revolt.²

After this, those of Samos hearing of it, send a reinforcement of ships and a force for garrison to the Hellespont; and

¹ *In full force.*] I agree with Valla, Heilman, and Krueger, that ἀρπάς ταις ναυσὶν should be joined with ἀξιώμαχοι, not with ἀντανάγοντο, as Portus and others take it.

² *Were tempest-tossed, and some, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense of the contort and perplexed words of the original. Krueger is of opinion that there is some *corruption*; Goeller thinks not. There may possibly be a lacuna after Μίλητον: but probably this is one of those many passages of the present book which never received the author's last hand.

there occurred a petty sea-fight off Byzantium with eight ships to eight.

LXXXI. And now those who were in authority at Samos, and particularly Thrasybulus, who had ever (especially since he had effected the change of government) adhered to the same opinion, that Alcibiades should be recalled, and at last had, in an assembly, persuaded the bulk of the soldiers to that measure; and they having decreed return and security to Alcibiades, he went to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, conceiving that it would be their own safety if they could detach Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians. On an assembly being held, Alcibiades complained of and bewailed the private calamity of his exile; then dilating on public affairs, he put them in no small hopes of the future, and exaggeratingly set forth his own influence with Tissaphernes, in order that those who maintained the oligarchy at home might stand in awe of him, and the *combination* be dissolved; and that those in Samos might hold him in the greater honour, and take the more courage; and, moreover, that the enemy might feel the utmost hatred of Tissaphernes¹, and be brought to abandon the hopes they entertained. Alcibiades, therefore, with a great parade of words, undertook to say, "that Tissaphernes had solemnly engaged to him that as long as he had any thing left, if he could but trust the Athenians, they should never want for support, no not if he were driven to sell his last couch²; also, that he would bring up the Phœnician ships now at Aspendus for the *Athenians*, and not the *Peloponnesians*; and that he would place reliance only on

¹ *Feel the utmost hatred of Tissaphernes.*] Such Hack has shown to be the sense, by a comparison of a kindred passage at c. 83. See his note.

² *Sell his last couch.*] This was quite in the hyperbolical style of the East. There is something very similar in the following passages: Xen. Anab. 7, 5, 5. *καὶ προσδανεισάμενος, εἰ μὴ γ' ἄλλως ἰδύνω, καὶ ἀποδόμενος τὰ σαντοῦ ἱμάτια.* and Hist. 5, 3. where Cyrus says, *ἰὰν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκλίπῃ, καὶ τὸν θρόνον κατακόψῃ, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐκάθητο, ὅντα ἀργυροῦν καὶ κρύσσον.* Themist. 309. C. *καὶ τοὶ τὰ χρήματα γε ἀφελόμενον, καὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, καὶ νῆ Δία γε τὸν χίτωνα τὸν τελευταῖον.* Aristoph. Lysist. 114. *ἐγὼ δὲ γ' ἂν, κὰν με χρεῖη τοῦγκυκλον Τουτὶ καταδείσαν, &c.* Diog. Laert. 6, 87. *ἐξαργυρισάσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν.* Isæus p. 55, 21. *οἶκον* — *διολώλεας, καὶ ἐξαργυρισάμενος πένιαν ὁδύργ.* 'Εξαργυρώ signifies, as we say, *to turn into money.*

the Athenians on condition that he (Alcibiades) should return, and would be bound for them.

LXXXII. On hearing these and many other such speeches, they immediately chose him commander, conjointly with the former ones, and committed all affairs to his management.¹ Indeed, their present hope of preservation, and being avenged on the four hundred, not a man would have bartered for any price; and they were now ready, from their exultation at these speeches, to hold in contempt their present enemies, and sail for the Piræus. Their going, however, to Piræus, to the abandonment of their nearer enemies, though many urged it, he wholly forbade; but, he said, "since he had been chosen commander in chief, he would first go to Tissaphernes, and manage the business of the war." And from this assembly he immediately set out thither, in order that he might seem to communicate every thing with him; moreover, as wishing to be of greater consequence in his eyes, and to show that he was now chosen commander, and was able to do him both good and evil.² Thus it happened that Alcibiades kept the Athenians in awe by the means of Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by them.

LXXXIII. But the Peloponnesians at Miletus, on hearing of the return of Alcibiades, and having before distrusted Tissaphernes, were now much more filled with hatred at him. For it had happened that, when, at the cruise³ of the Athenians to Miletus, they were unwilling to put to sea and fight them, Tissaphernes became yet more slack in the dis-

¹ *Committed all affairs to his management.*] Something is left to be understood at ἀνετίθεσαν. Almost all translators seem to supply αὐτοῖς: but Smith rightly understands αὐτῷ, which is confirmed by the opinion of Goeller, who aptly compares a kindred passage at l. 2, 65. στρατηγὸν εἰλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπείτευσαν.

Krueger remarks that such an one was called ἀντοκράτωρ: and he refers to Pausan. 4, 15, 2. Xen. Hist. 1, 4, 2. and Schœmann de Com. Ath. p. 314.

² *Able to do him both good and evil.*] i. e. could either be a valuable friend or a formidable foe. This was a sort of proverbial expression, of which I shall adduce many examples in my edition.

³ *At the cruise.*] I here read, from the conjecture of Goeller, for καὶ τὸν, κατὰ τὸν.

charge of the pay, and thus in addition to his being, before this, hated by them on account of Alcibiades, he became the object of greater enmity.⁴ Then the soldiers, forming themselves into clusters, enumerated their grievances, as they had before done; and certain others, even men of consequence, and not private soldiers alone, recounted that "they had never yet received full pay; that the rate given was but scanty, nor yet regularly paid. In short, that unless they were led to battle or taken where they might have support, the men would abandon the ships; and that of all this Astyochus was the cause, who, for private lucre, accommodated himself to the humour of Tissaphernes."⁵

LXXXIV. Whilst they were thus recounting their grievances, it fell out that a tumult on the following account arose about Astyochus. The Syracusans and Thurians, inasmuch as they consisted chiefly of freemen¹, so they with the most daring importunity demanded their wages. Whereupon he answered them somewhat haughtily, and even threatened Dorieus², who was pleading for his own sailors, and lifted up

⁴ *For it had happened, &c.*] I know not how better to represent the perplexed sentence of the original, in which there is an anacoluthon.

⁵ *Accommodated himself, &c.*] *Ἐπιτίποντα ὀργὰς Τισσαφέρνηι.* The Scholiast has here well explained the sense, of which the following are examples: Dionys. Hal. Ant. 507, 39. and 434, 11. Eurip. Bacch. 1301. *ὀργὰς πρίπει θεῖους οὐχ ὑποιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς.* Æschyl. Eum. 846. *ὀργὰς ξυνοίσω σοι γεραιτέρα γὰρ εἰ.* So the Latin *obtemperare* is well explained by Facciolati *ad alterius voluntatem me temperare.*

¹ *Consisted chiefly of freemen.*] Such seems to be the true sense of the awkward words of the original, of which the versions are not satisfactory, and on which the commentators are silent. Why there should have been less than the usual proportion of slaves, may have been from the populousness of Sicily. For the same reason, Attica being a very small country, and the population little in comparison with its consequence, a considerable number of slaves was always employed on board the Athenian ships, and consequently, for security, were (as we have before seen) kept in chains. Thus it would happen that the Syracusans and Thurians sending forth far more seamen than the usual proportion, would have a greater weight in popular debates.

² *Dorieus.*] Namely, the commander of the Thurian squadron. Vide supra, c. 35. The Scholiast (as Krueger remarks) does not take *Dorieus* for *Hermocrates* (as some have thought), but only notices a *var. lect.* This, doubtless, was written in the margin by some one who wondered that *Hermocrates* was not mentioned, and therefore conjectured *Hermocrates* for *Dorieus*, but very injudiciously; for it is probable that *Hermocrates* was not then there, or, at least, was out of office; for we find by what just

his truncheon³ at him. On seeing which, the military multitude, seamen-like, shouting aloud⁴, rushed upon Astyochus to slay him. But he, foreseeing their purpose, takes refuge at an altar.⁵ The Milesians also suddenly attacked and took the fort⁶ built at Miletus by Tissaphernes, and ejected the garrison therein. This met the approbation of the rest of the allies, and especially of the Syracusans. Lichas, however, was not pleased therewith, and said that the Milesians and the rest of those in the king's dominions ought to be subject to Tissaphernes, and render him respect in all things reasonable, until the war should be successfully terminated. But the Milesians were incensed at him for this, and such like speeches, and on his dying soon after of sickness, would not suffer him to be buried where the Lacedæmonians present wished.⁷

LXXXV. When affairs were in this state of dissension, both as regarded Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus came up from Lacedæmon, as successor to Astyochus in the naval command, and assumes the government, and Astyochus sailed away; with whom Tissaphernes sent as ambassador one of his courtiers, Gaulites by name, a Carian, who could

afterwards follows, that he had been already superseded by an order from home.

³ *Truncheon.*] Not *stick*, as Mitford renders. From the well-known anecdote of Eurybiades, and from what Hudson has collected, it appears that the *Lacedæmonian* generals bore sticks or truncheons; from whom it passed to the Romans, and thus to the moderns. But whether it was usual with the other Greeks, Goeller professes doubt; and, indeed, I am not aware of any proof to that effect.

⁴ *Shouting aloud.*] For this seamen have in all ages been distinguished. Most of my readers will here bring to mind Horace's humorous account of his voyage to Brundisium.

⁵ *Altar.*] Not, I conceive, one at any temple, but probably the domestic *larula* in the hall.

⁶ *The fort.*] Of this Thucydides has said nothing before. We may, however, gather from the present passage that Tissaphernes had taken this measure for securing his authority at Miletus; and though the Milesians had not, in their necessity, made any opposition to this, yet at length, indignant at this badge of servitude, and encouraged by the increasing discontent against Tissaphernes, they ventured on this step.

⁷ *Where the Lacedæmonians present wished.*] Namely, we may suppose, in some conspicuous place of the city, as was the case with Brasidas.

speak both languages¹, in order to accuse the Milesians in the affair of the fort, and also to apologize concerning himself; knowing that the Milesians had gone thither for the especial purpose of exclaiming against him, and Hermocrates with them, who was prepared to represent that Tissaphernes was ruining the affairs of the Lacedæmonians, in conjunction with Alcibiades, and was playing a double game, and dealing with both parties. Indeed, he had been continually at enmity with him, on account of the payment of the wages; and at last, on Hermocrates being banished from Syracuse, and others of the Syracusans (Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus,) come to Miletus to take the command of the fleet, Tissaphernes then inveighed yet more bitterly against Hermocrates (then become a fugitive), and, among other offences, accused him of this; that on once asking him for money, and not obtaining his request, he conceived an enmity against him. Astyochus, then, and the Milesians and Hermocrates sailed away for Lacedæmon, while Alcibiades passed over again from Tissaphernes to Samos.

LXXXVI. And now the ambassadors from the four hundred at Delos, whom they had sent to soothe and inform those at Samos, arrive while Alcibiades is present, and an assembly being called, they attempted to speak; but the soldiers at first would not hear them, but shouted out, "Kill those destroyers of popular government!" Afterwards, however, being with difficulty quieted, they gave them a hearing. They then delivered this message, "that it was not for the destruction of the state that the change was made, but for its preservation, and that it might not be delivered up to the enemy. For *that* was in their power when the enemy had lately, during their government, made an invasion. That all of the five thousand should participate in the government in turn; that their relations were not insulted, as Chareas had

¹ *Both languages.*] i. e. Grecian and Persian. Now, the Carians were celebrated for their knowledge of both these languages. Thus Valckn. on Herod. 8, 133. observes that Mardonius sent a Carian to consult the Greek oracles; and Cyrus the younger employed Carians as interpreters; and the Persians used such at court in the same office. Similar persons, too, there are in the present Turkish court, generally Greeks.

calumniously reported, nor suffered any injury, but each remained undisturbedly in possession of his own." Notwithstanding, however, this, and more that they said, the others would not the more hearken to them, but were still enraged, and some declared one opinion, some another, but especially that they should sail to Piræus. Whereupon Alcibiades showed himself then, for the first time, as the benefactor of the state, and that in as great a degree as any one ever was¹; for the Athenians at Samos being exceedingly bent on sailing against themselves², at a time when the enemy would immediately have possessed themselves of Ionia and the Hellespont, he was the man that prevented it.³ For at that time no one would have been able to restrain the people; whereas he made them desist from the voyage, and by rebuking those persons that were incensed at the ambassadors, he diverted them from their purpose; and he himself sent them away with this answer: "That the five thousand he would not hinder from governing, but the four hundred he desired them to dismiss, and establish the council of five hundred as before. Further, if, from a principle of frugality, any expense had been retrenched, with a view that the soldiery should be better paid, he gave the thing entire commendation. He, moreover, bid them stand out, and make no concessions to the enemy. For if the *city* were preserved, there was great hope that they would come to terms of treaty with *them*; but if once either portion, the one at Samos, or *they*, were worsted, there would be no longer aught left for them to treat withal." There were also present some ambassadors of the Argives, who engaged to give assistance to the popular government at Samos. And Alcibiades, after commending them, and telling them to be at hand when called upon, so sent them away. The Argives came with the Para-

¹ *Alcibiades showed himself, &c.*] Mitford thus paraphrases: "Then Alcibiades did his country a real service, and such a service that, perhaps, no man ever did a greater."

² *Sailing against themselves.*] A very significant and energetic expression, to characterise the madness of such a step.

³ *He was the man that prevented it.*] The next sentence seems to have reference to a clause omitted, namely, "and he was the only one that could have done so." Mitford well paraphrases thus: "No man but Alcibiades was able to prevent this; and he did prevent it."

lians, who being before appointed ⁴ to serve in the transport-trireme by the four hundred, and to cruize around Eubœa, and who, conveying the ambassadors of the Athenians sent to Lacedæmon by the four hundred, Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melesius, when they were sailing off the coast of Argos, seized the ambassadors, and delivered them to the Argives, as persons who were principally concerned in abolishing democracy. They themselves went no more to Athens, but came with the trireme they were in to Samos, conveying thither the ambassadors from Argos.

LXXXVII. This same summer Tissaphernes, at the very time in which the Peloponnesians were most offended with him, because of the return of Alcibiades, and on various other accounts, as though he were now manifestly Atticizing; with the intention, as it seemed, of clearing himself of their calumnies, got ready to go to Aspendus ¹, to fetch ² the Phœnician fleet, and desired Lichas to accompany him. Over the army he said he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant, to give out the pay while he was absent. The matter, however, is variously related, nor is it easy to ascertain for what reason he went to Aspendus, and yet did not bring away the ships. For that the Phœnician ships, one hundred and forty-seven in number ³, were come as far as Aspendus, is clearly ascertained; but why

⁴ *Who being before appointed, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense of this perplexed sentence, where the critics propose various conjectures; the most probable of which is that of Bekker and Goeller, who cancel the *οἱ* before *ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο*. Even thus, however, the construction is very rough.

¹ *Aspendus.*] A city of Pamphylia, situated near the mouth of the river Eurymedon; certainly nearer than the maps make it, otherwise the fleet could not be said to be at Aspendus. With respect to the *name*, it seems to be of Oriental derivation, many words in the Hebrew and other eastern languages ending in *d*.

² *To fetch.*] Such, from what follows, is so plainly the sense of *ἐπι*, that it is strange none of the translators should have seen it except Hobbes. Into the error of the translators Mitford also has unwarily fallen.

³ *One hundred and forty-seven in number.*] Plutarch Alcib. 25. says one hundred and fifty. But Isocrates de Big. 7., only ninety. Diodorus l. 13, 36. says three hundred. Yet for *τριακοσίων* I would there conjecture *διακ*. Diodorus is only speaking of the number which was *intended* to be assembled. In the passage of Isocrates there seems to be an error of the literal figures: for $\Delta\Lambda\Lambda\Lambda\Lambda$ read $\text{H}\Delta\Delta\Delta$. As to Plutarch, he may be supposed to use a *round* number.

they did not come up, is variously conjectured. Some think the purpose was, that, by his absence, he might, agreeably to his design, wear down the strength of the Peloponnesians; as a confirmation of which, Tamus, to whom the business had been committed, gave out the pay no better, but rather worse. Others, that by proceeding to Aspendus, he might squeeze money from ⁴ the Phœnicians for letting them go, as at this rate he was not likely to use them.⁵ Others, again ⁶, are of opinion, that it was done on account of the clamorous accusation which had gone to Lacedæmon, in order that it might be said that he was *not* doing them wrong, but was actually gone to the ships, which were really manned for service. To me, however, it seems *most* manifest, that his not bringing up the fleet was for the sake of wearing out the Grecians, and keeping affairs in suspense ⁷; for their ruin, while he went thither and delayed the time; for the balancing of them, in order that he might make neither party too strong by adding his forces to it. Since, had he indeed meant to bring the war to a conclusion, it is plain that he could have put the matter beyond all doubt. For, by bringing up this force, he could, in all probability, have given the victory to the Lacedæmonians, who, indeed, at the present, were lying opposite with a navy, and rather a full match for than at all inferior to their opponents. But what most betrays his purpose ⁸ is the excuse which he

⁴ *Squeeze money from.*] Literally, "make money out of." The word ἐκρημαρίζεσθαι is very rare; but I have noted it in Dio Cass. 702, 11. ὑπηκόους μὴτε ὑβρίζετε μὴτε ἐκρημαρίζεσθε. and 9, 25, 78. ὅπως τὰ τῶν Ἰεήρων ἐκρημαρίσθηται.

⁵ *As at this rate he was, &c.*] Or, according to Goeller's view of the words, "for even thus (i. e. though he had not received money from the Phœnicians) he would never have used them." Of this sense of καὶ ὥς Goeller adduces examples from 1, 44. and 74.

⁶ *Others, again, &c.*] Of these conjectures any one, or *all* of them, might be true.

⁷ *Keeping affairs in suspense.*] Or, delaying and keeping back. So Goeller explains it *mora*, subjoining "dum moratur et tergiversatur, magis utrumque vires exæquat, certe exæquatas esse, ut jam nunc sunt, patitur; quamprimum alterutris adjungitur, quasi libra altera lance propendens alteram deprimit, moramque tollit."

⁸ *What most betrays his purpose.*] It is long since I conceived καταφορά (not καταφορά) to be the true reading; and this has, I find, been since adopted by all the recent editors. I would compare l. 1, 82, 1. ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὴ καταφοράν. Dio Cass. 846, 31. τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν καταφοράν. See also Lex. Xen.

made for not bringing up the ships : saying that " they were fewer than the king had ordered to be collected." But surely he might have done the king a greater favour in this matter, by not expending much of his money, but by accomplishing the same business with less expense. To Aspendus, then, whatever might be his purpose, Tissaphernes repairs, and holds communication with the Phœnicians. And the Peloponnesians, at his desire, sent Philippus, a Lacedæmonian, with two triremes, to the fleet.

LXXXVIII. But Alcibiades, after hearing that Tissaphernes was gone to Aspendus, sails also himself thither, taking thirteen ships, promising to those at Samos a certain and great advantage ; for " either he would bring the Phœnician ships to the Athenians, or at least would hinder their coming to the Peloponnesians ;" knowing, as it is probable, a long time the purpose of Tissaphernes in not bringing them up, and being desirous to expose him, as much as possible, to calumny with the Peloponnesians, by his friendship to himself and the Athenians, that he might thereby be the more compelled to take their part. And he, on weighing, takes his course upwards straight for Phaselus and Caunus.

LXXXIX. And now those ambassadors of the four hundred sent to Samos, on their arrival at Athens, told what they were charged with from Alcibiades, " that he desires them to hold out, and give way in no respect to the enemy ; as also that he has great hopes he shall reconcile the army with them, and that they shall get the better of the Peloponnesians." By this message infusing more courage into those who took part in the oligarchy, who had before been most of them weary of the business, and would have gladly got rid of it in any safe way. And they now formed cabals, and found fault with the state of affairs, having for their ringleaders some of the heads of the oligarchy, and those in office, such as Theramenes son of Agnon, and Aristocrates son of Scellias¹, who principally par-

¹ *Aristocrates son of Scellias.*] For the orthography, *Scellias* is confirmed by the best MSS. Respecting the person in question, Wasse refers to Lysias C. Erat. p. 171.; to which may be added Aristoph. Av. 126.

ticipated in the management of affairs, but standing in great awe, as they frankly said, of the army in Samos, and of Alcibiades most seriously, and also the ambassadors whom they had sent to Lacedæmon; and fearing lest they (i. e. the ambassadors) should, by negotiating without the consent of the great body of rulers, do the state some injury, did not, indeed, avow that they desired to get rid of the government coming so much into the hands of a few, but frankly confessed that the five thousand ought to be appointed not in name only, and that a more equalized form of government should be established.² Now this, indeed, was the scheme of polity which they in words professed; but most of them, through their private ambition, had fallen upon that course by which an oligarchy, coming after a democracy, is especially brought to

² *Who principally participated in the management, &c.*] This is, perhaps, the most obscure passage in our author, truly a *locus conclamatus*. All the commentators acknowledge its difficulty, and the ablest of them, Duker, ingenuously says, "Totus hic locus mihi difficilior est, quam ut explanare eum possim. Nec satisfaciunt interpretes, quorum interpretationes sententiam etiam magis videntur obscurare."* Some *corruption* may, he justly says, be suspected from the marvellous variety of readings; but, were he now alive, he would grant that the interpreters have done far more than merely *obscure* the passage. Nay, it seems to me that Bekker and Goeller have done much, the former to emend, and the latter to explain it; and the recent collations of valuable MSS. have supplied better opportunities for settling the reading and adjusting the sense, than were enjoyed by the older commentators. It may be thought some confirmation of the truth of Bekker and Goeller's reading and explanation, that my own text, version, and explanation, formed very many years ago, are nearly the same. This is no place to minutely discuss the various readings, or treat on the passage critically; but I would observe, that the conjecture of Abresch, ἀπαλλαξίειν (or ἀπαλλαξίειν), which was also undoubtedly in the Scholiast's MS., rids us of one of the most formidable difficulties; and the reading of some of the best MSS., φοβούμενοι δ' ἀδεῶς ἔφασαν, removes another. The repetition, too, of the words, ἀδεῶς ἔφασαν, in the latter part of the passage, throws great light thereon.

Finally, σπουδῇ πάνν is, as Goeller observes, a frequent Thucydidean phrase; as, he adds, has been shown (after Valckn. on the Epistles of Phalaris, p. 17.) by Wolf on Demosth. Lept. p. 321.

Thus there remains no difficulty, nor indeed obscurity, except at ἀνεν τῶν πλείονων, where the πλείονων must refer, as Goeller says, to the *rest* of the four hundred (of whom were doubtless these ambassadors), and perhaps, also, the five thousand. Ἐπεμπον is well said by Goeller to be used with reference to the *several* embassies sent, not less than three.

* One may, indeed, commend the ingenuousness, rather than the courage or perseverance, of this learned editor. Numerous passages in Thucydides, which were given up by him, are now satisfactorily explained.

ruin. For all at once³ claimed not only to be on an equal footing, but each one to be himself decidedly first. Whereas, when election is made under a democracy, each one more easily bears what may take place, inasmuch as he is not *worsted by his equals*. But, what most manifestly buoyed them up was the powerful state of Alcibiades at Samos, and the opinion entertained that the oligarchical government would never be lasting. Therefore, each strove who should be first to stand forth as an advocate of democracy.

XC. But those of the four hundred who were most opposed to such a form, and were leaders of their party, such as Phrynichus, who once holding the command at Samos, had then been at great difference with Alcibiades and Aristarchus, a man among the most bitter and inveterate adversaries of democracy, also Pisander, Antipho¹, and others of the most powerful persons, not only heretofore upon their first establishing the present government, but after affairs at Samos had passed into a democracy — these, therefore, sent ambassadors of their own party to Lacedæmon, and made zealous exertions for the oligarchy, and especially were erecting a fortress on what is called the Eétonea; and so much the more, after the ambassadors returned from Samos, perceiving, too, that the greater part, nay, even those that had been esteemed the most trusty, were changed.

They also sent Antipho, Phrynichus, and others, in haste (alarmed at the state of affairs there and at Samos), charging them to effect a treaty with the Lacedæmonians on any terms which should be at all tolerable.

Furthermore, they carried forward, with yet greater activity, the building of the fortress at Eétonea. Now, their object in the erection of this was, as Theramenes and his party said, not that they might prevent those at Samos, if they should attempt it by force, from entering the Piræus, but rather that,

³ *At once.*] Literally, "on the same day;" i. e. the same on which oligarchy was founded.

¹ *Phrynichus — Aristarchus, Pisander, Antipho.*] The violent measures employed by these had left them no means of retreating, and therefore they might well stand so firm.

when they pleased, they might admit the enemy both with sea and land forces. For the Eétonea is a pier (or jetty²) of the Piræus, and close by is the entrance of the harbour. A wall, then, was there erected, uniting with the wall towards the continent, so that a few men posted there might command the entrance. For at the very tower at the mouth of the port, which is narrow, there terminated both the old wall towards the continent, and the new one within the wall, and built down to the sea-side. They also erected a portico, which was exceedingly large, and closely abutting on the wall in the Piræus (and themselves occupied it with a force), into which they compelled all persons to unload both the corn on hand, and what should be imported, and to draw it from thence³ for sale.

XCI. These proceedings had, for a long time, been censoriously reported by Theramenes, and after the ambassadors from Lacedæmon had returned without accomplishing any thing which should give peace to the state at large¹, he averred that this wall would endanger the safety of the city. For, at

² *A pier or jetty.*] i. e. one of the two promontories at the entrance of the port. Poppo Proleg. 2, 253. writes thus: "On the extreme part of Eetonea towards these entrances to the port was a tower, in conjunction with another tower on the opposite promontory defending the entrance. To prevent Eetonea from being taken from the land, a wall was built down to that tower, to which wall the four hundred were about to add another, to be carried between the preceding one to the sea, as far as that tower; which, if it were completed, they would be built round with walls on both sides, and have in their power the entrance of the port, especially as the portico in the Piræus, which was very close to that fortification of Eetonea, they had built apart from the other walls and obstructed." (*Δωκοδόμησαν*, 8, 90.)

On this whole passage there is much light thrown by Xenoph. Hist. 2, 5, 46. *φανερὸι γίνοντο ἐπὶ τῷ χώματι ἔρυμα τειχίζοντες, ἐς δ' ἰσοῦλοντο τοὺς πολεμίους δεξιόμενοι*, κ. τ. λ. Polyæn. 2, 22, 1. *τὸν πύργον τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ χώματος*. and 4, 7, 6. *κατελάθοντο τοὺς πύργους*. Photius Lex. 52. *Ἡερωνεία, οὕτως ἐκαλεῖτο ἡ ἑτέρα τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ κατακτησαμένου τὴν γῆν Ἡερῖωνος*.

³ *Draw it from thence.*] *Προαυρεῖσθαι* signifies *promere* velut e penu. So Aristoph. Thesm. 419. *δ' ὅ' ἦν ἡμῖν προτοῦ, αὐταῖσι ταμίῳ προαυρούσας λαθεῖν*, Ἀλφρον, Ἰλαιον, &c. The *δείγμα* here mentioned answers to what we call a *bazaar*, literally, *show-market*; as appears from Polyæn. 550. *συνίταξε τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν προσπλευσάσι τῷ δειγμάτι τοῦ Πειραιῶς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν τραπέζων ἀρπάσσει τὰ χρήματα*.

¹ *The state at large.*] i. e. both those at Athens and at Samos. Portus, strangely enough, refers *ξύμπασι* to the *Lacedæmonians*. I was formerly of opinion that it might be an adverbial phrase signifying *omnino*.

this time, it happened that the forty-two ships (some of which were Italic ships from Taras, and others Sicilian) were now riding at anchor at Las² in Laconia, and preparing, at the solicitation of the Eubœans, to make sail to Eubœa, under the command of Agesandridas, a Spartan. These, Theramenes said, were not so much bound for *Eubœa*, as intended for those who were building Eétoinea, and unless the people would stand on their guard, they would be surprised and ruined. Indeed, there was something of this kind in agitation on the part of those who lay under this imputation³, nor was it a mere calumny of words. For their chief purpose was to govern the *allies also* under an oligarchy, or, in case of failure therein, holding the possession of their fleet and walls, to preserve their independence; but if debarred of that likewise, then not, at the re-establishment of democracy, to themselves alone perish for the rest⁴, but even bring in the enemy, and come to terms, and without walls or ships⁵ to retain the city upon any terms, if there were but security afforded for their persons.

XCII. With this view they diligently carried forward the erection of this wall, which had posterns, and entries, and ways to introduce the enemy; and they were desirous to have it finished in time for their purpose.

Now these had been before the theme of conversation, but amongst a few only, and rather in secret. When, however, Phrynichus, on arriving from the embassy to Lacedæmon, was treacherously stabbed in full market by¹ a certain

² *Las.*] A town near Gythium, the site of which is accurately described by Pausan. l. 3, 24, 5. and Strabo. See Goeller in loc.

³ *There was something, &c.*] Such seems to be the sense, and not that expressed by Portus and Hobbes.

⁴ *Themselves especially perish for the rest.*] i. e. be the scapegoats for them.

⁵ *Without walls or ships.*] i. e. without conditioning for their preservation, but allowing them to be given up.

¹ *In full market.*] What particular time is meant by this phrase, the commentators are not agreed; for it seems to have been applied to any time within nine and twelve o'clock. See Duker's note, who, however, strangely omits to notice Herod. 3, 104, 7. μέχρις οὖν ἀγορῆς διαλύσεως. See also Weiske on Xen. Anab. 1, 8, 1. 2, 1, 7. here the expression does not seem to designate any time in particular.

person of the patroles, and fell down dead on the spot ², not having gone far from the council-hall (whereupon he who struck him escaped; but an abettor, a certain Argive, being apprehended and tortured by the four hundred, mentioned no name of any person who set them on, nor said aught else than that "he knew many persons assembled together at the house of the commander of the patroles, and elsewhere in houses), then, indeed, when nothing serious came of this ³, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and such others of the four hundred, and those out of that body who were of the same party, went more boldly to work. For, moreover, the ships from Las had now sailed round, and were anchoring at Epidaurus ⁴, and had overrun Ægina. Whereupon, Theramenes said it was not likely that ships sailing to Eubœa would enter the gulf, and then take port at Epidaurus, unless they had come by invitation, and for the purposes he had denounced. It was, therefore, impossible any longer to be passive; but, at length, after many factious words and suspicious speeches had passed, then they, in good earnest, applied themselves to the work. For the soldiers in the Piræus, who were engaged in building the wall of Eétonea, among whom was Aristocrates, a taxiarch [or captain], together with his band ⁵ [or company], arrested Alexicles, who was a commander under the oligarchy, and a man especially attached to the other party, and took and confined him in a house. In this they were assisted by others, and especially by Hermon, a certain commandant of

² *Fell down dead on the spot.*] On the murder of Phrynichus, Taylor tells us, Vit. Lys. p. 118., Lysias' c. Agor. p. 493. varies from Thucydides; and to his authority more weight seems to be due, as he appeals to the public records. To which may be added the authority of Lycurg. c. Leocrat. p. 417. sq. Though he relates some things that are either doubtful or manifestly false [as, that it was committed by night, without the city, at a fountain near some willow-beds.] (Krueger.) It is, however, a just observation of Mitford, that "Lycurgus remarkably confirms what is more important in the account of Thucydides, the popularity of the deed, and the popularity of the principle that assassination, in the cause of the people, was meritorious."

³ *When nothing serious came of this.*] Such is, I conceive, the sense, which has been strangely misunderstood by all the translators.

⁴ *At Epidaurus.*] Not the country, as Hobbes and others suppose, but the city, as appears from the *ις*, and the words following *ἐν Ἐπιδάυρῳ ὄρουσιν*.

⁵ *Band.*] See note on l. 6, 98.

the patrols stationed at Munychia; and, what was most of all, the bulk⁶ of the army approved of what was doing. As soon as the news was told to the four hundred, who happened to be sitting together in the council-hall, immediately all, except those who approved not their proceedings, were ready forthwith to take to arms, and uttered threats against Theramenes and those on his side. But he, justifying himself, said he was now ready to go and assist them in rescuing Alexicles. And taking one of the commanders who was of his own party, he repairs to the Piræus. Aristarchus, also, and some of the younger of the cavalry gave their assistance. Now the tumult was vast and astounding; for those in the city now thought that the Piræus was seized, and that every one that was taken was slain; while those in the Piræus supposed that those of the city were all but attacking them. At length, the elderly men stopping those that ran up and down the city, and were rushing to arms, and Thucydides, the host⁷ of the city of Pharsalus, being present, and vigorously exerting himself to stay the tumult, shouting out to them "not to ruin their country, while the enemy were so near and on the watch for an advantage, they were appeased, and kept their hands from each other. And Theramenes, going to the Piræus (for he was also himself a commander), as far as shouting went⁸, expressed his anger at the soldiers; but Aristarchus and those who were of the opposite party were

⁶ *The bulk.*] Or, the whole posse.

⁷ *The host.*] i. e. he who lodged any Pharsalians who came on public business.

⁸ *As far as shouting went.*] On this expression ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς ἔνεκα, see Wasse and Duker, who, however, have treated it but superficially. It seems to have been a sort of popular phrase, and may be thought nearly equivalent to ὡς κατὰ βοῆς ἔνεκα supra c. 87., or μέχρι βοῆς θρασὺ in Herodian 7, 8, 12. (and so Joseph. 1221, 13. μέχρι λόγου μόνον), or ἰως τοῦ στομίου πολλοὶ in Lucian 2, 828., or ὅσον βοῆσαι in Chrysost. 5, 6, 16. An extremely apposite passage occurs in Xen. Hist. 2, 4, 31. (cited by Duker) ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐπειθοντο, προσέβαλλεν, ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς ἔνεκεν, ὅπως μὴ δῆλος εἴη εὐμενὲς αὐτοῖς ὢν. In this expression there is a remarkable pleonasm, since either ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς, or ὅσον βοῆς ἔνεκα would have been sufficient. Thus we have in this sense ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς in Dio Cass. 260, 10. and 640, 46. and ὅσα ἀπὸ βοῆς in 987, 39.; ὅσον or ὡς βοῆς ἔνεκα supra c. 87. So ὅσον πειρᾶς ἔνεκα in Lucian de Saltat. 2, 269. Either of the two, therefore, ἀπὸ, or ἔνεκα, were sufficient: but both united have, perhaps, an emphasis.

exceedingly angry with the multitude.⁹ The heavy-armed, however, most of them went to the work pell-mell, and did not repent of what they had done; nay, they asked Thera-
menes whether *he* thought that the wall was building for any good purpose, and whether it were not better demolished. On which, he said that if indeed it seemed good to them to demolish it, he also should be of the same opinion. Whereupon, the soldiery, and many of the inhabitants of the Piræus, immediately went up and set about pulling down the fortification. And now the watch-word to the people was, "that whoever wishes the sovereignty to be with the five thousand rather than the four hundred, let him set his hand to the work." For notwithstanding what was doing, they veiled the thing under the name of *the five thousand*, and did not plainly say "whoever wishes for the *sovereignty of the people*," fearing lest they should be of the five thousand, and so by speaking thus to any one, any one might injure the business through ignorance. And for this reason the four hundred were neither willing that the five thousand should exist, nor have it appear that they existed not, thinking that to make *so many* participators of the government were an utter democracy; while, on the other hand, to have it uncertain would create a fear one of another.

XCIII. On the day following, the four hundred, though in some perturbation, assembled at the council-hall. As to the soldiers in the Piræus, having dismissed Alexicles, whom they had apprehended, and demolished the fortification, they went to the temple of Dionysius, and in the Piræus, near Munychia¹, and making their camp [or place d'armes]

⁹ *With the multitude.*] I have here followed the common reading *τῷ πλήθει*: but it may be questioned whether that of three MSS., the Scholiast, and Valla, *τῷ ἀληθεί*, be not preferable. And this has been approved by Duker, and edited by Haack, who, however, is not justified in denying that the common reading yields any good sense. If it be joined, as it ought, with *ἐχάλεπαινον*, it will yield a very good sense. The other reading, however, is strongly confirmed by the preceding difficult phrase *ὅσον ἀπὸ βοῆς ἕνεκα*, of which it will be in some measure exegetical.

¹ *The temple of Dionysius, &c.*] I have here followed the text of several excellent MSS., in which the words *τὸ ἐν Πειραιεῖ* are inserted. Those words are not admitted into the text by Bekker and Goeller; but they are ap-

there², held an assembly³, and agreeably to the resolution there made, marched straight to the city, and took post in the Anacéum.⁴ Thither to them went certain persons chosen⁵ by the four hundred, and conversed with them man to man, endeavouring to persuade such as they saw were worthy and respectable⁶ both to be themselves quiet, and to restrain the rest; telling them that they would both proclaim the five thousand, and that out of those the four hundred should be appointed in turn, in such way⁷ as should seem good to the five thousand; but in the mean time⁸ bidding them not to ruin the city, nor hurl it into the hands of the enemy. And now the general body of the soldiers, after many words had pro-

proved by Porson ap. Kidd. Anecd. p. 263. Schoemann admits that the words might be tolerated, if it were certain that this was the same theatre with that mentioned a little before; and that it was the same, is maintained by Spanheim, Wytttenbach, Schneider, and Krueger. That there was a theatre of Dionysius at Piræus, is certain from various passages of Xenophon and Lysias. Poppo and Goeller remark that the question is, whether both Munychia and Piræus had their respective theatres, or whether there was but one, so situated that it was sometimes reckoned to one, and sometimes to the other. Krueger, indeed, maintains that Munychia was a part of Piræus. On which Goeller remarks, that thus there would have been no need of the *additamentum* in question. But though Munychia might be in the district, or, as we say, liberty, of Piræus, yet it was doubtless spoken of separately, as is *Scotland*, though a part of England. Besides, the words have no character of an *additamentum*: the *πρὸς τῇ Μουνυχίᾳ* have much more that appearance: they seem to have been added by way of precision. And it is not improbable that there was another temple of Dionysius at Piræus, in another part of the town.

² *Making their camp.*] See note on l. 2, 2.

³ *Held an assembly.*] I here read, from one MS., *ἐκκλησίασαν*, which is approved by Matthiæ, Buttman, and Krueger, and edited by Bekker and Goeller; indeed, I had myself conjectured the same very many years ago. Schoemann, however, and Schneider, defend the common reading. They say that *ἐκκλησιάζειν* signifies to hold an assembly out of the usual place: but such a sense would here be very harsh and frigid.

⁴ *Anacéum.*] This was a temple of the Dioscuri (Castor and Pollux), not far from the Prytaneum and the chapel of Aglaurus; and, therefore, it seems to have been adjacent to the citadel. (Poppo.)

⁵ *Chosen.*] Or, as a sort of committee.

⁶ *Worthy and respectable.*] Hobbes renders "the mildest;" but the word *ἐπιεικής*, in Attic Greek, often signifies *moderate*, *worthy*, and sometimes *respectable*. So Gregorinus de dialectis p. 246. says *τὸ δὲ μέτριον καὶ καλῶς ἔχον ἐπιεικίστατον φασι*. And the Scholiast on Lucian t. 2, 737. explains *τὸ ἐπιεικὲς* by *τὸν τρόπον ἀγαθόν, τὸ σύμμετρον, τὸ πάνν.* and Xen. Hist. 1, 1, 21. *τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους τῶν τριηραρχῶν.*

⁷ *In such way.*] Mitford paraphrases: "It should be for the five thousand to decide the kind of rotation, and the mode of election, by which their successors should be appointed."

⁸ *In the mean time.*] This sense of *τίως* occurs also at l. 6, 61.

ceeded from many to many, was become more tractable than before, and was in alarm chiefly for the safety of the commonwealth at large. They therefore consented that an assembly should be held on an appointed day in the temple of Dionysius ⁹, to treat of a reconciliation.

XCIV. When the time for the assembly in the temple of Dionysius had come, and the people were almost congregated, news arrives "that the two and fifty ships under Agesandridas are standing over from Megara along the coast of Salamis." And now every one of the great body of the people, and those disposed to democracy ¹, conceived that this was what had been already spoken of by Theramenes and his party, that the ships were sailing to the fortification, and that it was well the place had been demolished. But Agesandridas, as perhaps had been previously concerted, turned off to Epidaurus, and the parts thereabout; though it is probable, that on the present faction subsisting among the Athenians, he stayed ² hovering about, in hopes that he might find a convenient opportunity for coming up.

On the contrary, the Athenians, as soon as the news reached them, immediately marched at full run to the Piræus, with all their forces, considering that their domestic quarrel was of inferior moment ³ to war from the enemy, and that not remote,

⁹ *Temple of Dionysius.*] Not, it should seem, that before mentioned, but one in the city, which Poppo thinks is to be sought for near the citadel, where also was the council-hall and Prytaneum. The council-hall, Goeller remarks, was certainly in the agora, or forum; and the Prytaneum was situated not far from the east angle of the citadel.

¹ *The great body of the people, and those, &c.*] Such seems to be the full sense of τῶν πολλῶν: which reading (instead of ὁπλιτῶν) is, with reason, edited by Bekker and Goeller.

² *Stayed.*] A very rare signification, of which I have noted one example in Xen. Hist. 1, 6, 14. τὴν οὖν ἡμέραν οὕτω ἀνείχον. This seems, even by its present use, to have been a phrase of nautical application; which is, indeed, placed beyond doubt by Plutarch ap. Steph. Thes. ἀνείχε τὰς ταυτοῦ ναῖς.

³ *Of inferior moment.*] Such is plainly the sense; but it is admitted that something is wrong in the text. Duker thinks an οὐ has slipped out after πολέμου: others suppose an *ellipsis* of οὐ: others, again, would cancel ἢ, or transpose the words; and, finally, Dorville would read μείονος, which I also myself long ago conjectured. And either this method, or that of Duker, may be adopted: the others are too bold. As to the *ellipsis* of οὐ, that is a principle very precarious and unsound, and now almost wholly exploded in criticism.

but at the port. And some of them embarked on board the ships at hand, while others launched off the rest; and others, again, went to give succour at the walls and the mouth of the port.

XCV. But the Peloponnesian ships having sailed along the coast [of Attica], and doubled Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasias¹, and afterwards arrived at Oropus.

And now the Athenians being compelled, in all haste, to use raw and unexercised² forces, inasmuch as the city was at faction, and they were anxious, as speedily as possible, to give aid, for the preservation of their greatest stake (for, blocked up as Attica was, Eubœa was every thing to them³), they send ships, under the command of Thymocharis, to Eretria. These, on their arrival, made up, when added to those already in Eubœa, thirty-six sail. And they were immediately compelled to come to battle; for Agesandridas, after having dined, drew his ships out from Oropus. Now the distance of Oropus from the city of Eretria is about sixty stadia of sea. The Athenians, then, on his making sail upon them, immediately manned their ships, thinking that their forces were near the ships. But they happened not to have provided themselves with any dinner from the market, for nothing was found on sale⁴, but had to be sought for from the farthest quarters of the city⁵, and that by the previous contrivance of the Eretrians, in order that the crews being long in getting on board, the enemy might fall upon the Athenians before they were

¹ *Between Thoricus and Prasias.*] Perhaps, at an inlet called Potamos, now Dascali. Thoricus yet nearly retains its name in *Therico*.

² *Raw and unexercised.*] Such is the sense of ἀνεκπορήτους (and not that assigned by the Scholiast, *ready*). Thus Goeller cites from Lucian t. 6, 527. ἵππος συνεκπορημένη. To which it may be added, that Plato in Crit. 24. uses συνεκπορῆω in the sense to *exercise* and *prepare by instruction*.

³ *Was every thing to them.*] See the learned note of Duker on the phrase πάντα εἶναι. I shall have much to add in my edition.

⁴ *Nothing was found on sale.*] i. e. no provisions were found in the market. That they should not have provisions from Athens sufficient for at least two or three days, is amazing. It is truly observed by Mitford, "that among the numerous proofs in history of the great defects in the antient system of naval war, this is not the least remarkable."

⁵ *From the farthest quarters of the city.*] i. e. up and down, at private houses, such as had any provisions to spare.

ready, and compel them to put to sea just as it might happen. A signal, too, was set up by those of Eretria towards Oropus, at the time when they should weigh. The Athenians putting to sea, after so insufficient a preparation, and coming to battle before the port of the Eretrians, yet stood their ground some little time; then taking to flight, they were chased to the shore. And such of them as took refuge at the city of the Eretrians, as a friendly one, fared the worst, being butchered by them; while those who threw themselves into the fort at Eretria, which was held by the Athenians, were saved, as also were such of the ships as reached Chalcis. And the Peloponnesians, after having taken twenty-two ships of the Athenians, whose crews they partly put to death and partly made prisoners, set up a trophy. Not long afterwards, having brought the whole of Eubœa to revolt, except Oreus (which the Athenians occupied with their forces), they settled all the rest of the affairs of the island at their discretion.

XCVI. And now, on the news respecting Eubœa reaching the Athenians, there was the greatest consternation among them ever before known. For not even the calamity in Sicily, great as it then seemed to be, nor any other affair that had yet happened, so alarmed them. For, whereas the armament at Samos was in rebellion, and no other ships being at hand, nor any seamen to man them; themselves, too, being at faction, and in uncertainty when they might engage in conflict with each other, then such a calamity as this had befallen them, wherein they had lost their fleet, and, what was most, *Eubœa*, from which they were more benefited than from Attica — how then *had they not* reason to be dispirited? But what gave them the greatest and nearest alarm, was, lest the enemy should, as victors, venture immediately to make sail to the Piræus, empty as it was of ships. Nay, they imagined them to be all but there already. And certainly *that*, had they been more adventurous, they might easily have done; and then by lying off the city, might either have thrown it into yet greater dissension; or, if they had remained and besieged it, they would have compelled the fleet in Ionia, however hostile to the oligarchy, to have come to the aid of their relations and

the city at large; meanwhile, the Hellespont would have been theirs, and all Ionia, and the isles as far as Eubœa, and, in a manner, the whole of the Athenian dominion. But it was not in this instance alone, but in many others, that the Lacedæmonians showed themselves the most accommodating enemies for the Athenians to encounter. For they were totally different in disposition; the one being quick in action, the other tardy; the one adventurous, the other timorous; and thus the Lacedæmonians gave them great advantages, especially towards the establishment of their maritime superiority. This was manifest by the Syracusans; for they, being most similar in disposition, contested against them with the greatest success.

XCVII. However, on these tidings, the Athenians, notwithstanding, equipped twenty ships, and convened an assembly immediately at what is called the Pnyx¹ (or Pynx), where they had been at other times accustomed to hold them. At this meeting having deposed the four hundred, they decreed to deliver up the government into the hands of the five thousand. Of these were to be all such of them as furnished arms.² Also, that no one should enjoy any emolument for any office, or otherwise they pronounced him accused. There were afterwards, also, numerous other assemblies, at which they appointed certain framers of laws, and enacted other things concerning the form of government. And at that time (first within my memory), the Athenians appear to have

¹ *The Pnyx.*] Or, as Bekker and Goeller edit, the Pynx; which, too, is thought to be countenanced by the derivation from *πυκνός*. On this doubtful, though unimportant, question, see Poppo Proleg. s. 2, 247. and the note of Goeller. This place was situated near the Acropolis, and had been of old a place of assembly, being appointed such by the laws of Solon.

² *Furnished arms.*] i. e. contributed his service in full arms and armour; which would be the case only with those who were above the lower ranks. Krueger here aptly adduces the following important citation from Aristot. Polit. 6, 4, 3. *ἐπεὶ τέτταρα μὲν ἴσθι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλῆθους, γεωργικόν, βάνανσον ἀγοραῖον, θητικόν, τέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον· ἱππικόν, δπλιτικόν, ψιλόν, ναυτικόν, ὅπου μὲν συμβέηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι ἱππασίμων, ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐφυνῶς ἔχει κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν ἰσχυράν· ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τοῖς οἰκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἴσθι τῆς δυνάμεως· αἱ δὲ ἱπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσὶν ὅπου δὲ ὀπλιτίν, τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν· τὸ γὰρ ὀπλιτικόν τῶν εὐπόρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων, ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοκρατικὴ πάμπαν.* He also refers to Polit. 2, 502. and Plato de Legg. p. 755. C.

regulated their government the best. For there was then a moderate admixture, both with respect to the few and the many.³ And this first, after so many past calamities, enabled the city to raise its head. They decreed, moreover, the recall of Alcibiades, and the rest with him; and sending to them and to the army in Samos, exhorted them to strenuously apply themselves to the business in hand.

XCVIII. Immediately after this change, Pisander and Alexicles, and their partisans, and such as were the chief supporters of oligarchy, steal off to Decelea. Aristarchus alone of them (for he chanced to be a commander of the troops), taking in haste some archers of the most barbarous sort⁴, marched to CEnoe.⁵ Now, this was a fort of the Athenians on the borders of Bœotia, and there were now besieging it (on account of the loss of men sustained by them in their retreat from Decelea) some Corinthian volunteers, and Bœotians, whom they had called to their assistance.⁶ Having concerted

³ *And at that time first, &c.*] This is a very remarkable passage, as showing the author's opinion on the Athenian constitution more clearly than any other. "In this concise eulogy," Mitford remarks, "is contained the whole of the account given by Thucydides of the form of government established by Theramenes; and upon no occasion does he leave us so much to regret the want of explanation and detail. Upon no occasion, however, do we see the historian more strongly marked as the true patriot. Frequently we find him reprobating the extravagancies of an unbalanced democracy so strongly, that we might suspect him of some partiality for oligarchy. But here, as indeed throughout his account of the oligarchy established by Pisander, he shows himself a decided enemy to tyranny in every shape, and the warm partisan only of whatever government might best secure universal freedom, through equal and well-supported law."

What would the great historian have said to our *British Constitution*, in which there is just that moderate and attempered admixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, which gives it all the peculiar advantages of each form, and, by a happy blending, *increases* each; and by its *tout ensemble*, makes the constitution the admiration of the civilised world.

⁴ *Archers of the most barbarous sort.*] Namely, some Scythians; for such were commonly in the pay of the Athenian government, both for civil and military purposes.

⁵ *CEnoe.*] Now called Gypho Castro.

⁶ *And there were now besieging it, &c.*] Such seems to be the true sense of the perplexed sentence of the original, of which the following may be the construction: οἱ δὲ Κ. ἐπολιόρκουν αὐτὸ, ἐξελοντηδὸν προσκαλίσαντες τοὺς Β., διὰ συμφορὰν σφισιν γιγνομένην ἐκ τῆς Οἰνός (πρὶ) διαφοράς ἀνδρῶν ἐκ Δ. ἀναχωρούντων. I would further observe, that *ἐμφορὰν* is put for *διαφοράν*. 'Εξελοντηδὸν must be taken with οἱ Κορίνθιοι, as the sense requires. The expression seems to denote that the siege was a private and

measures with them, Aristarchus deceives the garrison of CEnoe, by telling them that the Athenians have come to treaty with the Lacedæmonians on certain terms, and that they must deliver up the place, for this was a condition. They yielding credence to him, as a person invested with command, and having no knowledge of what was going on by reason of being besieged, evacuated the place under a safe conduct. And CEnoe thus taken, was occupied by the Bœotians, and the oligarchy and civil commotion at Athens ceased.

XCIX. About the same time this summer, the Peloponnesians in Miletus, as none gave them their pay of those who were appointed so to do by Tissaphernes when he went to Aspendus, and when Philippus, who had been sent with him, and also another person, one Hippocrates, a Spartan, who was at Phaselus, had sent word to Mindarus that "the ships are not come, and they were totally deceived and wronged by Tissaphernes;" since, also, Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was ready (as well as Tissaphernes), on obtaining a fleet, to induce the remaining cities of his own government to revolt from the Athenians; under these circumstances, and because he hoped to get somewhat more of pay from Pharnabazus ¹, Mindarus, (orders being suddenly issued, so that it might escape the knowledge of the Athenians at Samos) with the utmost regularity setting sail from Miletus with seventy-three ships, took his course for the Hellespont (whither sixteen ships had before in the course of this summer also sailed, which were ravaging a part of the Chersonesus). Being, however, tempest-tossed,

voluntary concern of the Corinthians, and not enjoined by the confederacy. The προσπαρακλιῶντες of some MSS. (and which is edited by Bekker and Goeller) is required by propriety of language.

It should seem by the expressions here used, that the loss spoken of had been such as was usual, though probably, of late, more severe. Why the loss should be especially on their *retreat*, may have been from their going to Decelea in large bodies together; but often returning, by furlough or otherwise, in *small parties*, when they would be exposed to sallies from the garrison of CEnoe, which scoured the country.

¹ *Hoped to get, &c.*] I know not what other sense the words can well have, though some translators render so as to apply the words to *Pharnabazus*.

and compelled to put in at Icarus, after remaining there five or six days, he arrives at Chios.

C. And now Thrasyllus, on learning his departure from Miletus, himself immediately sailed from Samos with fifty-five ships, hastening lest the enemy should arrive at the Hellespont before him. But hearing that he was at Chios, and thinking that he would stay there, he set a watch at Lesbos and the continent opposite, that, if the ships should chance to stir, no motion might escape observation, and he himself repaired to Methymna¹; and ordered meal and other necessities to be provided², in order that if the enemy should stay long, he might make cruises upon them from Lesbos. At the same time he intended to go, and, if possible, take Eresus, for it had revolted from Lesbos. Indeed, some fugitives of the Methymnæans and those of the most powerful, having brought over from Cyme about fifty heavy-armed, as voluntary associates³, and others hired from the continent, in all about three hundred, who were commanded by Anaxarchus, the Theban (on account of affinity⁴), made an attack on Methymna first, but were beaten off from the attempt, by means of the Athenian garrison which proceeded against them from Mytilene; and again, in a battle outside of the city, being driven off the field, and compelled to take their way across the moun-

¹ *To Methymna.*] This position was certainly most skilfully chosen, to intercept the passage of the fleet.

² *Ordered meal and other necessities to be provided.*] This is one of the few places where any mention is made of victualling ships.

³ *Voluntary associates.*] Προσεταιριστοὺς. This is a very rare word; it occurs, however, in Dio Cass. 335, 20. Hence may be illustrated Lucian 1, 647, 57. ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς θρασυτάτους προσεταιρούμενος καὶ δορυφόρους συναγαγών. The verb προσεταιρίζομαι, it may be observed, is scarcely found elsewhere. Προσεταιρίζομαι is used by the best writers.

⁴ *On account of affinity.*] For the Thessalians were Æolians, and Thessalia was formerly called Αἰολίς from Æolus, who there ruled. Some, before the Trojan war, departing from hence, settled in Bœotia. Afterwards, others, being expelled from Arne in Thessaly, occupied what was in process of time called Bœotia. Hence arose this affinity of the Bœotians and Lesbians. See Thuc. 1, 12. Eustath. on Homer Odys. 9. p. 1644. Schol. Pind. Ol. 1, 164. Pyth. 2, 128. Nem. 4, 136. (Duker ap. Goeller.) To the above references may be added, from Krueger, Herod. 1, 151. 6, 8. Diod. 5, 81. Thuc. 3, 2. Strab. 13, 2. p. 136.

tain⁵, they draw Eresus into revolt. Thrasyllus, therefore, sailing against it with all the ships, intended to carry the place by storm. But Thrasybulus had arrived before him with five ships with which he had set out from Samos, on the news of the passage of the exiles having reached him. Being, however, too late, he went and lay at anchor off Eresus. There also arrived from the Hellespont some two ships⁶ of the Methymnæans which were on their return home. And the total number of ships present was sixty-seven, with the forces from which they prepared themselves to take Eresus by storm, with machines and in every other way possible.

CI. In the mean time, Mindarus and the ships of the Peloponnesians from Chios, having taken in provisions for two days⁷, and received from the Chians each three Chian tesseracosts⁸, they, on the third day, set sail from Chios, not taking to the main sea⁹, that they might not fall in with the ships at Eresus, but keeping Lesbos on the right, they sailed towards the continent; and making the coast of Phocais at the port at Carteria¹⁰, and having dined, they coasted along the Cymæan territory, and supped at Argennusæ, which is opposite to Mytilene.¹¹ Thence coasting along, while it was

⁵ *The mountain.*] This is represented in the best maps as a very lofty one, part of a chain running all across the north part of the island.

⁶ *Two ships.*] Krueger says there were five; Diodorus *three*. (Goeller.)

⁷ *Two days.*] It is remarkable that they should have ventured on such a voyage with so slender a store of provision.

⁸ *Tesseracosts.*] Spanheim (as referred to by Duker) thinks it plain that the sense of τεσσαρακόστας is "forty-three drachmas," i. e. Chian drachmas. But Duker has shown that τεσσαρακόστας cannot be taken for τεσσαράκοντα: and he (I think rightly) acquiesces in the opinion of the Scholiast, that the tesseracost was an ancient Chian coin. Portus, with great probability, thinks it was so called from being the fortieth part of some other coin. It should seem to have been much more than equal to a drachma. Duker thinks it might be a month's pay; but that is uncertain, and not very probable.

⁹ *Not taking to the main sea.*] I have here followed the conjecture of Hack and Krueger, τῆς Χίου οὐ πελάγος, as being required by the words following ἐν ἀριστερᾷ, &c.

¹⁰ *Carteria.*] Not Crateræi, as Hobbes writes; still less Crateræi, as Smith. From Pliny l. 5, 38. we know that its name was Carteria; and he represents it as an island near Smyrna. Wasse also refers to Scylax p. 36. It was, doubtless, between Phocæa and Smyrna.

¹¹ *Supped at Argennusæ, which, &c.*] There are several difficulties connected with this passage, for which I must refer to Poppo Proleg. t. 2.

yet deep night, and having arrived at Harmotus on the continent opposite to Mytilene, and there dining, they in all haste coasted along Lectum¹², Larissa, and Hamaxitus, and the parts thereabouts, and arrive a little before midnight at Rhœteum on the Hellespont; but some of the ships put up at Sigeum and other places thereabouts.

CII. And now the Athenians who were at Sestus with eighteen ships, as soon as the watchmen gave signal by torch¹, and many fires were suddenly perceiving to be displayed in the enemy's territory², perceived that the Peloponnesians were

p. 444., Krueger Comment. in loc., and Goeller. The most formidable of these difficulties is, that Strabo and Diodorus, both very minute writers, call Argennusæ "two islands off the coast of Æolis." From Diodor. it appears that they were so near to it, that the thing is of little importance. The discrepancy is removed by cancelling the words τῆς ἡπείρου, which Krueger has almost proved to have crept in from the words following.

With respect to the orthography of the place, *Argennusæ* is that of the best MSS. To the evidence adduced by the commentators for this spelling may be added the authority of Etym. Mag. 124, 14., who also explains the meaning of the word: Ἀργεννοῦσαι. ἀργιλώδεις — εἰσι δὲ τοιαῦται εἰς κάρπων ἀνίσχουσιν φαῦλαι, καὶ ὥς ἐπὶ πλείστον μηλόβοτοι, καθάπερ ἡ Σκύρος, καὶ αἱ λεγόμεναι Ἀργινοῦσαι. where Ἀργινοῦσαι is doubtless corrupt, for Ἀργεννοῦσαι, which had occurred just before. Thus the name plainly appears to have been given from the colour of the soil, of a white clay kind. It may be derived from the old word ἀργεννος, equivalent to ἀργίλος.

In support of the above orthography, the commentators also cite Steph. Byz., as having Ἀργεννον. It is, however, thought strange that he mentions but one island; and still stranger might the commentators have thought it, that he places this Ἀργεννον near the promontory Argennum, on the coast of the *Troad*. But this ought to have made the editors suspect some corruption of the text of Steph. The fact, I conceive, is that Steph. does not mean the *Argennusæ islands*, but an island which appears in the maps lying near the promontory Argennum. Certainly, the words Ἀργεννον ἄκρα forbid the idea of Steph. meaning the Argennusæ. But what are we to do with the words τῆς Τρωιάδος? Now these would be inconsistent even with *Argennusæ*, and therefore must be wrong. I suspect that Steph. wrote Ἐρυθριάδος, meaning the *Peninsula*, which is called Ἐρυθραία by Thucydides l. 3, 53. and Strabo 922, 30. The words Τρωιάδος and Ἐρυθριάδος might easily be confounded. Τρώας, it may be observed, is used by Steph. Byz. himself in voc.

¹² *Lectum.*] The promontory of Ida. See Hom. Il. ζ. 284. Herod. 9, 114. (Hack.) As to the other places, Harmotus and Hamaxitus, they cannot well be fixed. The name of the former signifies properly a waggon-road; that of the other, a chariot-road. The names were doubtless given from actual circumstances.

¹ *Gave signal by torch.*] So at l. 3, 22. we have mention of the τὰ σημεῖα τῆς φουκτωρίας. The signal given by the watch was a war-signal, made by waving the torches about. See supra l. 3, 22. and the notes.

² *Many fires were, &c.*] These fires, lighted in the enemy's territory,

entering the Hellespont. And this same night they, with all haste, covertly creeping along³ the shore of the Chersonesus, coasted for Elæus, wishing to sail out into the open space, [and escape⁴] the enemy's ships. Thus they eluded the notice of the sixteen ships of Abydos, though the watch had been previously charged by the fleet of their friends to exert themselves diligently on keeping guard, should the Athenian ships attempt to get out to sea.⁵ But on descrying, at the dawn of day, the fleet with Mindarus, which immediately made chase after them⁶, they could not all get off, but the greater part effected their escape to Imbros⁷ and Lemnos, while four of the hindmost in the course were overtaken near Elæus. And one which was stranded over against the temple of Protesilaus⁸ they captured with the crew; two others they took

were meant to signify that they descried and were preparing to receive their friends.

³ *Creeping along.*] Or, as the sailors say, hugging the shore. This is, however, I believe, an unprecedented signification of *ὑπομίννμι*.

⁴ *And escape.*] I have placed these words in brackets, because I suspect there is a lacuna, not being able to bring myself to suppose that our author would use *ἐκπεύσαι* for *ἐκπεύσαντες διαφύγειν*, as the Scholiast says. Nay, even Goeller, who has justified almost every other irregularity of our author, is compelled to abandon this phrase to the fury of the critics: indeed, all this chapter, and much of the latter part of the present book, abounds in harsh and anomalous expressions, and other marks of unfinished composition. Here, however, I am persuaded there is either, as I have said, a lacuna, or else the words have been thrown into confusion; and may, perhaps, be set right, merely by transposing *καί*, and placing a *period* after *ἐρυχωρίαν* thus: *βουλόμενοι ἐκπεύσαι ἐς τὴν ἐρυχωρίαν. καὶ τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς, τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ — ἔλαθον.* There is a similar phrase at l. 2, 90. *ὑπεκπεύγουσι ἐς τὴν ἐρυχωρίαν.*

Added to the rough state in which the latter part of this book was left by the author, it may be observed that the scribes seem to have been weary, and grown very careless towards the end.

⁵ *Though the watch had been, &c.*] Here, again, it is impossible to justify the author's words on any principle of correct composition. We may just, and only just, make out what *sense* the author *intended* to express.

⁶ *Which immediately made chase after them.*] Here, again, is another formidable difficulty. Now, though Kistemacher and Bredow attempt to justify the words as they stand, yet that would seem to be impossible. I am, however, inclined here again to think the fault not in the *author*, but in his *scribes*. The corruption, doubtless, rests on *ποιούμενοι*, for which Duker conjectures *ποιουμένων*: Benedict and Goeller *ποιουμένων*: the latter of which is greatly preferable. It is long since I conjectured *ποιουμένας*, which certainly yields excellent sense; and this I have followed.

⁷ *Imbros.*] I here read, from two MSS. and the editions of Bekker and Goeller, for *ἡπέρου*, τῆς Ἰμβρου. The corruption is, as Goeller observes, rendered certain by c. 103. fin.

⁸ *The temple of Protesilaus.*] So Herod. 9, 116. (cited by Hack) *Ἐν*

without them; and the remaining one they set fire to, as she was lying empty on the shore of Imbros.

CIII. After this, with the ships from Abydus which had joined them, and the rest ¹, in all eighty-six, they besieged Elæus that day, but when it would not submit, they sailed off to Abydus.

As to the Athenians, they, deceived by their watchmen, and never supposing that the enemy's ships could sail by unobserved, but employed in leisurely carrying on their siege, as soon as they learnt the news, immediately abandoned Eresus, and made all haste to the defence of the Hellespont; they also captured two ships of the Peloponnesians, which running out to sea in the late chase more daringly than the rest, chanced to fall in with the Athenian fleet. And arriving one day after the Peloponnesians, they anchored at Elæus, and bringing in from Imbros the ships which had taken refuge there, they made preparations for battle during five days.

CIV. After this, they came to action in the following manner. The Athenians coasted along in line ², close under shore, to Sestus; but the Peloponnesians perceiving it, put to sea against them from Abydus. And knowing that there must be a battle, they extended their wings, the Athenians along the Chersonesus from Idacus as far as Arrhiana, to the number of seventy-eight sail ³; the Peloponnesians from Abydus to

¹ Ελαιοῦντι τῆς Χερσονήσου ἐστὶ Πρωτεσίλειω τάφος τε καὶ τέμενος περὶ αὐτὸν, ἐνθα ἔην χρήματα πολλὰ.

² *And the rest.*] i. e. those of Mindarus, as Krueger has shown.

³ *In line.*] On the sense of ἐπὶ κίρας see note on I. 2, 90.

On the battle of Cynos-sema see Poppo Proleg. 2. p. 331.

³ *Seventy-eight sail.*] I have here followed the reading of several good MSS., which is edited by Bekker and Goeller. The common reading (sixty-eight) cannot be tolerated. The Athenians had had sixty-seven at Lesbos; to which, when the fourteen ships are added which belonged to the squadron of eighteen which engaged, there will be eighty-one; a number exceeding the one now edited by *five* ships, which Hack supposes were left behind at Lesbos, though Krueger thinks that not probable. Perhaps the five in question might be of the fourteen, and not be fit for an engagement, and, as such, sent off to Lesbos.

As to the number of the Peloponnesians, the common reading makes it *sixty-eight*: but so small a number is quite improbable. The Peloponnesians are just before said to have had eighty-six ships at Elæus: it is,

Dardanus, with eighty-eight sail. On the side of the Peloponnesians, the right wing was occupied by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself and the best sailing ships. On that of the Athenians, Thrasyllus commanded the left, and Thrasybulus the right; the other commanders were ranged each as their post might be. And now the Peloponnesians hastening first to give the onset, and themselves endeavouring with the left to outflank the right of the Athenians, and exclude them, if possible, from getting off to sea, and to push the centre to the shore, which was not far distant; the Athenians, perceiving their intention, drew out their own line in the direction where the enemy meant to cut off their way out; and they outwent them in speed. Meanwhile, their left had now doubled the cape which is called the Cynos-sema [or Dog's monument]. By this means the ships at the centre were formed scatteringly, and in a weak line, especially as their number was inferior to that of the enemy; the place, too, about the Cynos-sema being of a sharp and angular form, so that what was doing on the other side was not visible.

CV. The Peloponnesians, therefore, making a charge on the centre, drove the ships of the Athenians to the dry land, and having completely the better in the fight, disembarked to attack them on shore. And to succour them was neither in the power of Thrasybulus and his men from the right, for the multitude of the ships that pressed upon him; nor in that of Thrasyllus on the left, inasmuch as he had no view of what was doing for the promontory of Cynos-sema, and moreover, the Syracusans and the rest, who were a full match for him, hindered this; till at length the Peloponnesians, in the fear-

therefore, not without reason that Bekker and Goeller edit, from one good MS., *eighty-eight*; which, as Goeller observes, is confirmed by Diodorus, who says that the Peloponnesians were superior in *number*, the Athenians in *skill*. How there came to be *two more ships*, Goeller does not account for. If I am not mistaken, for *δὲ τὴν καὶ ἐξήκοντα* should be read *ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἑξ*. Such an error might easily arise. As to the conjecture of Acacius, that the numbers of the Athenians and Peloponnesians have been respectively interchanged, it is indeed ingenious, but not solid; for the Athenians could not be so few in number as sixty-eight. Diodorus, indeed, reckons *eighty-eight*; but he seems to have forgotten to take into the account the *two* just before captured by the Athenians.

lessness of victory, chasing some one ship, and some another, began, on their side, to fall into somewhat of disorder. And now Thrasybulus and his division, on perceiving that the enemy over-against them stopped their course, desisting from all attempts to come round their wing, immediately charged them, and put them to rout; and having come up with such ships of the Peloponnesians of the victorious part as were scattered abroad, they made havoc of them, and put the rest and greater part of the fleet, and that had not yet fought, into fear. The Syracusans, too, who happened themselves to be then giving way to Thrasyllus and his division, now turned more unhesitatingly into flight, when they saw the rest routed.

CVI. Defeat being now manifest, and the Peloponnesians running for refuge chiefly to the river Midius [or Pydus], afterwards to Abydus, the Athenians took indeed but few of their ships (for the Hellespont being narrow, afforded the enemy retreats at a short distance), yet they obtained a victory, and that most opportune. For having hitherto stood in awe of the Peloponnesian navy, because of the losses which they had gradually sustained, and the heavy calamity in Sicily, they were now divested of self-contempt, and the opinion that the Peloponnesians were worthy of notice in naval affairs. They, however, captured of the enemy's ships eight Chians, five Corinthians, two Ambracians, two Bœotians, and of Leucadians, Lacedæmonians, Syracusans, and Palladians, one each; with the loss, indeed, themselves, of fifteen ships. Having fixed a trophy at the promontory where is the Cynossema, and picked up the wrecks, and given the dead to the enemy under truce, they sent a trireme to Athens to announce the victory. On the arrival of the ship, the Athenians hearing of this unexpected success, were much raised in their spirits, which had sunk under the late misfortunes about Eubœa, and the events of the sedition, and thought that their affairs might, if they diligently exerted themselves, even yet be relieved.

CVII. On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians in Sestos, having in all haste repaired their ships, made sail to Cyzicus, which had revolted. And espying at Harpagium

and Priapum the eight ships from Byzantium lying at anchor, they attacked them, and defeating those from the shore that aided them, took the ships. And arriving at Cyzicus, they compelled it, being unfortified with walls, to submit, and imposed the payment of a sum of money. In the mean time, the Peloponnesians had sailed from Abydus to Elæus, and had fetched away such of their captured ships as were whole (for the rest the Elœusinians burnt), and sent off Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to bring the ships that were there.

CVIII. About the same time also Alcibiades sails with the thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselus¹ to Samos, bringing news that he had turned back the Phœnician ships from coming up to join the Peloponnesians, and that he had made Tissaphernes a greater friend to the Athenians than before. Then equipping nine ships besides those which he had, he exacted a considerable sum of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. Having done this, and appointed a governor to Cos, he sailed back to Samos, when it was now autumn. And Tissaphernes, on hearing that the Peloponnesians had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, shifting his quarters from Aspendus, went in haste to Ionia.

While the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are Æolians) upon some wrong done them by Arsaces, a deputy of Tissaphernes, fetching troops from Abydus by land through Mount Ida, introduced them into the city. This Arsaces, pretending some hostility not disclosed against whom, had sent a message to call upon the services of some of the chief of the Delians, who had dwelt at Atramyttion, since they had been expelled by the Athenians, at the fortification of Delos; and having them led forth, under a semblance of friendship and alliance, he watched a time when they were at dinner, and surrounding them with his soldiers, shot them to death with darts. Fearing him, therefore, on account of this action, lest he should commit some

¹ *Caunus and Phaselus.*] It is strange that Thucydides should here (as *supra*, c. 88. and 99.) have put the places in exactly what we should call the wrong order. Considering his great exactness in geographical details, this is extraordinary.

such enormity towards *them*, and especially as he had laid upon them burdens which they could not bear², they expelled his garrison from the citadel.

CIX. Tissaphernes perceiving that this affair too was the act of Peloponnesians, and not that at Miletus and Cnidus only, for *there* also his garrison had been expelled; and feeling that he had become the object of their deep hatred, fearing, too, lest they should do him yet some other injury; and, moreover, chagrined that Pharnabazus, after receiving them, should in less time, and at less expense, be more successful against the Athenians than himself³, determined to take a journey to the Hellespont to them, that he might both complain of what was done respecting Antandros, and make the most handsome apology he could concerning the Phœnician fleet, and other points. And having arrived first at Ephesus, he offered sacrifice⁴ to Artemis.

[When the summer following this winter shall be ended, the one and twentieth year will be completed.⁵]

² *Laid upon them, &c.*] So St. Matt. 23, 4. 4 Kings, c. 18, 14. ὃ ἐὰν ἐπιθῇς ἐπ' ἐμὲ βασιλεύω. Pollux 1, 169. χρήματα ταξάμενοι, δεκάτην ἐπιβαλόντες.

³ *Chagrined that, &c.*] Mitford ably paraphrases the whole passage thus: "Tissaphernes, meanwhile, more wily than wise, and true to nothing but his ever-varying opinion of his own interest, was very uneasy at the departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Miletus. He not only apprehended the loss of advantages derived from his Grecian alliance, but he envied the probable accession of those advantages to Pharnabazus."

⁴ *Offered sacrifice.*] Not "performed sacrifice," as Mitford writes, for that expression is only suitable to the *priest*. The phrase of the original literally signifies *made* or *did sacrifice*; which denotes offered or gave victims to be offered up and sacrificed by the priests. On the action itself Mitford remarks, "that such a compliment to such a religion as the Greek from a Persian, though a weak man, in the high situation of Tissaphernes, and whether superstition or policy produced it, appears strong proof that decay, in various ways, had been making rapid progress in the Persian empire." Which may be true; but it is a question whether Tissaphernes was not worshipping one of his own deities under the name of Diana.

⁵ *When the summer, &c.*] These words I have placed between brackets and expressed in a smaller character, because the critics seem agreed that they did not come from Thucydides.

MEMOIR
ON THE
STATE OF GREECE,
CIVIL AND MILITARY,
AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

TRANSLATED, WITH COMPRESSION AND OCCASIONAL MODIFICATION AND
SLIGHT ALTERATION, FROM THE LATIN OF

PROFESSOR POPPO.

PROLEG. 2; 9. SEQ.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE VARIOUS COMBINATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS AMONGST THE GREEKS,
AND ESPECIALLY THE ATHENIAN AND LACONIAN CONFEDERACIES.

GREECE, as it comprised many nations (ἔθνη), by nature free, so in these were again contained many tribes or clans (ῥῆμοι, Germ. *Gane*) properly of equal freedom, and only conjoined together by origin, language, and certain sacred rites. Such were originally not shut up in walls, but lived each separately in the fields. Each man's house, therefore, was his castle; and nothing but the necessary business of life caused any connection between neighbouring houses, which were, indeed, united into one hamlet, but whose houses were not contiguous and surrounded with a common wall. Therefore, the most antient Greeks lived κατὰ δῆμους καὶ κατὰ κώμας, by clans and villages, or parishes. The towns, such as there were, were destitute of walls and similar to villages (l. 1, 5.) A state of society like that of the antient Germans (see Tacit. de Mor. Germ. c. 16.), and present Mainotes and Albanians, or Arnauts, and which, at the commencement of the Peloponnesian

war, was yet preserved among some nations of Greece, as the Ætolians, Acarnanians, Ozolian Locrians (l. 1, 5.), some of the Arcadians, as the Mænaliens, and some tribes living around Thessaly : all which had no large cities, but paltry towns, castles, and villages. Among which places, indeed, there were sometimes leagues ; and we see the Ætolians in the Peloponnesian war fight, conjointly, and latterly, at least, these had treaties of league. But for the most part, this conjunction was rather from necessity, to repel invasion, or carry on common attack and pillage, and was a union arising rather from remembrance of a common origin than from any actual compacts. For, that the inhabitants of those regions always carried arms, and mutually plundered each other (l. 1, 51.), shows how little security or quiet subsisted ; and that the political union was not complete, is manifest from l. 2, 8. 3, 101, &c. But, in other parts of Greece, the inhabitants, weary of rapine, formed closer political unions, for better defence against pirates, and greater security of commerce, and the maintenance of their possessions. These, therefore, coalesced (συγκρίσθησαν) into one state (πόλις, *gemeinde*), and fortified some cities or towns (l. 1, 8.), whither they might take refuge at the approach of an enemy, and which might be the seats of their religion and magistracy. Hence it happened that, although the generality, when no danger impended, lived in the country, yet they considered those cities *their own* ; and, therefore, the hamlets themselves more and more passed into villages, and castles (φρουρίαι), and were formed into tribes ; and those cities in which the meetings (ἐκκλησίαι, ξύλλογοι, ζύνοδοι) of the citizens (πολιτῶν or ἀστῶν) were held, comprised under that name even those hamlets or villages, and, compared with them, were styled *cities* (πόλεις or πολιτεῖαι), though they were properly ἄστυ.

Of such sort of cities, in all the larger nations, there were many, except that, besides them, certain *villages* retained the old form, especially in Arcadia.

Now, since these cities were formed mutually independent of each other, as the villages had before been, the same rivalry and discord now existed among the cities which had subsisted between the *villages* ; and, ere long, the necessity for fresh societies was perceived, or forced on the minds of men. Thus, therefore, *treaties* (σπονδαί) were entered into, and communities (or perpetual consociations of cities united by blood) arose, called in Greek τὰ κοινὰ or τὰ πάτρια, or, in the later writers, *ἐμπολιτεῖαι*, elsewhere *συνεδρία*. Hence may be explained the phrases in question at l. 8, 65 and 66. 2, 2. 3, 61.

Such sort of consociations of cities were, however, not every where made (for there is no vestige of them in the parts of Thrace, except Chalcidice), nor, when they *were* formed, were all the cities of any people or nation comprised; since sometimes one or more aimed at being either free of all association, or even recommended itself to the protection of some other nation, as Platæa and Lepreum (l. 5, 31.) Again, there were in many parts of Greece even *more* consociations of cities; as in Argolis three, in Arcadia two, or, if Elis be reckoned, even more *societies*, properly so called, were entered into. For in antient times, indeed, when the communication between nations was very slight, they did nothing by conjoint strength (see l. 1, 3.); and, if we omit the fabulous age of the Theban and Trojan war, we only read of a connection in war between the Chalcidæans and Eretrians (l. 1, 15.); the other wars being generally carried on between neighbouring states:

But, by general communication, the power of some and the rivalship of others being increased, the utility of societies was perceived. Now these societies (*ξυμμαχίαι*, or *ἑταιρίαι*, l. 1, 18.) differed from the consociations of cities principally in this, that they were formed for a certain series of years, or for the accomplishment of a certain purpose. (See 5, 23 and 47.) Treaties, too, were concluded, either for mutual defence only, and to repel an enemy (*ἐπιμαχίαι* τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, l. 1, 44. 5, 48.), or also for the invasion of others (*ξυμμαχίαι*, in a more limited sense, ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν, l. 3, 75.) But if societies of that kind had lasted a somewhat long period, they became like those *consociations of cities*; and those held by them were not at liberty to rescind the covenants or treaties, unless they were disposed to be accused of revolt (*ἀποστάσις*), and punished for it. But not even thus had the difference between these two kinds of treaty ever been quite done away, nor can we term either the Lacedæmonian or Athenian allies as a *ξυμμαχία*.

These two sorts of association, then, subsisted in Greece at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

Of which the Lacedæmonian was the more antient, and had arisen before the Persian war. That the Lacedæmonians had established, as well by the antient conjunction of the Dorians for the conquest of Peloponnesus, and by the common religious rites of the same, as by the influence which they obtained by the conquest of the Messenians, Tegeans, and Argives; and they so craftily used this bond, that most of the cities of Peloponnesus formed treaties with them, and, about the time when the Pisistra-

tidæ were expelled from Athens, conceded to them supremacy; as appears from the expeditions of Cleomenes narrated by Herodotus, l. 5. As soon, then, as Xerxes came into Greece, the Lacedæmonians both led to the war the Greeks already conjoined with them (see l. 1, 18.) (and who those were, may be conjectured from the enumeration of the Peloponnesians in the army of Leonidas given by Herodotus, 7, 102. and 8, 72.), and received from the rest also, who were called forth by the greatness of the danger, the command of the united fleet (Herod. 8, 2.) (though there were but ten Laconian ships in it); so that they might now be considered as the chiefs of all Greece. But since the Athenians had gained very great glory in this war, and Pausanias treated the Peloponnesians very haughtily, these, in 470 B. C., except the Peloponnesian ones, passed over to the Athenian government. From that time, those Grecians who had before been united against the Persians, or had revolted from them, were separated into two societies, the Athenian and the Lacedæmonian (l. 1, 18.); nor are the Athenians to be supposed to have been then chiefs of Greece, as their orators, and from them the common historians, represent. For the Peloponnesians did not obey them; and those of the rest of the Greeks who had not fought against the Persians, were at first included neither in the treaty of the Athenians nor in that of the Peloponnesians. Wherefore, in this age, Greece may be divided into *federate*, and *non-federate*, ἑσπονδοί, and ἄσπονδοί, or ἄγραιοι and ἑκσπονδοί. But the number of cities non-federate was gradually diminished, since, whenever any disagreed, they betook themselves to those societies (l. 1, 18. 3, 91. 1, 31.)

Presently these very societies made war on each other, from the year 459 to 450 B. C. (l. 1, 105, seqq.), which was then broken off by a fifty-years' treaty (l. 1, 112.); afterwards *renewed* in Bœotia in 447 (l. 1, 113.); and again by giving assistance to the Eubœans and Megaræans against the Peloponnesians (l. 1, 114.); and finally terminated by a truce of thirty years in 446. (See l. 1, 116.)

By these treaties a sort of *public law* arose in Greece; for, from the conditions of the peace, except that the Athenians restored Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzene, and Achæa (l. 1, 115.), it was also agreed, that if any controverted questions should arise between either society, these should be decided by judicial discussion (l. 1, 78.), on sending ambassadors to debate the points at issue (l. 1, 85.). Hence arose the expression τὸ δίκας δίδναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, (l. 1, 140.), by which (as is clear from l. 1, 18. and 5, 75.) it was meant that the differences should be settled by reference to ami-

cable umpires. It was, besides, permitted to free cities, which were allies of neither party, to join which they pleased (l. 1, 35.), so that it were without injury to the other party. (c. 40.) Those, on the contrary, which had revolted from others, it was thought wrong to receive in time of peace (l. 1, 40.); and even after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, the Lesbians, who entreated to be admitted to the Laconian confederacy, thought there was need of many words to excuse their defection. As to *islanders*, however, though they desired to be *neutral*, the Athenians scarcely ever allowed them to be so. (See l. 5. sub fin.)

Thus, about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Greece *non-federate* was very small, and consisted of the Argives, Achæans, and some nations of the north. Wherefore the war, which had been properly that of two nations, or two confederacies, became one of almost all Greece.

CHAP. II.

HOW IT CAME THAT SINGLE CITIES JOINED EITHER THE ATTIC OR LACONIAN TREATY; WITH AN INCIDENTAL NOTICE OF THE DISCORDS OF THE NEIGHBOURING STATES CONCERNING THE BOND OF CONSANGUINITY BETWEEN COLONIES AND THE PARENT STATE, AND BETWEEN CITIES OF THE SAME RACE.

WE have seen that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were two most potent societies in Greece, to which most of the others had gone over; which passing over was sometimes brought about by accident, sometimes by necessity; such a sort of necessity as arose from the mutual enmities always subsisting between neighbouring states (*κατὰ τὸ ἕμωρον διάφοροι*, 6, 88.). If one of these was unable alone to defend itself or to overpower another, it looked round for allies. Thus the Bœotians cultivated the friendship of the Lacedæmonians, because they had had contentions of old with the Athenians, respecting the borders; for instance, about Panactum and Oropus. The Acarnanians and the Amphilochians call in the Athenians on account of the Ambraciots (l. 2, 68.); and the Naupactians prevail on Demosthenes to attack the Ætoliæ (l. 3, 94.), who again calling in the Lacedæmonians, enter into a war with the Ozolian Locrians. (l. 3, 100. seqq.) And thus the

contentions between the Syracusans and Leontines, and afterwards the Egestians and Selinuntians, procured for either of the great Grecian confederacies allies in Sicily, and the enmity of the Locrians and Rhegines in Italy.

But where no such necessity existed, there were certain causes which extensively moved individual cities to ally themselves with one league rather than the other; such as consanguinity, the internal form of the states, and modes of living; causes of which it will be proper to enter into a previous consideration, as being of great importance towards understanding the nature and extent of each society, and enabling us to judge what would be the nature of any war arising therein. *Consanguinity*, then, was of two kinds; the nearer one that of colonies and the mother country; the more remote, that of the same race. Now the connection which, among the Greeks, subsisted between colonies and the mother country was vague indeed, and rested not so much on compacts, as on dutiful affection; nay, its use had established certain duties which it was accounted disgraceful to neglect. Thus colonies, in games or other public solemnities (*ἐν πανηγύρεσι τῶν κοινῶν*), granted to the citizens of the mother country certain honours (*γίρα τὰ νομιζόμενα*) and the chief seats, and selected for them a part of the victims, or commenced the celebration of the sacrifices by the ministration of a priest fetched from the mother country. (l. 1, 25.) They also sent ambassadors (*ἑμποδοί*), who should be present at the great festivals there. (l. 6, 3.) [as a kind of *representatives* to the rest. Edit.] Other colonies (as the Potidæans, l. 1, 56.) took their *magistrates* from the parent state. If new colonies were founded by colonies, the *leader*, according to antient custom, was sent for from the mother country (l. 1, 24.), and thus these new colonies were conjoined with it. It was also thought just and right that the parent country should be honoured by the colony, and treated with affectionate attachment, should be its leader, and be given way to (l. 1, 38.) unless in points wherein the colony would be greatly aggrieved. Against the mother country it was thought impious to fight, insomuch that the Melians preferred siege and destruction to that impiety. (l. 5. fin.) If the colonies were in danger, they sought refuge and protection from the parent country (see l. 1, 24 and 25 and 60. 3, 114. 6, 18.), and gave in return many proofs of affection and respect. (See l. 1, 34 and 46.) Therefore it is no wonder that the Leucadians, Ambraciots, and Anactorians should have joined the Lacedæmonian party in conjunction with the Corinthians. The same sort of connection, which we have seen between Corinth and its colonies, subsisted, though with some change,

between Athens and Lacedæmon and their respective colonies. The Leontian cities, Naxus, Catana, and Leontium, were all intimately conjoined, and they preserved peace both with their parent country Chalcis and the rest of the colonies of Chalcis, as Rhegium. Some examples to the contrary may, indeed, be adduced, but only in cases where the colony in question has been under subjection, as in the case of the Dorian and Æolian colonies in Asia, and the Megaræan ones in Thrace. (See l. 7, 57.) In the cases of the Platæans, Corcyræans, Camarinæans, and Amphipolitans, there were particular interests and private resentments which broke the bonds of nature.

But the rights of relationship were yet further extended to those who were of the same *race*. Of the Grecian races there were two; the *Ionian*, which included the Achaic; and the *Doric*, which comprehended the Æolic. Now, since the Athenians were Ionians, and the Lacedæmonians Dorians, hence, from a war between those two powers, there arose a war between the *two races*, which, indeed, originated and was kept up by difference of manners and habits. For while the Ionians cultivated the arts of peace and elegance, and were studious of luxury in food and dress, the Dorians prided themselves on their superior bravery. (See l. 5, 9. and l. 129. 6, 77.) Thus, then, the Doric cities, naturally inimical to the Ionic, were by the other Dorians accounted naturally related. (See l. 6, 79.) On account of that consanguinity, fear was entertained lest the Syracusans should give assistance to the Dorians in Peloponnesus (l. 6, 6.): and that, too, the Ionians were always hostile to the Dorians, not even the Athenians, in the presence of the Camarinæans, who were Dorians, could venture to deny. (l. 6, 82.) But of the Chalcidic nation (from Chalcis in Eubœa) being bound by the ties of consanguinity, we every where read, though the origin of this relationship is not quite clear. See, however, Strabo 10. p. 446, seq. The Chalcidic cities in Sicily are (at l. 3, 86.), plainly called Ionic; and the Athenians pretend to render assistance by virtue of consanguinity, though Hermocrates truly insists that they came not to help their race, but to conquer Sicily. (See l. 4, 61.) This being the case, the Rhegines could not be censured because, though Chalcidic, they were unwilling to aid the Athenians in this second Sicilian war. (l. 6, 44 and 79.) For otherwise, as the Syracusans themselves grant to the Camarinæans (l. 6, 80.), they ought not to desert cities related to them.

And, in truth, we see that the allies of the Lacedæmonians who were free and had joined the confederacy of their own accord

(except the Bœotians and Eleans, who were Æolians) were all Dorians. On the contrary, the Achæans and Arcadians, although in Peloponnesus, most of which followed the Lacedæmonian confederacy, were either long before they entered the Lacedæmonian confederacy, or were not very zealous or faithful allies; and that from various causes, but chiefly as being sprung from another race. In the federate cities of the Athenians the thing is less clear, because not a few of them acceded to the confederacy contrary to their wishes. They had, therefore, bound to them all the Ionians, not only those in *Asia* (who were *properly* called Ionians, and were the authors of the defection from Pausanias), but also the Chalcidæans and other Eubœans and their colonists in the parts of Thrace, and afterwards in Sicily and Italy; finally, the Cæans, Andrians, Tenians, and other islanders. (l. 7, 57. Herod. 8, 46 and 48.) But in the same confederacies were conjoined, though by compulsion, not a few Dorians and Æolians, as the Methymnæans, Tenedians, Ænians, Rhodians, and Cretans; excepting, however, the Messenians, Platæans, and Corcyreans, for the causes above mentioned. After, indeed, the Athenians had begun to seek domination, and reduce the allies into servitude, they could no longer confide in affinity, as is plain from the defection of many cities in Thrace, and that of Chios and Miletus; but that having arisen from the cruelty of the Athenians, does not negative what has been said on the force of relationship towards the choice of alliance.

Furthermore, besides the Ionians and Dorians, there yet existed, in the time of the Peloponnesian war, some relics of the people which had formerly inhabited most of Greece, and had been hemmed up by the migrations of the Dorians, Thessalians, and Bœotians, into narrow limits (on these see Strabo 8. p. 373.), such as the Dryopes, Dolopes, Ænianes, Perrhæbi, and the Minyes of Orchomenus; as also the Tyrseni and Pelasgi mentioned at l. 4, 109. For the most antient Pelasgi (l. 1, 3.) had already vanished, unless the Arcadians be supposed derived from them. All these, however, except the Arcadians, were too weak to add much weight to whichever party they acceded to.

CHAP. III.

IN WHICH IS CONTAINED THE *SECOND* THING CONSIDERED IN FORMING ALLIANCE; A SIMILAR ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS: PREFACED BY A STATEMENT OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF CONSTITUTION IN THE GRECIAN STATES.

NONE can fail to observe that almost all the Grecian nations and cities were then either ruled by *the few*, or were *under a popular government*. For monarchical government (see l. 1, 13.), if we except the Macedonians, the barbarous Epirots, the savage Agræans (l. 3, 111.), and Lacedæmonians (whose kings, however, were subject to the nobles), was every where done away. Instead of kings, there had existed in many of the cities *tyranni* (l. 1, 13.), such as Theagenes at Megara (l. 1, 126.), Hippocrates at Gela (l. 6, 5.), Gelo at Syracuse (l. 6, 4 and 5.), Anaxilaus at Rhegium (l. 6, 5.), Hippoclus at Lampsacus (l. 6, 59.), and the Pisistratidæ at Athens; which last were better than the rest. For these (well knowing that the people, so that they be not oppressed with heavy taxes, and if gratified with petty gifts, and occupied with daily employment, will bear domination long with patience) only exacted the twentieth of their income from the Athenians, adorned the city with magnificent edifices, offered up splendid sacrifices, &c. (l. 6, 54. and 2, 13.) Yet to these may, nevertheless, be applied what Thucydides (l. 1, 17.) truly affirms of all the tyrants of Greece, that they consulted only the security of their persons, and the aggrandisement of their families (whence at l. 6, 85. it is said *ἀντὶ τυράννων οὐδὲν ἄλλογον ἔτι τι ζυμφερόν*), and did nothing memorable. As long, therefore, as these tyrants reigned, they hindered Greece from flourishing. Happily, however, it happened that, a little before the Persian war, the most and last of them (except the Sicilian ones) were driven from Greece, by the means chiefly of the Lacedæmonians, who had themselves never experienced tyranny. (l. 1, 18.) One such, however, is mentioned as subsisting in the age of Thucydides, Euarchus, tyrant of Astacus, who was expelled by the Athenians. (l. 2, 30.) With this exception, neither Greece nor the Grecian cities in Sicily and Italy then had any tyrant.

So much the more widely, therefore, extended the domination of *the few*, to which monarchical government had at first every

where passed; which domination of the few (oligarchy), called by the more honourable name of *the government of the best* (a moderate aristocracy, l. 3, 81.) though those few were not *the best*, but only *the most powerful*, and *most violent*. The folly of *the few* is well pointed out in the words of Athenagoras, l. 6, 39. But it must be observed that there were, of this government of the few, *two kinds*, an *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσθμοῦ*, and a *δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν*, of which distinction, however, nothing else is added, than that the latter is most contrary to law, and the nearest to a tyranny. This subsisted at Thebes, at the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. (c. 3, 92.)

To all these forms of government, in which the laws have less ruled than the arbitrary will of one or a few, was opposed *popular government*, in which, according to the laws, all, in private affairs, were on an equality; but, as to dignity, according as any one excelled in any thing; not for his birth or rank in society, but because of his merit, he was preferred to the management of public affairs, and was not excluded from them by poverty. (l. 2, 37.) [But this was, in truth, a mere legal fiction. Edit.]

Now as the Athenians themselves enjoyed a popular government, so they supported its cause in other states; while the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, strove that their allies should be governed by the few, just as it was most conducive to their interest. (l. 1, 19 and 76. 5, 81.) Wherefore the people (or the multitude) every where favoured the Athenians, and the nobles the Lacedæmonians (l. 3, 47 and 82.); and from a war of the two powers arose a contest, as of the *two races*, so of the *two forms of government*. We must therefore scrutinise which cities used a popular, and which an oligarchical form; and thus it will appear why they were more or less inclined to the Lacedæmonians. This will be noted in the general tables which will be subjoined, so that all may be seen at one view. In such a war, however, that seditions were very frequent, and there were never wanting those who sought to themselves change their form of government, or introduce such change among others, none can need to be informed. How much, moreover, these dissensions of citizens perturbed the whole of Greece, and how many atrocities were committed therein, may be learnt from l. 3, 82.

But, in all these tumults, the nobles [or higher classes] showed themselves more violent and cruel than the people. [This may, however, be doubted. Edit.] These called popular government *δημολογουμένην ἄνοιαν* (l. 6, 89.), *πονηρίαν* (l. 8, 47.), *ὅτε ξυνετὸν, ὅτε ἴσον*. (6, 39.) These, if they could, would have put the allies

to death without a trial. (l. 8. 48.) These did not cease to stir up tumults and domestic disputes (l. 6, 38.), and could scarcely be kept from sedition by the attempt of foreign invaders. (l. 6, 89.)*

CHAP. IV.

ON THE STATE OF THE CITIES, AND THE MODE IN WHICH THEY GAINED THEIR SUPPORT.

THE Peloponnesians, all inhabiting the same peninsula (which, if its inhabitants were but of one mind, could be easily defended from invasion), were readily induced to choose the Lacedæmonians, the most powerful people of that country, as their chiefs. Besides, most of them were agriculturists, and supported by their hand-labour (l. 1, 141 and 142.), which caused them to be inclined to the Lacedæmonians, whose greatest power was in land forces, but to be tardy in defending the interests of the people on the sea-coasts. (l. 1, 120.) Now, some of the Peloponnesians, as the Corinthians, Epidaurians, Pellenians, also carried on commerce; but yet the Corinthians, as they had been the first of the Greeks who introduced naval improvements, made triremes, and checked piracy; so they then possessed, after the Athenians and Corcyræans, the most powerful navy. (l. 1, 36.) Now, not to say that they were Dorians, and nourished an antient hatred against the Athenians, who had aided the Megaræans in some disputes respecting the limits of their territory (l. 1, 103.), the quarrels respecting Corcyra and Potidæa had made them hostile; yet they did not venture to contest with them by sea. Wherefore, the whole confederacy of the Lacedæmonians, since even the Bœotians and other people of Greece Proper had either none, or (as the Leucadians and Ambraciots) very few ships, was terres-

* I omit the rest of the learned writer's philippic against the higher classes in Greece, as being wholly devoid of impartiality. A very different, and a far juster representation is given by Mitford. Both parties were, indeed, almost equally guilty of enormities; but, as far as regards the higher classes at Athens, they had so long groaned under such an intolerable tyranny of the mob, that they were surely excusable for wishing to throw off their chains, and it is no wonder that they should not have been very scrupulous as to the means. It is plain that Thucydides himself greatly preferred aristocracy to democracy; but he especially wished, as appears from l. 8, 98., for a "*moderate admixture* of both aristocracy and democracy," to which is very applicable the adage *μέτρον ἔστιν ἄριστον*. (Edit.)

trial, and Peloponnesus was its seat and strength. Therefore the Lacedæmonians, at the beginning of the war, put to death as enemies all whom they took by sea, not only those who sided with the Athenians, but also such as were neutral. (l. 2, 67. 3, 52.) To these the war became most perilous, when the Athenians had brought over the Argives, Eleans, and Mantinæans; and Alcibiades might with reason boast (l. 6, 16.) that he had compelled the Lacedæmonians at Mantinea to combat for their very existence.

On the contrary, the confederacy of the *Athenians* was naval; for whereas, before the Persian war, they had had but a small fleet, and that for the most part of fifty-oared barks, Themistocles first, between the expedition of Darius and that of Xerxes, induced them, then at war with the Æginetes, to build triremes (l. 1, 14.), and set about forming Piræus into a port. (l. 1, 93.) Soon after, at the coming of Xerxes, they were compelled to apply themselves to naval affairs (l. 1, 18.); and, on their endeavours proving successful, Themistocles ventured openly to say that they should aim at the dominion of the sea. That had been before held (to say nothing of the Carians and Phœnicians) among the Greeks by the Cretans (l. 1, 4 and 8.), the Corinthians (l. 1, 13.), the Ionians (l. 1, 13.), and, in other parts, by the tyrants of Sicily. (l. 1, 14.) But on the Ionians being subdued by the Persians in the Ægean sea, the Æginetes alone could be rivals to the Athenians, and they were soon vanquished (l. 1, 105-108.); which victory, and the obtaining of the dominion of the sea, Themistocles greatly assisted in procuring for his fellow-citizens by completing and fortifying the Piræus. In doing which, his first object seems to have been to repel any new attack on the part of the Persians. (l. 1, 63.) But what had first arisen from *necessity*, that Pericles retained; and he wished the Athenians to regard themselves as *islanders* (l. 1, 143.), perceiving that their empire rested on the dominion of the sea, since their power could not be sustained by a territory small and sterile; whereas, their fleets might be a defence of liberty and of popular government.*

In fact, the very form of government suggested to the Lacedæmonians to aim at the increase of land force; and, to the Athenians, that of naval power. For the government of one, and of a few, employed heavy-armed, and, when means could be found,

* *Popular government.*] Probably, however, Pericles had no such thought; for he was no friend to democracy, and in truth, as Thucydides himself says, (l. 2, 63.), the government of Athens was in *his time*, though nominally a democracy, yet really an aristocracy, and be a sort of monarch. (Edit.)

cavalry; because both these kinds of service required greater expense than the means of the lower ranks could afford. From the common people all arms were withdrawn, either by craft and guile (see l. 6, 58.), or by other methods; and they were scarcely put into their hands even in the greatest perils of the state. (l. 3, 27.) To serve among the light-armed or marines the higher classes refused, because their persons were too valuable to be exposed to the enemy's weapons. For such service they employed the Helots. Thus even at Athens, where one hundred ships are equipped, they are manned, besides the citizens, with the Metæci, while the citizens of the two first classes remain at home. (l. 3, 16.) Besides, the very license of nautical life nourished a sense of liberty. Thus we find the crew of the Parali always adverse to oligarchy (l. 8, 73.), and the first to restore popular government when fallen.

Thus, then, we see why the Athenians were obliged to give attention to maritime pursuits. Hence, too, it followed that their very allies became studious of the same. For islanders, Greeks, Asiatics, and others, far removed from their country, and in some measure, before the Persian war, excelling in naval affairs (l. 1, 13.), but also obnoxious to the perpetual attacks of most powerful barbarians, and not very strong in home-shipping, from what state could they so easily or speedily obtain assistance as from the Athenians? In like manner, the Athenians could by no other argument be induced to send help to those in need, than if a naval, not land-alliance, were offered. (l. 1, 35 and 44.)

From this *naval confederacy* arose the *empire of the sea*; for, by degrees, the Athenians deprived the federate states (except the Chians and Lesbians) of their ships (l. 1, 19.), so that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the only fleets, besides that of the Athenians, worthy of mention, were (alone of the Grecian states) in the possession of the Corcyreans and Corinthians (l. 1, 36.); for even the Syracusans, though, under Gelo and Hiero, their navy was in a very flourishing state (l. 1, 14. Herod. 7, 158.), afterwards so neglected it, that, when the Athenians passed over with a powerful fleet into Sicily, they did not venture on a sea-fight, but suffered themselves to be besieged by sea and land, until they were enabled by circumstances to try their fortune. The Corcyreans had united themselves with the Athenians; and for *both* nations the Corinthians were by no means a match. (l. 1, 36.) With reason, therefore, does Pericles boast (l. 2, 62.) that there was no king or people that could withstand their fleet: aware of which, they treated the islanders with haughtiness and

insolence. The Cephallenians and Zacynthians, though free, yet, as being islanders, were held so much the more in restraint (l. 7, 57.); and the Melians, though colonists of the Lacedæmonians, wishing to be neutral, were not permitted. (See 5, 84, 97, 99.)

But although the Athenians were so powerful in naval affairs, yet it was necessary for the Lacedæmonians, in order to deprive them of the empire of Greece, to contend with them for the empire of the *sea*, which, as we have before shown, constituted the nature of this war. This maritime contest, however, they could not have attempted, had not the pride of the Athenians driven first the Lesbians, and afterwards the Chians, to revolt.

CHAP. V.

OF THE ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY, THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF ITS ALLIES,
THE NATURE OF THE WHOLE ASSOCIATION, AND THE METHODS WHEREBY
IT WAS PRESERVED.

OF the allies there were different kinds, both as respected their *origin*, their *condition*, and *situation in regard to the Athenians*. Of the Greeks, those who, because of the Peloponnesian war, or, at least, in the course of that war, formed alliances with the Athenians, are to be distinguished from the *antient allies*. Of each such there were, again, two kinds, since *those*, either if they cultivated maritime affairs, were *compelled* to follow the Athenians; or, if their strength lay in land forces, did it of their own accord. For all these, then, they formed laws of association, equitable, indeed, but yet differing according to the power and usefulness which those allies contributed; for equity was *entirely* preserved in the covenants and treaties with the Argives, Eleans, and Mantinæans, after the peace of Nicias (l. 5, 47.), which were to continue for an hundred years, and by which they engaged to render mutual assistance in repelling enemies, but not to invade them; so that it was properly an *ἐπιμαχία*, not *συμμαχία*.

According to these treaties, war could only be laid aside by the unanimous consent of the federate states. To soldiers sent in aid, the state which sent them was to supply support up to the thirtieth day after their arrival in the city which had sent for the assistance; after which time, the money expended in provisions

was to be paid by the state which sent for the aid. It was agreed that the state which called out the allies should have the leading of the troops as long as the war should continue in its territory; but if an expedition were undertaken in common, the leading should be common to all [and taken in turn. Edit.]. Therefore, all these nations were *ισόκλητοι* and *ισόμοιροι*. Not very different was the treaty of the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, concluded a little before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war with the Athenians. (l. 2, 68. See also l. 3, 95 and 107.)

But so great an equality of rights the Athenians would not have granted these people, had they not been powerful by land, and safe from their attacks. As to the maritime states, which, in this war, had implored their aid, or were compelled to follow them, we see less equitable laws laid down for *them*. These were not, if peace were treated of, asked for their opinion, and the principal authority they were always expected to yield to the Athenians. And although the Corcyreans had, at the beginning of the war, only entered into a *defensive* alliance (l. 1, 44.), yet they afterwards concluded one offensive and defensive: still, though they had a considerable fleet, we do not find any ambassadors from either these or the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, at the conclusion of the treaty of peace with the Lacedæmonians.* (l. 4, 117. and 5, 17.) Nay, even at the siege of Syracuse, although the Thurians, Metapontines, Naxians, Catanæans, and the Athenians professed (l. 6, 84.) that they came to Sicily to procure full liberty and power for all, yet the chief direction of the army was always with *them*.† It was, no doubt, different in the former Sicilian war, in which the Athenians were present with a small fleet, and their allies consisted, besides the Naxians and Catanæans, of the Leontines, Camarinæans, and Rhegines (l. 3, 86.), when the confederacy was more upon an equality, as, indeed, the terms of the general peace (l. 4, 58–65.) lead us to suppose.

Far worse was the condition of those *old allies* who, in the Persian war, disgusted at the pride of Pausanias, had chosen the Athenians for their leaders. At first, indeed, the condition of

* The reason, perhaps, was, that the power of the Corcyreans was by that time brought down to almost nothing, and the Cephallenians and Zacynthians had really never acted as more than *defensive* allies; consequently *their* consent to the peace was not necessary to be asked. (Edit.)

† And how could it be otherwise, considering the infinite inferiority of each state to Athens? for as to the condition, just mentioned, of taking the lead by rotation, it was only suitable to, and practicable in, a confederacy of states with something of equality. Besides, here the Athenians were *principals*; not, as in the former Sicilian war, *seconds*.

these also was equal and just : they were each independent, and deliberated on the common interests in the congresses held at Delos. (l. 1, 96 and 97.) Now, the avowed purpose of the confederacy was to avenge themselves on the Persians for the injuries they inflicted on Greece. For this war some contributed money, others ships (l. 1, 96.), according to a rate fixed by Aristides ; and the Athenians carried on the expeditions on a principle of equality. (l. 1, 99.) The money contributed, which amounted to four hundred and eighty talents annually, was preserved at Delos, and public treasurers of Greece took care of it ; appointed, however, by the Athenians. Yet the nature of this association was presently changed. The first cause of which mutation was the sluggishness of the allies, who, rather than go themselves to the war, chose to pay the expenses of it to the Athenians. Thus those, by the money contributed by the allies, increased their fleet ; while the *allies* were unprepared for war. (l. 1, 99.) By and by, some, weary of these perpetual payments, neglected to send the money due. (c. 99.) The Athenians then, seizing this opportunity, went to war against them, beginning with the weaker, lest, if they had attacked the more powerful first, there might be a combination, and a rallying point. (l. 3, 11.) The allies, too, by reason of the multitude of their suffrages, could not all pursue one common counsel ; by reason of which the Athenians (as afterwards did the Romans) subdued them singly, as each revolted, or failed in military service, or made war one upon another (as the Samians, l. 1, 115.), or for some other specious cause. (l. 6, 76.) Thus they deprived them all of ships, except the Chians and Lesbians, and imposed a tribute (l. 1, 19.), the amount of which they afterwards increased, and also removed the treasury to Athens.

Therefore, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, of those old perpetual allies, the following alone were free from tribute, and independent : — The *Platæans* and *Messenians of Naupactus*, as well for their situation as for their hatred towards the Thebans and Lacedæmonians, and fidelity towards the Athenians ; then the *Chians* and *Lesbians*, because they were the most powerful islanders in the *Ægean* sea, and had always shown especial respect to the principal men at Athens. (l. 3, 11.) Such allies contributed ships only (l. 7, 57.) ; yet even these were only free in the same way as the allies of the Romans, i. e. in name (l. 3, 10.) ; whence an *ἐπουλος αὐτονομία* is (at l. 8, 61.) opposed to full liberty, τῇ ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίᾳ. We never find their opinion taken on war or peace ; but to whatever wars they were called, they were bound to send ships and soldiers, to fight under the command of the Athenians. (l. 8,

9.) And even this slender portion of liberty was taken away from the Lesbians, in the Peloponnesian war, for defection, and only continued to the Methymnæans (l. 3, 50. 7, 57.), and afterwards given to the Samians.

There were also those who were free, and lived under their own laws, but yet were tributary. Of such there were none at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; but, at the peace of Nicias, we find Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus, the Mecybernæans, Samæans, Singæans.

The rest of the old allies were all reduced to servitude (see l. 3, 10. and l. 18.), i. e. from free allies had been made subject (*ὑπήκοοι*), tributary (*φέρου ὑποταλαίς*), and compelled to plead all their causes of contracts, except the smaller ones, at Athens. (l. 1. 77.) They were deprived of ships; but, besides contributing *money*, they sometimes sent to the wars heavy-armed, but more frequently light-armed, soldiers. The commanders of these troops, we need not doubt, were Athenians. Such being the state of things, Athens, instead of having the pre-eminence among, had obtained the dominion or tyranny (*τυραννίδα*), over the allies (l. 3, 57.), and was called *τύραννος πάντας* (l. 1, 122.)

This domination they endeavoured to preserve and amplify, both by specious words and craft, and by open force, united with the methods sedulity and severity. The specious argument, urged by the Attic orators, was, that the rule they bore was due to them for the unwearied activity they had shown in the Persian war, and that the allies were not *deserving* of freedom, as having carried on war against Greece with the Persians. (l. 6, 82 and 83. 1, 74 and 75.) In order to set their crime in a stronger light, and show that themselves (i. e. the Athenians) had a right over them, they spoke of them as their *colonies* (l. 6, 82.), though few of them were colonies of *Athens*. Again, they pretended that they were every where the assertors of the Ionians and popular government, against the Dorians and the higher classes, although the falsity of this pretence, as regarded the Chalcidæans, is proved by Hermocrates. (l. 4, 61. 6, 76 and 79.) And, indeed, where their orators hoped they could strike terror by a confident strain of speaking, they did not dissemble their views, but frankly avowed that they acted on the customary principle, "that the weaker must be governed by the stronger;" they did not say their domination was *just*, since justice was to be preserved only amongst *equals*, but that "what the great demand the little must concede." (l. 5, 89.) Their *sedulity*, or readiness to serve others, they evinced from the assistance they always gave when called upon by

any Greeks in distress. Thus despising quiet, they declined no labour to subjugate the free, and keep in check the subject states. On this principle, they intermeddled in every affair from which they could derive benefit to themselves. Hence they formed a treaty with the Corcyræans (l. 1, 32.), though they received no benefit from them; with the Chalcidæans in Sicily, though never assisted by them (l. 4, 61.); nay, they went to the aid of the Egestans, Barbarians, against the Selinuntians, though Grecians, and though the former were the aggressors (l. 6, 11 and 13.); nay, they brought assistance to those who never called them in. (l. 6, 87.) Their *severity* appears from this, that even on bare suspicion they demolished city walls, and demanded hostages, as in the case of Potidæa (l. 1, 56.) and Chios (l. 6, 51.) The Æginetes, for a similar suspicion, they expelled from the island (l. 2, 27.), and in like manner the Delians (l. 5, 1.), whom afterwards they were, by the command of an oracle, to restore. (l. 5, 32.) Defection they punished with the utmost cruelty. (See l. 3, 56. 3, 50. 5, 32 and 116. 5, 3. 3, 34. 6, 58. 3, 2.)

Since, therefore, they disdained no mode, however base, of acquiring or preserving their empire, the number of their subject-allies had become great. (See the table of the Athenian confederacy, paulo infr.)

Such an association would have been formidable indeed, if the fidelity of the allies could have been relied on; but, disgusted by the pride of the Athenians, most of them seized occasions for revolting. Wherefore, before the Peloponnesians had broken out, the Potidæans, Chalcidæans, and Bottiæans had revolted, of whom the former scarcely, at a heavy expense, subdued in the second year of the war (l. 2, 70.), and the rest never. In the fourth year followed the Lesbian revolt, which was happily repressed. Four years after, when Brasidas had gone to the Chalcidæans, Acanthus, Stagirus (l. 4, 88.), Argilus (c. 103.), Amphipolis (c. 106.), Scione (c. 120.), Mende (123.), and other cities passed over to the Lacedæmonians; of which but few were recovered. After the misfortunes of the Athenians in Sicily, the allies contended who should first revolt; and, not to mention the weaker states, the Chians and Erythræans (l. 8, 111.), the Milesians (c. 17.), the Rhodians (c. 44.), the Abydians (c. 62.), the Byzantines (c. 80.), and the Eubœans, passed over from the Athenian to the Lacedæmonian alliance. Besides, the power of the Athenians, in some cities of the continent of Asia, seems to have been diminished, because there were also Persian garrisons in them; as at least was the case for the latter years of the war, when Tamos

was præfect in Ionia; though afterwards, partly by the Lacedæmonians themselves, the Persian garrisons were expelled.

Thus far we have enumerated the federate states of the *Athenians* among the Greeks. With which allies are not to be confounded certain states friendly to the Athenians, or inimical to the Lacedæmonians, but entered on the lists of neither alliance. Such are the Phocians, Ozolian Locrians, Cætæans, Ænians, Dolopians, Melians (l. 5, 51. and 7, 3.), and, indeed, the Thessalians in general. These, although they had an alliance with the Athenians, on account of which they, in the first year of the war, sent them some horse (l. 2, 22.), yet did not afterwards renew this alliance; nay, they granted (though with difficulty) a passage through their territories to Brasidas. (l. 4, 78.)

There yet remain the Barbarians joined in alliance with the Athenians, the most powerful of whom was Sitalces, king of the Odrysæ, whose alliance (procured for the Athenians by Nymphodorus, 2, 29.) might have had the greatest weight in determining the event of the war, if the Athenians could have confided in him, and his friendship had been more lasting. The connection with the Odomanti, another Thracian people (l. 5, 6.), was of less moment, as was also that with some princes of Macedonia, especially Philippus and Derda (l. 1, 57.), not to mention the fickle Perdiccas. There was also a connection with certain tribes about Athos, who seem to have been subservient to the Athenians, as the Pelasgi, the Tyrseni, the Edones, and others (l. 4, 109.), of which some revolted to Brasidas. The Lacedæmonians and Perdiccas had, indeed, to combat with the Lyncestians (l. 4, 124.); but whether the Athenians were ever at treaty with these, may be doubted. In Italy there was a friendship, of long standing, between them and the Messenians, from whom they, in the Sicilian war, received some darters. (l. 7, 33.) The few Tyrseni present at the siege of Syracuse are hardly worth mentioning (l. 6, 103. 7, 57.); [and yet they decided the fortune of one battle. Edit.] In Sicily, of the Barbarians there were allied with them the Egestans (l. 6, 6.) and the Siculi, who had revolted from the Athenians [and such also as had been all along independent. Edit.]

The following is a view of the whole Athenian confederacy: —

THE ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY.

A. GRECIANS.

1. OLD ALLIES.

Cities, Commonwealths, Nations, and Countries.	Race.	Form of Government.
(a) Independent Allies, l. 3, 10.		
(aa) <i>Independent and not Tributary.</i>		
Of assured fidelity: —		
Messenians at Naupactus -	Dorians.	
Platæans, apart from the other } Bœotians -	Æolians -	Democracy.
Less to be relied on: —		
The Lesbians, who contributed } ships.		
The cities free; as Mytilene, Erasus, Pyrrha, Antissa, Methymna. } (The Mytilenæans had some } territory on the opposite coast } of the continent, called the } Actæan cities.)	Æolians -	{ Oligarchy, called <i>Proedri</i> .
Chians, furnishing ships. (These } had also some islets, called the } (CEnussæ) -	Ionians -	{ Oligarchy, or a mixed government, with a senate, or council.
(ββ) <i>Independent, but Tributary.</i>		
Before the peace of Nicias, none; } but afterwards some cities in } Thrace.		
(β) Colonies, and such as had } been allotted out.		
Faithful before the war: —		
Scyrus.		
Lemnus.		
Imbrus.		
Naxus.		
Andros. (Tenos? Ceos?)		
Hestizæa. (Chalcis Eub.?)	Athenian.	

Cities, Commonwealths, Nations, and Countries.	Race.	Form of Government.
Colonized, or allotted out in the war :— Ægina. Potidæa. Lesbos (except Methymna). Sciøne. Melos - - -	Athenian.	
Unstable, afterwards revolted :— Amphipolis. Eion (its port) - - Thurians, until the faction opposed to Athens gained the mastery.	Part Athenian, but mostly a mixed race.	
(γ) Dependent and Tributary Allies.		
Bœotia, Oropus, Eubœa, Eretrians, Chalcideans, Carystians, Macedonia, Methone -	Ionians from the Athenians, except the Carystians, who were Dryopes	Democracy.
The parts about Thrace, a name given to that part of the sea coast which had been colonized by the Athenians :— Chalcideans (city Olynthus) - Bottizeans (cities Scolus, Spartolus, and Singus). Potidæa. [All these revolted at the beginning of the war.]	-	Democracy.
Sciøne - - -	Colony of the Corinthians Of Achaic origin.	Archons, or epidemiurgi.
Mende - - - Torone - - - Sane, and other cities of the Acte.	Eretrian colony. Chalcidic -	Democracy.
Acanthus. Stagirus - - - Galepsus. Cesume - - - Argilus - - -	Andrian colonies. Thasian colonies. Andrian colony.	
Thasus - - - Thrace, Ænians - - - Hellepontians, as Sestus. Byzantium, which revolted Ol. 92, 1. Chalcedon - - -	Parian colony Æolians. Colony of Megara. Colony of Megara.	Democracy till Ol. 92.

Cities, Commonwealths, Nations, and Countries.	Race.	Form of Government.
Cyzicus.	Milesian colony?	Democracy till Ol. 92.
Lampsacus - - - }		
Abydus, which revolted Ol. 92, 1. }	Phocian or Milesian colony.	
Æolians, such as Cyme, which revolted - - - }	Milesian colony.	
Tenedos - - - }	Æolic.	
Ionians — as,	Ionians.	In sedition.
Phocæa, which revolted.		
Clazomenæ, which revolted, but was subdued.		
Erythræans, who revolted Ol. 92, 1. }		
Eræ.		
Teos.	Ionians	{ Oligarchy till Ol. 92, 1.
Lebedos - - - }		
Colophon and Notium -		
Myus.		
Miletus.		
Samos, to which the Athenians granted independence, Ol. 92, 1. for its fidelity - }	Dorians.	{ Oligarchy and sedition.
Caria, maritime parts.		
Thorians, adjoining to the Carians.		
Halicarnassus.		
Cnidus, which revolted after the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily - }		
Rhodes, which revolted, Ol. 92, 1. attached to which was the island Chalce; cities Lindus, Jelusus, and Caminus - }	Ionians.	
Cos.		
Islands situated between Peloponnesus and Crete towards the east, and the other Cyclades.		
Icarus.		
Myconus.		
Delos - - - }	Dorians, mixed with others.	
Some Cretans, as the Polichnitæ, and the Gortynians - }		

2. NEW ALLIES.

Countries and Nations, Cities, Commonwealths, and Tribes.	Race.	Form of Government.
<p>(α) Independent, but held in somewhat of Subjection.</p> <p>Islanders of the Ionian sea, allies from the beginning of the war: —</p> <p>Coryræans - - - }</p> <p>Cephalenians — Cities: —</p> <p>Palcis, Cranii, Samæi, Pronæi.</p> <p>Siceliots: —</p> <p>Zacynthians - - - }</p> <p>Naxians - - - }</p> <p>Catanæans.</p> <p>Leontines - - - }</p> <p>Italiots, Metapontians - - - }</p>	<p>Dorians from Corinth -</p> <p>Achæan colonists.</p> <p>Colonists of the Leontines -</p> <p>Chalcideans from Eubœa.</p> <p>Achæans.</p>	<p>{ Democracy, Council (but in sedition.)</p> <p>{ Democracy. Sedition.</p>
<p>(β) Independent, and with equal Suffrage.</p> <p>Acarnanians, all except the Æniadæ. } They dwelt in petty towns, Stratos the capital - - }</p> <p>Amphilochians, capital Argos Amphilochicum.</p> <p>Argives: — The generality, and with the exception of the Epidaurians; in alliance with them were the Cleonæans and the Orneatæ - - - }</p> <p>Those who had revolted from the Lacedæmonians; as the Eleans (Æolians), Mantinæans (Arcadians);</p> <p>And in the first Sicilian war: —</p> <p>Camarinæans (Dorians, but at enmity with Syracuse).</p> <p>Rhégines (Chalcidæans and Messenians).</p>	<p>Argives.</p> <p>Dorians -</p>	<p>{ Democracy, A council, The 80 artunæ (in sedition.)</p>

Countries, Cities, Commonwealths, and Tribes.	Race.	Form of Government.
<p>(γ) Those who favoured the Cause of the Athenians, though not under an actual Treaty of Alliance.</p> <p>Thessaly:— The cities of the Pharsalians, } Cranonians, Gyrtonians, Phe- } ræans, Lorissæans, Pirasians. } Subject to the Thessalians:— Peræbians. Magnetes. Achæans of Pthiotis:— Borderers on Thessaly. Melians. Paralians, Iereans. Trachians, friendly to the Lacedæ- monians:— Cetæans, Ænians, Delphians. Phocis, except the Delphians, inde- pendent, and attached to the La- cedæmonians. Locris; the Ozolian Locrians dwelling in small scattered villages. Demi (or clans); Amphissæans, who favoured the Lacedæmonians:— Myonians, Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalcæans, Tolopho- nians, Hessians, Æanthians, Olpeans, Hyæans.</p>	-	<p>{ Government in the hands of the powerful.</p>

B. BARBARIANS.

Countries and Nations.	Tribes and Cities.	Form of Govern- ment.
Thrace - - - {	The kingdom of Odrysia	Monarchy.
	Odомantians.	
	Pelasgians, Tyrsenians, and	{ Monarchy.
	others.	{ Philip,
	Some of the Macedonians.	{ Dardus, &c.
The parts about Thrace {	Lyncestæ, who, at least,	
	were at war with Per- diccas and Brasidas }	Monarchy.

Countries and Nations.	Tribes and Cities.	Form of Government.
Sicily - - {	Siculi ; mostly revolting from Syracuse.	Monarchy.
	Egestæans, who were Elymians.	
	Messapians; a nation of the Japygæ.	Monarchy.
Italy - - {	Some Tyrsenians, who joined the Athenians from hostility to the Syracusans.	Artas.

CHAP. VI.

THE ABILITY FOR WAR, AND THE METHOD OF CARRYING IT ON, IN THE
ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY, AND PRINCIPALLY AMONG THE ATHENIANS.

SUCH was the extent of the Athenian confederacy, as far as it is known to us, though our conceptions of the Athenian power must be imperfect, from our ignorance of other allies of whom no mention is preserved. [These, however, can have been but very few, and of inconsiderable importance. Edit.] We will now proceed to notice the *wealth* and *power* of the confederacy, whether as consisting in riches, or shipping, or soldiers, all carefully noted by Thucydides. (l. 2, 13.)

The money of the Athenians was partly laid up in the treasury, and partly consisted in annual revenue. In the treasury, deducting three thousand seven hundred talents, which had been expended on the vestibules of the citadel and other edifices, and on the siege of Potidæa, there remained six thousand talents; besides five hundred talents of gold and silver uncoined, which were contained in the presents, sacred vessels, and Median spoils; and besides this was money laid up in the temples, and the golden vest of Minerva, of thirty talents, so artfully made that it was removable. Every year, too, besides the rest of the income of the state (from the public demesnes, mines, customs, tax on foreign sojourners, and many other items, diligently treated on by Boeckh. Œcon. Publ. Ath. l. 3., of which, however, only the income from land, and the judgments in the courts are mentioned by Thucydides), the tribute paid by the allies amounted to six hundred talents.

How much each paid does not appear, except that the Cytherians were rated at four talents. (l. 4, 57.) [That, however, was a mere quit-rent. Edit.] The sum of the whole amounted (according to Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 26.) to a thousand talents; which sum was much increased in the war, one thousand two hundred talents being exacted from the allies only. (See Boeckh. p. 431.) But this large sum began rapidly to be exhausted, since the war was very expensive, as we may infer from the charges at the siege of Potidæa, and considering that two hundred and fifty ships, which, in the summer of the fourth year, were all equipped and in service, must have occasioned a heavy expense. Add, too, that, at the very beginning of the war, the Chalcidæans, Bottiæans, and other tributary allies revolted; the Lacedæmonians ravaged Attica itself with incursions; and the Locri Opuntii endeavoured to devastate Eubœa, and the Megaræans other parts of the sea with predatory privateers. (l. 2, 32, 60. 3, 51.) A thousand talents, too, in the first year of the war, were put aside for the last emergency; so that, in the fourth year, they found themselves obliged to contribute money from their private purses. (l. 3, 19.) Whether, besides the ordinary tribute, any *extraordinary* sums were collected from the allies, does not appear. Ships were, indeed, sent to them to collect money (l. 4, 75.), but whether this was the tribute itself, or arrears, is not clear. We are, however, to remember that ships of this kind are said to be sent to Caria and Lycia (l. 2, 69.), of which the latter, at least, was never tributary to the Athenians, as far as we know. In the course of the truce the city had somewhat recovered itself (l. 6, 26.), when the expedition to Sicily that followed overwhelmed them with expense. (l. 6, 31.) The fortifying, too, of Decelea was an extreme injury; for the Athenians were quite deprived of the use of their territory, and more than twenty thousand slaves deserted; vast herds of cattle perished, horses were lost or lamed, and the necessities of life had to be imported from Eubœa, by a very circuitous and expensive way, for the use of the city. The revenue then falling off, and the expenses, in so great a war, increasing, they were compelled, in the year of the Olymp. 91, 2., to levy on the allies a tax of a twentieth part of the goods imported or exported by sea, instead of the tribute, thinking that thus more money would come into the treasury. On receiving intelligence of the calamity in Sicily, they contracted their expenses (l. 8, 4.); and, after the defection of Chios, they even resorted to those one thousand talents reserved for emergency. This was the more necessary, since the other cities of Ionia, from which the greater revenue was derived,

followed the example of Chios. Such is the substance of what Thucydides says respecting the income and expenses of the state, except that the Thracian mercenaries received a drachma a day, and the soldiers at Potidæa two drachmas.

Of triremes fit for service, at the beginning of the war, there were three hundred (l. 2, 13.), of which one hundred were retained for the defence of Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis. (l. 3, 24.) In the fourth year, two hundred and fifty were in service. (l. 3, 17.) To the Athenian fleet may be added that of the Corcyræans, consisting of one hundred and twenty ships (l. 1, 25.); and of the Chians and Lesbians, who, in the second year, accompanied the Athenians with fifty sail. (l. 2, 56.) Triremes were divided into *swift-sailing*, or fit for naval battle, and *those formed to admit the conveyance of soldiers*, στρατιωτικὴς or ἐπιταγωγῆς. There were also *Hippagi*, horse-transports. (l. 2, 56.) There were, too, other ships destined for other uses, such as στρατηγικὴς νῆες, φρουρικὴς (l. 4, 13.), προφυλακτικὴς (l. 1, 117.), the Salaminia and the Paralus. Besides triremes, there were *light barks*, λεπτὰ πλοῖα (l. 2, 83.), *long barks* for war, πλοῖα μακρὰ (l. 1, 14.), privateering barks, and swift-sailing ones, *Pentecontors* (of fifty oars), κελήτια, or cock-boats, ἀμρηρικὰ, (l. 4, 67.), κατήρη πλοῖα. (l. 4, 118.)

To the equipping and manning of fleets were required (not to mention the *περινιδῆς* or *supernumeraries* (l. 1, 10.), *divers* (l. 4, 26.) *seamen* (ναῦται), *rowers* (ὑπηρέσια, ἱρέται, κωπηλάται, θρωῖται, θαλάμμοι), who were composed both of citizens and foreigners. These latter the Peloponnesians hoped they should be able to draw away by higher pay. (l. 1, 121.) The ships were manned both by citizens, and, when need required, by the *μέτῳκοι*, or sojourners; and these latter continued to man the fleet till the fourth year of the war. (l. 3, 16.) Seven hundred marines of the lowest class (θῆτες) accompanied the expedition to Sicily (l. 6, 43.); but, in the Ionic war, they were drafted from the heavy-armed. (l. 8, 24.) What was the number of all sorts on board a trireme does not appear from Thucydides.* We only know that, in forty triremes, five hundred and ten heavy-armed were conveyed to Sicily. [No proportion, however, can be imagined between the *number of ships* and the *number of heavy-armed*. Edit.] The soldiers sometimes themselves rowed the ships. (See l. 1, 10. 3, 18. 6, 91.) Even in other respects, the different offices of sailors were, in case of necessity,

* The Editor is, however, of another opinion, and thinks that it has been satisfactorily shown by Thucydides, and certainly by other writers, what was the average number. See l. 8, 29. and note.

interchanged. Thus Demosthenes arms his sailors with shields, and makes them fight on land. (l. 4, 9.) Gylippus, too (l. 7, 1.), procures arms for his sailors; and, in the descent on Sphacteria (l. 4, 32.), when all but the Thalamii took arms in the attack.* The expenses in fitting out a ship were supplied not only by the state, but by private persons. The state provided the empty ships, manned them, and gave the pay to the crews, commonly three oboli a day (l. 8, 45.); sometimes, however, a drachma. (l. 3, 17. 6, 31.) *Private individuals* who filled the post of trierarchs furnished the equipments, and also some extraordinary gratuities, in addition to the pay. The fleets were commanded mostly by several admirals, sometimes by one only. (See l. 1, 46 and 51. 1, 57 and 16. The ships had their trierarchs or captains, masters, or steersmen, and *celustæ*, like our *boatswains*, besides other lower officers.

In naval war, the daring and skill of the Athenians was of the highest order. Phormio, with twenty ships, attacks forty-seven of the Peloponnesians, and puts them to flight (l. 2, 83). The same officer, with the same twenty ships, maintains a dubious engagement with seventy-seven Peloponnesian ones. (l. 2, 87.) And, upon the whole, the Athenians had adopted the notion that they ought not to give way to *any* number of Peloponnesians. Therefore, they conceived themselves conquered by the Corinthians (famous as they were for naval skill), because they had not carried off a decisive victory; and the Corinthians claimed the victory, because not defeated. (l. 7, 34.)

The form adopted in ranging the ships was various. Very often the vessels followed each other, one by one, as Phormio's did in each of his battles; which was called *ἐπὶ κέρως πλεῖν*. We have also the expressions *ἐπὶ κέρως* and *κατὰ μίαν τάσσεισθαι*. (l. 2, 83 and 90.) The battles themselves were either regular and scientific, or tumultuary, and similar to land engagements. (l. 1, 49.) In the regular engagements, such as those of Phormio, and that at Sestus in the twenty-first year of the war, the parties strive, before the commencement of the combat, to snatch some advantage from the enemy. (See l. 2, 84 and 9. 8, 104.) The Athenians were attached to two modes of fighting, the *περίπλους*, and the *διέκπλους* (with which are connected the *ἀναστροφὴ*, *ἀνὰ κρουσίς*, and *ἰμβολή*). By the *former* they sailed in long line around the enemy's fleet, confining them gradually into a smaller compass, until they crowded them together and threw them into disorder, when they made their assault

* Such, indeed, was very general; especially in the case of an Athenian squadron cruising round Peloponnesus. (Edit.)

with beak, on the broadside of the enemy's ships. (l. 2, 84.) By the *latter* they broke the enemy's line, and sailing through, damaged the hulks, and brushed among the rows of oars. For this effect they sometimes approached, and sometimes recoiled, and then again rushed on the enemy. The *recoil* was made either with prow opposite to the enemy (when the ship was said to be *ἀντίπρως*, and such a recoil was called *ἀνὰρξουσις*, *πρίμνας* *κρούεσθαι*), or by turning away the prow, which usually indicated defeat, and was called *ἀποτρέπεσθαι*, *ἀναστροφή*, &c. The *attack* was made on the *sides*; nor did the Athenians like to fight prow to prow. (7, 36.)

To elude these arts, the Peloponnesians, when compelled to fight on the open sea, aimed at throwing their fleet into the form of a ball. They, moreover, sought out confined situations, which the Athenians, on the other hand, avoided, as not favourable to quick-sailing vessels, since they could not have room for their evolutions; but the sea-fight became similar to a land engagement. (l. 2, 89. 7, 36.) Such will apply to all the engagements in which the Peloponnesians either conquered, or fought a drawn battle; as l. 2, 90. 4, 25. 7, 54. That they might keep clear of the beak, and themselves break down the enemy's foreparts (*τὰ πῶρα* *δαίν* and *τὰς πρυμνείας ἀναβήξαι*, l. 7, 34 and 36.), they avoided exposing their broadsides, and rather rushed forward together, prow first; and these prows the Corinthians first armed with *ἐκωτίδες*, prominent beams, bound fast to them. Which useful device the Syracusans adopted, with the improvement of *ἀντήριδες*, or stretchers, six feet long, from the prows to the sides of the vessel; at the same time shortening and strengthening the prow. (l. 7, 36.) They, moreover, resorted to *stratagems*, such as contriving to engage with the enemy when unrefreshed by dinner, while the other party had dined. (See l. 7, 39 and 40. 8, 95.) Finally, by the accession, after the defeat of the Athenian armament in Sicily, of the Syracusans, Chians, and other Ionians, the Peloponnesians made considerable advances in nautical skill, so that in the battle of Sestus we find a scientific sort of plan pursued. (l. 8, 104.) Yet there, and elsewhere, disorder was apt to arise, which gave many advantages to the enemy's skill and disciplined bravery. (See l. 2, 91. 8, 104. 7, 23.) Such, however, could not so well happen in combats similar to battles on land, wherein the engagement was less between the *sailors* than the *soldiers*, or *marines*, placed on the decks, who strove to prevent the ships from being held fast by the enemy's harpoons, or grapplings (*iron-hands*), which Pliny (l. 7, 56.) says Pericles invented. That

those, moreover, should not keep their hold, the fore-parts of the ships were sometimes sheathed with raw hides. (l. 7, 65.) The *marines* strove to drive the enemy from the decks with missiles, and then boarded their ships. (l. 7, 63 and 70.) For which reason, besides those who were properly styled *marines* (*ιπιδάται*), they placed many archers and dartsmen, as also heavy-armed, who fought hand to hand, while the ships stood still alongside of each other. (l. 1, 49. 7, 40 and 60.) In such battles, it is plain that strength and courage were of more avail than art. Hence it was that in the harbour of Syracuse the Syracusans hoped for victory, and the Athenians lost their whole fleet.

The fleet of the Athenians had, however, before those battles, been suffering much injury, by their having no facility for careening, nor even drawing their ships ashore whenever they became leaky. (l. 7, 12.) The number of sailors was also much diminished; those having been cut off by the enemy's horse, on going to fetch wood and water: the foreigners, too, had deserted in great numbers; besides that, military discipline had grown exceedingly relaxed.*

* It is not necessary to trace, with the Author, the gradual stages by which the Athenian fleet was brought to ruin; which may better be learnt from the historian himself: but the student will be interested with the following instructive collection of Thucydidean nautical phrases, by the diligent Professor, p. 66. *Armamenta nautica* — *κάπη*, *ὀπηρέσιον*, *τροπότηρ* (l. 2, 93.), *ταρσός* (7, 40.), *κοντός* (2, 84.), *ὅλκοι τῶν νεῶν* (3, 15.), *ἀποβάδρα* (4, 11.), — *ναῦς ποιεῖσθαι* (1, 14.) *ναυπηγεῖσθαι* (31.), *ζεῦξαι τὰς παλαιὰς ὥστε πλεῖμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκευάσαι* (1, 29.), *ἐπίνειον*, *νεώρια*, *νεώσοικοι*: — *Portus partes, στόμα, μυχός, κηλή* — *λιμὴν ἐκλητος* (2, 93.), — *ἐπιβῆναι ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἐμβῆναι ἐτ' ἐσβῆναι ἐς ναῦν* — *ἀναπειράσθαι* (7, 7.), *ἐφορμῆν τὴν ναῦν καὶ ξυνεχέιν τὴν εἰρσίαν* (7, 14.), *δραι* (1, 29.), *δραι ταῖς ναυσὶ ἐτ' τὰς ναῦς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς* (1, 52.), *ἀνάγεσθαι* (1, 48.), *ἀναγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι* (4, 29.): — *modus, quo vela solvebant, describitur* (6, 32.), *ἀντανάγεσθαι* (1, 29.), *καδελέκειν ναῦς* (2, 93.), — *ἀνεμον τηρεῖν* (1, 65.), *τηρεῖν ἀνέμου καταφέρεσθαι* (4, 26.), *ἐπλοια* (2, 85.) — *Cibi nautici* (3, 49.), *ἀναπλεῖν ἐς ποταμὸν* (1, 104.), *ἐν χρῶ παραπλεῖν* (2, 84.), *ἀπὸ κάλῳ πλεῖν* (4, 25.), *καδεῖσαι τὰς κόπας ἐπέστησαν τοῦ πλοῦ* (2, 91.), *ἀποσαλεύειν* (1, 137.), *φρυκτωρεῖσθαι* (3, 60.), *τὰ σημεῖα ἥρση* (1, 49.), *ἐπεπαιώνιστο ὥς ἐς ἐπιπλοῦν* (1, 50.), *τὰ σκάφη εἰλον ἀναδύμενοι τῶν νεῶν* (1, 50.), *τὴν νίκην προσεποίησαντο ἀνελόμενοι τὰ* — *ναυάγια καὶ νεκρούς* (1, 54.), *τροπαῖον ἔστησαν, ἀντίστησαν* (ib.), *ἥνπερ ἔλαβον ναῖν, ἀνέδεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ ῥῖον τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν παρὰ τὸ τροπαῖον* (2, 91.), *τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐκείνων [ναυάγια καὶ νεκρούς] ὑπόσπονδα ἀπέθεσαν* (ib.), *κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον* (1, 51.), *καταίρων* (1, 37.); *unde πάταρος* (4, 26.), *κατάγεσθαι, καταγωγὴ* (6, 42.), *ὀρμίζειν, ὀρμίζεσθαι, ὀρμεῖν, ὀρμος, εὐρησάμε* — *ἐφορμίσασθαι* (4, 8.), *ἐφορμεῖν τινι, ἐφορμεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τι* (3, 33.), *κατόρχων, καταρχεῖν, κατασχεῖν ἐς τι* (7, 38. 4, 42.), *sic σχεῖν ἐς τι ἐτ' ἐπὶ* (5, 2. 8, 64.), *ἀποβαίνειν cum ἐς γῆν et sine eo, εὐρε* — *ναύσταδμον πλοίων* (3, 6.), *ἔφρακτον στρατόπεδον* (1, 118.), *σταθῆμα περὶ τὰς ναῦς* (6, 66.), *modus quo valli evelluntur* (7, 25.).

CHAP. VII.

ON THE ATHENIAN LAND FORCES.

THE forces of the *Athenians themselves* must be distinguished from those of the *mercenaries*, and the *auxiliary troops* of the allies; and a distinction must also be made among the various kinds of soldiers.

The Athenian heavy-armed, who were taken from the military list (ix καταλόγου), were 29,000, of whom 16,000 were appointed for the defence of the city and the forts. These, however, were not all citizens, but also *Metæci*, or sojourners. (l. 2, 31.) Of horse, or horse-archers, there were 1200: a number which may seem small, but it was large compared with that of the Peloponnesian horse. Many could not keep horses, by reason of the ruggedness of the soil of Attica, and because of the popular government.* These horsemen, as also the heavy-armed (l. 3, 17.), seem to have had servants, who cooked their food and carried their baggage, and were, therefore, called *ἐπίπρῃται, ἀκόλουθοι*. (7, 75.) There were also 1600 archers. Regular light infantry, as darters, slingers, or Peltastæ (i. e. middle-armed), they had few or none. Whenever the *Metæci* (as was the case when the population was called forth *en masse*) were called out, they used such arms as were at hand. (l. 4, 94.) As the Athenians were opulent, they were enabled to hire excellent light-armed from foreign nations, Thracians, Cretans, and others. (l. 4, 129. 5, 6. 7, 27 and 29. 6, 43. 7, 57.) This use of mercenaries afterwards tended much to the ruin of Greece.

To advert to the forces of the allies, few of these, before the treaty with the Argives, Mantinæans, and Eleans, furnished heavy-armed. The Milesians, indeed, sent some to the expedition against Cythera (l. 4, 54.); and in the army passing over to Sicily, out of five thousand one hundred, two thousand two hundred and fifty were Athenians, five hundred Argives, two hundred and fifty

* Alas, for the rich! who could not, it seems, be allowed to keep a horse for health or pleasure, lest their *sans culottes* brethren should feel envy, and take offence at their *pride*. Such was the state of things in a country where liberty and equality were perpetually *boasted of*, but never *attained*; the higher classes having to enjoy what wealth they were permitted to keep, by stealth; as is the case in *Turkey* at the present day. We should never have suspected society to be in so unnatural a state, had not Aristophanes given us *more* than a peep behind the curtain: we might, indeed, scarcely be disposed to credit the satirist, were not his representations confirmed by the testimony of Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, the Greek orators, &c. &c. (Edit.)

Mantinæans, and the rest consisted of the subject-allies. (l. 6, 43.) If, however, the treaty with the nations of Peloponnesus, just mentioned, had been more lasting, the number of heavy infantry would have considerably increased; since even the Eleans furnished three thousand. (l. 5, 59 and 75.)

Among the allies who used light arms were the Acarnanians, excellent slingers. (l. 2, 81.) The Ænians were Peltastæ (l. 4, 28.), as were also the Methymnæans. (l. 4, 129.) The Rhodians were slingers. (l. 6, 43.) Others were archers. See l. 7, 57. 8, 69. Of the Grecian horse the best were the Thessalians, who, however, only aided the Athenians during the first year of the war. (l. 2, 22.) In the parts of Thrace they were assisted by some Macedonian horse. (l. 1, 61 and 63.)

These, then, were the forces of the Athenians, which, however, were dispersed throughout many countries, and could not easily fight conjointly. (l. 2, 39.) It was only to neighbouring countries that they marched forth in full force, or *en masse*, *παρῆμαί*. Thus a very considerable force made an irruption into Megara, consisting of thirteen thousand heavy-armed, of whom three thousand were Metæci, and no small number of light-armed. (l. 3, 31. See also l. 3, 91.) To Delium they led forth not only all the citizens and Metæci of military age, but even the foreigners staying in the city (l. 4, 90.), of whom the light-armed were far more numerous than that of the enemy. In the first expedition to Sicily, the fleet conveyed five thousand one hundred heavy-armed, four hundred and eighty archers, seven hundred darters, one hundred and twenty Peltastæ, and thirty horse (l. 6, 43.); who were afterwards joined by two hundred and fifty horsemen, to be mounted in Sicily, and thirty horse archers. Lastly, Demosthenes brought five thousand heavy-armed, and archers, darters, and slingers in considerable numbers. (l. 7, 42.) These were the greatest armies of the Athenians, in this war, united in any one place. For, since the Peloponnesians were far superior in number, the Athenians did not venture to encounter them in a *pûched* battle (the only ones worthy of which name were, the battle at Delium against the Bœotians, that at Amphipolis against Brasidas, that between the Spartans and Argives, wherein the Athenians participated, and the battles in Sicily*), but allowed their fields to be ravaged, and, cruising around Peloponnesus with their fleets, made descents at all favourable spots, and committed

* The Author forgets the important and well-contested one with the Corinthians (l. 4, 43.), and that near Megara. (Edit.)

ravages. Which, that they might do in the winter also, and when the greater part of the fleet was absent, they occupied the islands near Peloponnesus; and took in and fortified some peninsular promontories, and thus separated them from the continent. Of this we have instances in Minoa (l. 3, 51.), Pylus (l. 4, 3.), Methone (l. 4, 45.), Cythera (l. 4, 53.) Compare l. 5, 51 and 75. Their allies, who were somewhat removed from the sea, they persuaded to carry down walls thereto, that if they should be blocked up on the land side, they might receive supplies by sea. (l. 5, 82. 1, 103. 5, 52. 5, 82.) For, upon the whole, the Athenians were thought very skilful in attacking fortified places (τειχομαχεῖν ἰδόντων δυνατοὶ εἶναι, l. 1, 102.); and, therefore, they did not decline a war of siege. How rapidly they fortified places appears from what was done at Pylus (l. 4, 3 and 4.) and Nisæa. (l. 4, 69.) They had numerous carpenters (τέκτονες), and stone-masons (λιθουργοί, l. 4, 69., λιθολόγοι, l. 7, 43.) Of the iron tools used by these artificers we have mention at l. 5, 82. 6, 44. 4, 4, 69. They, however, not only stormed cities, but besieged them, till famine or sedition should compel the inhabitants to submit. To this were applied the terms προσκαθίζεσθαι, προσκαθῆναι, προσεδρία, &c. By famine Potidæa and Melus were reduced; by famine and sedition Mytilene; by sedition Mende. That supplies might not be introduced, the places were circumvallated (περιτειχίζοντο κύκλῳ, or ἀπειχίζοντο), either (when there was no fear from an external force) by a single wall, fortified with towers and castles, or sometimes by a double one, of circumvallation also. The labour of these works was portioned out among the allied states (l. 5, 114. 5, 75. 2, 78.); on the completion of which, the major part of the army returned home, and a garrison (φρουροί, φύλακες) was left to defend the walls. The enemy impeded this circumvallation by making sallies (ἰπεξίεναι, ἐπέξουδον ποιεῖσθαι ἐκβοηθεῖν), and themselves carried out transverse walls. (l. 6, 99. seq.)

The mode of engaging in battle was not destitute of art. Both parties strove to carry out the wings (especially the right, l. 5, 71.) beyond the enemy's line, and thus outflank them (which was termed περιέχειν τῷ κέρει, or ὑπέρχειν: and, by the later writers, ὑπερφαλαγγεῖν and ὑπερκερᾶν). They laid ambushes in hollow and bushy places, and made a sudden attack on the rear (κατὰ νότου), or rushed on the flanks (so κύκλωσις ἐς τὰ πλάγια, l. 4, 35.), surrounded them (ἐκυκλοῶντο), and resorted to stratagems (κλίμματα) of every kind. The enemy used to draw out (ὑπεξάγειν) their wings, so as to equal those of the enemy; by which, however, they sometimes left an interval (διάκνον), at which the enemy rushed in (l. 5, 7.), as

they opposed *other* troops to those in ambush, or defended themselves by the *form* of their array. The plan of array was chiefly this: the heavy-armed were placed in the centre, the horse and light-armed at the wings. Sometimes the army was distributed into two *divisions*, one placed in the rear, and as a *corps de reserve* to the other, and called the *οἱ ἐπιτακτοί*: the depth was from eight to sixteen, and sometimes twenty-five. (l. 4, 94.) There was also a *τετράγωνος τάξις*, or square array, formed on emergencies, consisting of heavy-armed, and within which the light-armed, baggage-bearers, &c., were placed; and a *lighter*-armed corps was appointed to charge upon the enemy, on occasion. (l. 4, 125.) The battle commenced with skirmishing on the part of the light-armed; meanwhile, the respective generals delivered harangues, the soothsayers and augurs offered up sacrifices, and the trumpeters, &c. sounded a sort of battle-march. The heavy-armed were of most consequence, and these maintained a close combat (*στάδια* or *συσταδὸν μάχη*), the opposite to which was *περισταδὸν προσβολή*. (l. 7, 81.) The respective armies, as soon as they had sung the pæan, rushed on (*προσέμειξαν ὁρῶμεν*, l. 4, 96.), and fought hand to hand (*ἐς χεῖρας λέναι* or *ἐλθεῖν, ἐν χερσὶ γήγεσθαι*, and *εἶναι*). They used their shields for pushing and breaking the enemy's line. (l. 4, 96. 5, 73. 6, 70.) Sometimes, however, the light-armed poured in their volleys from a distance (*ἐκ πολλοῦ*, l. 4, 32.), pressing upon the enemy when he retreated, but giving way when he attacked. (l. 2, 79. 3, 97.) They, by the lightness of their armour, easily outstripped the heavy-armed, and were often of great service. By these the Athenians at Spartolus (l. 2, 79.), in Ætolia (l. 3, 97.), and in Sicily, on the retreat from Syracuse (l. 7, 79.), and the Lacedæmonians at Sphacteria (l. 4, 32.), were vanquished.* The horse very rarely decided battles; though some instances are found at l. 4, 44 and 96. 2, 79. Their use was greater before and after battles, in covering the retreat of an army, or in harassing an invading force, by cutting off stragglers and parties sent out for wood and water. (l. 7, 13.)

The battles (of which only one in this war was nocturnal) were obstinate (*καρτεραί*), but not bloody. (See l. 3, 99. 4, 44. 4, 101. 5, 11. 6, 71. 5, 74.)

Of commanders among the Athenians there were generally *three* (l. 4, 42 and 53.); sometimes *two* (l. 4, 89 and 129.); and occasionally with full powers to decide on the magnitude of the

* In both these last cases, however, there seem to have been *some* heavy-armed employed. (Edit.)

army, and all the details of an expedition. (l. 6, 26.) But it was difficult for them, by reason of the general feeling of liberty inherent in democracy, to preserve military discipline (l. 7, 14.); which we also see in the Syracusans. (l. 6, 69, and elsewhere.)

CHAP. VIII.

ON THE GENIUS AND POLITICAL FEELINGS OF THE ATHENIANS, THEIR MODE OF ADMINISTERING PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND THEIR CHIEF PERSONAGES.*

PUBLIC affairs were debated and determined in an assembly of the people (τῇ τοῦ δήμου ἐκκλησίᾳ), called by the senate, or council of ballot (βουλῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου), l. 8, 66.), which body was sometimes addressed previously to the people. (l. 5, 45.)

The people determined *en dernier ressort* concerning war or peace (l. 1, 139.), alliance (l. 1, 31, 5, 45.), the magnitude of armies (l. 6, 24. seqq.), the fate of the vanquished (l. 3, 36.), the mode of administration of the city, and its magistrates (l. 8, 67.), and on public offences. (l. 6, 29 and 60.) It created generals (l. 2, 65. 6, 7.), substituted others in their place (l. 4, 28.), and, by its suffrages, which the Prytanis (i. e. the *president* of the Prytanes), after he had given the orators permission to speak (γνώμας προῖδμε), used to put or propose (rogabat), which was called ἐπιψηφίζειν, ψῆφον ἐπάγειν, it decreed and confirmed every matter of consequence. (l. 8, 69.) †

* For what is said on the first of these heads, the Editor must refer to the original. The parallels drawn by Thucydides, at l. 1, 70. & 2, 37., may abundantly suffice.

† The places of meeting mentioned in Thucydides, are the Pnyx (l. 8, 97.), where the people usually met; the temple of Bacchus, near Munychia (l. 8, 93.), and the Colonus. (l. 8, 67.) Here may be noted the phrases ἐκκλησίαν ποιεῖν and ποιεῖσθαι, τὸν δῆμον συλλέγειν, ἐγγικλῆσαι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸ Κολωνόν (8. 67.), γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον (ib.), ῥήτορας ἐπιέναι (6, 29.), παρόντες, παρελθόντες ἔλεγον. (1, 139.) The following are the magistrates of the Athenians (οἱ ἐν τέλει, 3, 36., αἱ ἐνδημοὶ ἀρχαὶ (5, 47.), mentioned in Thucydides: οἱ ἐνθάδε Ἀρχοντες, who, in the time of Cylon, administered the greatest part of public affairs (l. 1, 126.); Πρυτάνεις, who are ordered to administer the oath to the other magistrates, in the Argive treaty (l. 5, 47.); Γραμματεῖς (7, 10.): after the defeat in Sicily, ἀρχὴ τις πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων προσβουλευσούσι (8, 1.); afterwards ἐγγράφοις ἀντακράτορες (8, 67.), by whom the form of government was changed.

Sometimes they consulted twice about the same thing (when the Prytanes are said αἰδῖς γνῶμας, or διαγνῶμην προδιδῶναι and ἀναψηφίζειν, l. 3, 36 and 92. 6, 14.), and in the second assembly rescinded the decree (ψηφίσματα) of the former. Thus it was in the deliberation on the treaty with the Corcyræans (l. 44.), and on the punishment of the Mytilenæans (3, 36.), and on the expedition to Sicily, though it appears to have been not without offence and danger.*

CHAP. IX.

ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN CONFEDERACY.

THE Lacedæmonian Confederacy seems, at first sight, to have been formed on far juster principles, and, as far as respected the external condition of the states, was really much more equitable than the Athenian; for its first law was, that each of the states should be free and self-governed. Thus, in the treaties between the Lacedæmonians and Argives, it is expressly laid down, "that all the cities of Peloponnesus shall be free, according to the custom of their country" (though we shall see that this first law of the Peloponnesian treaty was perpetually violated by the Arcadians and Eleans). These allies did not pay tribute (οὐχ ἑποταλαῖς φόρου, l. 19.); but, where there was need, they made contributions of money (ισφοράς, l. 141.). All, moreover, had equal right of suffrage (πάντες ἰσόψηφοι), and consulted in congress on all matters of importance, when the opinion of the majority was abided by and acted upon, unless some impediment of a religious nature arose. (l. 5, 30.) Thus the Lacedæmonians did not decree the war against the Athenians before they had held a congress (σύνεδον) of the allies, and put the question to the states, great and small. (l. 1, 87 and 119 and 125.) Thus they take counsel with them on admitting the Mytilenæans into the confederacy. (l. 3, 8.) To the treaties entered into with Athens, the ambassadors [or deputies. Edit.] from the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, and Megareans subscribe their names. (l. 4, 118.) The peace of Nicias and Plistoanax some of the allies received, others rejected. (l. 5,

* The part treating on the great statesmen and generals the Editor has omitted, as containing nothing of originality or importance.

19.) In case there were any disputes between the federate states, these, if respecting private persons, were to be decided equitably (*ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ*), according to the laws of the state in whose territory the dispute originated; but if they regarded the *states themselves*, they were to be determined by impartial arbitration. (l. 5, 79.) The Lacedæmonians, therefore, who held the supremacy, seem almost alone, in comparison with the other states, to have obtained these rights: — first, they presided at the congresses, and thus convoked the allies to Lacedæmon (l. 1, 87 and 119.), or sometimes Olympia. (l. 3, 8.) They proposed the affairs to be deliberated on, and put the question to vote. (*ψῆφον ἐπέγον*, l. 87 and 119 and 125.) Then they superintended the execution of what was determined on; and in war, they held the supreme command. Hence they sent round summonses (*περιήγγειλον*, 2, 8. 4, 8. *ἔταξαν*, 8, 3.) to the rest, when and with what quotas of troops and quantity of provisions they were to repair to the general muster, for a common expedition; and the expenses of the war were laid out by them. (l. 2, 7.) Again, though the states had each their commanders (*στρατηγοὶ κατὰ πόλεις*), yet with these were sometimes associated Lacedæmonian officers (called *ἐναγγοὶ ξυναφιστάταις ἐκαστῆς πόλεως*, 2, 75.), and the whole army was commanded by a Lacedæmonian king, as also the fleet by a Lacedæmonian *ναύαρχος*, or admiral in chief. Hence it appears that the principles of the confederacy, though not very unfair, were exceedingly imperfect. For they were destitute of a perpetual common-council, the congresses were tardily held, and when convened, by different nations deliberating, each as suited its private interest, the good of the community was postponed, and each was desirous to throw the trouble and danger upon the rest. (l. 1, 141.) Whence arose a great tardiness in their deliberations; and, if the thing were decided to be done, excuses were never wanting for delaying the execution of the general orders from Lacedæmon. Besides, the very equity of the league was a mere crafty deceit; for, in the first place, the Lacedæmonians, who boasted that they would restore freedom to Greece (l. 1, 69. 2, 8.), subjected it to the domination of *the few*, which they set up in all the federate cities. (l. 1, 19 and 76. 5, 8.) Again, there was a suspicion (amply confirmed by subsequent events) that they only granted the allies an outside show of liberty, in order to withdraw them from the Athenians. (l. 1, 76.) For, in the treaties of Nicias (l. 5, 19 and 23.), they agreed with the Athenians that, if any thing were forgotten, *they themselves* (without consulting the allies) should make such additions or changes as might be

approved by both parties. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians were little fit for supreme rule, because their manners and customs differed from those of all the rest of Greece; and on going out from their country, they adhered to their own customs, and did not adopt those of others. (l. 1, 77.)

Such being the case, this Peloponnesian confederacy would not have lasted so long as it did, had it not been preserved, confirmed, and amplified by the plots which the Athenians were perpetually laying against the liberty of the states.

Those who belonged to the Lacedæmonian confederacy may also be divided into the *old* and the *new* allies. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war they were (as we learn from 2, 9.) the following:—First, all the Peloponnesians, except the Argives, Achæans, and, in some measure, the Arcadians. Of these the *Argives*, though always hostile to the Lacedæmonians, yet, for the first part of the war, kept quiet, because a thirty years' treaty still subsisted between them and the Lacedæmonians. Of the Achæans, the Pellenians were, at first, the only people who aided the Lacedæmonians; but afterwards (perhaps from the time that the Lacedæmonians ordered things in Achæa according to their pleasure, 5, 82.) all the rest. The Arcadians are also mentioned among the allies; but they effected little, and, indeed, took pay on both sides; and the Mantinæans afterwards went to war with the Lacedæmonians. On the contrary, the most zealous allies of the Lacedæmonians, and the most active excitors of the war against the Athenians, were the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, Epidaurians, Trœzenians, Hermionians, Halians, — *all*, by reason of their enmity with the Argives, needing the aid of the Lacedæmonians; and, in the Mantinæan war, the *Tegæans*, by their hostility to the Mantinæans. But of Peloponnesus there were the Megaræans, Bœotians, Locrians (Opuntii), Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. From the Bœotians (who, like the Megaræans, by their form of government, and hatred of the Athenians, were the most trusty) must be excepted the Platæans. *Anactorium* was, in the war itself, subdued by the Athenians and Acarnanians. (4, 28.) And the Ambraciots, in the sixth year of the war, were compelled by the Acarnanians to make peace (l. 3, 114.); which, however, did not quite deprive them of power to injure Athens. (See 7, 58.) In the place of these, however, arose (by hatred of the Acarnanians and Messenians) the Ætolians, whom, in the third book, we find at war with the Athenians, but not before they had been first attacked by them; and they seem to have had no permanent treaty with the Lacedæ-

monians. The Trachinians, too, acceded to the alliance in the sixth year, for defence against their neighbours (l. 3, 92.); and, finally, the Dorians, the parent country of Lacedæmon, but too weak to be of any weight in such a war.

Beyond Greece, if we except the cities which gradually withdrew from the Athenian alliance, there were no Grecian cities that had formed any close treaty with the Lacedæmonian confederacy. The cognate cities of Italy and Sicily had, indeed, promised assistance immediately at the commencement of the war (2, 7.); but they did not contribute any before the wars in Sicily. In the former of those wars all the Doric cities in Sicily, except Camarina (3, 86.); namely, Syracuse, Gela, Agrigentum, Himera, Messene, and the Lipari islands; in the latter, Syracuse, Camarina, Gela, Selinus, and Himera, entered into war with the Athenians. Of the Italian cities, the Locri Epizephyrii were their enemies up to the peace of Phæax (l. 5, 5.), and ever again afterwards. Tarentum favoured the Lacedæmonians (l. 6, 104.), but sent no aid before the close of the Sicilian wars; on the conclusion of which, also the Syracusans, Selinuntians, and Locrians went to give assistance to the Lacedæmonians. (8, 26 and 91.) The Cyrenæans, too, supplied the Peloponnesians, when on their way to Sicily, with two triremes.

Whatever treaties the Lacedæmonians concluded with the *Barbarians* were of a very different nature, having no reference to dominion, but present utility. The Chaones, Thesprotians, Molossians, Atintanes, Paranæans, and Orestians, once went on an expedition against Acarnania, under the guidance of the Lacedæmonians. (l. 2, 80.; see also 1, 47. and 3, 73.) As to Perdiccas, he was never long on any side. On his policy, see 1, 62. 4, 83 and 128. Some of the Siculi, under the direction of the Syracusans, fought against Athens. But no alliance was of greater importance (though none so disgraceful) than that of the Persians. The Lacedæmonians must have known how ignominious it was to make treaties with the enemy of the Greek nation; but they excused it on the ground of the plots laid by the Athenians against the freedom of Greece (l. 1, 82.), and at the beginning of the war they prepared to send ambassadors to the king. (l. 2, 7.) These embassies (of which one was intercepted) (l. 2, 67.) effected nothing; meanwhile king Artaxerxes Longimanus died, and negotiations were afterwards entered into with two of the satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and treaties at length concluded, though interrupted with constant bickerings. (See l. 8. *passim*.)

THE LACEDÆMONIAN CONFEDERACY.

A. GREEKS.

1. OLD ALLIES.

Countries, Cities, and Commonwealths.	Race.	Form of Govern- ment.
(α) Of assured Fidelity.		
Peloponnesus : — Corinthians. Phliasians. Sicyonians. Epidaurians Allies of the Epidaurians : — Trœzenians Hermionians Haliæans Pelleneans Tegetæ. Lepreatæ Hellas : — Megareans The commonwealth of Bœotia ; capital Thebes Independent states : — The Haliar- tians, Coronæans, Copæans, Thespians, Tanagræans, Orcho- menians. Cities or states tributary and con- joined : — Chæronea and others. Dorians, parent country of the Lacedæmonians.	Dorians Dorians. Dolopians. Dolopians. Achæans. Arcadians. Pelasgi. Dorians Æolians	{ Oligarchy. Epidemiurgi. { Oligarchy. Artynæ. { Democracy to the 89th Ol. { Oligarchy, with equal laws ; the 4 councils of the Bœo- tians ; the 11 bœotarchs.
(β) Of suspected Fidelity, and who revolted after the Peace of Nicias.		
Peloponnesians : — Eleans	Ætolians and Æolians, except the antient in- habitants, who were Epeans	{ Mixed; Demi- urgi, the 600, the Thesmo- phalaces, and the Hellano- dicæ.

Countries, Cities, and Commonwealths.	Race.	Form of Government.
Peloponnesians: — Mantinæans, with their subjects The Parrhasians, afterwards liberated by the Lacedæmonians	Arcadians - Pelasgi -	Democracy. { Demiurgi, Senate, Theori, Polemarchi.

2. THE NEW ALLIES.

Countries, Cities, and Commonwealths.	Race.	Form of Government.
(α) Those who were such from the beginning of the War. Hellas: — Ambraciots. Leucadians. Anactorians (These all followed the Corinthians). Locri Opuntii. Epicnemidii?	Dorian colonists of Corinth -	{ Democracy?
(β) Those who acceded to the Alliance afterwards, except such as revolted from the Athenians. Hellas: — Heraclea Trachinia - Ætolian commonwealth - Apodoti, Ophiones, Eurytanes. Bomians, Callians (Agræans) - Peloponnesus: — Achæans (unwillingly) -	Melian Dorians Æolians - Grecians.	{ Governed by Lacedæmon. Harmostæ. { Inhabited in villages. Monarchy.

Countries, Cities, and Commonwealths.	Race.	Form of Government.
Sicily : —		
Syracusans - -	Dorians from Corinth -	} Democracy.
Camarinæans (in second Sicilian war) - -	Syracusans or Geloans -	
Geloans - -	Rhodians and Cretans.	} Democracy.
Agrirentines (who, however, in the second war kept quiet, as did also the Messenians) -	Dorian colonists of the Geloans.	
Selinuntians - -	Dorians from Megara.	
Himeræans - -	Language a mixture of Doric, customs Chalcidic.	
Æolian islands : —		
Messenians.	} Mixed colonists of Cnidus.	
Liparæans - -		
Italy : —		
Tarentines - -	Lacedæmonian colony.	
Locri Epizephyrii -	Locrians.	

B. BARBARIANS, WHO WERE AT TIMES ALLIES.

The Persians; treacherous.

Edones; under monarchical government.

The Macedonians; unstable, under the government of Perdiccas, and after him Archelaus (whose enemies were the Lyncestæ, under the government of king Arrhibæus).

Epirots : —

The Chaonians; not monarchical.

Thesprotians; not monarchical.

Molossians; under the government of Tharypus.

Atintanians; regent Sabulinthus.

Paranæans; under the government of king Orædus.

Orestians; under the government of king Antiochus.

Siculi : —

Such as were subject to the Syracusans.

Inessæans, Hyblæans, &c.

Sicani?

CHAP. X.

THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF LACEDÆMON, AS WELL REVENUE, AS FLEETS
AND ARMIES; AND THE MODE OF CARRYING ON WAR.

As to *funds*, the Lacedæmonians neither had any in the treasury, nor readily contributed from their private purses. (l. 1, 80.) Very similar, too, were the other Peloponnesians, whose property, moreover (absent, as they were, during the war from their domestic concerns, and precluded from the use of the sea), could not but be diminished. (l. 141.) Of the old allies, the Corinthians alone were at all opulent, whose city had, in former times, been very rich. (l. 1, 13.) Of the other allies, the Siculi were possessed of wealth both public, and (in the case of the Slinuntians) deposited in the temples; and in that of the Syracusans, there was wealth arising from tribute paid by the Barbarians. (l. 6, 20.) The *Peloponnesians*, on the contrary, had no other means of providing for the expenses of the war but by *forced contributions* (levied at the order of the Lacedæmonians, after a certain rate, from the citizens), plunder (as in the case of Iasus, l. 8, 28 and 36.), and loans from the wealth laid up at Delphi and Olympia (l. 1, 121 and 143.), or obtained from barbarian kings, and such allies of Athens as had revolted. Thus, from the Rhodians they exacted thirty-two talents. (l. 8, 44.) The army of Brasidas, too, was sometimes paid by the Macedonians. As to the *Persians*, rich as they were, they derived but little assistance from *them*. Tissaphernes, indeed, in the twentieth year of the war, promised to pay their soldiery a drachma a day each. He, however, only paid it for one month, and afterwards would have only given half a drachma, when, at the urgent remonstrances of Hermocrates, he added a trifle more. (See note on 8, 29.) By the terms of the second treaty, the Persians engaged to support such forces as they should *send for*. (l. 8, 37.) But they feared lest, if they gave more than the Athenians, the seamen of that power would desert to the Lacedæmonians, and *those*, consequently, would become too powerful. Besides, Tissaphernes was so much the more sparing, because he had to provide the money from his own treasures, and did not receive it from the king. In the third treaty he engaged to pay such a fleet as should be present, until the king's ships

should arrive; after which he would *advance* the money for the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, to be repaid him at the end of the war. (See also l. 8, 80, 83, 87.)

We see, therefore, how difficult it was for the Lacedæmonians to maintain a fleet; indeed, at the beginning of the war, they scarcely had one. For though at first they meditated the formation of a fleet of five hundred sail, yet most of them they expected from Sicily and Italy, and the allies there; in which they were disappointed. They, therefore, were obliged to furnish of themselves such as they could build and equip; and though the Corinthians had possessed a considerable number, yet many of those were lost in the conflict with Corcyra. So that after all there was no considerable force sent to sea, and nearly the whole of it was lost by the disaster at Sphacteria. Besides, had the Peloponnesians even possessed *more* ships, they stood in need of skilful seamen; who could not be formed, just when wanted, out of mere landmen, nor would the Athenians give them opportunity for practice. (l. 1, 80 and 142.) The latter disadvantage, indeed, they hoped they should overcome, could they draw away, by the temptation of higher pay, the foreign seamen in the service of the Athenians. (l. 1, 121.) But it was doubtful whether, if they had *funds* sufficient for that purpose, they could induce them to venture on an increased peril, for an increase of pay only during a short period. (l. 1, 143.) Hence we need not wonder at the little skill or success evinced by the Lacedæmonians in the first years of the war. (l. 2, 83, 3, 30, 4, 13.) Their hope of victory, indeed, depended on converting a naval battle into a land engagement. Thus we see how much the Athenians injured themselves by transferring the war to Sicily, where the Syracusans ere long opposed them with a nearly equal force, and where the method of engagement became exactly what the Peloponnesians desired. The complete success there obtained incited the Lacedæmonians to order the building of an hundred ships, by the allies, in certain proportion. With these, however, partly by the craft of Tissaphernes, nothing very effectual was performed against the Athenians. Though, indeed, *without* the Persians great things *might* have been done, especially after the sedition at Samos, had not the Lacedæmonian admirals been sluggish, foolish, cowardly, and at variance with each other. Alcidas was tardy and timid, but Astyochus was worse, who threatened those he ought to have assisted, sold himself to Tissaphernes, and, by bribery, permitted his companions to be defrauded of their hard-earned wages. His successor, Mindarus, was something

better, at least, no crimes are recorded of him, and he evinced some ability in forming the line of battle at Cynos-sema. (l. 8, 104.) Of others, as Chalcideus, 'predecessor of Astyochus, Theramenes, and Thrasymedes, no decided opinion can be formed; but there is little reason to think they were different from Alcidas. Indeed, through distrust of their commanders, the Lacedæmonians sometimes sent *counsellors*. But these did not all resemble Brasidas, and two others sent to the fleet opposed to Phormio; and even *those* in vain endeavoured to rouse the torpor of Alcidas. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, afterwards adopted the wiser expedient of giving the counsellors power to control, on occasion, the measures of the commanders, form such plans as they judged best, and even deprive the admiral of his command.

Thus we have seen how feeble was the Lacedæmonian power by sea. By land they were more powerful; but even there they were found inferior to the opinion entertained of them.

Their number of heavy-armed is nowhere clearly mentioned; but from l. 5, 64. we may infer it. After they had taken the field, *en masse*, with the Helots, leaving behind the sixth part, they mustered about four thousand two hundred. Of cavalry, at first, there were none, except the three hundred about the king's person; but, on the capture of Pylus and Cythera by the Athenians, they were obliged, in order to check the incursions of predatory bands, to raise a force of four hundred horse and archers. Yet in the army collected at Nemea, though nearly the finest Greece had seen, there were no cavalry. At Mantinæa there *were* some; but they are not mentioned as taking part in the battle. When, therefore, the Lacedæmonians spoke of their *numbers*, they included their *allies*. As to their *skill* and *courage*, on which they prided themselves, and for which they were so celebrated, they showed little worthy of their reputation. Where was their *obedience* or *warlike skill* at Mantinæa? Where their *fortitude* at Sphacteria? What must we say of their *sieges*, in which they confessed their ignorance at Ithome? (l. 1, 102.) And in this war they could with difficulty *starve out* Plataæa, though never defended by so many as five hundred men.* Upon the whole, except some glorious deeds of Brasidas, which were rather to *his* honour than that of the Lacedæmonians, we find no proof of any remarkable warlike merit. They mostly contended with a very inferior num-

* This was, however, as Thucydides gives us to understand, partly the result of Lacedæmonian craft. (Edit.)

ber of the Athenian army, which consequently gave way to them. What was the number of the whole Peloponnesian alliance Thucydides nowhere informs us. Plutarch, *Peric.* 33., says that the number, in the first invasion of Attica, was sixty thousand. Most of the army consisted of heavy-armed. The horse were chiefly furnished by the Bœotians, sometimes by the Locrians and Phocians, Perdiccas, the Chalcidæans, and the Edones; in Sicily, by the Syracusans and Geloans. The peltastæ were from the cities in Thrace which revolted from the Athenians, as also from the Bœotians, who had, besides, many light-armed, and the Syracusans and the Ætolians. Mercenaries from Peloponnesus [chiefly Arcadians] were hired by both parties.

In expeditions to distant countries undertaken by the whole confederacy, *two-thirds* went out to war, and the *other third* remained for home defence. The greater expeditions were commanded by a Lacedæmonian king, at first with full power, but afterwards controlled by a *board* of ten counsellors. (l. 5, 63.) Deputy-officers were sent out to succeed to the command in the event of the death of the principals. (l. 3, 100. 4, 38.)

In all expeditions the superstition of the Lacedæmonians was very injurious to them. Before they passed the borders, they offered up sacrifices to the gods; and if these were not favourable, they returned home. (l. 5, 54 and 56.) The same was the case in *earthquakes*. They also would not go out to war on the festivals, especially the Carnean month; which superstition lost them Pylus, and the fruit of the victory of Mantinæa. From such superstition, indeed, the other Greeks were not free. For the Corinthians, in order to celebrate the Isthmian games in quiet, exposed the Chians to imminent peril. (l. 8, 9.) Earthquakes disturbed the assemblies both of the Athenians and Corinthians. (l. 5, 45 and 50.) An eclipse of the moon was the ruin of the Athenian army in Sicily. (l. 7, 50.) But the rest of the Greeks were less alarmed at such occurrences than the Lacedæmonians, and the Argives sometimes magnanimously despised them. (l. 5, 54. 6, 95.)

In the field of battle, the Sciritæ stood on the left wing, the Tegæans on the right, the king in the centre, and the rest where the general appointed. The Lacedæmonian army (excepting the Sciritæ) was divided into *lochoi*, which, at Mantinæa, were seven; every lochos comprehended four pentecosteis, each pentecostus four enomotias, and the enomotia, at that time, consisted of thirty-two, four in front and eight deep. The commanders under

the king were the Polemarchs, Lochagi, Pentecosters, Enomotarchi. Before the battle they sung warlike songs, and then proceeded with slow step to the attack, to the sound of pipes. (l. 5, 70 and 73.) The Lacedæmonians might, however, easily be beaten, if, as at Sphacteria, they were assailed in rear and flanks with missiles; for of this sort of warfare they were ignorant, and their armour was no sufficient defence. (l. 4, 34.)*

* The learned Author has two other chapters; one on the genius, manners, and mode of administering public affairs among the Lacedæmonians, and on the principal personages: the other containing a comparison of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and the causes why the Peloponnesian war was so disastrous to the Athenians. But if the reader will turn to the elaborate comparison of Thucydides himself, at l. 1, 70., and in the first and second orations of Pericles, and also pay any tolerable attention to what is narrated by our historian, he may well dispense with such sort of summaries. (Edit.)

A

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF THE
MOST REMARKABLE EVENTS
RECORDED IN THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

B. P.	Olym.	B. C.	
		347	1124 The Boeotians are driven from Arne, and colonise Cadmeis. l. 1, 12.
		339	1116 The island of Melos is first colonized. l. 5, 112.
		327	1104 The Dorians with the Heraclidæ occupy Peloponnesus. l. 1, 12.
		257	1033 About this year the Siculi possessed themselves of the greater part of Sicily. l. 6, 2.
			804 Lycurgus formed the Lacedæmonian legislation. l. 1, 18.
			733 Naxos, the first Greek colony in Sicily, is founded. l. 6, 3.
			732 Syracuse is founded. l. 6, 3.
			727 Leontini is built, and a little after Megara Hyblæa. l. 6, 3.
			704 Aminocles, the Corinthian, makes triremes for the Samians. l. 1, 13.
			687 Gela founded. l. 6, 4.
			664 The most ancient sea-fight of the Corinthians and Corcyreans. l. 1, 13.
			597 A colony led to Selinus. l. 6, 4.
42,1		612	The sacrifice of Cylon. l. 1, 126.
45,3		597	Camarina built by the Syracusans. l. 6, 5.
50,1		579	Agrigentum founded. l. 6, 4.
58,1		548	Cræsus conquered by Cyrus. l. 1, 16.
63,1		527	After the death of Pisistratus, Hippias becomes tyrant of Athens. l. 6, 94.
65,1		519	The Platæans received by the Athenians into alliance. l. 3, 68.
66,2		514	Hipparchus killed. l. 6, 59.
67,2		510	Hippias driven from Athens. l. 1, 18, 6, 59.
70,3		497	Aristagoras, endeavouring to lead forth the colony 'Ερπία ὀδύς, is killed. l. 4, 102.
72,3		490	The battle of Marathon. l. 1, 18, 6, 59.
73,3		486	The death of King Darius. l. 1, 14.
74,4		481	Piræus begun to be built. l. 1, 95. The war of the Athenians and Æginetæ. l. 1, 14.
75,1		480	The expedition of Xerxes against Greece. l. 1, 18.
75,2		479	The Persians driven out from Greece. l. 1, 89.
75,3		478	The Athenians repair and fortify their city. l. 1, 89 and 93.
75,4		477	The fortification of the Piræus completed. l. 1, 95.
76,3		475	Eruption of Ætna. l. 3, 116.
77,3		470	The Grecian allies of the Spartans make the government over to the Athenians, l. 1, 95.
77,4		469	The sea and land fight at Eurymedon. l. 1, 100. Pausanias is killed. l. 1, 131. seqq.

B. P.	Olym.	B. C.	
	78,4	465	Colony sent by the Athenians to the Strymon. l. 4, 102. Earthquake in Laconia, l. 1, 106. The beginning of the third Messenian war. Themistocles comes to Artaxerxes. <i>ibidem</i> .
	79,2	463	The Egyptians led by Inarus revolt from the Persians. l. 1, 104. Defeat of the Athenians at Drabescus. l. 1, 100. 4, 102.
	79,3	462	The Athenians bring assistance to the Egyptians, l. 1, 104. These sent back to Ithome by the Lacedæmonians. l. 1, 102.
	80,3	458	The war of the Corinthians and their allies against the Athenians. l. 1, 105.
	80,4	457	The Athenians driven from Egypt. l. 1, 109 and 110. The long walls at Athens are begun. l. 1, 107. The battle at Tanagræ, 108.
	80,4	456	Battle at Cænophyta, l. 1, 108. The Æginetæ subdued, <i>ibidem</i> .
	81,1	455	The Messenians driven from Ithome. l. 1, 103.
	82,1	451	The Lacedæmonians enter into a thirty years' treaty with the Argives. l. 5, 14.
	82,1	450	The five years' treaty of the Peloponnesians and Athenians. l. 1, 112.
	82,1	449	The death of Cimon. 112.
	82,4	448	The sacred war. 112.
	83,1	447	Defeat of the Athenians at Coronea. l. 1, 113.
	83,1	446	Eubœa revolts from the Athenians. l. 1, 114.
	83,1	445	Plistoanax in Attica. l. 2, 21. The treaty between the Athenians and Peloponnesians concluded after the recovery of Eubœa. l. 1, 87 and 115. 2, 1.
	85,1	440	The war of the Samians and Milesians. l. 1, 115.
	85,4	437	Amphipolis founded by Hagnon. l. 4, 102.
	86,1	436	The Epidamnians implore the help of the Corinthians l. 1, 25.
	86,2	435	The victory of the Corcyræans. Epidamnus taken. l. 1. 29.
	86,1	433	Treaty entered into between the Corcyræans and Athenians.
	86,4	432	The second sea-fight between the Corcyræans and Corinthians. l. 1, 49. Potidæa revolts from the Athenians. l. 1, 58.
	87,1	432	The Lacedæmonians decree the war. l. 1, 87.
	87,2	431	The Thebans privily fall upon Platæa, l. 2, 2., in the beginning of the spring. The first invasion of the Lacedæmonians in Attica under Archidamus. l. 2, 19.
	87,2	430	The plague at Athens, l. 2, 47. in the beginning of the summer.
	87,3	-	The unsuccessful expedition of the Ambraciots to Argos Amphilochicum. l. 2. 68.
	87,1	429	Potidæa conquered. l. 2, 70.
3	87,1	429	The expedition of the Peloponnesians against Platæa. l. 2, 71.
-	-	429	The expedition of the same and the Ambraciots against Arcanania. l. 2, 80. seqq. Sitalces king of the Odrysæ, leads an army into Macedonia against Perdiccas and the Chalcidians. l. 2, 95. seqq.

B. P.	Olym.	B. C.	
4	88,1	427	Lesbos revolts from the Athenians. l. 3, 2.
	-	427	Two hundred and twelve Plataeans having passed over the wall of the Peloponnesians, escape to Athens, l. 3, 20. seqq.
	88,½	427	Lesbos comes again into the power of the Athenians. l. 3, 28. Plataea is given up to the Lacedæmonians. l. 3, 52. Corcyra is harassed with seditions. l. 3, 70.
-	88,2	-	The former expedition of the Athenians to Sicily. l. 3, 86. The plague again depopulates the Athenians. l. 3, 87.
	88,¾	426	Heraclea in Trachis founded. l. 3, 92. Demosthenes undertakes an expedition against the Ætoliæ, and is defeated. l. 3, 95. seqq.
-	88,3	-	The expedition of the Ambraciots against Argos Amphiloehium, and their defeat. l. 3, 105. seqq.
7	88,3	425	The Athenians fortify Pylus, in Messenia. l. 4, 4.
-	88,4	-	Two hundred and ninety-two Spartans are taken alive in the island of Sphacteria by the Athenians. l. 4, 31—39. Artaxerxes dies. l. 4, 50.
8	88,4	424	Cythera occupied by the Athenians. l. 4, 54.
-	89,1	-	The Sicilians restore peace among themselves. l. 4, 65. The long walls of the Megareans are taken by the Athenians. l. 4, 66. seqq. Also Nisæa. l. 4, 69. Brasidas passes through Thessalia to Chalcis. l. 4, 78. Defeat of the Athenians at Delium. l. 4, 89. seqq. The Amphipolitans receive Brasidas. l. 4, 107. Torone taken by treachery. l. 4, 112.
9	89,1	423	The annual truce between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. l. 4, 117., on the 14th day of the month Elaphebolion, ¾ March.
10	89,½	422	Torone taken by Cleon. l. 5, 2, 3.
-	89,3	422	Battle at Amphipolis, in which Cleon and Brasidas are killed. l. 5, 10., at the close of the summer.
11	89,3	421	Peace for fifty years made between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. l. 5, 17—19., on the fourth of April. Afterwards also an alliance. c. 22. The Argives take the lead in joining alliance against the Lacedæmonians, l. 5, 28., to which the Mantinæans and Eleans accede. Scione is taken. l. 5, 32. The Lacedæmonians renew their treaty with the Bœotians. l. 5, 39.
12	-	-	Treaty between the Athenians, Argives, Mantinæans, and Eleans. l. 5, 47.
13	90,1	419	The Bœotians occupy Heraclea in Trachis. l. 5, 52.
-	90,½	-	War of the Epidaurians and Argives. l. 5, 53. To both afterwards the allies bring assistance.
14	90,¾	418	Truce between the Lacedæmonians and Argives. l. 5, 60.
-	90,3	-	Battle between the Argives and Lacedæmonians under the command of Agis. l. 5, 66. seqq. Peace between the Argives and Lacedæmonians. l. 5, 77., and then an alliance concluded. 6, 79.
15	90,¾	417	The Argives renew their treaty with the Athenians. l. 5, 82.
16	90,4	416	The Athenians attack Melos, and at length subdue it. l. 5, 84. seqq.
17	91,1	415	A great portion of the Athenian forces, under Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades, sets out for Sicily. l. 6, 80.

B. P.	Olym.	B. C.	
17	91,2	415	Alcibiades, being summoned from Sicily, flies to Peloponnesus. l. 6, 61. First battle between the Athenians and Syracusans, in which the Athenians conquer. l. 6, 67. seqq. The Lacedæmonians, stimulated by Alcibiades, again prepare to carry on war with the Athenians. l. 6, 93.
18	91,2	414	Being in another battle victorious, the Athenians set about circumvallating Syracuse. l. 6, 97. seqq.
-	91,3	-	The arrival of Gylippus the Spartan. l. 7, 2.
19	91,3	413	The Lacedæmonians fortify Decelea. l. 7, 19. First sea-fight between the Athenians and Syracusans. Gylippus takes Plemmyrium. l. 7, 22. seqq., in the month of June.
-	91,4	-	Second sea-fight between the same. l. 7, 36. seqq. The arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon into Sicily. l. 7, 42. Night battle at Epipolæ. l. 7, 43., in the month of July. The Syracusans conquer in a sea-fight, then the Athenians in a land-fight. l. 7, 52. seqq., in the month of August. That battle in which the fleet of the Athenians is completely defeated, l. 7, 69. seqq., at the beginning of September. The Athenians retreat from the Syracusans by land. l. 7, 75. seqq. Demosthenes with his army surrenders himself to Gylippus. l. 7, 82. Nicias, with his men, surrenders himself to Gylippus, l. 7, 85., in the month of September.
20	92,1	412	The Chians, Erythræans, and Milesians revolt from the Athenians. l. 7, 14 and 17. First treaty of the Lacedæmonians with Darius and Tissaphernes. l. 8, 37. Alcibiades flies to Tissaphernes. l. 8, 45.
-	-	411	Rhodes joins the Peloponnesians. l. 8, 44., January. Democracy put down at Athens. l. 8, 63. seqq. init. March.
20	92,1	411	The army of the Athenians in the island of Samos determines to defend the popular form of government. l. 8, 79., seqq.
21	-	-	Abydus revolts from the Athenians. l. 8, 62., in the month of April. Alcibiades being recalled by the army at Samos is created general. l. 8, 82. Battle at Eretria. Eubœa is occupied by the Peloponnesians. l. 8, 95. June. Democracy restored at Athens. l. 8, 97. same month.
-	92,2	-	Victory of Thrasybulus at Sestus. (Κυνόε σῆμα.) l. 8, 104., middle of July.
27	93,4	404	Athens given up to Lysander. End of the Peloponnesian war. l. 5, 26., in the month of April.

GENERAL INDEX.

A.

- ABRONTECHUS* son of *Lysicles*, colleague of Themistocles in the embassy to Lacedæmon, i. 166.
- Abydos* revolts from the Athenians, iii. 330.
- Acanthians*, speech of Brasidas to, i. 328—335. Revolt from the Athenians, 335.
- Inscription on the vase dedicated by, to Apollo, ii. 335, n.
- Acanthus*, etymology and site, ii. 327, n.
- Acarnania* divided into independent districts, ii. 276, n.
- Acarnanians* retain the custom of wearing arms, i. 18.
- Request a relative of Phormio's for a commander, ii. 13. March to relieve Argos, 182. Defeat the Ambraciots at Olpæ, 185; and at Idomene, 189. Jealous of the Athenians, 192. Make peace with the Ambraciots, 193. Benevolent and upright, 193, n. Seize and colonise Anaetorium, 276; their moderation there, 276, n.
- Accusations*, reciprocal, of the Athenians and Peloponnesians, i. 123.
- Acesines*, orthography, site, and etymology, ii. 237, n.
- Achaean Rhium*, ii. 496, n.
- Acharnæ*, famous for asses and charcoal, i. 332, n. Rudeness of its inhabitants, 332, n.
- Acharnians*, their rudeness, i. 332, n.; and irascibility, 333, n.
- Acherusian Lake* derives its name from the river Acheron, i. 98.
- Acheron*, a river of Thesprotia, gives name to the Acherusian Lake, i. 98.
- Acorns*, as food, introduced by the Pelasgi, i. 11, n. Common food of the Arcadians, 11, n. Used roasted by the Spanish peasants, 11, n.
- Acradina*, a division of Syracuse, description and etymology, iii. 118, n.
- Acraë*, founded by the Syracusans. iii. 15. Site and etymology, 15, n.
- Acraëum Lepas*, meaning of the name, iii. 252, n. Fortified by the Syracusans, 252. Athenians repulsed from, 253.
- Acragas*, etymology and site, iii. 13, n. Ruined temples at, 13, n. Settled by the Geloans under Aristonous and Pustolus, 14. Sicani fail in bringing it over to the Syracusan interest, 215.
- Acropolis*, golden shields taken from, by Lacharis, i. 312, n. Called the city, by the Athenians, 322.
- Acrothoi*, its site, ii. 370, n.
- Acte*, on the continental territory of Lesbos, ii. 279, n. Described, 369.
- Actium*, sea fight off, between the Corinthians and Corcyreans, i. 66. Forces stationed there by the Corinthians, 70.
- Admetus*, king of the *Molossi*, Themistocles throws himself on his hospitality, i. 246. Refuses to deliver him up, 248. Sends him to Pydna, 249.
- Æantides*, tyrant of *Lampsacus*, marries the daughter of Hippias, iii. 97; who flies to him on his expulsion, 98.
- Ægaleos*, its site, 329, n.
- Ægestus*, leader of the Trojan colony to Sicily, iii. 5, n.
- Ægina*, besieged by the Athenians, i. 188. Capitulates, 194.
- Æginean* drachma and obolus, ii. 487, n.
- Ægineta*, Corinthians supplied the Athenians with ships against, i. 91. Defeated

- by the Athenians off Ægina, 188. Expelled by the Athenians, 345. Are received by the Lacedæmonians, who give them Thyrea, 346.
- Cynuria given to them by the Lacedæmonians, ii. 285. Those taken at Thyrea put to death, 286.
- Ægittum*, site, ii. 171. Stormed by the Athenians, 171.
- Ænianians*, their country, ii. 495, n.
- Ænus*, called Apainthus, site of, ii. 246, n.
- Æolians* retain the custom of wearing arms, i. 18.
- Æolus*, islands of, antienta supposed to have a subterraneous communication with Ætna, ii. 156, n. Described, 156, n. Colonisation of, 156, n. Ravaged by the Athenians, 157.
- Ætheans* revolt from the Lacedæmonians, i. 181.
- Ætna*, eruption from, ii. 195.
- Ætians*, their soldiers shod on the left foot only, ii. 34, n. Warlike, 165. Inhabit unvalled villages, 165. Their rudeness, 165, n. Pirates and robbers, 165, n. Invaded by the Athenians, 166; whom they defeat, 171.
- Afer Domitianus*, his reply to Quintilian, i. 525, n.
- Agamemnon* collected the armament against Troy through his power rather than from the suitors being under oaths to Tyndarus, i. 26; or from attachment to himself, 28. Contributed the greatest number of ships to the Trojan war, 28. His character, 28, n. Representation on his seal, 231, n.
- Agatharchus* commands a Syracusan fleet, iii. 183. Joint commander of the Syracusans in the last sea fight with the Athenians, 236.
- Age* indispensable in Spartan legislators, ii. 480, n.
- Agessandridas* routs the Athenians, iii. 368.
- Agis son of Archidamus*, his invasion of Attica prevented by an earthquake, ii. 157. Ravages Attica, 196. Invades the Argive territory, 502. Manœuvres, 504—507. Grants a truce and retreats, 508. Censured, 508. Indignation of the Lacedæmonians, 512. Obtains a suspension of his sentence, 512. Engages and routs the Argives at Mantinea, 514—529. Demolishes the long walls at Argos, 540.
- Invades Attica, iii. 177. Fortifies Declea, 178. Probably remained at Declea from its erection, 271, n. More deference paid to him there than to any Spartan king at home, why, 272, n. Exacts money from the Ceteans and the Achæans of Phthiotis, 272. His authority while at Declea, 272. The Corinthians refusing to violate the Isthmic truce, in putting to sea, offers to take the whole armament on himself, 278. Cause of his enmity to Alcibiades, 311, n. Hoping to profit by their disturbances, approaches Athens, but without success, 340. Returns to Declea, 341.
- Agnon son of Nicias* colonises Amphipolis, ii. 368, and note.
- Agreans*, site of their territory, i. 519, n.
- Warred against by the Athenians, ii. 316.
- Ajar*, his tumulus at Rhœteum still remains, ii. 278, n.
- Alcamenes*, anecdote of, i. 368, n.
- Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas*, appointed governor to Eubœa, iii. 273; order countermanded in favour of Lesbos, 273. Fleet to proceed from Chios to Lesbos under his command, 277. Sets sail, 279. Slain, 280.
- Alcibiades son of Clinias*, his early consequence, ii. 480, n. Ancestry, 480, n. Of a contentious spirit, 481. His name a Lacedæmonian one, 481, n. Cause of his enmity to the Lacedæmonians, 481. Urges the Argives to form an alliance with Athens, 482. Overreaches the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, 483. Going with troops to Peloponnesus, adjusts matters regarding the Argive league, 496. Prevails on the Argives to break the truce with the Lacedæmonians, 510. Apprehends three hundred suspected Argives, 541.
- Appointed chief commander in the Sicilian expedition, iii. 19. His supporters, 19, n. His extravagance, and its effects, 30. Speech in favour of the Sicilian expedition, 30—42. Sent seven chariots to Olympia, and gained three prizes, 31; when he feasted the whole assemblage, 31, n. Stone Mercuries made to resemble, 52, n. Probably not guilty of their mutilation, 53, n. His opponents, 54, n. Accused of impiety, 54. Demands a trial ineffectually, 55. His advice on hearing that no money

- was to be expected from Egesta, 83. Fails in negotiation at Messene, 86. Stratagem at Catana, 87. The Salaminia arrives for his apprehension, 89. Causes of of suspicion against him, 100. Escapes at Thuria, 101. Sails to Peloponnesus, 101. Sentenced to death in his absence, 102. Indictment preserved in Plutarch, 102, n. Betrays the schemes of the Athenians against Messene, 117. Proceeded to Cyllene, 124; thence to Argos, 134, n.; and Lacedæmon, 134. Speech, exciting the Lacedæmonians to aid the Syracusans, 135—142. Advises the fortifying of Decelea, 139. Persuades the ephors not to abandon the Chian expedition, 281. Sails with it to Chios and Clazomenæ, which revolt, 282; and Miletus, which revolts, 285. Advises the Sicilian fleet to aid Miletus, where he was present at the battle, 294. Orders coming for his murder, he withdraws to Tissaphernes, and does various ill offices to the Lacedæmonians, 311—314. Cause of the enmity of Agis, 311, n. Writes to Samos regarding Phrynichus's treachery, 320. Thought unworthy of belief, 320. Persuades Tissaphernes to become friendly to the Athenians, 321; hinders him from making a treaty with them, 325; reasons for this conduct, 325, n. Arrives at Samos, 349. Chosen commander, 350. Passes over from Tissaphernes to Samos, 353. Prevents the Athenians at Samos from sailing against Athens, 354. Dismisses the ambassadors from Athens and Argos, 354. Sails to Aspendus, 357. Recalled to Athens, 370. Fortifies Cos, and sails back to Samos, 379.
- Alcidas* sails with a fleet to Lesbos, ii. 26. Sent with a fleet to Mytilene, 41. His delay, 44. Consults, on learning the capture of Mytilene, 45—48. Of weak character, 48, n. Sails to Myonesus, where he butchers his prisoners, 48. Flies from Ephesus, 49; and arrives at Cyllene, 126. Sails for Corcyra, 136. Defeats the Corcyreans, 137. Conveys the ships across the Isthmus of Leucas, and returns home, 140. Leads a colony to found Heraclæa in Trachinia, 163.
- Alcinous*, sacred enclosure of, at Corcyra, stakes sacrilegiously cut from, ii. 129.
- Alciphron* the *Argive*, with Thrasyllus, induces Agis to grant a truce, ii. 507.
- Alcmaeon* son of *Amphiaraus*, story of his inhabiting the Echinades, i. 538.
- Alcmaeonida*, Pisistratidæ overturned by, iii. 97, n.
- Alexarchus* commands the Corinthian troops sent to the Syracusans, iii. 178.
- Alexicles* arrested by the democrats at Athens, iii. 362. Liberated, 364. Steals off to Decelea, 370.
- Allies* of the Athenians, their equality how violated, i. 146, n. Of the Lacedæmonians not tributary, 154, n.
- Alpe*, etymology of the name, i. 345, n.
- Allar* of the twelve gods, and that of Apollo, consecrated by Hippias, iii. 93.
- Allars* frequently common to two or more deities, ii. 108, n. A refuge for involuntary offenders, 352, n.
- Ambassadors* from the Peloponnesians to the king of Persia, i. 455. Delivered up by Sadoc to the Athenians, 456. Put to death, 457.
- Ambracia*, territory of, its site, i. 458, n. City of, its site, 458 n. A Corinthian colony, 459, n.
- Ambracian Gulf*, Anactorium seated at the mouth of, ii. 276.
- Ambraciots* invade Amphilocheian Argos, ii. 181. Defeated at Olpæ, 185. Surprised and routed at Idomene, 190. Make peace with the Acarnanians, 193.
- Aminocles*, a Corinthian, constructed four triremes for the Samians, i. 38.
- Aminius* son of *Coraxus*, first to ascend the blockading wall in the escape from Plataea, ii. 35.
- Amorges* taken by the Sicilian fleet, and delivered to Tissaphernes, iii. 296.
- Amphilochia*, its site, i. 459, n.
- Amphipolia*, anciently called the Nine-Ways, i. 179.
- Its colonisation, ii. 358. Site, 359, n. Taken by Brasidas, 364. Serviceable for ship-building, 367. Peloponnesians defeat the Athenians at, and Brasidas and Cleon slain, 433.
- Besieged by the Athenians and Perdiccas, iii. 168.
- Amphissa*, now Salona, ii. 174, n.
- Amyclæ*, temple of Apollo at, ii. 450, n.
- Amyleus*, governor of the "marsh-land," retains his independence, i. 199.

- Anactum*, its site, iii. 365, n.
Anactorium seized by the Corinthians, i. 111. Its topography, 111, n.
 — Taken by the Athenians and Acarnanians, ii. 276. Corinthians expelled and replaced by Acarnanians, 276.
Anæilans, whence, ii. 30, n.
Anapus, Athenians force the passage of the, iii. 252.
Anazarchus the Theban, repulsed in an attack on Methymna, iii. 372.
Anazilas, tyrant of the Rhegini, founder of Messena, iii. 14.
Andocides informs concerning the mutilation of the Mercuries, iii. 99; whether truly or falsely, uncertain, 99.
Androcles, a supporter of democracy, assassinated, iii. 383.
Androcrates, his fane, ii. 39, n. Prayers offered to him before the battle of Plataea, 39, n.
Andromenes the Lacedæmonian delivers up the prisoners to the Athenians, ii. 480.
Androsthenes the Arcadian, victor at Olympia, ii. 491.
Anopus, mistake in maps regarding this river, i. 488, n.
Antandros taken by the Mytilenæan exiles, ii. 279. Its site, 279, n. Wood plentiful at, 279. Mytilenæan exiles driven from, 313.
Antihene, its site, ii. 478, n.
Antients, their skill in avoiding missiles, ii. 255, n.
 — Their mode of reckoning the days after an event, iii. 244, n. Supposed their gods to envy the too great successes of men, 249, n.
Antiochus, the most ancient writer on Sicily, iii. 6, n. Not the historian called πᾶν ἀρχαῖος by Dionysius, 194, n.
Antiphemus, leader of a Rhodian colony, joint founder of Gela, iii. 12.
Antipho the orator, his reply to Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, iii. 97, n. His character, 336. Brought about the oligarchy at Athens, 336. An opposer of democracy, 359.
Antissa, derivation of the name, ii. 28, n.
Antistians defeat the Methymneans, ii. 29.
Antisthenes commands the fleet sent to Pharnabazus, iii. 805.
Aphrodisia, its site, ii. 284, n.
Apollo, the Pean after victory in his honour, i. 105, n.
 — Temple of, at Leucas, ii. 164. Temple of, in Tanagra, 315, n. His temple at Delium fortified by Hippocrates, 387—339; taken by the Boeotians, 356. His temple at Amyclæ, 450, n. Temple of, near Asine, 497, n.
 — Altar of, in the Pythium, consecrated by Hippias, iii. 93. Worshipped by the Syracusans, as the arch-leader of their colony, and the reason, 150, n. Temple of, opposite Cythera, 185.
Apollo Archegetes, altar of, at Naxos, iii. 9.
Apollo Delian, Polycrates consecrates Rhenea to him, i. 40.
Apollo Maloeis, festival of, ii. 6.
Apollo Pythæus, failure in furnishing a victim to, the pretence for war between the Argives and Epidaurians, ii. 497.
Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, i. 61, n.
Apparel, quantity to be taken by expelled citizens generally defined by treaty of surrender, i. 463, n.
Aqueduct, that at Syracuse destroyed by the Athenians, iii. 151; its ruins still visible, 151, n.
Arcadia, of old, did not often change its inhabitants, i. 6.
Arcadians, Agamemnon furnishes them with ships for the Trojan war, i. 28.
Archedice daughter of Hippias, married to Æantides, iii. 97. Her monument, 98.
Archelaus son of Perdiccas, his improvements, i. 352.
Archeptolemus, chief ambassador to Athens regarding Pylus, ii. 224, n.
Archestratus son of Lycomedes, a commander of the Athenian expedition against Perdiccas, i. 14. Ordered to demolish the Pallenian wall and take hostages from the Potidæans, 114. Sails to Thrace, 116; thence to Macedonia, 116.

- Archias*, leader of a Corinthian colony, founds Syracuse, iii. 9.
- Archidamus*, king of Lacedæmon, dissuades from war with the Athenians, i. 149. Addresses his forces previously to the irruption into Attica, 299. Enters Attica, 304. Censured for tardiness, 328. Confers with the Plataeans, 464.
- Ravages Attica, ii. i.
- Areopagites*, oath administered by, ii. 449, n.
- Areopagus*, court of; first punish with death, ii. 78, n.
- Argennusæ*, etymology and site, iii. 378, n.
- Argilians* revolt from the Athenians, ii. 360.
- Argilus*, etymology and site, ii. 446, n.
- Arginus*, etymology and modern name, iii. 301, n.
- Argives* reckoned time by the years of their high-priestess, i. 275, n.
- Endeavour to become head of a league in opposition to Lacedæmon. ii. 459; reasons, 460. Form a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, 479. Curious clause regarding Cynuria, 478. Send ambassadors to negotiate a treaty with the Athenians, 482. Enter into alliance with the Athenians, 485. Ravage Epidauria, 499. Persuade the Athenians to send the Helots back to Pylus, 502. Territory invaded by the Lacedæmonians, 502; with whom they conclude a truce, 508. Break the truce, 510. Take Orchomenus, 511. Defeated at Mantinæa by the Lacedæmonians, 514—529. Form an alliance with the Lacedæmonians, 532. Change their government to an oligarchy, 538; which is overturned, 538. Democrats call in the Athenians, and build long walls to the sea, 539; which the Lacedæmonians demolish, 540. Three hundred suspected carried off by Alcibiades, 541. Ravaging Phliasia, fall into an ambuscade, 560.
- Their territory ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, iii. 17. Raze Orneæ, 17. Ravage Phliasia, 157.
- Argos*, oligarchy established at, ii. 537; which is overturned, 538.
- Argos in Amphilochia*, i. 459.
- Arianthidas son of Lysimachidas*, ii. 340.
- Aristagoras*, his fruitless attempt to plant a colony on the Strymon, ii. 358.
- Aristarchus* opposes the democratical party at the Piræus, iii. 363. Takes Ence by stratagem, and delivers it to the Boeotians, 371.
- Aristeus son of Pellichas*, joint commander of the Corinthian fleet sent to Epidamnus, i. 66.
- Aristeus son of Adimantus* commands auxiliaries sent by the Corinthians to the Potidæans, i. 117. Chosen general of the infantry of the allies, 119. Worsted by the Athenians, 119. Besieged in Potidæa, 121. Escapes to the Chalcideans, and wars in conjunction with them, 122.
- Aristides son of Archippus* apprehends Artaphernes, ii. 277. He and Demodocus drive the Mytilenæan exiles from Antandros, 313.
- Aristides son of Lysimachus* colleague of Themistocles in the embassy to Lacedæmon, i. 166. His virtue instrumental in procuring the command for the Athenians, 173, n. Adjusted the rate of tribute, 174, n.
- Aristocles* banished for disobedience at Mantinæa, ii. 525.
- Aristocrates son of Scellias* sent to Chios on account of the revolt, iii. 278. A ringleader against the oligarchy at Athens, 357. Arrests Alexicles, 362.
- Aristogiton*, narrative of his celebrated enterprise, iii. 91—97. Honours paid to, 97.
- Aristonius*, with a Geloan colony, found Acragas, iii. 14.
- Aristophanes*, his hit at Laches, ii. 195, n. His summary of bread-making, 223, n. His gross injustice to Demosthenes, 261, n.; and Socrates, 262, n.
- Aristophon*, ambassador to Lacedæmon, delivered up to the Argives, iii. 355.
- Armaments*, ancient, their magnitude accounted for, i. 32, n. Feeble from want of money, not of men, 34. Against Troy exaggerated, 34.
- Armies*, most feared at first, iii. 85. Very large, subject to panic when marching by night through a hostile country, 254.
- Armour*, complete reserved by the higher orders, and inferior given to the common people, ii. 43, n.
- Arms*, custom of wearing, retained by the Ozolian Locrians, Æolians, and

- Acarnanians, i. 18. Formerly worn throughout Greece, 18. Worn by early Greeks and Barbarians at their customary avocations, 18; by the ancient Galli and modern Poles at council, 18, n. First laid aside by the Athenians, 19. Worn by Circassian husbandmen at labour, 19, n. Improvements in, by the Carians, 24, n. Buried with warriors by the Asiatics and Americans, 25, n. Lacedæmonians celebrated for the manufacture of, 151, n.
- Why the Lacedæmonians preferred those for close fight, ii. 252, n. For close fight accounted most honourable, 262, n. Cessation of, proclaimed before each Olympic festival, 491, n.
- Army*, Lacedæmonian, officers of, ii. 517. Order of Lacedæmonian, at the battle of Mantinæa, 517. Order of Argive, at the battle of Mantinæa, 519. Number of Lacedæmonian, at Mantinæa, 521. Pushes out to the right wing, why, 524.
- Arna*, etymology, ii. 360, n.
- Arne*, the Boeotians expelled from, by the Thessalians, i. 35.
- Ancient name of Chæronæa, ii. 314, n.
- Arrhibæus* son of *Bromerus*, ii. 324. His lineage, 325, n. Expedition of *Brasidas* and *Perdiccas* against, 395—405.
- Arrogance* frequent amongst isolated nations, ii. 204, n.
- Arrow*, saying of a Spartan regarding, ii. 262.
- Arasces* murders some Delians at *Atramyttion*, iii. 379.
- Artabæus* son of *Pharnaces* sent by *Xerxes* to treat with *Pausanias*, i. 231.
- Artaphernes*, a Persian ambassador to Lacedæmon, apprehended by *Aristides* and sent to Athens, ii. 277. His letters read, and himself sent to *Ephesus*, 277.
- Artas* furnishes darters to *Demosthenes*, iii. 194.
- Artaxerxes* tries to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, but fails, i. 196. Sends forces to Egypt, which reduce it, 197. Letters of *Themistocles* to him, 251. Receives him, 253; and assigns him three cities, 257.
- Artemis*, *Tissaphernes* offers sacrifice to, iii. 380, and note.
- Arts*, what is new in them most esteemed, i. 134, n.
- Artynæ*, who designated by, ii. 488, n.
- Artifice* of *Themistocles* to forward the building of the walls of Athens, i. 163. Of supplicants at Athens to retain religious protection, 227, n. Of the Lacedæmonians to procure the exile of *Pericles*, 228. Of the ephors to discover the guilt of *Pausanias*, 229. Of *Hannibal* to bring *Fabius* into disrepute, 305, n.
- Of *Demosthenes* at *Olpe*, ii. 187. Infamous, of the *Corcyrean* democrats, 273. Infamous, of the Lacedæmonians against the *Helots*, 322. Of *Alcibiades* against the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, 488. Of the wives of the *Melians* to liberate their husbands, 542, n.
- Of the *Egestæans* to persuade the Athenians that they were wealthy, iii. 81.
- Asine*, its site, ii. 218, n.
- Asopius* son of *Phormio* ravages Laconia, ii. 13. Slain at *Nericus*, 13.
- Aspasia*, funeral oration said to have been written for *Pericles* by her, i. 360, n.
- Aspendus*, etymology and site, iii. 355.
- Asphodel*, said by *Pausanias* to abound in the *Ozolian* territory, ii. 175, n.
- Asses*, *Acharnæ* famous for its breed of, i. 382, n.
- Assinarus*, its waters discoloured with the blood of the Athenians butchered in, iii. 261. *Nicias* surrenders at, 261.
- Assyrian Language*, Persian letters written in, ii. 277. Conjectures regarding, 277, n.
- Atacus*, its site, i. 351, n.
- Astronomy*, ignorance of the ancients in, i. 347, n.
- Atyochus*, arrives at *Chios*, iii. 289. Sails for *Lesbos*, but hearing of the taking of *Mytilene* desists, 289. Brings over *Ereasus* to revolt, 289. Returns to *Chios*, 290. Attacks *Pteleum* and *Clazomenæ* without success, 299. Driven by storm into *Cyme*, 299. His narrow escape from the Athenian fleet, 301. Arrives at *Miletus*, 302. Refuses to assist the *Chians*, 304. Sacks *Cos* *Meropiæ*, 307. Defeats the Athenian fleet, 308. Returns to

- Cnidus, 308. His baseness with regard to Phrynichus, 319. Cowardly, 331, n. Murmurings of the soldiers against, 346 and 351. Attacked by his troops takes refuge at an altar, 352. Superseded, 352.
- Asylum*, attached to a temple, mode of constructing, ii. 443, n.
- Atalante*, inundation at, from earthquake, ii. 158. Site, 448, n.
- Athenæus*, witty epigram of, iii. 312, n.
- Athenagoras* the *Syracusan*, a factious partisan, ii. 290, n.
- His speech on the prospect of an Athenian invasion, iii. 69—74
- Athenians*, the first to cease wearing arms, i. 19. Colonise Ionia and most of the islands, 36. Induced by Themistocles to improve their navy during the war with the *Æginetæ*, 40. On the approach of the Medes, embarked with their movables on board their ships, 145. Acquired military skill from frequent wars, 46. Their mode of governing their allies, 47. Corcyreans solicit their alliance, 71; and are opposed by the Corinthians, 71. Enter into a defensive alliance with the Corcyreans, 95. Send ships to their aid, 96. Require the Potidæans to demolish the Pallanian wall and send hostages, 113; which they order Archestratus to effect with the armament against Perdiccas, 114. Defeat the Potidæans, 120. Their character, 130. How they attained to the administration of affairs, 161. After the taking of Sestos, return home, 162. Allies alarmed by the greatness of their navy, 163. The Greeks, incensed by the insolence of Pausanias, request them to become their leaders, 171. Obtain the supreme command, 173. Tax the allies, 173. Establish Hellenotamiæ, 173. Take Eion on the Strymon, 175. Carry away captive the inhabitants of Scyrus, and colonise it themselves, 175. Force the Carystians to yield on conditions, 176. Reduce the Naxians, 176. Their rigorous exactions cause revolts, 176. Obtain naval strength at the expense of their allies, 178. Thasians revolt from them, 178; and are defeated, 179. Colony sent by them to Amphipolis set off by the Thracians, 179. Force the Thasians to surrender, 180. Assist the Lacedæmonians against Ithome, 182. Dismissed thence on suspicion, 183. Renounce the alliance of the Lacedæmonians, 183; and join the Argives and Thesalians, 183. Settle the Helots at Naupactus, 184. Occupy Megara and Pegæ, 185. Assist Pammenicus, governor of Egypt, 186. Defeated by the Corinthians off Halia, 187. Beat the Peloponnesians of Cecryphaleia, 187. Defeat the *Æginetæ* off *Ægina*, and besiege the city, 188. Defeat the Corinthians at Megara, 189. Begin to build the long walls, 190. Defeated by the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, 193. Make themselves masters of Boeotia, 193. Finish their long walls, 194. Force the *Æginetæ* to capitulate, 194. Burn Gythium, 195. Take Chalcis, 195. Defeat the Sicyonians, 196. Driven out of Egypt by the Persians, 197. Their fleet destroyed off Mendesium, 199. Fail in the attempt to restore Orestes, 200. Defeat the Sicyonians, 200. Besiege *Eniadæ* unsuccessfully, 201. Conclude a truce with the Peloponnesians, 202. Send an expedition against Cyprus, 203; which is censured by Sir W. Raleigh, defended by Mitford, its true cause assigned by Plutarch, 203, n. Defeat the Phœnicians and Cilicians, 202. Take the temple at Delphi and deliver it to the Phocians, 203. Attack the Boeotian exiles at Chæronæa and take the city, 203. Defeated at Coronea and driven out of Boeotia, 203. Subdue Euboea, which had revolted, 205. Make the thirty years' truce with the Peloponnesians, 205. Send an expedition to Samos, 207; which they reduce, 210. Reduce the revolted Byzantines, 210. Require the Lacedæmonians to purge the pollution of Tænarus, 229; and of the temple of Minerva Chalcæcus, 229. Expel Pausanias from Byzantium, 234. Their final reply to the Lacedæmonians, 274. Garrison Plataeæ, 288. Prepare for the war, 289. Greeks in general inimical to them, 295. List of their confederates, 297. Remove into the city, 316. Extent of their preparations, 307. From what their revenue was derived, 307. Fond of living in the country, 317. Country population occupy the temples and chapels, and the Pelasgium, 324; and the long walls, 326. Their country ravaged by the Peloponnesians, 329. Send a fleet to cruise round Peloponnesus, 337. Ravage the coast, 341. Send a fleet to Locris, which

- ravages the coast, 345. Expel the Æginetæ, 345; and colonise the island, 346. Ravage Megara, 353. Solemnise a public funeral for those who had first fallen in the war, 354; peculiar to them, 355, n. Children of the slain educated at the public cost, 397, n. Pestilence, 398. Defeated by the Thracians, 482. Fleet under Phormio defeats the Peloponnesians, 401.
- Lesbians revolt from them, ii. 1. Send a fleet against the Mytilenians, 6. Blockade Mytilene, 12. Ravage the Laconian coast, 13. 25. Their fine navy, 26; which, with the siege of Potidæa, exhausts the treasury for the first time, 27, 28. Send Paches with an army against Mytilene, 29. Raise contributions amongst themselves and allies, 30. Gather the Colophonians, and settle them at Notium, 52. Their murderous decree against the Mytilenians, 53; seized with compunction, 54; convene an assembly to reconsider it, 55; Cleon defends it, 55—69; Diodotus opposes it, 69—85; rescinded, 86. Their instability, 56, n. Their orators accountable for their advice, 74, n. Partition the lands of the Lesbians, 90; and take possession of their continental towns, 91. Seize Minoa, 92; and garrison it, 93. Their government under Pericles a practical aristocracy, 112, n. Expedition to Sicily, 154. Second pestilence, 155. Ravage the islands of Æolus, 156. Send a fleet to cruise round Peloponnesus, 159. Expedition to Melos, 160. Invade Ætolia, 166; defeated, 171. Defeated at Inessa, 177. Purify Delos, 178. Send a fleet to Sicily, 198. Military rank terminated with the time specified, 199, n. Fortify Pylus, 202. Refuse peace to the Lacedæmonians, 232. Defeat the Syracusans in the Straits of Messene, 236. Appoint ten generals annually, 244, n. Celebrated in sea fight, 252, n. Invade the Corinthian territory, 264; defeat the Corinthians, 268; ravage the coast, 271; fence the Isthmus, 272. Fleet cooperates with the Corcyrean democrats against Mount Istone, 272; deliver the Corcyrean aristocrats to their enemies, 273. Seize Anactorium, 276. Send an expedition against Cythera, 280; which capitulates, 281. Their enterprising spirit, 283. Set up a trophy at Cotyrta, 284. Sack Thyrea, 286. Their injustice to Pythodorus, Sophocles, and Eurymedon, 297, n. Ravaged the Megarean territory twice a year, 298. Their extravagant views, 298, and note. Attempt to take Megara by treachery, 299; but fail, 310. Effects of the terror of their arms, 306, n. Sent large armaments to collect their taxes, 312, n. Attempt to revolutionise Boeotia, 318. War against the Agræans, 316. Declare war against Perdiccas, 324. Defeated at Delium by the Bœotians, 349. Accused of sacrilege, 350; reply to the charge, 351. Their attempts to found a colony on the Strymon, 358. Make truce for a year with the Lacedæmonians, 379. Dispute about Scione, 393. Take Mende, 409. Besiege Scione, 410. Expel the Delians, 416. Take Torone, 418. Defeated by the Peloponnesians at Amphipolis, 433. Their inducements to peace, 438; which is concluded for 50 years, 444. Restore the Lacedæmonians taken on Sphacteria, 456. Peace lasts six years and ten months, 457. Barbarity to the Scionæans, 466. Restore the Delians, 467. Suspicion between them and the Lacedæmonians, 471. Differ with the Lacedæmonians, 480. Form a treaty with the Argives, 485; to whom they send Laches and Nicostratus with forces, 509. Hasty in condemning, 512, n. Blockade Macedonia, 540. Declare Perdiccas an enemy, 540. Send an expedition against Melos, 542. Debate of ambassadors with the Melians, 543—560. Blockade the city of Melos, 560. Make incursions from Pylus on the Lacedæmonians, 560. At war with the Corinthians, 560. Take Melos, 562; cruelty to the inhabitants, 562; colonise it, 563.
- Circumstances which led to the Sicilian war, iii. 16. Send ambassadors to Egæta, 17. Assist the Argives against Orneæ, 17. Ravage the territory of Perdiccas, 18. Decree an expedition to Sicily, 18; proof of their intention on, 43, n; desire for, universal, 50. Offer rewards for the mutilators of the Hermæ, 53. Embarkation for Sicily, 56; description of the armament, 58—61; ceremonies previous to sailing, 61; arrive at Corcyra, 75; enumeration of ships and troops, 76; arrive at Rhegium, 79. Trick put upon, by the Egæstæans, 81. Form a camp at Catana, 88. Send the Salaminia for Alcibiades and others accused, 89. Suspicious, from reported

cruelty of the Pisistratidæ, 90; who were not overturned by them, but by the Lacedæmonians, 90. Punish those accused of mutilating the Hermæ, 99. Sentence Alcibiades in his absence, 101. Take Hyccara, 102. Encamp before Syracuse, 106. Operations, 107. Defeat the Syracusans, 115. Winter partly at Naxos, 117. Levied money from the allies rather than ships and arms, why, 128, n. Winter partly at Catana, 133. Preparations for hostilities, 134. Forbade any Grecian state to harbour Alcibiades, 134, n. Real intent of the Sicilian expedition, 137. Ravage the Sicilian coasts, 143. Effect a landing at Leon, 146. Palisade the Isthmus at Thapsus, 147. Take Epipolæ, 148. Commence the wall of circumvallation, 148; operations during its progress, 149—154. Assist the Argives against the Lacedæmonians, in violation of the treaty, 156. Various operations at Syracuse, 159—166. Appoint colleagues with Nicias, 174. Send a fleet to cruise round Peloponnesus, and reinforcements to Sicily, 179. Defeat the Syracusan fleet, 181. Destroy the piles in front of the dock, 183. Fortress of Decælea ruinous to, 186. Their doggedness regarding the Sicilian war, 187. Levy a tax on goods transmitted by sea, 188. Sea fight at Naupactus, 195. Account themselves conquered, if not decidedly victors, 196. Fleet defeated by the Syracusans, 202. Defeated in the night attack on Epipolæ, 206—210. Commanders deliberate on the course to be pursued, 210—215; decide on remaining, 215; repenting of which, they prepare to depart, but are restrained by an eclipse of the moon, 216. Defeated in a sea fight by the Syracusans, 217. Their dejection, 220. Nations assembled with them against Syracuse, 222—224. On the Syracusans blocking up the port, resolve in council on a sea fight, 226; in which they are defeated, 235—241. Deliberate on retreating during the night, 241. Seamen refuse to try another engagement, 242. Deceived by a stratagem of Hermocrates, defer their departure for that night, 243. Burn some of their ships, and suffer the Syracusans to haul off the remainder, 244. Their wretched departure, 244—247. Order of march, 251. Force the passage of the Anapus, 252. Driven back from the Acræum Lepas, 253. Retreat by night, 254. Force the passage of the Cacyparis, 255. Demosthenes's division overtaken and surrounded by the Syracusans, 256; capitulates, 258. Nicias's division arrives at the Erineus, 258; learning the surrender of Demosthenes, offers conditions, 258, which are rejected, 259; attempting to march by night is discovered, 259; marching next day, arrives at the Assinarius, 259, where it surrenders at discretion to Gylippus, 261. Three hundred who had escaped the previous night apprehended, 262. Thrust into the stone quarries, 263; their sufferings there, 265. Their expedition to Syracuse the most disastrous on record, 266. The division of Demosthenes confined in the stone quarries, that of Nicias sold into slavery, 266, n. For a long time discredited the news of the calamity, 268. Their rage against the promoters of the expedition, 268. A barber who communicated news of the disaster to the archons tortured, 268, n. Their magnanimity, 269. Resolve to prepare a fleet, curtail the state expenses, and establish a board of government, 269. Greece in general hostile to them, 270. Build ships and fortify Sunium, 272. Abandon the fortification in Laconia, 272. Send to Chios regarding the revolt, 278. Drive the Peloponnesian fleet into Piræus, 279; where they disable and blockade it, 280. Decree to use the thousand talents, 283. Reinforce the blockading fleet at Piræus, 288. Take four Chian triremes, 287. Take Mytilene, 289. Reduce Clazomenæ, 290. Make a descent at Panormus, and slay Chalcideus, their trophy destroyed by the Milesians, why, 290. Defeat the Chians thrice, and plunder the country, 291. Defeat the Peloponnesians at Miletus, 298. Blockade Miletus, 298. Chasing three Chian ships, three of their own bulged at the city of Chios, 301. Take six Peloponnesian guard-ships, and attack Cnidus without success, 302. Seize the Chian territory, and fortify Delphinium, 304. Those at Samos deliberate on adopting an aristocracy and recalling Alcibiades, 316; send ambassadors to propose the measures at Athens, 321: which are at first violently opposed, but at length agreed to, 323. Despatch ambassadors to negotiate with Tissaphernes, 325; who fail, 326. Send ambassadors to establish an oligarchy at Athens, and in the

- dependencies, 332. Abolish democracy, 333—340. Send ambassadors to Agis to treat of peace, who refuses, 340; send a second time, 341. Send an embassy to Lacedæmon, 341. Send ambassadors to Samos, 341. The soldiers at Samos swear to support democracy, and oppose the four hundred, 344; hold an assembly, 345. Ambassadors to Samos dismissed by Alcibiades, 355. Ambassadors to Lacedæmon delivered to the Argives by the Paraliæans, 355. Cabals against the oligarchy, 357. Tumults at the Piræus, 362—364. On the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet forget their quarrels, and rush to defend the Piræus, 366. Fleet defeated by the Peloponnesians, 368. Consternation on hearing of the loss of Eubœa, 368. The four hundred deposed, 369. Their government at this time best regulated, 369. Recall Alcibiades, 370. Defeat the Peloponnesian fleet, 376—378. Their courage revives, 378. Take eight ships from Byzantium, 379. Subdue Cyzicus, 379.
- Athens*, Athenians returned to, after the taking of Sestos, i. 162. Greater part destroyed by the Barbarians, 162. Description of walls of, 167. Assigned to the chief sultana for pin-money, 258, n. Its temples in the citadel or adjacent, 319. No city so much praised, 375, n.
- Inhabitants, into what classes distinguished, ii. 337, n. Why resorted to by strangers, 337, n. President furnished by tribes in rotation, 385, n.
- The paradise of the mob, iii. 236, n.
- Athletes* formerly contended with girdles about their pudenda, i. 21. Barbarian athletes still contend girdled, 22. Greek, when girdles disused by, 22, n.
- Atintania*, its site, i. 484.
- Atramyction*, Delians murdered at, by Arsaces, iii. 379.
- Atræus*, having fled from his father to Eurystheus, i. 27, succeeds to his government, 28.
- Atrocities* at Corcyra, ii. 142.
- Attacks* usually made at dawn, ii. 372, n.
- Attica*, its sterility, i. 7. Uninterruptedly inhabited by the same race of men, 8. A refuge for the expatriated natives of other parts of Greece, 8. Sent out colonies to Ionia, 9. Causes of its early dense population, 9, n. Anciently inhabited in separate towns, 317.
- Great part of the corn consumed in, imported, iii. 45, n.
- Aulon*, its site, ii. 360, n.
- Autodes son of Tolmaeus*, with colleagues, takes Cythera, ii. 281; and ravages the coast, 282.
- Avarice*, Thracians noted for, ii. 246, n.

B.

- Bacchiadae*, a noble Corinthian family, ii. 324, n.
- Bacchus and Ceres* chiefly worshipped at Phlius, ii. 503, n.
- Bakers* impressed to bake for troops, iii. 47, and note.
- Barbarians*, the term no where used by Homer, i. 13. Origin of the term, 13, n. Early, inhabiting the coasts of Asia Minor and the islands, pirates, 15; and land robbers, 18. Destroyed the greater part of Athens, 162.
- Barbarous nations*, modern, catch missiles, ii. 255, n.
- Barber* who communicated the news of the destruction of the Athenian army at Syracuse tortured by the archons, iii. 258, n.
- Baskets* borne by virgins at Athenian festivals, iii. 94.
- Bas relief* at Orchomenus, supposed tomb of Hesiod, ii. 169, n.
- Battalions*, policy of separating, at Megara, ii. 311, n.
- Battering engines*, various opinions regarding their invention, i. 475, n.
- Battle*, the resource of ignorant generals, i. 209, n.
- Battlements*, their form, ii. 35, n.
- Battus*, a Corinthian commander, ii. 269.
- Beaks* of ancient vessels described, iii. 196, n. Of the Syracusan vessels, how constructed, 197, n.
- Ball*, carried by the Greek watch, ii. 413.
- Bellows*, vestiges of primitive, ii. 353, n.

- Benefactors* steadier friends than the benefited, i. 381, n.
- Birman rowers*, their mode of retreat, i. 106, n.
- Births* not permitted in Delos, why, ii. 178, n.
- Boat*, cart used for conveying, ii. 301, 302, n.
- Boats*, most ancient, formed like Indian canoes, ii. 216, n.
- Body-guard* of Medes and Egyptians employed by Pausanias, i. 233.
- Baotarchs*, their number and office, i. 276, n.
- Their number, ii. 339, and note. Two sent by Thebes, 340, n.; who command in turn, 340, n.
- Bæotia*, of old, frequently changed its inhabitants, i. 6. Formerly called Cadmeis, 35.
- Federal districts of, ii. 314, n. Plan for revolutionising, 313—316. Boundary between it and Attica, 340, n. Districts of, 344, n.
- Bæotian* exiles attacked by the Athenians, whom they defeat, i. 303.
- Bæotians*, expelled from Arne by the Thessalians, settle in Cadmeis, i. 35.; to which they give their own name, 35. Ravage the Platæan territory, 304.
- Their form of government, ii. 112, n. March to relieve Megara, 307. Engage the Athenians near Nisæa with doubtful success, 308. Defeat the Athenians at Delium, 349. Accuse the Athenians of sacrilege at Delium, 350. Take Panactum, 419. Their pretence for razing Panactum, 479. Occupy Heraclea in Trachis, and dismiss the Lacedæmonian governor, 495.
- Send troops to the Syracusans, iii. 178. Promise to aid the Lesbians in revolting from Athens, 273. Take Oropus, 328. Occupy Cæcoe, 371. Their affinity to the Lesbians, 372, n.
- Bolbe, Lake of*, in Mygdonia, territory around, assigned to the Chalcideans, i. 115.
- Its estuary, ii. 360.
- Bolissus*, its site, iii. 291, n. Chians defeated by the Athenians at, 291.
- Bomians*, derivation of their name, ii. 170, n.
- Bones* of the sacrilegious dug up and cast out, i. 228.
- Gigantic, popular notion regarding, iii. 8, n.
- Border land*, strip uncultivated between Megara and Attica, i. 259, n.
- Botticæans*, situation of their territory, and some account of themselves, i. 183, n.
- Brasidas son of Tellus* relieves Methone, i. 341. First who obtained praise at Sparta in the Peloponnesian war, 342. His character, 342, n.
- His bravery at Pylus, ii. 216. Wounded 217. His shield used for a trophy by the Athenians, 217. His great abilities, 306, n. Comes to relieve Megara, 306. Refused admittance, 307. Advances with his army, 308. Offers battle to the Athenians, 309; and on their declining it is received into Megara, 311. Crossing Thessaly, stopped by the natives, 318; soothes them and proceeds, 319. Joins Perdiccas, 321. Sent at his own desire, 328. Brings over most of the Thracian cities, 324. Renders the Lacedæmonians popular, 324. Persuades Arrhibæus to withdraw his forces, 327. Persuades the Acanthians to revolt from the Athenians, 335. Takes Amphipolis, 365. His moderation shakes the allegiance of the Athenian allies, 367. Not seconded by the Lacedæmonians, 369. Invades Actæ, 369. Takes Torone, 374. Addresses the Toroneans, 376. Demolishes Lecythus, 378. Addresses the Scionæans on their revolt to the Lacedæmonians, 390. Stratagem of the boat, 390. Invested with a golden crown at Scione, 391. Second expedition against Arrhibæus, 395. Deserted by Perdiccas, 397. Address to his troops, 399—402. Retreats, 403—405. His fruitless attempt on Potidæa, 413. Takes post at Cerdylum, 422. Address to his troops at Amphipolis, 427. Defeats Cleon, 433. Slain, 435. Honours paid to him after his death, 435. Resemblance in his death to Wolfe, Moore, and Nelson, 435, n. His mother's answer unjust, 435, n. His reason for opposing peace, 441. His youth a hindrance to, 480, n.
- Bravado*, vainglorious, of Cleon, ii. 245, n.
- Bread*, a mixed kind used by the ancients, ii. 241, n.
- Bread-making*, Aristophanes's summary of, ii. 223, n.
- Bribery*, accusations of, frequent in Athenian assemblies, why, ii. 290, n.
- Bricinnia*, etymology, ii. 420, n.
- Bricks*, height of a wall computed by numbering the courses of, ii. 31, n.
- Bromiscus*, its site, ii. 360, n.

Brutus and Cassius, their resemblance to Harmodius and Aristogiton, iii. 94, n. 95, n.
Buphras, probable site, ii. 382, n.
Burns, noble couplet of, ii. 215, n. Compared with Tyrtæus, 326, n.
Byzantines revolt from the Athenians, ii. 207. Reduced, 210.
Byzantium, Pausanias expelled from, by the Athenians, i. 234.

C.

Cabbage, wild, used in Greece, ii. 188, n.
Cadmeis, ancient name of Boeotia, i. 35.
Caduceus described, i. 109.
Cakes kneaded up with wine and oil, ii. 87, n.
Calex, Lamachus loses his ships at, by a land flood, ii. 313, n.
Callians, where situated, ii. 171, n.
Callias son of Calliades arrives in Macedonia with the Athenian army, i. 117.
 Makes an unsuccessful attack on Beroæ, 118. Encamps at Gigonus, 118.
 Defeats the Potidæans, and is slain, 120.
Calligritus son of Laophon, ambassador from Pharnabazus to Lacedæmon, iii. 275.
 Does not give the money for the Chian expedition, 276.
Callistratus, his magnanimous conduct at the retreat from Syracuse, iii. 262, n.
Calydon, etymology and site, ii. 176, n.
Camarina, its colonisation and fortunes, iii. 15.
Camarineans refuse to admit the Athenians, iii. 89. Though Dorians, adverse to the Syracusans, 119, n. Assemble to hear the Syracusan and Athenian ambassadors, 119. Declare themselves neutral, 138.
Cambyzes, his army reduced to eat human flesh, i. 463, n.
Camel, its walk a mode of measuring distances in the East, i. 521, n.
Canastrium, etymology and site, ii. 373, n.
Cannibalism at Potidæa, through famine, during the siege, i. 463. A Scythian custom, 463, n. First instance on the expedition of Cambyzes to Æthiopia, 463, n.
Capital punishment, Spartans slow in resorting to, i. 237.
Capitulation of the Mytilenians with Paches, ii. 43.
Caprena. See *Copurna*.
Capurna, site of ancient Cheronea, ii. 314, n.
Carians, corpses of, dug up at Delos, how known, i. 24.
 — Celebrated for their skill in Greek and Persian, iii. 353, n.
Carnæ continued for a month, ii. 204, n.
Carneus regarded as a holy month, ii. 499, n.
Cart, boat conveyed in, ii. 301, 302, n.
Carthaginians defeated at sea by the Phocæans, i. 40.
Caryæ, etymology and site, ii. 500, n.
Caryatides, in ancient architecture, origin of the term, ii. 501, n.
Carystians warred on by the Athenians, yield on conditions, i. 175.
Casmenæ, founded by the Syracusans, iii. 15. Site and etymology, 15, n.
Castles used as tribunals, ii. 181, n.
Catana, settled by a Chalcidæan colony, iii. 10. Athenians form a camp at, 88.
 Athenians winter at, 133. A place of refuge to the Athenians who might escape from the Syracusans, 263.
Catanæans refuse to admit the Athenians, iii. 86. From persuasion and fear admit them, 88.
Caulon, its site, iii. 183, n. Naval timber burnt at, 183.
Ceadas, what it was, i. 243, n. Malefactors cast into at Sparta, 244.
Cenæum, site and etymology, ii. 163, n.
Cenchrea, its site, ii. 267, n.
Centoripa, etymology and site, iii. 143, n.
Cercine, attempt to fix its site, i. 527, n.
Cerdylum, etymology and site, ii. 423, n.
Ceremonies, religious, used at embarkation, iii. 61.
Ceres and Bacchus chiefly worshipped at Phlius, ii. 503, n.
Ceryces, their office, iii. 322, n. Bear witness to the impiety of Alcibiades, 322.

- Charæas* son of *Archestratus* inflames the soldiers against oligarchy, iii. 343.
- Charonea* taken by the Athenians, i. 203.
- Its site, ii. 314, n. Boeotians defeat the Athenians near, 314, n.
- Chalæum*, its site, ii. 174, n. Etymology, 175, n.
- Chalcedon*, at the mouth of the Pontus, ii. 313.
- Chalcideans*, rest of Greece involved in the war between them and the Eretrians, i. 42. Destroy their cities, and remove to Olynthus, 115.
- Aided by the Lacedæmonians, ii. 321. Join the Argive league, 465.
- From Eubœa, first Greek settlers in Sicily, iii. 9.
- Chalcideus* sent with ships to the Chians and Erythræans, iii. 276. Sails with a fleet for Chios, which revolts, 282; and for Clazomenæ, which revolts, 282; and Miletus, which revolts, 285. Slain at Panormus, 290.
- Chalcis* taken by the Athenians, i. 195. Derivation of the name, i. 490, n.
- Chancel* corresponds to the *ναός*, ii. 338, n.
- Chapels* sometimes apart from the temples, ii. 338, n.
- Charicles* son of *Apollodorus* commands the fleet cruising round Peloponnesus, iii. 179. Fortifies a position in Laconia, and returns to Athens, 185.
- Chariots*, seven sent to Olympia by Alcibiades, iii. 31.
- Charles XII.*, his conduct at Bender an egregious example of false shame, ii. 558, n.
- Charæades* son of *Euphiletus* commands an expedition to Sicily, ii. 154. Slain, 159.
- Charybdis*, cause of its danger, ii. 235, n.
- Chasms*, several in central parts of Peloponnesus, ii. 515, n.
- Chatham, Lord*, anecdote of, i. 360, n.
- Chersonesus*, its site, ii. 266, n.
- Chians*, by order of the Athenians, demolish their wall, ii. 278.
- Their independence permitted, on condition of furnishing ships, iii. 129. Apply to the Lacedæmonians for assistance in revolting from the Athenians, 273. Admitted into alliance, 276. Give seven ships to the Athenians as a pledge of their fidelity, why, 278. Revolt, 282. Four of their ships captured by the Athenians, 287. Bring over Lebedos and Eræ to revolt, 287. Go on an expedition to Lesbos, 288. Thrice defeated by the Athenians, and their territory plundered, 291. Their moderation, 291. Their territory invaded by the Athenians, 304. Faction in the city, 304. Closely besieged, 325. Engage the Athenian fleet with some advantage, 330.
- Children, legitimate*, law that orators and commanders should procreate, i. 395, n.
- Chimerium of Theoprotis*, its topography, i. 70, n. and 98. Forces stationed there by the Corinthians, 70.
- Chios*, the paradise of modern Greece, iii. 313, n.
- Cherades*, reason of the name, iii. 194, n.
- Choragus*, sometimes reduced by the expense of the office to utter poverty, iii. 32, n.
- Christianity*, its influence on warfare, ii. 191, n.
- Chrysis*, high-priestess of Juno at Argos, accidentally burns the temple, ii. 411.
- Corinth*, currants named from being shipped from, ii. 503, n.
- Cimon* son of *Miltiades*, Medes defeated by him at the river Eurymedon, i. 178. Commands the Athenians at the siege of Ithome, i. 182. Commands an expedition against Cyprus, i. 202. Besieges Citium, 202. Dies, 202.
- His virtues won over the confederates, ii. 324, n.
- Circassian husbands* work armed, i. 19, n.
- Cities*, ancient, built at a distance from the coast, i. 23. Modern, on the coast, 22. Ancient, why built at a distance from the coast, 68, n. Greek, Lacedæmonians wish the walls of demolished, 163.
- Usual site of market-place in, ii. 561, n.
- Citium*, besieged by the Athenians, i. 202. The birthplace of Zeno, Apollodorus, and Apollonius, 202, n.
- Clazomenæ* revolts from the Athenians, iii. 282. Alexander joined it by a mole to the continent, 283, n. Again subject to the Athenians, 290. Attacked by Astyochus without success, 299. The country ravaged by the Peloponnesians, 299.
- Clazomenians* revolt from the Athenians, iii. 282. Fortify Polychne, 283. Their fortified town on the continent taken by the Athenians, and the people

- brought back to the island, 290; the authors of the revolt retire to Daphnus, 290.
- Cleandridas*, when exiled for bribery, resided at Thurium, iii. 155.
- Clearchus son of Ramphius* appointed commander of the fleet from Lesbos to the Hellespont, iii. 277. Sent with forty ships to Pharnabazus, 348.
- Clearchidas son of Cleonidas* placed over Amphipolis, ii. 411. Disobeys orders to deliver up Amphipolis, 453.
- Cleobulus and Xenares*, their political intrigues, ii. 474.
- Cleomedes son of Lycomedes*, leader of the Melian expedition, ii. 543.
- Cleomenes*, with the Peloponnesians, ravages Attica, ii. 42.
- Cleon son of Cleonatus*, Cicero's opinion of him, ii. 55, n. Supports the murderous decree against the Mytileneans, 56—69. The accuser of Laches, 195, n. Prevents the treaty with the Lacedæmonians, 231. Jestingly forced to take the command at Pylus, 245. His bravado, 246. Arrives there, 248. Brings the Lacedæmonians on Sphacteria prisoners to Athens, 261. Robs Demosthenes of his glory, 261, n. First who prefixed *χαρτω* to an epistle, 262, n. Procures a decree against the Scioneans, 394. Takes Torone, 418. Fails at Stagirus, but takes Galepsus, 422. Defeated at Amphipolis, 433; and slain, 434; His reasons for opposing peace, 441.
- Cleones*, its site, ii. 370, n. Etymology and site, 520, n.
- Clippides son of Dinias* leads the Athenian fleet against Mytilene, ii. 6; which he blockades, 12.
- Close fight*, Lacedæmonians celebrated for, ii. 252, n.
- Cnidus* unsuccessfully attacked by the Athenians, iii. 302.
- Coins*, tortoise stamped on the Lacedæmonian, i. 131, n.
- leaf of wild parsley represented on those of Selinus, iii. 12, n.
- Colona*, Pausanias fixes his residence at, i. 234. Its site, 234, n.
- Colonides*, its site, ii. 218, n.
- Colonies*, rights due from them to the parent state, i. 57, n.
- Extent of their obedience to the mother country a frequent cause of quarrel, ii. 111, n.
- Colonisation*, a decent name for deportation, i. 36, n.
- Colonists* not sent out to be slaves, i. 86.
- Colophonians*, collected by the Athenians and settled at Notium, ii. 52.
- Columns*, singular ones at Corfu, ii. 133, n.
- Commander-in-chief* (*στρατηγος*), office defined, i. 448, n.
- Commanders*, decree that they should procreate lawful children and possess lands, i. 395, n.
- Commerce*, chief source of the wealth of the Athenians, i. 150, n.
- Communities*, origin of, among the Greeks, i. 278, n.
- Como the Messenian*, at Sphacteria, receiving a detachment, ii. 256, and note, takes the Lacedæmonians in rear, 257.
- Computations* founded on office incorrect, ii. 452.
- Condemning*, Spartans slow, Athenians precipitate, in, ii. 512, n.
- Conductors* necessary in passing through barbarous nations, ii. 318.
- Confederacy*, list of the Lacedæmonian, i. 297. List of the Athenian, 297.
- Confederation*, unequal, tends to misery, i. 147, n.
- Confederations*, difference between Athenian and Peloponnesian, ii. 487, n.
- Conference* of the Melians and Athenians, ii. 543—560.
- Confidence* arises from acquaintance with reverses, ii. 284, n.
- Conon*, governor of Naupactus, obtains ships from Demosthenes, iii. 192.
- Contributions* (*εὐροπά*), how levied at Athens, ii. 29, n.
- Conventions* between the Athenians and their allies, their nature, i. 145, n.
- Corcyra*, formerly inhabited by the Phæacians, i. 61. Opportunely situated for the passage from Peloponnesus to Italy and Sicily, i. 81.
- Its various names, ii. 132, n. Its site, 133, n.
- Athenian armament, iii. 75.
- Corcyreans*, their sea fight against the Corinthians the earliest known, i. 38. Colonise Epidamnus, i. 57. Refuse aid to the Epidamnians in the war against the Taulantii, 59. Slight the Corinthians, 60. Wealthy and powerful, 61. Send an armament against the Epidamnians, and command

- them to receive their exiles, 62. Besiege Epidamnus, 63. Send ambassadors to Corinth, 64; who fail in their mission, 66. Defeat the Corinthians off Actium, 67. Take Epidamnus, 68. Erect a trophy on Leucimne, 68. Ravage Leucas, 68. Burn Cyllene, 68. Station forces at Leucimne, 70. Send ambassadors to Athens, for assistance, 71; their speech, 71. Enter into defensive alliance with the Athenians, 95. Send a fleet to Sybota, 98. Defeated by the Corinthians off Thesprotia, 99—107. Erect a trophy on insular Sybota, 110.
- Torn by faction, ii. 126. Resolve to continue in alliance with Athens, 127. Aristocrats impeach Pithias, the democratical leader, who acquitted, 128. Pithias accuses four aristocrats of sacrilege, 128; who, being found guilty, slay him and others in the senate house, 130. Aristocrats drive the democrats into the citadel, 131; but are worsted in a subsequent fight, 134. Aristocrats take refuge in the temple of the Dioscuri, 135; afterwards remove to the temple of Juno, 136. Beaten by the Peloponnesians in a sea fight, 137. Athenian fleet arrives, 140. Suppliants destroy themselves in despair, 141. Democrats butcher their opponents, 142. Their sedition the first, 148. Aristocrats, seizing forts on the continent, make descents on the island, 153; send an ineffectual embassy to Lacedæmon, 153; return to the island, burn their boats, 153; and seize Mount Istone, 154; devastate the country, 154. Aristocrats on Mount Istone surrender, 272. Infamous artifice of the democrats, 273. Dreadful catastrophe of the aristocrats, 274—276. No further sedition amongst them, 276.
 - Corfu*, derivation of the name, ii. 132, n. Its fortress the strongest in Europe, 133, n. Singular columns at, 133, n.
 - Corinth*, triremes first built at, i. 38. A double emporium, 39.
 - Corinthia*, east coast of, inaccurately laid down, ii. 266, n.
 - Corinthians* improve the structure of ships, i. 37, and note. Build the first triremes, 38. Their sea fight with the Corcyreans the most ancient, 38. Exceedingly wealthy, 39. Epidamnians deliver up their colony to them, and supplicate assistance, 60. Slighted by the Corcyreans, 60. Assist the Epidamnians, 61. Proclaim a colony to Epidamnus, 63; and fit out an armament, 64. Contributions of their allies, 64. Declare war against the Corcyreans, and sail for Epidamnus, 66. Defeated by the Corcyreans off Actium, 67. Station forces at Actium and the Chimerium of Thesprotia, 70. Send ambassadors to Athens against the Corcyreans, 71; who fail in their object, 95. Send a fleet against Corcyra, 97. Defeat the Corcyreans off Thesprotia, 99. Erect a trophy on continental Sybota, 109. Seize Anactorium, 111. Send an army to the assistance of the Potidæans, 117. Send ambassadors to induce the Lacedæmonians to declare war against the Athenians, 124. Defeat the Athenians off Halim, 187. Defeated at Megara, 189. A second time try to persuade the Lacedæmonians to a war with the Athenians, 212. Restore Evarchus to the possession of Astacus, 354.
 - Invaded by the Athenians, ii. 264. Defeated, 268. Their coasts ravaged, 271. Persuade the Argives to originate a league in opposition to Lacedæmon, 459. Reply to the accusations of the Lacedæmonians regarding it, 462. Join the Argive confederacy, 465. Endeavour to seduce the Lacedæmonian allies, 467. Obtain a cessation of arms from the Athenians, 468. Refuse to accede to the treaty between the Argives and Athenians, 490. Withdraw from the Argive confederacy, 490. Make war on the Athenians, 560.
 - Colony of, found Syracuse, iii. 9. Resolve to aid the Syracusans, 134. Send ambassadors to Lacedæmon on their behalf, 134. Send troops to the Syracusans, 178. Sea fight at Naupactus, 195. Consider themselves victors unless utterly beaten, 196. Procured the death of Nicias and Demosthenes, 264. Refuse to put to sea during the Isthmic truce, 278. Put to sea under Alcamenes, 279. Driven into Piræus by the Athenians, 279; and there disabled and blockaded, 280. Break through the blockade, capturing four ships, 287.
 - Corn* probably imported from Africa by the Spartans, ii. 281, n.
 - Great part of that used in Attica imported, iii. 45, n. Ground with pestles

- and mortars, 47, n; the process laborious, and to work at esteemed disgraceful, 47, n.
- Coron*, its site, ii. 218, n.
- Corycus*, etymology, iii. 300, n.
- Coryphæstum*, southern horn of the port of Navarino, ii. 199, n.
- Cos Meropis*, etymology, iii. 307, n.
- Cotyl*, its capacity, iii. 266.
- Cotyria*, trophy of the Athenians at, ii. 284. Site, 284, n.
- Couches* of brass and iron dedicated to Juno, ii. 125.
- Counsellors* frequently sent out with generals by the ancients, i. 495, n.
- Country*, to pass through, without first obtaining consent of natives reckoned suspicious, ii. 318.
- Crocylum*, its site, ii. 170, n. Taken by the Athenians, 170.
- Cranii*, orthography, ii. 502, n.
- Cranion*, its site, i. 352, n.
- Cratæmenes*, joint founder of Zancle, iii. 14.
- Crateria*, its site, iii. 373, n.
- Cretans* marched to battle to the sound of music, ii. 523, n. Colony of, joint founders of Gela, iii. 12.
- Crew*, number of, in an Athenian trireme, iii. 18, n.
- Crommyon*, etymology and site, ii. 271.
- Cromwell* obscure in his speeches, why, ii. 328, n.
- Crown*, Brasidas invested with a golden, at Scione, ii. 391.
- Crucifixion*, of Oriental origin, i. 199, n.
- Cuirasses* of quilted stuff, ii. 254, n.
- Currant*, the produce of Phlœsia, and shipped from Corinth, ii. 503, n.
- Curtis*, *Commodore*, his humanity at Gibraltar, ii. 191, n.
- Cushion*, how used by Greek sailors, i. 512, n.
- Cutting the line*, an ancient manœuvre, i. 101, n.
- Cyclades*, Carians expelled from, i. 15. Minos first coloniser of most of, 15.
- Cyclops*, conjectures regarding, iii. 3, n.
- Cydonia*, its site, i. 497, n.
- Cyllene* burned by the Corcyreans, i. 68.
- Cylon the Athenian* seizes the citadel, 223; in which he is besieged, 226; but escapes, 227. His partisans take sanctuary, but being inveigled away are slain, some even at the altars, 227; their murderers expelled, 228.
- Cynos-sema*, Athenians under Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus defeat the Peloponnesians under Mindarus off, iii. 376—378.
- Cynuria*, etymology and site, ii. 285, n. Given to the Æginetæ by the Lacedæmonians, 285. Compact to decide the right to, by battle, 478.
- Cypress*, its durability, i. 356, n. Folding-doors of the Ephesian temple made of it, 356, n.
- Cyprus*, expedition sent against by the Athenians, i. 202.
- Cypselæ*, conjectures regarding, ii. 468, n.
- Cyreneans* supply two triremes and guides to the Peloponnesian auxiliaries going to the Syracusans, iii. 215.
- Cyrus*, Ionian cities subjugated by him, i. 42.
- Cyrus the younger*, Carians employed as interpreters by, iii. 353, n.
- Cythera*, etymology, ii. 280, n. Situation and polity, 280. Its citizenship proverbial to denote any thing mean, 280, n. Point of approach for ships from Africa, 280, n. Called the Phœnician post by Xenophon, 281, n. Contained but two cities, their sites, 281, n.
- Cyzicus* reduced by the Athenians, iii. 379.

D.

- Dædalus*, rudeness of the statues before his time, iii. 51, n.
- Dance*, annual, of Lacedæmonian virgins round the statue of Diana, ii. 501, n.
- Daphnus*, authors of the revolt at Clazomenæ retire to, iii. 290.
- Daric stater*, its value, iii. 296, n.
- Darius*, Ionian islands subjugated by him, i. 42.

- Dasco*, joint leader of a Syracusan colony to Camarina, iii. 15.
Dascon, etymology and site, iii. 107, n.
Daulis, site and etymology, i. 348, n.
Dawn, the usual time chosen for attacks, ii. 372, n.
Dead, truce for burying, never denied, i. 120, n.
Death, first adjudged by the court of Areopagus, ii. 78, n.
Deaths not permitted in Delos, why, ii. 178, n.
Debatable land, how disposed of by the ancients, ii. 479, n.
Debates, at Athens, undignified after the death of Pericles, ii. 245, n.
Decelea, injuries to Athens from fortifying, iii. 139, and note. Fortified by the Lacedæmonians, 177. Site, 178. Ruinous to Athens, 186.
Deinomache, mother of Alcibiades, ii. 481, n.
Deities frequently had altars in common, ii. 108, n.
Delia instituted by the Athenians, ii. 179.
Delians expelled by the Athenians, ii. 416. Restored by the Athenians, 467.
 —Some at Atramyttion murdered by Arsaces, iii. 379.
Delium, its site, ii. 315, n. Fortified by Hippocrates, 337. Suggestion for ascertaining its site, 347, n. Effects of battle of, 350, n. Taken by the Bœotians, 356.
Delos, Carian corpses dug up at, i. 24. The treasury of the Greeks, 174. Earthquake at, previously to the Peloponnesian war, 294.
 —How purified by the Athenians, ii. 178. How defiled, 178, n. Entire island a temple, 178, n. Games instituted at, 179. Contests at the ancient games, 179.
Delphi, temple at, taken by the Lacedæmonians, i. 202. Retaken by the Athenians, 203.
 —Plistoanax accused of suborning priestess of, ii. 442.
Delphians, custody of the temple delivered to them, i. 203.
 —Always favoured the Lacedæmonians, ii. 166, n.
Delphic Oracle, consulted by the Epidamnians whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians, answers in the affirmative, i. 60. Corcyreans propose to refer their differences to it, 65. Consulted by the Lacedæmonians previously to going to war with Athens, 211; its answer, 211, and note. Consulted by Cylon, 223; its response, 223.
Delphinium fortified by the Athenians, iii. 304.
Demagogue used in a good sense by Isocrates, ii. 231, n.
Demetrius Phalereus, his strictures on the letter of Nicias, iii. 169, n.
Democracy not formed for large empire, ii. 55, n.
Democrats, French, their enormities at Lyons beggared all former ideas of atrocity, ii. 274, n.
Demodocus and *Aristides* drive the Mytilenian exiles from Antandros, ii. 313.
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes ravages Leucadia, ii. 164. Invades Ætolia, 166. Partial to the Messenians, 167, n. Defeated, 171. Defeats Eurylochus at Olpæ, 185. His artifice, 187. Surprises and routs the Ambraciots, 189. Armour selected for him, 193. Blown into Pylus, 200; which he fortifies, 202; and remains to defend, 204. Arms and distributes his forces, 209. Exhorts his troops, 212. Engagement, 215—218. Profit by a former error, 247, and note. Attacks the troops on Sphacteria, 249; who surrender, 259. Robbed of his praise by Cleon, 261, n. Misrepresented by Aristophanes, 261. He and Hippocrates negotiate for the betrayal of Megara, 299. Takes the long walls by stratagem, 300—303. Invests Nisæa with a wall, 304; which surrenders, 305. Engages the Bœotians with doubtful success, 308. Concerts for revolutionising Bœotia, 313. Wars against Salynthius, 316. Sails to Siphæ; his designs on Bœotia frustrated, 336. Makes a descent on Sicynia, 357. Withdraws the garrison from Epidaurus, 536.
 —Chosen colleague to Nicias, iii. 175. Sent with a reinforcement to Sicily, 179. Arrives at Ægina, 179. Ravages the Laconian coasts, and having drawn a wall across an isthmus to make incursions from, sails for Corcyra, 185. Joins Eurymedon, 192. Arrives at Thurium, 194. Prosecutes his voyage, 197. Arrives at Syracuse, 203. Deliberates on the mode of proceeding, 205.

- Attacks Epipolæ**, 206; defeated, 210. Advises to raise the siege, 211; at least to remove to Thapsus or Catana, 214. Commands in the last sea fight at Syracuse, 235. Advises a second engagement, 241. Commands the rear division in the retreat, 251; its disastrous detail, 251—257. Surrenders on terms, 258. Put to death by the Syracusans, 263. Said, by Justin, to have slain himself, 264, n.; probable cause of the assertion, 264, n.
- Demosthenes son of Procles** commands a squadron against Peloponnesus, ii. 160.
- Demostratus** an Athenian orator, iii. 50, n.
- Dercyllidas** sent with a detachment to the Hellespont, iii. 329.
- Despatches** from generals delivered verbally, iii. 167, n.
- Dialogues** rarely introduced by historians, why, ii. 544, n.
- Diana**, annual dance of Lacedæmonian virgins round her statue at Caryæ, ii. 501, n.
- Dians** take Thyssus, ii. 471.
- Diasia**, a festival at Athens, i. 224.
- Dicæarchus** not so ancient as supposed, ii. 124, n.
- Didyma**, etymology, ii. 156, n.
- Dieans** in *Athos* revolt from the Athenians, ii. 538.
- Diemporus son of Onetorides**, i. 276.
- Differences**, a euphemism for wars between fellow countrymen, ii. 291, n.
- Distrephe**s conducts the Machærophori from Athens, iii. 188. Butchers the Mycæssians, 189. Statue erected to, by the Athenians, 189, n.
- Dilatatoriness** a characteristic of the Lacedæmonians, i. 154, n.
- Dinadas**, a commander of the Peloponnesian fleet, iii. 288.
- Diocles**, Nicias and Demosthenes put to death at his suggestion, iii. 263, n.
- Diodotus son of Eucrates** opposes the murderous decree against the Mytilenæans, ii. 69—85.
- Diomedes**, his men-eating horses explained by the expense of keeping, iii. 27, n.
- Diomedon** takes four Chian triremes, iii. 287. Concludes a treaty with the Teians, 287. Fruitlessly assaults Eræ, 287. Mytilene taken by him and Leon, 289; they thrice defeat the Chians, and ravage the country, 291. He and Leon sent to supersede Phrynichus and Scironides, 323. Operations after arrival, 324. Opposed to oligarchy, 342.
- Diomilus** appointed commander of the garrison for Epipolæ, iii. 146. Slain, 148.
- Dionysia**, ii. 451, n.
- Dionysius**, temple of, at the Piræus, iii. 364. Temple of, at Athens, 366, n.
- Dionysius of Syracuse**, smart reply of Antipho to, iii. 97, n.
- Dioscuri**, the Anacæum a temple of theirs, iii. 365, n.
- Their temple at Torone, ii. 372.
- Diotrephe**s, going to Thrace, abolishes democracy in Thasus, iii. 332.
- Diphilus**, commander of the Athenians in the fight off Naupactus, iii. 195.
- Disobedience**, outlawry a punishment of, ii. 499, n.
- Dium**, reason of the name, ii. 370, n.
- Dium** in Macedonia, its site, ii. 320, n.
- Divers** carry provisions across to Pylus, ii. 241.
- Employed to saw off submarine piles, iii. 184.
- Diviners**, odd numbers favourites with, ii. 458, n.
- Dolopes**, the former inhabitants of Scyrus, carried away captive by the Athenians, i. 175.
- Dolphin**, mode of using in warfare, iii. 202, n. Why called so, 203 n.
- Dorcis** sent from Lacedæmon to command the allies, i. 172. Finding them ill inclined towards them, return, 173.
- Dorians** occupy Peloponnesus, i. 35.
- The month Carneus their holiday time, ii. 499, n.
- Dorieus**, the Rhodian, a second time victor at the Olympic games, ii. 14.
- Doris**, the mother-country of the Lacedæmonians, i. 190. Described, 190, n.
- Attacked by the Phocians, who are repelled by the Lacedæmonians, 191.
- Attacked by the Athenian colony cut off there, i. 179.
- Drabescus** in Edonia, Athenian colony cut off there, i. 179.
- Drabiscus**, Athenian colony destroyed at, ii. 358. Its site, 358, n.
- Draco**, his laws of short duration, ii. 77, n.; their severity, 78, n.

- Dress* of the early Athenians, i. 19. Simple, first used by the Lacedæmonians, 21.
Dresses, Median and Persian, described, i. 233, n.
Drunkards less liable to plague in Moscow, i. 414, n.
Dutch, their resemblance to the Lacedæmonians, ii. 418, n.
Dyme, its site, i. 494, n.
Dyrrachium, the port of Epidamnus, i. 57, n. Derivation of the name, 57, n.

E.

- Earthquake* at Lacedæmon, the origin of the revolt of the Helots, i. 180, n. At Delos, previously to the Peloponnesian war, 294.
 — At Orobæ, its effects, ii. 157. Superstition regarding, 157, n. At Atlantæ and Peparethus, 158. Opinion of Thucydides regarding, 159. Occurrence of one, 278. Why recorded, 278, n. Athenian assembly dissolved by the shock of, 484. Separates a congress at Corinth, 494.
 — Lacedæmonian expedition against Argos turned back by, iii. 144. Appointment of a commander recalled on the occurrence of, 276.
Earthquakes, various, in Greece, ii. 155. Undertakings abandoned on their occurrence, 157, n. Probably feigned for political purposes, 494, n.
East, atrocious punishments used in, i. 199, n.
Eastern princes, their revenue very dependent on gifts, i. 524, n.
Ecceutus, commander of the Lacedæmonian auxiliaries sent to the Syracusans, iii. 178.
Echinades, islands off the mouth of the Achelous, i. 537. First inhabited by Alcæon, 538.
Eclipse of the moon, i. 347.
 — of the sun, ii. 278. Why recorded, 278, n.
Eclipses, ignorance of the ancients regarding, i. 347, n.
 — Ignorance of the ancients regarding, iii. 216, n. Number of days after esteemed unlucky, 216, n. Departure of the Athenians from Syracuse restrained by an eclipse of the moon, 216.
Edonians driven from the Strymon by the Athenians, ii. 359.
Étœnea, fortress erecting on, iii. 359; demolished by the democratical party, 364.
Egesta, etymology and site, iii. 5, n.
Egestæans, their ambassadors incite the Athenians to war with the Syracusans, iii. 16. Artifice to persuade the Athenians that they were wealthy, 81.
Egyptians defeated by the Persians under Megabyzus, i. 197.
 — Their treatment of the Israelites similar to that of the Helots by the Lacedæmonians, ii. 322, n.
Eion on the Strymon taken by the Athenians, i. 175.
 — Etymology, ii. 205, n. Simonides takes it by treachery, but is beaten out, 205. Artaphernes apprehended there, 277. Fruitlessly assaulted by Brasidas, 365.
Eleans join the Argive league, ii. 463; cause, 463. Form a treaty with the Athenians, 485. Exclude the Lacedæmonians from the temple and games at Olympus, 491.
Elizabeth, probable cause of her half-amorous intercourse with her courtiers, i. 389, n.
Ellomenus, site and etymology, ii. 164, n.
Elymians, Trojan colonists of Sicily called, iii. 5.
Elymus, leader of the Trojan colony to Sicily, iii. 5, n.
Embarkation, ceremonies used at, iii. 61.
Embatum, its site, ii. 45, n.
Embroidery brought to perfection by Miss Linwood, i. 523, n.
Εὐδημοί, who designated by, ii. 488, n.
Engine for emitting flame against Delium, ii. 355, n.
Enipeus, etymology, ii. 319, n.

- Enneacrunus*, formerly Callirrhoe, its water used before the marriage rites, i. 322; and on other occasions, 322, n. Derivation of the name, 321, n.
- Ensigns*, conjectures regarding those of ships, iii. 59, n.
- Ephēbi*, their oath, i. 136, n.
- Ephors* had power to confine the king, i. 235.
- Their power at Sparta, ii. 457, n.
- Ephyra*, a city of Thesprotia, i. 98.
- Ephibates*, meaning of the term, iii. 329, n.
- Epidamnus*, derivation of the name, i. 56, n. Situated on the Ionian Gulf, bordering on the Taulantii, 57. Founded by a colony of Corcyreans led by a Corinthian, 57. Besieged by the Corcyreans, 63. Compelled to surrender, 68.
- Epidamnians* engage in war with the neighbouring barbarians, i. 58; whom the higher ranks, driven out by the commonalty, join, 58. Send to Corcyra for aid, 59; which is refused, 59. Deliver up their city to the Corinthians in obedience to the Delphic oracle, 60; who assist them, 61. Refuse to receive their citizens, who had fled to Corcyra, 62. Besieged by the Corcyreans, 64; surrender on conditions, 68.
- Epidauria* devastated by the Argives, ii. 499.
- Epidaurians* make an irruption into the Argian territory, ii. 530. Renew the treaty with the Athenians, 537.
- Epidaurus* garrisoned by the Lacedæmonians, ii. 501. Invested by the Eleans and Athenians, 530. Restored by the Athenians, 537.
- Epidaurus Limera*, etymology, ii. 285, n. Its territory devastated by the Athenians, 285.
- Epimenidas*, his mode of staying the plague, i. 427, n.
- Epipolæ*, a suburb of Syracuse, etymology, iii. 118, n. Its importance, 144. Reason of the name, 145. Seized by the Athenians, 147.
- Epirots*, accustomed to hire as mercenaries, ii. 187, n.
- Epitadas son of Molobrus* commands the Lacedæmonians on Sphacteria, ii. 209. Gallant defence, 249—259. Slain 259.
- Epitolidas son of Hegesander* placed over Torone, ii. 411.
- Eræ* revolts from the Athenians, iii. 287. Fruitlessly assaulted by Diomedon, 287.
- Eressus*, site and etymology, ii. 28, n.
- revolts from the Athenians, iii. 289.
- Eretrians*, rest of Greece involved in the war between them and the Chalcidæans, i. 42.
- Invite the Peloponnesians into Eubœa, iii. 329. Butcher the Athenians who take refuge at their city, 368.
- Erineus of Achæa*, its site, iii. 195, n.
- Eriassus* the ancient Acanthus, ii. 327, n.
- Erythræ*, its site and etymology, ii. 39, n.
- Erythræans* apply to the Lacedæmonians for assistance in revolting from the Athenians, iii. 273. Admitted into alliance, 276.
- Eryx*, etymology and site, iii. 5, n.
- Eteonicus* sent with troops to Antissa and Methymna, iii. 290.
- Eualus*, a commander of the Peloponnesian land forces, iii. 288.
- Euarchus*, leader of the Chalcidæan colony to Catana, iii. 10.
- Eubœa* revolts from the Athenians, i. 204. Is subdued, 205.
- Contributed money, not arms or troops, why, iii. 128, n. Revolts from the Athenians, 368. More benefit to Athens than Attica itself, 368.
- Eubœans* send ambassadors to Agis to propose a revolt from the Athenians, iii. 273; measures regarding it postponed. 273.
- Eucles* elected a commander by the Syracusans, iii. 155.
- Eucles the Athenian*, governor of Amphipolis, ii. 362.
- Euclidas*, joint leader of a colony to Himera, iii. 14.
- Euesperitæ*, site of their city, iii. 215, n. Besieged by the Lilyans whom they conquer, 215.
- Eumetion* besieges Amphipolis, iii. 168.
- Eumolpidæ* bear witness to the impiety of Alcibiades, iii. 322. Their office, 322, n.

- Euphamidas the Corinthian*, ii. 500.
Euphemus the Athenian, his speech to the Camarinæans, iii. 125.
Euphorbia Characia said by Dodwell to abound in the Ozolian territory, ii. 175, n.
Eupolium, its site, ii. 170, n.
Eupompidas son of Daïmachus, and Tolmides, suggest the escape from Platæa, ii. 31.
Euryalus, a castle at Syracuse, etymology, iii. 118, n.
Eurylochus commands an expedition against Naupactus, ii. 174. Joins the Ambraciots at Olpæ, 186. Defeated, 185; and slain, 186.
Eurymachus son of Leontiades negotiates with some Platæans to deliver up their city, i. 277. Slain 287.
Eurymedon in Pamphylia, Medes defeated by Cimon at, i. 178.
Eurymedon son of Thucles arrives with a fleet at Corcyra, ii. 140. During his stay the democrats butcher their opponents, 142. Departs, 153. His disgraceful conduct, 153, n. Commands a party at Tanagra, 160. Sails with a fleet for Sicily, 198. Aids in reducing the Corcyreans on Mount Istone, 272. His shameful conduct at Corcyra, 274. Fined, 297.
 — Appointed colleague to Nicias, iii. 175. Joins Demosthenes, 192. Arrives at Thurium, 191. Prosecutes his voyage, 197. Arrives at Syracuse, 103. Advises departure from Syracuse, 214. Slain in a sea fight, 218.
Eurytaniæ said to eat raw flesh, ii. 166.
Euthydemus appointed colleague to Nicias, iii. 174. Jointly commands the Athenians in the last sea fight at Syracuse, 235.
Eutimus, leader of a Cretan colony, joint founder of Gela, iii. 12.
Evarchus the Acarnanian restored to the possession of Astacus, i. 354.
Evenus named from its gentle stream, i. 490, n.
Evils threatened, to suspend, a frequent policy with the Lacedæmonians and Romans, i. 153, n.
Evolutions, military, remarks on, ii. 431, n.
Exile, opponents of government driven into, by the various Grecian states, ii. 314, n.

F.

- Faction*, the whole Grecian nation disturbed by, ii. 143. Induces many calamities, 144. Its evil effects on morals, 145. Changes the signification of words, 146. Every kind of wickedness induced by, 151. Specious names assumed by, 149. Wickedness of, 150.
False reports, affecting the state, punishment for spreading, iii. 71, n.
False shame, conduct of Charles XII. at Bender an egregious example of, ii. 558, n.
Famine breeds pestilence, i. 56, n.
Fane distinguished from the temple, ii. 338, n.
Father, to call a man by his father's name a mark of kindness, iii. 234, n.
Fear, its effects on the factious at Megara, ii. 307, n.
Ferrule of a spear used as a bolt, i. 283, and note.
Festival of Jupiter Milichius, i. 224. Of the goddess Synæcia at Athens, 319.
 — Panathenæic, ii. 489, n. Olympic, 489, n., and 490; cessation of arms before, 491, n.
Festivals, Lacedæmonian, sometimes continued several days, ii. 204, n. Names of, used to denote times of the year, 479, n.
 — Virgins carried baskets at Athenian, iii. 94.
Field, not to encamp on, a surrender of claim to a doubtful victory, ii. 11, n.
Fine, reason for levying in bribery cases, ii. 512, n.
Fire the usual Grecian signal, ii. 373, n.
Fire-ship sent by the Syracusans against the Athenian fleet, iii. 219.
Flesh eaten raw by the Eurytaniæ, ii. 166.
Fools, men, in general, choose rather to be called rogues than, ii. 149.
Foot, Ætolian soldiers shod on the left only, ii. 34, n.

- Forces*, one third the usual proportion for home defence at Sparta, ii. 513, n.
Forest at Sphacteria accidentally burnt, ii. 248.
Founder of a state, honours paid to him sometimes transferred to a great benefactor, i. 60, n.
French, similarity between them and the Athenians, i. 383, n.
 — Their dread of the Prussian infantry, ii. 254, n.
French Revolution, the wise overthrow by the cunning during, ii. 152, n.
Funerals, public, peculiar to the Athenians, i. 355, n. Why celebrated for those whose bodies could not be found, 356, n. Oration at, instituted by Solon, 361, n.
Funeral solemnities at Athens for those first fallen in the war, i. 354.
Future events may be predicted from the past, i. 53.

G.

- Gail*, his reading of the elegy on Gay, i. 391, n.
Galepus revolts to Brasidas, ii. 366. Orthography, etymology, and site, 366, n. Taken by the Athenians, 422.
Games, ancient, at Delos, ii. 179. Modern, 179.
Games, Isthmian, time of their celebration, iii. 277, n.
Garlands worn by slaves at Sparta during manumission, ii. 322. Brasidas decked with by the Scioneans, ii. 391.
Garments, women always wore two, i. 463, n.
Gaulites sent ambassador to Lacedæmon by Tissaphernes, iii. 352.
Gela, conference of the Siceliots at, ii. 287—297.
 — Founded by Antiphemus and Eutimus, iii. 12. Etymology, 12. Site, 12, n.
Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, expels the Megareans from Hyblæan Megara, iii. 12.
Geloans, colony of, found Acragas, iii. 13.
Gelon, third settler of Camarina, iii. 15, and n.
General, a portion of the spoils selected for him previously to any division, ii. 193, n.; a custom as early as the Trojan war, 193, n.
Generals, ten annually appointed by the Athenians, ii. 241, n.
 — Syracusan, fifteen, iii. 75, n.
Geræstus, etymology and site, ii. 7, n. Quick passage from, to Mytilene, 8. Mistake of Eustathius regarding the passage of Nestor from Lesbos to Geræstus, 8, n.
Geranea, its topography, 188, n.
Getae, cavalry-archers, i. 519.
Giants, bones of, to be found in every country, popular notions regarding, iii. 3, n.
Gifts, custom to present, in the East, 524, n. 525, n.
Gods, statues of, before the time of Dædalus, busts with the lower parts squared off, iii. 51, n. Thought by the ancients to envy the too great successes of men, 249, n.
Gongylus the Eretrian sent with a letter to the king of Persia by Pausanias, i. 230.
Gongylus the Corinthian arrives at Syracuse and reanimates the Syracusans, iii. 159.
Goose, ancient superstition of swearing by, ii. 163, n.
Gortyn, account of it, i. 497, n.
Grace, its site, i. 339, n.
Grand Seigneur, his taxes forcibly collected, ii. 312, n.
Grappling-irons invented by the Syracusans, ii. 236, n.
Grasshopper worn by the Athenians described, i. 20, n.
Great Mogul, his revenue made up from gifts, i. 523, n.
Greece, of old not fixedly inhabited, i. 3; especially the richer districts, 6. Not so named before the time of Hellen son of Deucalion, 9. Its best land toward the sea, 26, n. Its navies increase the power of their owners, 41. Lacedæmonians preeminent in, 45. From its geological structure subject to earthquakes, 55, n. How the Athenians attained to the administration of affairs in, 161. Its history after the Median war, imperfectly written before Thucydides, 175.

- Snow rare in, ii. 38, n. Travellers in, sleep in thick woollen cloaks, 125, n.
- Greeks*, feebleness of the early, i. 94. Achieve no enterprise in common before the Trojan war, 95. Called Danaans, Argives, and Achæans by Homer, 13. Pirates in early times, 15; and land-robbers, 18. Early, their modes of living similar to those of the Barbarians, 22. Effect of their return from the Trojan war, 35. Send out colonies, 36. Acquire power by their navies, 41. No land wars except those of the borders, 41. Combinedly involved in the war between the Eretrians and Chalcideans, 42. Having driven back the Barbarians split into parties, leaguings with either the Lacedæmonians or Athenians, 45; to whom they refer their disputes, 46. Thought it disgraceful to refuse aid to supplicants in peril, 78, n. Incensed by the insolence of Pausanias, request the Athenians to become their leaders, 171; taxed by them, 173. Their treasury at Delos, 174.
- Distinction of race, a cause of dissension, ii. 111, n. Regard it suspicious to pass through a country without first obtaining the natives' consent, 318. Eat three meals a day in the time of Thucydides, 389, n. Esteemed it disadvantageous to receive the onset, 347, n. Law of, regarding the custody of temples, 351. Of Thucydides's age deficient in mechanics, 354, n. Religion most prominent in their treaties, 380, n.
- Their ships ill adapted for sleeping in, iii. 86, n.
- Groves*, sacred, preserved by law, ii. 129, n.
- Guard-forts* (περπύλια), their use, ii. 173, n.
- Gylippus* son of Cleandridas appointed commander over the Syracusans, iii. 142. Had been banished for misconduct, 142, n. Coasting Italy is caught in a storm, 155. Arrives at Himera, where he collects auxiliaries, 158. Marches for Syracuse, 159. Arrives at Epipolæ, 160. Offers to treat with the Athenians for their evacuation of Sicily, 161. Beaten by the Athenians, takes all the blame on himself, 164. Beats the Athenians in a second engagement, 165. Traverses the rest of Sicily to raise men, 166. Returns with forces to Syracuse, 179. Exhorts the Syracusans to fight the Athenians at sea, 179. Takes the forts at Plemmyrium, 181. Takes a second journey over Sicily to collect forces, 210. Returns with a considerable army, 215. Leading a party to the jetty in aid of the fleet is repulsed, 219. Speech to the naval forces before the last sea fight, 231—234. Blocks up the roads, 243. Accused by the Syracusans of letting the Athenians go off, 255. Division of Demosthenes surrenders to him on terms, 258. Rejects the conditions proposed by Nicias, 259. Nicias surrenders to him in particular, 262; and is put to death against his will, 264. His baseness, 264, n. Convicted of embezzlement, 264, n. Arrives at Corinth, 282.
- Gymnastic exercises* first used by the Lacedæmonians, i. 21.
- Gythium* burned by the Athenians, i. 195.
- Gymnopædia* at Lacedæmon, ii. 538.

H.

- Hagnon*, memorials of, obliterated by the Amphipolitans, ii. 436.
- Halkæ*, its topography, i. 187, n.
- Hamaxitus*, meaning of the name, iii. 374, n.
- Hamippi*, what kind of troops they were, ii. 503, n.
- Hand*, waving aloft, a sign of submission, ii. 259, n.
- Hapsburg*, house of, fortunate in marriages, i. 28, n.
- Harmodius*, the Pisistratidæ not overturned by him, iii. 90. Narrative of his celebrated enterprise, 91—97. Honours paid to, 97, n.
- Harmodius and Aristogiton*, popular error regarding, i. 48.
- Harmostes*, nature of his office, iii. 296, n.
- Harmotus*, meaning of the name, iii. 374, n.
- Heathen*, their casuistry regarding oaths, ii. 449, n.
- Heavy-armed*, Lacedæmonian, the best in Greece, i. 151, n.

- Their pay at the siege of Potidæa, ii. 27. Allowed each a servant, 28.
Confined to the aristocratical party, 43, n.
- Expected to provide their own arms and armour, iii. 116, n.
- Hegesander* commands the Boeotian auxiliaries sent to the Syracusans, iii. 178.
- Hegesippidas* the Lacedæmonian dismissed from the government of Heraclea by the Boeotians, ii. 495.
- Helen*, bath of, ii. 267, n.
- Hellanicus*, his history brief and inaccurate, i. 175.
- Hellen son of Deucalion*, the appellation Greece did not exist before his time, i. 9. He and his sons powerful in Phthiotis, 12.
- Hellenotamiz* established among the Athenians, i. 178.
- Helots* revolt from the Lacedæmonians, i. 180. Called Messenians, 181. Account of them, 181, n. Besieged in Ithome, 182; surrender, 184; settled at Naupactus, by the Athenians, 184. Tampered with by Pausanias, 237.
- Freedom promised to those who provisioned Pylus, ii. 240. Their devices for that purpose, 240. Two thousand destroyed by the Lacedæmonians, 322; conjectures regarding, 323, n. Who fought under Brasidas enfranchised, 469.
- Heraclea* in *Trachinia*, Lacedæmonians found a colony at, ii. 162. Favourable for ship-building, 162, and note. Ruined by the Thessalians and misgovernment, 164. Taken possession of by the Boeotians, 495.
- Heracleots* in *Trachis* defeated by the neighbouring tribes, ii. 495.
- Heracleidæ* occupy Peloponnesus, i. 35.
- Heraklides son of Lysimachus* chosen a commander by the Syracusans, iii. 116. Again elected a commander, 155.
- Heræa*, its site, ii. 519, n.
- Heralds*, not so indifferent as represented by the poets, ii. 192, n.
- Heretics*, hypocritically recommended to mercy by the inquisitor, ii. 110, n.
- Hermæ*. See *Mercuries*.
- Hermocrates son of Hermon*, Smith's character of, ii. 287. A true patriot, 290, n. His speech at Gela, 287—296.
- Speech to the Syracusans on prospect of the Athenian invasion, iii. 63—68. Encourages the Syracusans, 115. Chosen a commander, 116. His speech to the Camarinæans, 119—125. Makes dispositions to defend Epipolæ, 146. Exhorts the Syracusans to fight the Athenians by sea, 180. Prevents by stratagem the Athenian army from decamping by night, 242. Death of Nicias and Demosthenes unjustly charged upon him, 263, n. The Syracusans urged by him to assist the Peloponnesians, 294. Remonstrates with Tissaphernes against reducing the pay, 297. Inaccessible to bribery, 313, n. Sails to Lacedæmon, 353.
- Herodotus*, his writings known to Thucydides, i. 49, n.
- Mountain path at Thermopylæ might be identified from him, ii. 258, n.
- Heroes*, sacrifices to, ii. 435, n.
- Hesiod*, story of his death, ii. 168, n. His tomb at Orchomenus, 169, n. His bones removed to assuage a pestilence, 169, n. Natives of Orchomenus called Minyeians on his tomb, 314, n.
- Hestians* expelled from Eubœa, i. 205.
- Hiera*, etymology, ii. 156, n. Supposed to contain Vulcan's smithy, 157.
- Hieramele*, widow of Pharnaces, iii. 327, and note.
- Himera* invaded by the Athenians, ii. 194.
- Site, iii. 14, n. Colonisation, language, and polity, 14. Athenians not received into, 104.
- Himeræans* join Gylippus, iii. 158.
- Hippagretæ*, conjectures regarding, ii. 259, n.
- Hipparchus*, not the eldest son of Pisistratus, iii. 91. Did not succeed his father, 91, 98. Tamperers with Harmodius, 92. His government not oppressive, 92. Why reputed tyrant, 94. Causes the sister of Harmodius to be insulted, 94. Slain, 96.
- Hippias*, eldest son of Pisistratus, succeeded him, iii. 91—93. Discovers the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton, 96; which makes him suspicious

- and cruel, 97. Gives his daughter to Æantides, 97. After his expulsion goes to Darius, 98. Present with the Medes at the battle of Marathon, 98.
- Hippocles son of Menippus* intercepts Gylippus in his return from Sicily and takes one of his ships, iii. 282.
- Hippocrates son of Ariphro*, with Demosthenes, negotiates for the betrayal of Megara, ii. 299. Takes the long walls by stratagem, 300—303. Invests Nisæa with a wall, 304, which surrenders, 305. Engages the Bœotians with doubtful success, 308. Retires home, 311. Concerts with Demosthenes for a revolution in Bœotia, 318. Fortifies Delium, 337. Exhorts his army, 346. Defeated by Pagondas, 344—349; and slain, 356.
- Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian* arrives with a fleet at Cnidus, iii. 301.
- Hippocrates tyrant of Gela* leads a colony to Camarina, iii. 15.
- Hipponicus son of Callias* commands a party at Tanagra, ii. 160.
- Hipponoides* banished for disobedience at Mantinæa, ii. 525.
- History* not considered a place for moralising by the ancients, i. 399, n.
- Hobbes*, his ignorance of Greek idioms, i. 8, n.
- Holts*, names of places in England derived from, ii. 39, n.
- Holy Water* of the ancients, how consecrated, ii. 350, n.
- Homer* confines the term Hellenes to the natives of Phthiotis, i. 13; calls the others Danaans, Argives, and Achæans, 13. No where uses the term Barbarian, 13. Says that Agamemnon sent the greatest number of ships to Troy, 28. Credit due to him, 34, n.
- His hymn on Apollo, cited, ii. 179; varies from the text of Homer, 179, n.
- Hymns of doubtful authenticity, 180, n.
- Honey* mixed with poppy seed, how used, ii. 241, n.
- Honour*, point of, regarding invaders, ii. 340, n. Post of, usually assigned to the troops of the country in which the battle was fought, 519.
- Horses* not much bred in Peloponnesus, i. 150, n.
- For war, principally kept by the Thessalians and Bœotians, ii. 507, n.
- Keeping of, esteemed a proof of riches, iii. 27, n. Diomedes' men-eating, explained by the expense of keeping, 27, n. Imported to Athens at a high price, 45, n. Sicily famous for, 45, n.
- Horse-transport* made out of old galleys, i. 428.
- Employed by Xerxes in transporting his troops to Greece, ii. 265, n.
- Hosts*, public, sometimes named after the nation to which they performed the office, ii. 93, n.
- House*, demolition of, a punishment of Oriental origin, ii. 512, n.
- Houses*, Grecian, flat-roofed, ii. 305, n. Formed into defences by adding battlements, 305.
- of the mountain Siculi subterranean, iii. 133, n.
- Humanity* closely connected with sound policy, ii. 259, n.
- Hyæra*, etymology, ii. 175, n.
- Hybla*, three towns so named in Sicily, iii. 11, n.
- Hybla Galeatis*, Athenians unsuccessful against, iii. 103.
- Hyblon*, a Sicilian king, Hyblæan Megara founded under his auspices, iii. 11.
- Hyccara*, etymology and site, iii. 102, n. Birth-place of Lais, 102, n. Taken by the Athenians, 103.
- Hyllæic port*, at Corcyra, ii. 132, n.
- Hymn on Apollo*, evidence of ancient games at Delos, ii. 179.
- Hyperbolus*, the last person banished by ostracism, iii. 342, n. Put to death at Samos, 342.
- Hysia*, its site and etymology, ii. 39, n. Taken by Agis, 540.

I.

- Iasus* taken and plundered by the Sicilian fleet, iii. 296.
- Idomene*, Ambraciots defeated at, ii. 189, n.
- Igea*, its site, iii. 160, n. Taken by Gylippus, 160.

- Inarus son of Psammeticus* makes himself governor of Egypt, i. 186. Assisted by the Athenians, 186. Crucified, 199.
- Indictment* against Alcibiades preserved in Plutarch, iii. 102, n.
- Inessa*, Athenians defeated at, ii. 177.
- Its site, iii. 143, n.
- Inn* erected from the part of the ruins of Plataea, ii. 124. Similar to the Eastern caravanseras, 124, n.
- Inquisitors*, their feigned clemency, ii. 110, n.
- Inscription* of Hippias on the altar of Apollo in the Pythium, iii. 93. On the monument of Archedice at Lampsacus, 98.
- Institutions*, unchanged, best for states in tranquillity, i. 134, 135.
- Interest*, true, what it is, i. 93, n.
- Interment*, mode of, amongst the Phœnicians, i. 25, n.
- Incas*, buildings of, mortar not used in, ii. 203, n.
- Iolaus*, appointed his lieutenant by Perdiccas, i. 119.
- Ionia* colonised by the Athenians, i. 86.
- Greatest revenue of the Athenians derived thence, ii. 46.
- Ionian Gulf* to be distinguished from the Ionian Sea, i. 57, n.
- Ionians*, their navy in the time of Cyrus, i. 39. Their continental cities subjugated by Cyrus, i. 42; and their islands by Darius, 42.
- Ipnaeans*, derivation of name, ii. 174, n.
- Ischagoras the Lacedæmonian*, ii. 410.
- Islands* frequently named from the animals they produce, ii. 48, n.
- Those near continents supposed to be torn from, a common notion, iii. 2, n.
- Israelites* treated by the Egyptians as the Helots by the Lacedæmonians, ii. 322, n.
- Isthmian games*, when celebrated, iii. 277, n.
- Isthmus of Corinth*, machines prepared to transport ships across, ii. 24. Imperfectly surveyed, 266, n.
- Istone*, mountain of, seized by Corcyrean aristocrats, ii. 154. Site, 154, n. Stormed by the democrats of Corcyra, 272.
- Itali*, old inhabitants of Italy so called, ii. 287, n.
- Italiotæ*, Greek colonists of Italy so called, ii. 287, n.
- Italus*, king of the Siculi, Italy called after, iii. 6.
- Italy* greater part colonised by the Peloponnesians, i. 36.
- Called after a king of the Siculi, iii. 6. Boundaries of ancient, iii. 194, n.
- Ithome* besieged by the Lacedæmonians, i. 182. Surrenders, 184.

J.

- Jerusalem* assigned to the sultan's concubines for pin-money, i. 258, n.
- Jews*, Lacedæmonians claim descent from, i. 147, n.
- Johnson*, his failure in an imitation of Juvenal, i. 383, n.
- Fine apostrophe in his "London," iii. 346, n.
- Joke*, Athenians give the command to Cleon in a, ii. 245, n.
- Juno*, her temple at Argos burnt down, ii. 411.
- Her statue at Agrigentum the master-piece of Zeuxis, iii. 13, n.
- Jupiter*, four persons accused of cutting stakes from sacred enclosure of, at Corcyra, ii. 128; take refuge in the temple, 129. His temple at Mount Lycæum, 443, n.

K.

- King of Persia*, representation on his seal, i. 231, n.
- King of Sparta* absolute at the head of his army, ii. 517.
- Ephors had power to confine, i. 235.

L.

Labdulum, a castle at Syracuse, etymology, iii. 118, n. Taken by Gylippus, 161.
Laccius, Syracusan harbour why called, iii. 180, n.

Lacedæmonians, popular error regarding the mode of voting of their kings, i. 49.

First to use simple dress, 21; and gymnastic exercises, 21. Put down the last of the tyrants, 43. Longer harassed by faction than any other nation, 44. From their settled polity, acquired preeminence in Greece, 45. Took the command of the Greeks on the Persian invasion, 45. Acquired military skill from their frequent wars, 46. Their mode of governing their allies, 46. Their jealousy of the Athenians the true cause of the Peloponnesian war, 56. Summon an assembly to hear the accusations of their allies against the Athenians, 124. Their character, 130. Proverbially home-keepers, 131, n. Their coins marked with a tortoise, 131, n. Their unsocial spirit towards other nations, 147, n. Claimed descent from the Jews, 147, n. Celebrated for the manufacture of arms, 151, n. Their heavy-armed the best in Greece, 151, n. Their allies not tributary, 154, n. Of a phlegmatic constitution, 154, n. Their character, 155. Reason of their implicit obedience to the laws, 156, n. Assemblies decided by shout, not by ballot, 160, and note, Decide that the thirty years' truce was broken, 161. Wish the walls of the Greek cities demolished, 163. Send ambassadors to examine into the state of the Athenian walls, 166; whom Themistocles procures to be detained till his return, 166. Lose the supreme command through the insolence of Pausanias, 171. Helots, Thuriens, and Æthians revolt from, 181. Call in the aid of the Athenians, 182; whom they dismiss from distrust, 183. Reduce Ithome, 184. Drive the Phocians from Doris, 191. Defeat the Athenians at Tanagra, 193. Engage in the Sacred War, 202. Take the temple at Delphi, and deliver it to the Delphians, 203. Never hasty in going to war, 211. Consult the Delphic oracle relative to the war with Athens, 211. Debate a second time regarding the war, 211; on which they finally decide, 222. Order the Athenians to purge the pollution of the goddess, 228; their motives, 228; their pretence, 228, 222, n. Their seals of iron, 238, n. Send a final embassy to Athens, 260. Prepare for the war, 289. Greeks in general favour them, 295. List of their confederates, 297. Give Thyrea to the exiled Æginetæ, 346. Their expulsion of strangers, and its causes, 372, n.

— Reduce Platæa, ii. 93; and put the inhabitants to death, 123. Their invasion of Attica stopped by earthquake, 157. Found the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia, 161; reasons for so doing, 162; consult the Delphic oracle regarding, 163. Send troops to the Ætolians, 174. Ravage Attica, 198. Festivals continued several days, 204, n. Their arrogance and selfishness, 204, n. Said to have sprung from the Jews, 204, n. Assault the Athenian fort at Pylus, 215; battle at the ships at, 220. Terms of truce, 222. Send ambassadors to Athens to sue for peace, 224; their speech, 224; refused, 231. Famous for close fighting, 252, n. Their troops on Sphacteria taken, 261; fruitless negotiation regarding, 264. Discrepancy between their ambassadors to Persia, 277. Intrigues with the court of Persia, 277, n. Embarrassed by the descents of the Athenians, 282, and note. Naval warfare contrary to their military institutions, 283. Heavy-armed their peculiar glory, 283, n. Only used the horse and light-armed of the allies, 283, n. Their want of confidence after the affair at Sphacteria, 284. Their institutions unfavourable to eminence in youth, 306, n. Two thousand Helots destroyed by, 322. Brasidas not seconded by, 369. Truce for a year with the Athenians, 379. Dispute about Scione, 393. Their inducements to peace, 439; which is concluded for fifty years, 444; but only last six years and ten months, 457. Unprincipled conduct to their allies, 463, n. Enfranchise the Helots who fought under Brasidas, 469. Pass a decree of dishonour against the prisoners taken at Sphacteria, 470; revoked, 470. Distrust between them and the Athenians, 471. Private league with the Boeotians, 476. Form a treaty

- with the Argives, 479. Differ with the Athenians, 480. Their ambassadors over-reached by Alcibiades, 483. Excluded from the temple and games at Olympus, for hostilities during the Olympic cessation, 491. Refuse to pay the fine, 492. Garrison Epidaurus, 501. Invade the Argive territory, 502. Conclude a truce with the Argives, 508; which is broken by the latter, 510. Defeat the Argives at Mantinea, 514—529. Power of their kings exerted in war, restricted in peace, 517, n. Brigade, divisions of, 517, n. Use hortatory addresses to their armies less than the other Greeks, 523, n. Their addresses to their troops accompanied by music, 523, n. Form an alliance with the Argives, 532. Establish an oligarchy at Sicyon, 537; and Argos, 538. Demolish the Argive long walls, 540. Lay waste Phliasia, 540. Retreat from the Argive borders, on account of inauspicious omens, 561.
- Ravage the Argive territory, iii. 17. Overturned the Pisistratidæ, 90. Resolve to aid the Syracusans, and appoint Gylippus commander, 142. Advancing against Argos, are turned back by an earthquake, 144. Ravage Argos, 156. Prepare for the invasion of Attica, 176. Causes of their alacrity regarding it, 176. Ravage Attica, and fortify Decelca, 177. Send forces to the Syracusans, 178. Resolve to carry on the war against the Athenians vigorously, 271. Require their allies to build ships; rate of each, 272. Receive ambassadors from Tissaphernes, the Chians, and Erythræans, 273; and from Pharnabazus, 275. Resolve to send ships to the Chians and Erythræans, 276. Conclude an alliance with the king of Persia through Tissaphernes, 286. Of two sorts, 289, n. Second treaty with the king of Persia, 303. Send a fleet to Pharnabazus, which burns three Athenian ships, 306; operations of the fleet, 310. Send orders to assassinate Alcibiades, 311. Third treaty with the king of Persia, 327. Send a fleet to Milcetus, 329.
- Iacharis*, golden shields taken from the Acropolis, and ornaments from Minerva, by him, i. 312, n.
- Laches son of Melampus* commands an expedition to Sicily, ii. 154. Reduces Mylæ, 159. Defeats a party of Locrians, 177. Superseded by Eurylochus, 195. Accused by Cleon of embezzlement, 195, n. Sent with auxiliaries to Argos, 509.
- Lade*, island of, its site, iii. 285.
- Læans*, site of their territory, i. 520, n.
- Læopodias*, ambassador to Lacedæmon, delivered up to the Argives, iii. 355.
- Læstrygons*, conjectures regarding, iii. 3, n.
- Lais the courtesan*, one of the slaves made by the Athenians at Hyccara, iii. 102, n. Probably two of that name, 102, n.
- Lamachus*, losing his ships by a land flood, travels with his forces through Bithynia, ii. 313.
- Appointed a commander in the Sicilian expedition, iii. 19. Poor and dissipated, 19 n. His advice on finding that no money was to be expected from Egæta, 84. More a soldier than a politician, 84, n. Slain, 153.
- Lamis*, leader of a Megaræan colony, founds Trotilus, iii. 10; and Thapsus, where he is slain, 11.
- Lamps*, picket-guards furnished with, ii. 37, n.
- Lampisacus*, assigned to Themistocles, to supply his wine, i. 258.
- Etymology, iii. 97, n. Monument of Archedice at, 98. Revolts from the Athenians, 330. Taken and spoiled by Strombichides, 330.
- Land flood*, ships destroyed by, ii. 313.
- Lands*, law that orators and commanders should possess, i. 395, n.
- Laodiceum*, battle between the Mantinæans and Tegæans at, ii. 412.
- Latins* accounted inferior by the Romans, ii. 280, n.
- Latonia*, Athenian prisoners confined in, by the Syracusans, iii. 263. Cicero's description of, 263, n.
- Laurium*, silver mines at, i. 427, n. Site, 427, n. Etymology, 428, n.
- Legislators*, age indispensable in Spartan, ii. 480, n.
- Lectum*, its site, iii. 374, n.
- Lecythus*, its site, ii. 375, n. Taken by Brasidas, and demolished, 378.
- Leocorium*, its origin, iii. 95, n. Hipparchus slain at, 96.

- Leocrates* son of *Stræbus* commands the Athenians at the siege of Ægina, i. 188.
- Leon*, Mytilene taken by him and Diomedon, iii. 289; they thrice defeat the Chians, and ravage the country, 291. He and Diomedon sent to supersede Phrynichus and Scironides, 323; operations after arrival, 324. Governor of Chios, 329. Opposed to oligarchy, 342.
- Leon*, in Sicily, its site, iii. 146, n.
- Leonidas* preferred fighting during a storm, why, iii. 112, n.
- Leontines* at war with the Syracusans, ii. 154. Their allies, 154. Seek the alliance of the Athenians, 155; who send them aid, 155. Besiege Messene, 237; are defeated, 238. The higher classes expel the populace, demolish the city, and inhabit Syracuse, 420.
- Leontini* settled by a Chalcidæan colony, iii. 10. Etymology, 10, n.
- Leotychidas*, king of Lacedæmon, returned home after defeat of the Medes, i. 162.
- Lepreum*, etymology and site, ii. 463. Lacedæmonians fined for attacking during the Olympic cessation, ii. 491.
- Lesbians* revolt from the Athenians, ii. 1. Of the Æolic race, 4, n. Received into the Peloponnesian league, 24. Reduced by the Athenians who partition their land, 90; and subjugate their continental towns, 91.
- Their affinity to the Bœotians, iii. 372, n. Negotiate with Agis concerning a revolt from the Athenians, 273; who makes preparations for it, 273.
- Lesbos*, account of, ii. 1, n. Colonised by the Æolians, 2, n.; partly by the Athenians, 3, n.
- Lessina*, curious plants in, ii. 175, n.
- Letter* of Nicias to the Athenians, 169—174. Censures of Demetrius Phalereus on, 169, n. Closely imitated by Procopius, 169, n.
- Leucadia* ravaged by the Athenians, ii. 164.
- Leucas* ravaged by the Corcyreans, i. 68. Isthmus of, its dimensions, ii. 206, n. Ships conveyed across, 206, n.
- Leucimne*, trophy erected on, by the Corcyreans, i. 68. Derivation of the name, 70, n.
- Leucorium*, Athenians defeat the Chians at, iii. 291.
- Leuctra*, etymology and site, ii. 498, n.
- Lichas* son of *Arcesilaus* receives stripes at the Olympic games, ii. 493. Arrives at Argos with proposals of either peace or war, 582.
- Sent out as counsellor to Astyochus, iii. 305. Finds fault with the Persian treaties, 309. Why the Milesians would not permit him to be buried where the Lacedæmonians wished, 352. Accompanies Tissaphernes to Aspendus, iii. 355.
- Life*, Tarentines said that they alone enjoyed, i. 133, n.
- Lightness* esteemed necessary to ships in sea fights, iii. 295, n.
- Limnæa*, site, ii. 183, n.
- Lindii*, a part of Gela, iii. 13. Origin of the name, 13, n.
- Linseed*, nutritive and medicinal, ii. 241, n.
- Linwood*, *Miss*, her skill in embroidery, i. 523, n.
- Lipara*, etymology, ii. 156, n. Malmsey wine, made at, 156.
- Liparæans*, a colony of Cnidians, ii. 156, and note.
- Lochoi*, number contained in, ii. 209, n.
- Locri*, city of, its site, ii. 236, n.
- Locrians* invade the Rheginian territory, ii. 197.
- Locris*, coast of, ravaged by the Athenians, i. 345.
- Long walls* of Athens, their extent, i. 313, and note; inhabited by the country population, 326.
- Conjectures regarding those of Nisæa, ii. 304, n.
- Longinus*, probable cause of a various reading of his, iii. 261.
- Lycæum*, Mount, Plistonax resided on, during his exile, ii. 443. Site of, 498, n.
- Lycophron* the Corinthian defeated by Nicias, ii. 268. Slain, 270.
- Lycurgus*, general purpose of his laws, i. 21, n. Affirmed his laws to have been written by Apollo, 156, n.
- Lydians* marched to battle to the sound of music, ii. 523, n.

- Lyncestæ*, site of their territory, i. 529, n.
Lyncus, pass of, ii. 324.
Lyons, atrocity of French democrats at, ii. 274, n.
Lysicles sent out from Athens to levy contributions, ii. 30. Perishes with many of his army at the hill of Sandius, 30.
Lysistratus the Olynthian, ii. 372.

M.

- Macarius* goes with the expedition to Naupactus, ii. 174. Slain, 186.
Macedonia blockaded by the Athenians, ii. 540.
Macedonia, maritime, first gained by Alexander, father of Perdiccas, i. 529. Its composition and origin, 529, and note.
Macharophori, Thracians so called, sent back from Athens, iii. 185. Take Mycalessus, and murder the inhabitants, 189. Routed by the Thebans, 190.
Machines, some ancient, more powerful than the modern, iii. 184, n.
Magnesia assigned to Themistocles to supply his bread, i. 257; his monument there, 257.
Malea, a roadstead and market to Mytilene, ii. 12. Site, 6, n. 9, n.
Malefactors often employed in pounding corn, iii. 47, n.
Mankind, in general, choose rather to be called rogues than fools, ii. 149.
Mantinæa, congress at, ii. 500. Battle of, 516—521.
Mantinæans, doubtful battle with the Tegæans at Laodicium, ii. 412. Join the Argive league, 460. Form a treaty with the Athenians, 485. Make peace with the Lacedæmonians, 537.
Manumission, ceremonies at, in Sparta, ii. 322.
Marathon, a sepulchre erected on the spot for the slain, i. 357.
Mardonius, a Carian sent by him to consult the Greek oracles, iii. 353, n.
Market-place, its site in Greek cities, ii. 561, n.
 — *Mercuries* set up in, iii. 52, n.
Mars, the Pæan before battle in his honour, i. 105, n.
 — Temple of, near Megara, ii. 300.
Marsh-land of Egypt, account of it, i. 198, n. Inhabitants the most warlike of the Egyptians, 199.
Massacre of the Corcyrean aristocrats, ii. 274—276.
Meal, a pint of, thought a man's allowance per day, ii. 223, n.
Meals of the Greeks, ii. 339, n.
Measurement, by days' sail and days' journey, i. 521, n.
Mechanics, deficiency of Greeks of Thucydides's age in, ii. 354, n.
Mecyberna, etymology and site, ii. 447, n. Taken by the Olynthians, 476.
Medeon, derivation and site, ii. 183, n.
Medes, after their retreat the Peloponnesians returned home, but the Athenians remained, i. 162. Defeated by Cymon at the river Eurymedon, 178. Their dress, 233, n.
Median dress assumed by Pausanias, i. 231.
Median war decided by two sea fights and two land engagements, i. 54.
Medixing, Pausanias acquitted of, i. 172.
Megabaxus the Persian fails in his mission to bribe the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica, i. 196.
Megabynus son of Zopyrus reduces Egypt, i. 197.
Megara occupied by the Athenians, i. 185; who built the long wall, 185.
Megara Hyblæa founded by the Megaræans, iii. 11. Its site, 11, n. Its port, 85, n. Distance from Syracuse, 86, n. Garrisoned by the Syracusans 118.
Megaræans join the Athenian confederacy, i. 185. Cause of their hatred to the Athenians, 185. Revolt from the Athenians, 204. Forbidden to use the port or market of Athens, 259.
 — Orthography of the name, ii. 123, n. Democratical leaders negotiate for delivering up the city to the Athenians, 299; terms of the treaty, 300. Long walls taken by stratagem, 300—303. Conspiracy in Nisæa discovered, 303.

- Nisæa invested with a wall, 304; Garrison surrenders, 305. Factions reconciled, 307. Refuse to admit Brasidas, 307. Their caution, 307—310. Admit Brasidas, 311. Recall the exiles from Pegæ, 311; who, in violation of their oaths, procure the death of a number of their enemies, 312. Oligarchy established at, 312. Raze their long walls, 369.
- Colony of, found Trotilus, iii. 10; Thapsus and the Hyblean Megara, 11; and settle Selinus, 12.
- Melanctridas*, his appointment recalled in consequence of an earthquake, iii. 274.
- Melanthus* appointed governor to Lesbos, but countermanded, iii. 273.
- Melesander* defeated by the Lycians and slain, i. 462.
- Melesippus* son of *Diacritus*, ambassador to the Athenians, refused a hearing, i. 303. Sent guarded to the borders, 304. His words at parting, 304.
- Mesius*, ambassador to Lacedæmon, delivered up to the Argives, iii. 355.
- Melians* consist of three tribes, ii. 162. Invaded by the Athenians, ii. 542. Colonists of the Lacedæmonians, 542, and note. Conference with the Athenian ambassadors, 543—560. Their city blockaded, 560; taken, 562; men put to death, women and children enslaved, 562; colonised by the Athenians, 563.
- Melita* in *Achaëa*, orthography, etymology, and site, ii. 317, n.
- Melos* ravaged by Nicias, ii. 160. Island and city, 542, n.
- Menander* appointed colleague to Nicias, iii. 174. Joint commander of the Athenian fleet in the last sea fight at Syracuse, 235.
- Mende* revolts to the Lacedæmonians, ii. 394. Site, 394, n. Taken by the Athenians, 409.
- Meneolos* joint leader of a Syracusan colony to Camarina, iii. 15.
- Menedæus* enters into a private treaty with Demosthenes for the Peloponnesians, ii. 186; who depart on pretence of gathering wood, 188. His conduct unprincipled and impolitic, 187, n.
- Mercenaries*, Thracians hired themselves as, ii. 246, n.
- Mercuries*, stone, at Athens square, iii. 51. Described, 51, n. Mutilated, 52. Made to resemble Alcibiades, 52, n. Set up in porches and market places, 52, n. Indecent, 53, n. Some persons executed for mutilating, 99; their guilt doubtful, 100.
- Mercury*, temple of, near Mycalessus, iii. 189.
- Messena*, the key to Sicily, ii. 197, n.
- founded by Anaxilas, tyrant of the Rhegini, iii. 14. Treachery of Alcibiades regarding, 117.
- Messenians*, helots so called, i. 181.
- Messenians in Sicily* reduced by the Athenians, ii. 159. Their city seized by the Syracusans and Locrians, 197. Ravage Naxos, 237. Routed by the Naxians, 238. Their city besieged by the Leontines, whom they defeat, 238. Driven back by the Athenians, 239.
- Messenians of Naupactus* devastate Laconia, ii. 263.
- Methone* attacked by the Athenians, i. 341. Relieved by Brasidas, 342.
- Its site, ii. 272, n.
- Methydrium*, etymology and site, ii. 504, n.
- Methymna*, its site, ii. 2, n. 10, n. Democratical party superior in it, 3, n. Derivation of the name, 28, n.
- Anaxarchus repulsed in an attack on, iii. 372.
- Methymnians* adhere to the Athenians, ii. 10. Defeated by the Antisséans, 29.
- Their independence permitted on condition of furnishing ships, iii. 129.
- Meton*, madness feigned by, to avoid the Sicilian expedition, iii. 53, n.
- Mexicans* offered paste figures to their idols, i. 225, n.
- Migrations* frequent in the ancient world, i. 4, n.; and in the new, 5, n.
- Milesians* attack the fort built by Tissaphernes, and eject the garrison, iii. 352.
- Miletus*, Athenians rout the Peloponnesians at, iii. 293.
- Military rank*, among the Athenians, never held beyond the time specified, ii. 199, n.
- Milliades* takes Eion on the Strymon, i. 175.
- Mindarus* sails from Miletus and ravages the Chersonesus, iii. 371. Arrives at

- Chios, 372. Arrives at Rhœteum, 374. Chases the Athenian fleet and takes four vessels, 375. Defeated off Cynos-sema, 376—378.
- Mine* in Thasos, i. 179.
- Minerva*, the ornaments of her statue at Athens might be used in great emergency, i. 310; their value, 311; must be replaced, 312; removed by Lacharis, 312, n.; plundered at different times, 312, n.
- Temple of, at Lecythus, ii. 37; reward paid to, by Brasidas, 378.
- Mines*, gold and silver, near Amphipolis, ii. 360, n.
- Minoa* taken by the Athenians, ii. 91; and garrisoned, 92.
- Minos* the most ancient possessor of a navy, i. 14; by which he becomes master of the Archipelago, 15. Drives the Carians from the Cyclades, and makes his sons governors, 15. Wars against pirates, 15.
- Mingyians*, inhabitants of Orchomenus so called, ii. 314, n.
- Missiles* caught by the ancients, ii. 255, n; and by barbarous nations now, 255, n. Use of, thought to imply cowardice, 262, n.
- Molycrium*, its site, i. 495, n.
- Moon*, departure of the Athenians from Syracuse restrained by an eclipse of, iii. 216; date of its occurrence, 216, n.
- Moore, Sir John*, resembled Brasidas in his death, ii. 435, n.
- Resemblance between him and Nicias, iii. 84, n.
- Morganine*, conjectures regarding, ii. 296, n. Delivered to the Camarinæans, 297.
- Mortar* seldom used in the earliest buildings of antiquity, ii. 203. Not used in the palaces of the Incas, 203, n.
- Motyn*, conjectures regarding its site, iii. 8, n.
- Mountains* generally seized and fortified by invaders wishing to remain, ii. 154, n.
- Multitude* judge their superiors by themselves, ii. 293, n.
- Music*, novelty in, always required, i. 134, n.
- Lacedæmonians advanced to battle with, ii. 523. Exhortations of the Lacedæmonians to their troops accompanied by, 523, n. Lacedæmonians marched to battle to the sound of, 523, n; as did the Cretans and Lydians, 523, n.
- Musicians*, early navigators well provided with, why, iii. 204, n.
- Mycæneus*, its site, iii. 189, n. Butchery of its inhabitants by Diitrephes and the Machærophori, iii. 189.
- Mycenæ*, its government committed by Eurystheus to Atreus, i. 28; who obtains the sovereignty, 28. A small city, 29. In ruins, 29, n.
- Myle*, derivation and site, ii. 159, n. Reduced by Laches, 159.
- Myonesus*, its site and etymology, ii. 48, n.
- Myonia*, etymology, ii. 175, n.
- Myrsinus* revolts to Brasidas, ii. 365. Its site, 365, n.
- Myronides* commands the Athenians at Megara, i. 189; and in the expedition against the Bœotians, 193.
- Myrrhine*, five sons borne to Hippias by, iii. 93.
- Mysteries, profaning*, several accused of, iii. 54. Supposed to be a plot against democracy, 98.
- Mytilene*, derivation of its name, ii. 3, n. Description of the city, 4 n. 10 n.
- taken by the Athenians, iii. 289.
- Mytilenians* revolt from the Athenians, ii. 3; who send a fleet against them which takes ten of their triremes, 6. Ten triremes their regular quota, 7. Prepare their city for defence, 8. Send ambassadors to Athens, 9; who fail in their mission, 10. Promised assistance from Lacedæmon, 10. After an engagement retire within their walls, 11. Send ambassadors to Lacedæmon, 11. Their speech to the Peloponnesians at Olympia, 14. Received into the Peloponnesian league, 24. Unsuccessful against Methymna, 28. Blockaded by the Athenians, 29. Encouraged by Salæthus, 40. Forced by the commonalty to surrender, 43. Terms of capitulation, 43. Suppliants treacherously induced to rise, 44; sent to Tenedos, 44; afterwards to Athens, 53; where they are put to death, 89. Cruel decree of the Athenians against, 53; rescinded, 86. Their narrow escape, 88. Their walls demolished, ships seized, 89; lands partitioned amongst the Athenians, 90;

and continental towns subjugated, 91. Exiles seize on Rheoteum, 278; restore it for 2000 staters, 279; take Antandrus, 279; their designs, 279; defeated and driven from Antandrus, 313.

Myus assigned to Themistocles to supply his meat, i. 258.

— Its loveliness, ii. 30, n.

N.

Names, whimsical, given to remote nations, ii. 285, n.

Napoleon, cause of his political end, iii. 177, n.

Natural genius of Themistocles, its extraordinary strength, i. 254.

Naupactus, Helots settled at, i. 184. Described, i. 462.

Nautical manœuvre of an Athenian ship, i. 509, and note.

Navarino, bay of, most capacious in Greece, ii. 220, n.

— Battle of, similar to that at Syracuse, iii. 236, n.

Navies, those of Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth, most considerable, i. 81.

Navigation, tardiness of ancient, iii. 215, n.

Navigators, early, well provided with musicians, why, iii. 204, n.

Navy, Minoas first possessor of, i. 15.

Naxians reduced by the Athenians, i. 175. The first state deprived of freedom, 175.

— Their country ravaged by the Messenians, ii. 237; whom they rout, 238.

— Receive the Athenians, iii. 86.

Naxos settled by a Chalcidian colony, iii. 9. Site, 9.

Naxus, Athenians winter at, iii. 117.

Nelson resembled Brasidas in his death, ii. 435, n.

Nemea, Hesiod murdered at, ii. 168, n.

Neptune, ship dedicated to him by the Athenians, i. 495.

Nericus, Asopius slain there, ii. 13. Afterwards called the city of Leucas, 13, n.

Nicias son of Niceratus takes Minoa, ii. 91; which he garrisons, 92. Ravages Melos, ii. 160. Defeats the Tanagraeans, 160. His character, 160, n. Censured by Mitford, 244, n. Waves his right to command at Pylus in favour of Cleon, 245. His stratagem at Solygea, 265, n. Defeats the Corinthians, 268; resigns his claim to the victory, how, 271, n.; opinions regarding the motive, 271, n. Religious, 271, n. He and his colleagues take Cythera, 281; and ravage the coasts, 282. Wounded at Mende, 407; which he takes, 409. Besieges Scione, 410. Why desirous of peace, 441. Sent to Lacedæmon, to procure the performance of the treaty, 484; fails, 485.

— Appointed a commander in the Sicilian expedition, iii. 19. Brought in by the aristocratical party, 19, n.; against his will, 20. Speech against the Sicilian expedition, 20—29. His advice on finding that no money was to be expected from Egæta, 82. His situation resembled that of Sir John Moore in Spain, 84, n. Takes Hyccara, 102; and sells the inhabitants for slaves, 103. Takes up a position before Syracuse, 106. Exhorts his troops, 109. Defeats the Syracusans, 113. His retreat defended, 114, n. Winters at Naxus, 117. Besieges Syracuse, 147. His stratagem to save the wall of circumvallation, 153. Sole commander from the death of Lamachus, 154. Removes the forces to Plemmyrium, 162. Beats Gylippus, 164; worsted by him, 165. His letter to the Athenians, 169—174. In bad health, 174. Induces the Siculi to attack a party of Siceliots, 193. Advises perseverance in the siege, 211—213. Reasons for his advice, 213. Agrees to depart, but, a lunar eclipse occurring, refuses to deliberate further for thrice nine days, 216. Too superstitious, 216. His speech to the naval forces before last sea fight, 227—231. Exhorts the captains, 234. Fails to induce the seamen to try another engagement, 242. Deceived by a stratagem of Hermocrates, delays the departure, 243. Retreats, 244. Encourages the army, 247—251. Commands the first division, 251. Disastrous retreat, 252—258. Hearing of the surrender of Demosthenes, proposes conditions, 258; which are refused, 259. Attacked at the Assinarus, 259. Surrenders

- to Gylippus, 261. His noble conduct, 261, n. Ingratitude and injustice of the Athenians in not permitting his name to be inscribed on the column commemorating those who had fallen in Sicily, 262, n. Put to death by the Syracusans, 263; reasons for doing so, 264. His virtue, 265.
- Nico* commands the Boeotian auxiliaries sent to the Syracusans, iii. 178.
- Nicomachus* the Phocian discloses the designs of the Athenians on Bœotia, ii. 336.
- Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus* commands the Lacedæmonian expedition to Doris, i. 191.
- Niconidas of Larissa*, ii. 318.
- Nicostratus son of Diotrephe*s arrives at Corcyra with forces, ii. 134. Endeavours to reconcile the factions, 135. Saves several of the aristocrats, 135. Worstèd by the Peloponnesian fleet, 137. His benevolence, 153, n. He and his colleagues take Cythera, 281; and ravage the Laconian coasts, 282. Joint commander of the expedition to Mende, 406. Sent with auxiliaries to Argos, 519.
- Nightingale*, why called the Daulian bird, i. 349.
- Nine-ways*, ancient name of Amphipolis, i. 179. Origin of the name, 179, n. — Colony planted at, by Agnon, ii. 358.
- Nisæa*, traitors in, besmear themselves with ointment, to be known by the Athenians, ii. 303; discovered, 303. Invested with a wall, 304. Houses formed into defences by adding battlements, 305. Surrenders, 305. Evacuated by the Athenians, 311.
- Nobility*, Aristotle's definition of, ii. 481, n.
- Norman barons*, who accompanied William I., proud of their descent, i. 196, n.
- Notium*, a port of Colophon, ii. 50, n. Divided by faction, 51. Treachery of Paches at, 52. Colophonians assembled and settled at, by the Athenians, 52.
- Nymphodorus son of Pythes* made an Athenian citizen, i. 348. Brings about an alliance with Sitalces, 350. Reconciles them to Perdiccas, 351.

O.

- Oak-heads* near Platæa, ii. 39, n.
- Oar-bag*, its use, i. 513, n.
- Oath*, form of, for the observance of the treaty between the Athenians and Argives, ii. 488. How to be taken, 488.
- Oaths*, casuistry of the ancients regarding, ii. 449, n.
- Obolus*, value of the Æginæan, ii. 487, n.
- Odryæa*, its extent, i. 521; and revenue, 522.
- Odd numbers*, favourites with diviners, ii. 458, n.
- Œanthe*, its site, ii. 174, n.
- Œneon*, its loveliness, ii. 169, n.
- Œniadæ* unsuccessfully besieged by the Athenians, i. 201. Its situation, 201, n. — Attacked unsuccessfully by the Athenians, ii. 18.
- Œnoe* besieged by the Peloponnesians, i. 327. Its site, 327, n. — Occupied by the Bœotians, iii. 371.
- Œnophyta*, battle of, thought more glorious than those of Marathon and Platæa, i. 194.
- Œnotri*, Arcadian colonists of Italy so called, iii. 6, n.
- Œsune* revolts to Brasidas, ii. 366. Etymology, 366, n.
- Office*, computations founded on, incorrect, ii. 452.
- Oil*, cakes kneaded up with, ii. 87, n.
- Ointment*, Megarean traitors besmear themselves with, that they might be recognised by the Athenians, ii. 308.
- Olophyrus*, its site, ii. 370, n.
- Olpæ*, site, ii. 181. Etymology, 181, n. Besieged by the Ambraciots, 181.
- Olympia*, seven chariots sent to by Alcibiades, iii. 31; who feasts the whole assemblage, 31, n.

- Olympic cessation*, Lacedæmonians fined for hostilities during, ii. 491.
Olympic games, after their celebration, political and private matters adjusted, ii. 14, n. Lacedæmonians excluded from, 491.
Olympicum, at Syracuse, its magnificence, iii. 105, n. Why not occupied by Nicias, 113, n. Garrisoned by the Syracusans, 118.
Olynthians, their kindness to the Toroneans, ii. 419, and note. Take Mecyberna, 476.
Olynthus, derivation of the name, i. 115, n. Formerly occupied by the Boetians, who were exterminated by Artabazus, 123, n.
Omens, earthquakes and eclipses regarded as, ii. 278, n.
 — Doubtful ones considered unfavourable by those in adverse circumstances, iii. 216, n.
Oncius, *Mount*, its site, ii. 266, n.
Onobala, its site, ii. 237, n.
Onomacles, an Athenian commander at Miletus, iii. 293.
Opicians, same as the Ausonians, iii. 6, n. Drove the Siculi out of Italy, 6.
Oracle, Pythian, regarding Ithome, i. 184.
 — Regarding Hesiod's death, ii. 168, n. Commanding the fetching of his bones to remove pestilence, 169. Delphic, which procured the recall of Plis-tonax, 442.
Oracles, their ambiguity, i. 224, n.
 — Corruptly obtained, ii. 381, n.
Oracle-singers, i. 294, n.
Orators, decree that they should procreate lawful children, and possess lands, i. 395, n.
 — Athenian, accountable for their advice, ii. 74, n.
Orchomenus in Boeotia, tomb of Hesiod at, ii. 169, n. Bones of Hesiod carried to, to remove pestilence, 169, n. Bas-relief at, 169, n. Its site, 314, n. Anciently called Minyeia, 314, n. Taken by the Argives, 510.
Orchomenus in Arcadia, etymology and site, ii. 510, n.
Orcus, alone of Euboea, firm to the Athenians, iii. 368.
Orestes son of Echekratides, king of Thessaly, exiled, i. 199. Persuades the Athenians to attempt his restoration, who fail, 200.
Orestæum, etymology and site, ii. 513, n.
Orneæ, etymology and site, ii. 520, n.
 — Its fortunes, iii. 17.
Orobææ, its site, ii. 157. Overwhelmed by an earthquake, 158.
Oropus, site and etymology, i. 338, n.
 — Taken by the Boeotians, iii. 328.
Orsippus, the first who ran naked in the stadium, i. 22, n.
Ortygia, etymology, iii. 9, n. Syracuse founded on, 9. A division of Syracuse, description and etymology, 118, n.
Otages assist to demolish the wall round Teios, iii. 284.
Ouilavry, punishment of military disobedience amongst the Lacedæmonians, ii. 499, n.
Oxolæ, derivation of name, ii. 175, n.
Oxolian Locrians retain the custom of wearing arms, i. 18. Deprived of Naupactus by the Athenians, 184.

P.

- Paches son of Epicurus* sent against the Mytilenians, ii. 29; who capitulate, 43. Induces the suppliants to rise and sends them to Tenedos, 44. Pursues Alcidas, 50. His treachery and cruelty at Notium, 52. Settles affairs in Lesbos, 53. Stabs himself, 89, n.
Pæan, what it was, i. 105, n.
Pagondas son of Æoladas incites the Boeotians to attack the Athenians, ii. 340—343. Defeats Hippocrates, 344—349.
Pale, its site, i. 352, n.
Palisades used in circumvallation, ii. 305, n.

- Pamphilus*, leader of a Megaræan colony, settles Selinus, iii. 12.
- Panacium* taken by the Boeotians, ii. 419. Etymology and site, 419, n. Demolished, 477. Pretence of the Boeotians for razing, 479.
- Panæi*, site of their territory, i. 535, n.
- Panathenæa*, when celebrated, ii. 489, n.
- Citizens permitted to assemble in arms on, iii. 94. Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton carried into effect on, 94.
- Panic*, incident to very large armies marching by night through a hostile country, iii. 254.
- Panormus*, its site, i. 498, n.
- Athenians make a descent on, iii. 290. Their trophy there, why destroyed, 290.
- Pantacias*, a Sicilian river, its site, iii. 11, n.
- Paralians* deliver up to the Argives the ambassadors sent to Lacedæmon, iii. 355.
- Paralus*, its site and etymology, i. 427, n.
- Paralus*, state vessel of Athens, how employed, ii. 49, n.
- Parapotamii* of Phocis, ii. 497, n.
- Paravæans*, site of their country, i. 484, n.
- Parnes*, the highest mountain in Attica, its site, i. 337, n.
- Parnetha*, Mount, ii. 349, n.
- Parrhasia*, its site, ii. 468, n.
- Parsley*, wild, leaf of, represented on the coins of Selinus, iii. 12, n.
- Paste figures* of animals used in sacrifices, i. 225, n.
- Pasitêidas* defeated and taken by Cleon, ii. 418.
- Patra*, account of, i. 489, n.
- Patreans*, persuaded by Alcibiades to carry their walls down to the sea, prevented by the Corinthians and Sicyonians, ii. 496.
- Pay* of Greek soldiers and sailors, ii. 28, n.
- Of Athenian sailors, iii. 18, n.
- Pausanias* joins the Athenians, i. 118.
- Pausanias son of Cleombrotus*, with the Grecian fleet, subdues Cyprus, i. 171; and reduces Byzantium, 171. His insolence and tyranny incense the Greeks, 171. Recalled to answer for his misconduct, 172. Partially acquitted, 172. Deprived of his office, 172. Aspiring after the monarchy of Greece, sails to the Hellespont to negotiate with the king of Persia, 229; whom he had obliged, 230. His letter to the king, 230; replied to, 231. Adopts the habits of the Barbarians, 232. Becomes choleric, 234. Expelled from Byzantium, goes to Colonæ, 234. Returns to Sparta, where he is confined, 235. Various causes for suspecting him, 235. Informed against by an Argilian, 238. His guilt discovered by stratagem, 239. Takes refuge in the temple of Minerva Chalcicæus, 241. Dies of starvation, 243. Buried in the porch, 245.
- Pedaritus son of Leon* sails to Erythræ, iii. 296. Crosses to Chios, 300. Refuses to deliver up the Chian ships to Astyochus, 300. Acquits some Erythræans of treachery, 301. Sends for aid to Astyochus, which is refused, 304. Sends for aid to Astyochus a second time, 306. Slain in a sally, 324.
- Pegæ*, Megaræan exiles at, ravage the territory of Megara, ii. 298.
- Pelagii*, districts where they resided named after them, i. 10. Their wanderings, 10, n.; and original habitation, 11, n.
- Pelagicum*, oracle regarding, i. 324. Its site, 325, n. Inhabited by the country people, 326.
- Pella*, its site, i. 531, n.
- Peloponnesians* did not breed horses, i. 150, n. Returned home after the defeat of the Medes, 162. Ravage Attica, 204. Make the thirty years' peace with the Athenians, 205. Assemble at the Isthmus, i. 299. Enter Attica, 304. Besiege CEnoe without success, 327. Ravage Attica, 329. Return to Peloponnesus, 339. Ravage Attica again, 398. Return from fear of the plague, 429. Ravage Zacynthus, 454. Ravage the Platæan territory, 454. Besiege Platæa, 470. Invade Acarnania, 483. Fleet defeated by Phormio, 491; and again off Naupactus, 506.
- Again ravage Attica, ii. 1. Receive the Lesbians into alliance, 24. Send Alcidas with a fleet to Lesbos, 26. Ravage Attica under Cleomenes, 42.

- Defeat the Corcyrean fleet, 137. Relieve Megara, 308. Aid the Chalcidians, 321. Defeat the Athenians at Amphipolis, 433.
- Assemble at Corinth, iii. 277. Defeat the Athenian fleet, 368. Their remissness, 369. Defeated by the Athenians off Cynos-sema, 376—378. See *Lacedæmonians*.
- Peloponnesian War* greater than any which had preceded it, i. 2. Its unparalleled calamities, 55. Its causes, 56. Commences, 275. Oracles regarding, 293. Preceded by an earthquake at Delos, 294.
- Lasted twenty-seven years, ii. 457.
- Peloponnesus* received its name from Pelops, i. 27. Occupied by the Dorians and Heraclidæ, 35.
- Unfavourable to ship-building, ii. 162, n. Chasms in central parts of, 515, n.
- Pelops*, from his wealth, acquired power in, and gave his name to, Peloponnesus, i. 27. Cause of his migration, 27, n.
- Pelt*, a Thracian, described, i. 350, n.
- Pentathlus* second coloniser of the Islands of *Æolus*, ii. 156, n.
- Peparethus*, earthquake at, ii. 158. Its prytaneum of white stone, 158, n.
- Peræbia*, etymology and site, ii. 820, n.
- Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedonia*, becomes inimical to the Athenians, i. 114. Cause of his enmity, 114. Endeavours to stir up enemies against them, 114. Induces the Chalcidians to demolish their cities, and remove to Olynthus, 115. Enters into alliance with the Athenians, 117. Forsakes the Athenians, 119. Chosen general of the horse by the Potidæans and Peloponnesians, 119. Appoints Iolaus his lieutenant, 119. Joins the Athenians, 351.
- Joined by Brasidas, ii. 320. Advances against Arrhibæus, 324. Takes umbrage at Brasidas, 327. Persuades the Argilians to revolt from the Athenians, 360. Co-operates in securing Amphipolis, 367. Second expedition against Arrhibæus, 395. Retreats unknown to Brasidas, 397. An unskilful general, 397, n. Conceives dislike to Brasidas, 405. Concludes a treaty with the Athenians, 410. Declared an enemy by the Athenians, 540.
- Pericles son of Xanthippus* commands the Athenians at Sicyon, i. 200; and (Eniadæ, 201. Subdues Eubœa, 205. Defeats the Samians, 208. His favourite maxim and dying boast, 209, n. Dissuades the Athenians from yielding to the Lacedæmonians, 261. Chief commander of the Athenians, 305. Promises to give up his estates if unravaged, 306. Encourages the Athenians, 312. Prevails on them to remove into the city, 316. Anger of the Athenians against him, 334. Leads an army to ravage Megara, 353. His speech at the public funeral, 359. Ravages the coasts of Peloponnesus, 429. Defends his conduct, 430. Fined, 448. State committed to his guidance, 448. Death and character of his administration, 449. Mismanagement of his successors, 452. His character, 453, n.
- Public debates undignified after his death, ii. 245, n.
- Pericles*, joint founder of Zancle, iii. 14.
- Periæci* accounted inferior by the Spartans, ii. 280, n.
- Their political condition, iii. 289, n.
- Peripoli*, similar to our militia, ii. 301, n. Conjectures regarding, 301, n.
- Peripolia*, what they were, iii. 80, n.
- Persian mode of living* adopted by Pausanias, i. 282.
- Persians* drive the Athenians out of Egypt, i. 197. Their dress, 233, n. More discreditable at their court to deny than to be denied, 524. Liberal, 524, n.
- Their triremes carried 200 men, iii. 298, n.
- Pestilence* at Athens, i. 398. Its causes, 399, n. Said to originate in *Æthiopia*, 401. Symptoms, 404, and effects, 408. Beasts and birds of prey eating the corpses died, 411. Its nature, 412, n. Never attacked the same person twice, 417. Causes neglect of sacred and social duties, 420; and unbounded licentiousness, 421. Prediction regarding, 425.
- Second, at Athens, ravages of, ii. 155. At Orchomenus, Orchomenians fetch Hesiod's bones to remove, 169, n.
- Phacium*, its site, ii. 320, n.

- Phæacians* famous for nautical skill, i. 61. Formerly inhabited Corcyra, 61.
Phæax son of *Eraistratus* sent to Sicily to foment a war against Syracuse, ii. 419.
Phœnis created high-priestess of Juno at Argos, ii. 411.
Phalerian Wall, its extent, i. 312.
Phalrus son of *Eratoclidus*, Epidamnus founded by him, i. 57.
Phane, its site, iii. 291, n. Athenians defeat the Chians at, 291.
Phanoteus, district of, ii. 315, and note.
Pharnabazus sends ambassadors to Lacedæmon, iii. 275; his reasons, 275. Satrapy and lineage, 275, n.
Pharsalus, its probable site, ii. 390, n.
Phia, its orthography and site, i. 343, n.
Philip, brother of *Perdiccas*, joins the Athenians, i. 118.
Phlœsia, currants the produce of, ii. 503, n.
 — Ravaged by the Argives, iii. 157.
Phliadans, Argives ravaging their territory caught in an ambuscade, ii. 560.
Phlius, etymology and description, ii. 503, n. Bacchus and Ceres chiefly worshipped at, 503, n.
Phœceans defeat the Carthaginians at sea, i. 140.
Phocians, going to war with the Dorians, are repelled by the Lacedæmonians, i. 190. Custody of the temple at Delphi delivered to them, 203.
 — From Troy, colonists of Sicily, iii. 6, n.
Phonicians, Ionian islands subjugated by means of their fleet, i. 42. Defeated by the Athenians, 202.
 — Settlements of, in Sicily, iii. 7, n.
Phormio son of *Asopus* leads an Athenian army against Potidæa, i. 121.
 Ravages the Chalcidean and Bottiæan territories, 123. Sent as general to the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, 460. Anecdote of, 461, n. Defeats the Peloponnesian fleet, 491; and again off Naupactus, 506. Ravages Acarnania, 536. Returns to Athens, 539.
Phrynichus, an Athenian commander at Miletus, iii. 293. His advice not to engage the Peloponnesians, 295. Esteemed prudent, 295. Opposed the propositions of Alcibiades for change of government, 317. Writes to Astyochus to injure Alcibiades, 319. Proposes to betray the Athenian armament, 320. Fortifies Samos to evade the accusation of treachery, 320. Impeached by Pisander, 323. Superseded, 323. Zealous for the establishment of an oligarchy, 337. His reasons, 337. Inveterate against democracy, 359. Sent on an embassy to Lacedæmon, 359. On his return assassinated, 362.
Phthiotis, its inhabitants alone called Hellenes by Homer, i. 13.
Phycus, Lacedæmonians fined for attacking, during the Olympic cessation, ii. 491. Etymology and site, 491, n.
Phytia, etymology and site, ii. 183, n.
Picket-guards furnished with lamps, ii. 37, n.
Pieria, its site, i. 529, n.
Pierian Gulf, its meaning, i. 530, n.
Pierius, conjectures regarding, ii. 437, n.
Piles, methods used to destroy those before the docks at Syracuse, iii. 183.
Pillar, infraction by the Lacedæmonians of treaty recorded on, inscribed under by the Athenians, ii. 502.
 — Government of Hippias proved by that in the citadel, iii. 93.
Pillars erected for promulgation of treaties, ii. 450, n. Customary to inscribe treaties on, 489, n.
Pilots, Samian exiles furnish, to the Lacedæmonians, ii. 213.
Pin-money, Athenians assigned to the chief sultana, Jerusalem to the concubines, for, i. 258, n.
Pipers, numerous, stationed in the Lacedæmonian lines, ii. 523.
 — Reason of their accompanying the expedition to Syracuse, iii. 204, n.
Piracy, practised by the early Greeks and Barbarians, i. 15. Not disgraceful, 16.
Piræus, its walls begun by Themistocles, i. 168; finished at his instance, 168. Description of them, 168. Composed of three ports, 168, n. Its extent, 314. Its dock capable of containing 400 ships, 315, n. Inhabited by the

- country population, 326. Plan of the Peloponnesians for its surprisal, 512. Great consternation in consequence, 514.
- Tumults at, iii. 362—364. Temple of Dionysius at, 364, n.
- Piræus*, its site, iii. 279, n. Corinthian fleet blockaded in, 279.
- Pirates* murderers in the age of Augustus, i. 17, n.
- Pisander*, ambassador from Samos to Athens, persuades them to treat regarding a change of government and the recall of Alcibiades, iii. 321. Appointed to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, 322. Impeaches Phrynichus, 323. Confers with Tissaphernes, 325. Departs without effecting the treaty, 326. Sent to Athens to establish an oligarchy, 332. Abolishes democracy in the subject cities, 333. Proposes an oligarchy in the assembly, 336. Steals off to Decelea, 370.
- Pisistratida*, Athenians suspicious of their reported cruelty, iii. 90. Not overturned by Harmodius, but by the Lacedæmonians, 90. Popular errors regarding, 91, n. Their moderation, 92.
- Pisistratus* succeeded by Hippias, iii. 91.
- Pisistratus son of Hippias*, inscription concerning, on the altar of Apollo in the Pythium, iii. 93.
- Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes* enters into league with the Samian aristocrats, i. 207. Samian hostages and Athenian garrison delivered up to him, 207.
- Pitanian band*, popular error regarding, i. 49.
- Pithias* impeached by the aristocratical party, and acquitted, ii. 128. Accuses four of his opponents of sacrilege, 128. Murdered in the senate-house, 130.
- Pittacus, king of the Edonians*, slain by his wife, ii. 366.
- Plague*, its symptoms, i. 412, n. Virulence at Florence, 412, n.; modes of preservation adopted at, 414, n. Tobacconists escaped in London, 418, n. Drunkards less liable in Moscow, 414, n. Difference concerning its contagious nature, 415, n. At Paris loosed the bonds of society, 423, n. Mortality occasioned by, at various places, 424, n. At Athens stayed by Epimenides, 426, n.
- Plantations* destroyed by the ancients in their ravages, i. 7, n.
- Platæa*, description of, i. 276, n. Entered by night by a party of Thebans, 276. About seventy stadia distant from Thebes, 285. Athenians garrison, 288.
- Annual rites at the tombs of those slain at, ii. 106, n. Razed to the foundations, 124. An inn built from the ruins, 124. Brass and iron of the walls formed into couches, and dedicated to Juno, 125.
- Platæans*, their city entered by a party of Thebans, i. 276. Enter into terms with them, 279. Afterwards attack and overpower them, 281. Prevail on those without to depart, 286. Butcher their prisoners, 287. Their territory ravaged by the Bœotians, 304. Their territory ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, 464. Confer with Archidamus, 464. Their city besieged, 470; first siege of which any connected detail remains, 470, n.; various expedients for attack and defence, 470—478; Peloponnesians leaving a garrison for the blockade depart, 479.
- Part with difficulty effect their escape, ii. 30—40; who are thenceforward accounted Athenian citizens, 40, n. Surrender, 93. Defence before their Lacedæmonian judges, 93—110. Opposed by the Thebans, 110—121. Put to death, 123. Their territory confiscated, 125.
- Plato*, the dialogue "Hipparchus" not written by, iii. 91, n.
- Plemmyrium*, etymology and site, iii. 162, n. Fortified by Nicias, 162. Athenian forces remove to, 163. Forts taken by Gylippus, 181. Its capture ruined the Athenian armament, 182.
- Pleuron*, etymology and site, ii. 176, n.
- Plistimach son of Pausanias* commands the expedition against Attica, i. 204. Banished on a charge of bribery, 332.
- Why desirous of peace, ii. 441. Said to have suborned the Delphian priests, 442. Brought from exile with dances and sacrifices, 442. Demolishes the fort at Cypsela, 469.
- Plutarch*, his birth-place and residence, ii. 314, n.
- Pnyx*, its site, iii. 369.
- Polichne*, its site, iii. 164, n.

- Polish Diet* decided by about, i. 160, n.
- Pollution* of the temple of Minerva at Athens, how incurred, i. 223. Of the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, how incurred, 229. Of the temple of Minerva Chalcicæus, how incurred, 229.
- Polyanthes*, commander of the Corinthians in the fight off Naupactus, iii. 195.
- Polychne* fortified by the Clazomenæans, iii. 283.
- Polycrates*, despot of Samos, his navy, i. 40. Consecrates Rhenea to the Delian Apollo, i. 40.
- Chains Rhenea to Delos, ii. 179.
- Polydamidas* despatched with troops to Scione and Mende, ii. 395.
- Pontus*, Greek colonies in, subject to Athens, ii. 312, n.
- Pools* formed by earthquakes, ii. 158. Opinion of Thucydides regarding, 159.
- Poppy seed* used in bread, ii. 241, n.
- Ports*, mode of obstructing, ii. 3, n.
- Potidæa*, a Corinthian colony, tributary to the Athenians, i. 113. Particulars regarding it, 112, n. Besieged by the Athenians, 120. Surrenders, and its inhabitants depart, 463. Colonised by the Athenians, 464.
- Fruitless attempt of Brasidas on, ii. 413.
- Potidaæans* revolt from the Athenians, i. 115. Receive aid from Corinth, 117. Choose Aristæus general of the infantry, and Perdiccas of the horse, 119. Defeated by the Athenians, 120.
- Potidania*, its site, ii. 169, n. Taken by the Athenians, 169.
- Prasia*, site and etymology, i. 428, n. Twice sacked, 429, n.
- Praxiteles*, statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton by, iii. 97, n.
- Priene*, its possession causes a war between the Samians and Milesians, i. 206.
- Prisoners*, their rate of ransom, ii. 126, n. Reply of a Lacedæmonian prisoner, taken at Sphacteria, to an Athenian who taunted him, ii. 262. Treated cruelly by the ancients, mildly in modern Europe, 262, n.
- Proclamation*, usual one where cities were treacherously entered, ii. 303, n.
- Procles*, son of Theodorus, commands a squadron against Peloponnesus, ii. 160. Slain, 173.
- Promontories* favourite places for temples, ii. 163, n.
- Pronæa*, its site, i. 352, n.
- Property*, its acquisition creates a desire for settled life, i. 25, n.
- Propylæa*, Pericles accused of profusion in erecting, i. 309, n.
- Proschium*, its site, ii. 177, n.
- Prosopis*, Island of, Athenians besieged in, i. 197.
- Prytanæ*, could put any measure to the vote, ii. 55, n.
- Prytaneum*, at Athens, at the east-end of the acropolis, i. 317, n.
- Prytaneum*, at Peparethus, overthrown by earthquake, ii. 158. Built of white stone, 158, n.
- Pteleum*, etymology and probable site, ii. 447, n.
- Pteleus*, probable site, iii. 291, n.
- Pisodorus*, a Boeotian exile, suggests a revolution in Boeotia, ii. 313.
- Ptychia*, Island of, Corcyrean aristocrats confined in, ii. 272.
- Public host*, his office, i. 348, n.
- Pustolus*, with a Gelœan colony, founds Acragas, iii. 14.
- Pydna* besieged by the Athenians, i. 117.
- Pylos*, northern horn of the port of Navarino, ii. 199, n. Site and etymology, 199, n. Fortified by the Athenians, 202. Not described by any traveller, 215, n. Various devices for provisioning troops on, 240. Athenians make incursions from, on Lacedæmonians, 560.
- Pyramids*, mortar not used in, ii. 203, n.
- Pyrrha*, site and etymology, ii. 28, n.
- Pyrrhicus*, a Corinthian steersman, his stratagem, iii. 290.
- Pythangelus* son of Phylidas, i. 276.
- Pythen*, commander of the Corinthian auxiliaries to Syracuse, iii. 155. Commands the Corinthians in the last sea fight at Syracuse, 236.
- Pythodorus* son of Isolochus defeated by the Locrians, ii. 195. Banished, 297.

Q.

Quit-rent, victim furnished as, ii. 497, n.

R.

Ramphias the Lacedæmonian, ii. 437.

Ransom, its rate, ii. 126, n.

Reports of past events taken up without examination, i. 48.

Republics, Greek, could bear neither diminution nor increase, ii. 22, n.

Retaliation considered innocent by the heathen, ii. 148, n.

Retreat of the Athenians from Egypt, i. 198, n.

— Disastrous, of the Athenians from Syracuse, ii. 244—261.

Revenues of the Athenians, from what sources, i. 307, n.

Reviews, military, common in Greece, ii. 311, n.

Revolts from the Athenians, their causes, i. 176.

Rhêgines, their territory invaded by the Locrians, ii. 197.

— Refuse to join the Athenians, iii. 79.

Rhêgium, etymology, ii. 234, n.

Rhêii, their site, i. 329, n.

Rhenea, consecrated by Polycrates to the Delian Apollo, i. 40.

— Etymology and various names, ii. 178, n. Chained to Delos by Polycrates, 179.

Rhetus, etymology and site, ii. 267, n.

Rhodiens, colony of, joint founders of Gela, iii. 12.

Rhoteum, town of, etymology and site, ii. 278, n.; taken by the Mytilenæan exiles, 278; restored for two thousand statera, 279. Promontory of, a little within the Hellespont, 278, n. Tumulus of Ajax there, 278, n.

Rhyta, its site, iii. 195, n.

Rivers of the ancient world named from quality or mode of discovery, i. 490, n.

— Names of derived often from the sound of their waters, ii. 319, n.

Roads, how formed by the ancients, i. 532, n.

Rogues, men, in general, choose to be called rather than fools, ii. 149.

Romans, Latins accounted inferior by, ii. 280.

Rowers, various appointments of, i. 512, n.

— Their designations, ii. 250, n.

Rowing, remarks regarding ancient mode of, iii. 172, n.

Rule, lust of, its evil effects, ii. 149.

S.

Saco, joint leader of a colony to Himera, iii. 14.

Sacred close usually planted, ii. 128, n.

Sacred precincts, divisions of, ii. 338, n.

Sacred War engaged in by the Lacedæmonians, i. 202. Æra of the greatest power of the Athenians, 203, n.

Sacrifices, what the principal offices, i. 61, n. Paste figures of animals used in, i. 225, n.

— Lacedæmonians turned back from Leuctra by inauspicious, ii. 498; and from Caryæ, 500.

— Between the skirmishing and main battle, iii. 111.

Sacrilege, excommunication for, adhered to posterity, i. 222, n.

Sadoc son of Sitalces immoderately fond of Athens, i. 456, n.

Sailors, their pay, ii. 28. Their usual food, 87, n. Rowing suspended during meal time, 87, n. Ancient, never kept at sea by night, 136, n.

Salæthus sent from Lacedæmon, enters Mytilene and encourages the rulers, ii.

41. Makes heavy-armed of the common people, 42. Taken by Paches, 52.

Put to death at Athens, 53.

Sulaminian, how employed, ii. 49, n.

Salynthius warred against by Demosthenes, ii. 316.

- Samians*, four triremes constructed for them by Aminocles, i. 38. Corinthians did not side with, against the Athenians, 91. Defeat the Milesians, in a war respecting Priene, 206. Reduced by the Athenians, 210.
- Their exiles supply the Lacedæmonians, with pilots ii. 313.
- Democrats rising against the nobles, put two hundred to death, and occupy their lands and houses, iii. 288.
- Saminthius*, etymology, ii. 506, n.
- Samos*, democracy established there by the Athenians, i. 207; besieged by them, 207; reduced, 210.
- Factional commotions at, in which the popular party get the better, iii. 342.
- Sandius*, hill of, Lysicles slain at, ii. 30.
- Sane*, etymology and site, ii. 370, n. 447, n.
- Sargeus* commands the Sicyonian troops sent to the Syracusans, iii. 178.
- Scandea*, site, ii. 281, n. Taken by the Athenians, 282.
- Scarborough*, derivation of its name, ii. 234, n.
- School*, boys murdered in, at Mycalessus, by the Machærophori, iii. 190.
- Scionæans of Pallene*, tradition of their ancestry, ii. 389. Invest Brasidas with a golden crown, 391. Cruelty of the Athenians to, 466.
- Sciæ* revolts to the Lacedæmonians, ii. 389. Claimed by both Lacedæmonians and Athenians, 393. Besieged by the Athenians, 410.
- Scirita*, what kind of forces they were, ii. 518, n.
- Scironides*, an Athenian commander at Miletus, iii. 293. Superseded in his command, 323.
- Scirophondas*, a Theban Bæotarch, slain, iii. 191.
- Scolus*, etymology and probable site, ii. 447, n.
- Scribe*, *state*, office not very honourable at Athens, iii. 169.
- Scripa*, modern name of Orchomenus, ii. 314, n.
- Scyros*, an island in the Ægean, its inhabitants, the Dolopes, carried away captive by the Athenians, who colonise it themselves, i. 175.
- Scythæ* described, i. 235, n.
- Scythians* eat human flesh, i. 463, n. If united no nation able to cope with them, 525.
- Sea fight*, Athenians celebrated in, ii. 252, n.
- Seal*, representation on king of Persia's, i. 231, n. On Agamemnon's, 231, n. On Helen's, 238, n. On Clearchus's, 238, n. On Areus's, 238, n. Lacedæmonian, of iron, 238, n.
- Select troops* (Λογίδες), what they were, i. 343, n.
- Selfishness*, a vice of the Lacedæmonians, ii. 204, n.
- Self-praise* of Pericles, i. 433, n.
- Selinus*, settled by Pamphilus, iii. 12. Etymology and site, 12, n. Description of its majestic ruins, 12, n. Leaf of wild parsley represented on its coins, 12, n.
- Sepulchre*, for those slain at Marathon, erected on the spot where they fell, i. 357.
- Sermyla*, Aristeus lays an ambush near, i. 123.
- Sestos* taken by the Athenians, i. 162.
- Athenians establish a fort at, iii. 330.
- Seuthes son of Sparadocus* bribed by Perdiccas, i. 535; who gives him his sister in marriage, 536.
- Succeeds to the kingdom of the Odrysians, ii. 357.
- Shields*, description of wicker, ii. 210, n. Pushing off, used in obstinate contests, 348, n.; their adaptation to this purpose, 348, n.
- Four, filled with the money of the division of Demosthenes, on surrendering to the Syracusans, iii. 258.
- Ship-building*, Antandrus commodious for, ii. 279, n.
- Ship of war*, most satisfactory representation of, i. 512, n.
- Ships*, ancient, not decked, i. 32. Why the crews continually debarked to encamp, 99, n.
- Lacedæmonian, retained contrary to treaty at Pylus, ii. 282. Of Lamachus destroyed by a land-flood, at the river Calix, 313. Size of, how estimated by the ancients, 384, n.
- Conjectures regarding their ensigns, iii. 59, n. Ancient, ill adapted for

- sleeping in, 86, n. Furnishing, a condition of independence, 129. Athenians charged on the side, 198. Charging at prow thought unskilful, 198. Of war never, if possible, encumbered with a single meal, 20, n. Lateral galleries of, described, 202, n.
- Shoes*, why the Ætolian soldiers wore but one, ii. 34, n.
- Shout*, Lacedæmonian assemblies decided by, not by ballot, i. 160. Used in the Polish diet, 160, n.; and in the assembly of divines convened by the Long Parliament, 160, n.
- Sicania*, a name of Sicily, iii. 4, n.
- Sicanians*, early colonists of Sicily from Iberia, iii. 4, n.
- Sicanus*, river, conjectures regarding, iii. 4, n.
- Sicanus son of Excestas* chosen a commander, iii. 117. Goes with fifteen ships to Acragas, to bring it over to the Syracusan interest, 210; in which he fails, 215. Joint commander of the Syracusans in the last sea fight with the Athenians, 236.
- Siceliots*, new settlers in Sicily so called, ii. 194, n. 287, n. Peace concluded between, through the persuasion of Hermocrates, 296.
- An army of, going to aid the Syracusans, attacked by the Siculi, iii. 193.
- Sicily* colonised by the Peloponnesians, i. 36.
- Athenian expedition to, under Laches, ii. 154. Wars in, 159.
- Various accounts of its size, iii. 1, n. Supposed disruption from Italy, 2, n. How colonised, 3—15. Called Trinacria and Sicania, 4, n.
- Siculi*, the original inhabitants of Sicily so called, ii. 194, n. 287, n.
- Account of their colonisation of Sicily, iii. 6, n. Numbers join the Athenians, 193. Perpetual independence of the mountaineers, 193, n.; who dwelt in subterranean houses, 193, n. Siceliots, going to the Syracusans, attacked by, 199.
- Sicyon*, oligarchy established at, ii. 537.
- Sicyonians* defeated by the Athenians, i. 195.
- Send troops to the Syracusans, iii. 178.
- Sidussa*, probable site, iii. 291, n.
- Siege*, that of Platæa the first regularly detailed, i. 470, n.; various expedients for attack and defence of, 470—478. Duties of women during, 480, n.
- Of Syracuse, iii. 148—155. 159.
- Sieges*, ancient, little more than blockades, i. 33, n. Athenians reputed skilful in, 182.
- Signals*, fire generally used for, by the Greeks, ii. 373, n.
- Signatures* to the fifty years' treaty, ii. 450. 456.
- Silence*, trumpets used to proclaim, by the ancients, iii. 61, n.
- Silver-mines* at Laurium, i. 427, n.
- Simus*, joint leader of a colony to Himera, iii. 14.
- Singus*, site, ii. 447, n.
- Siphæ*, probable site, ii. 314, n.
- Sitalces son of Teres* forms an alliance with the Athenians, i. 349. His son delivers up the Peloponnesian ambassadors, 456. Undertakes an expedition against Macedonia, 516; which he overruns, 532. Induced to return, 535.
- Dies, ii. 357.
- Slaves*, at Sparta, went in procession round the temples, crowned with garlands, during manumission, ii. 322. Make the severest masters, 548, n.
- In the time of Hermocrates, a talent the usual price for, iii. 269, n.
- Slings*, Acarnanians expert in using, i. 487.
- Snow* rarely seen in Greece, ii. 38, n.
- Socrates* survived the plague through temperance, i. 425, n.
- Present at the battle of Delium, ii. 349, n. Stories regarding, 349, n.
- Soldier*, every man one in ancient times, i. 32, n.
- Soldiers*, their pay, ii. 28, n. Work their own transports, 29. Ætolian, shod on the left foot only, 34, n.
- Sollium*, its site, i. 351, n.
- Soloeis*, its site, iii. 8, n.
- Solygea*, error of geographers regarding, ii. 265, n. True site, 266, n. Battle at, 268.

- Songs, warlike*, Lacedæmonians address each other with, before the battle of Mantinea, ii. 522.
- Soothsayer*, the chaplain to the garrison, ii. 31, n.
- Sophocles*, his accuracy confirmed by Dr. Clarke, ii. 162, n. Sails with a fleet for Sicily, 198. Aids in reducing the Corcyreans on Mount Istone, 272. His shameful conduct at Corcyra, 274. Banished, 297.
- Sparta*, not adorned with sumptuous edifices, i. 30. Built in the village form, 30. Rules all Peloponnesus, 30.
- Ceremonies of manumission at, ii. 322. Age indispensable in a legislator, 480 n.
- Spartans* slow in resorting to capital punishment against one another, i. 237.
- Periæci accounted inferior by, ii. 280 n. Slow in condemning, 512, n.
- Their political condition, iii. 289, n.
- Spectacles, public*, choragus sometimes ruined by, iii. 32, n.
- Speech of the Corcyrean ambassadors to the Athenians for their alliance*, i. 71.
- Of the Corinthian ambassadors to the Athenians, against the Corcyreans, 82.
- Of the Corinthian ambassadors to the Athenian commanders off Sybota, 109; and their reply, 109. Of the Corinthian ambassadors, to persuade the Lacedæmonians to go to war with the Athenians, 125. Of the Athenian ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, in reply to the Corinthians, 137. Of Archidamas to the Lacedæmonians, dissuading from war with the Athenians, 149. Of Sthenelaidas to the Lacedæmonians, advising war against the Athenians, 159. Of the Corinthian ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, to excite them to war with the Athenians, 212. Of Pericles, to the Athenians, dissuading submission to the Lacedæmonians, 261. Of Archidamas to the soldiers, previously to invading Attica, 299. Of Melesippus to the Athenians, on reaching the borders, 304. Of Pericles, at the public funeral, 359. Of Pericles to the Athenians, in defence of his conduct, 430. Of Cnemus to the Peloponnesian naval forces, 499. Of Phormio to the Athenian naval forces, 502.
- Of the Mytilenian ambassadors to the Peloponnesians at Olympia, ii. 14.
- Of Teutiplus the Eleian, advising Alcidas to sail to Mytilene, 45. Of Cleon, supporting the murderous decree against the Mytileneans, 55—69; of Diodotus opposing it, 69—85. Of Demosthenes at Pylus, 212. Of Brasidas at Pylus, 216. Of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors at Athens, for peace, 224—231. Of Hermocrates to the Siceliots at Gela, 287—296. Of Brasidas, persuading the Acanthians to revolt from the Athenians, 328—335. Of Pagondas to the Bœotian army, 340—348. Of Hippocrates to his army, 346. Of Brasidas to the Toronæans, 376. Of Brasidas at Scione, 590. Of Brasidas to his troops in Lyncestis, 393—402.
- Of Nicias, against the Sicilian expedition, iii. 20—23. Of Alcibiades, for the Sicilian expedition, 30—42. Of Nicias, regarding the armament against Sicily, 43—49. Of Hermocrates to the Syracusans, on prospect of the Athenian invasion, 63—68. Of Athenagoras, 69—74; and of a Syracusan general, 74. Of Nicias to his army at Syracuse, 109. Of Hermocrates to the Camarinæans, 119—125. Of Euphemus to the Camarinæans, 125—132. Of Alcibiades, inciting the Lacedæmonians to aid Syracuse, 135—142. Of Nicias to the naval forces, before the last sea fight with the Syracusans, 227—231. Of Gylippus to the Syracusan naval forces, 231—234. Of Nicias, encouraging the Athenians before the retreat from Syracuse, 248—251.
- Speeches*, genuineness of those reported by Thucydides, i. 51, n. Different modes pursued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians in delivering them to their armies, 299, n.
- Cromwell's, why obscure, ii. 328, n. Lacedæmonians use less to their troops than the other Greeks, why, 523, n. Of the Lacedæmonians to their troops, accompanied with music, 523, n. Of the Athenians and Melians at Melos, 543—560.
- Sphacteria*, etymology, ii. 207, n. Size, 208. Spartan troops placed on, 208. Forest on, by what chance consumed, 248. Battle on, 249—259; number of slain, 261. Length of siege, 261.

- Sphagin*, *Sphacteria* so called by Strabo, ii. 207, n.
- Spoil*, thrown into common stock by the Argives, iii. 144, n.
- Spoils*, a portion selected for the general previously to any division, ii. 193, n.; a custom as early as the Trojan war, 193, n.
- Stagirus*, orthography, etymology, and site, ii. 335, n. Revolts from the Athenians, 335.
- Stars*, mode of dividing the year by, i. 479, n.
- State generals*, nature of their office, ii. 495, n.
- States*, ancient, little communication between, ii. 190, n.
- Statues*, rudeness of, before the time of Dædalus, iii. 51, n.
- Stenography* probably known in the time of Thucydides, i. 52, n.
- Sthenelaidas the ephorus* exhorts the Lacedæmonians to war against the Athenians, i. 159. Chief cause of the Peloponnesian war, 159, n.
- Stilbides*, the augur, accompanied the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, iii. 268, n.
- Stone-casters* different from slingers, iii. 111.
- Stones*, height of a wall computed by numbering, iii. 31, n.
- Stoning*, punishment of, ii. 509, n.
- Storms*, Leonidas preferred to fight during, why, iii. 112, n.
- Strangers*, expelled from Lacedæmon, and the causes, i. 372, n.
- Stratagem*, cutting the line, an ancient one successfully revived by Rodney, Nelson, &c., i. 101, n. Of Themistocles, to procure the retreat of Xerxes, 252, n. Of the Plataeans against the Thebans, 279. Of Archidamus, in delaying the ravaging of Attica, 328, n. Various, in the attack and defence of Plataea, 470—478. Of the Stratians against the Chaonians, 487.
- Of Paches at Notium, ii. 52. Of Demosthenes at Olpæ, ii. 184; at Idome, 190; at Pylus, 209, n. Of Nicias at Solygea, 265, n. For the taking of Megara, 301. Of Brasidas, in sailing to Scione, 390. Of Brasidas at Amphipolis, 425. Of Demosthenes at Epidaurus, 537.
- Of Alcibiades at Catana, iii. 87. Of Hippias against the conspirators, 96. Of the Athenians, to take up a position before Syracuse, 105. Of the Athenians, in the battle against the Syracusans, 112. Of Nicias, to save the wall of circumvallation, 153. Of Pyrrichus, a Corinthian steersman, 200. Of Hermocrates, to prevent the departure of the Athenians by night, 242.
- Stratagems*, not scientifically cultivated, before the time of Philip and Alexander, perfected by Cæsar and Pompey, ii. 336, n.
- Stratus*, its site, i. 485, n.
- Stripes*, officers at the Olympic games had the power of inflicting, ii. 493, n.
- Strombichides son of Diotimus* sent with ships to Chios, iii. 283. Chased to Samos by Chalcideus and Alcibiades, 284. Takes Lampascus and established a fort at Abydus, 330.
- Strongyle*, etymology, 156, n.
- Styalla*, the proper name of Megara Hyblæa, iii. 118, n.
- Subjects*, the fewer their causes of discontent, the more inclined to rebel, i. 146, n.
- Submission*, waving the hand aloft, a sign of, ii. 259, n.
- Suits* arising out of public conventions, how decided at Athens, i. 145, n.
- Suppliants*, sitting their posture, i. 59, n. When raised, their petition understood to be granted, 59, n. At Corcyra destroy themselves in the temple, 141.
- Sybota*, three small islands, i. 99, n. Continental, 105, n; trophy erected on, by the Corinthians, 109. Insular, trophy erected on, by the Corcyreans, 110.
- Synæcia*, her festival at Athens, i. 319.
- Synomosies*, described, iii. 323, n.
- Syracusans* at war with the Leontines, ii. 154. Their allies, 154. Seize Mesene, 197. Defeated in the straits by the Athenians, 235.
- Settle Acræ, Casmenæ, and Camarina, iii. 15. Assemble on news of the Athenian invasion, 63—75. Fifteen generals, 75, n. Prepare for war, 80. Defeated by the Athenians, 113. Invest the command in three instead of fifteen, 116. Fortify their city, 118. Ravage Catana, 119. Send ambassadors to Camarina to gain them over, 119; and to the Corinthians and

- Lacedæmonians, 134, who resolve to assist them, 142. Make dispositions to defend Epipolæ, 146; defeated, 147. Resolve to hazard no more general battles, 150. Build a transverse wall, 150; which is destroyed, 151. Various operations, 151—154. Confer with Nicias about capitulating, 154. Suspect each other and elect new commanders, 155. Encouraged by the arrival of Gongylus, 159. Various operations, 161—166. Defeated in a sea fight, 181. Send out a fleet under Agatharchus, its fortunes, 183. All Sicily joins them, 193. Defeat the Athenian fleet in the harbour, 202. Defeat the Athenians in a night attack on Epipolæ, 206—210. On arrival of the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, make preparations to attack the Athenians by sea and land, 215. Assault the Athenian fortification, 217. Defeat the Athenians in a sea fight, 217, taking eighteen ships, 219. Send a fire ship without effect, 219. Anxious to prevent the escape of the Athenians, why, 221. Nations assembled at Syracuse for and against the Syracusans, 222—225. Block up the port, 226. Case their prows with raw hides to prevent the grappling irons from taking hold, 231. Sea fight, in which they defeat the Athenians, 235—241. Betake themselves to drinking for joy, 242. Block up the roads, 243. Haul off the Athenian ship, 243. Party obstructing the passage of the Anapus routed, 252. Fortify the Acræum Lepas, 252; from which they repulse the Athenians, 253. Overtake the division of Demosthenes, 255; which they surround 256; and force to surrender on terms, 258. Overtake the division of Nicias, 258; refuse their conditions, 259; attack them at the Assinarus, 260; and force them to surrender at discretion, 261. Take the three hundred who had escaped in the night, 262. Thrust the Athenians into Latomia, 263. Put Nicias and Demosthenes to death, one of the most atrocious deeds ever perpetrated, 263, n. Their cruelty to the prisoners, 265. Their war with the Athenians the most disastrous on record regarding Greece, 266. Similar in disposition to the Athenians, 369.
- Syracuse*, founded by a Corinthian colony under Archias, iii. 9. Etymology, 11, n. Described, 118, n.

T.

- Tamos*, appointed his lieutenant by Tissaphernes, iii. 355.
- Tanagra* the *Graia* of Homer, i. 338, n. Derivation of the name, 340, n.
- Tanagræans* defeated by Nicias, ii. 160.
- Tantalus son of Patrocles* taken prisoner by the Athenians, ii. 286.
- Tarentines*, their saying regarding enjoyment, i. 183, n.
- Taulantii*, an Illyrian tribe on the border of the Ionian Gulf. i. 57.
- Taxiarchs*, their rank, ii. 201, n. Gay dress of, 201, n.
- Nature of their office, iii. 226, n. Sometimes called to council at a perilous crisis, 226, n.
- Tegæans*, doubtful battle with the Mantinæans at Leodicium, ii. 412.
- Teios*, wall around it partly demolished by the Clazomenians and Erythræans, iii. 284; remainder by Tissaphernes, 287.
- Tellias* elected a commander by the Syracusans, iii. 155.
- Tellus* buried at the public expense, where he fell, i. 357, n.
- Temenites*, a suburb of Syracuse, etymology, iii. 118, n.
- Temperance* preserved Socrates during the plague, i. 425, n.
- Temple of Androcrates* near Platæa, ii. 39, n.
- Apollo at Amyclæ, ii. 450, n.
- near Asine, ii. 497, n.
- opposite Cythera, iii. 185.
- Delium in Tanagra, ii. 315, n. Fortified by the Athenians, 337—339. Taken by the Boeotians, 356.
- Pythian Apollo at Athens, i. 319.
- Apollo Temenites at Syracuse, iii. 150, n.
- Bacchus, suppliants walled up in, ii. 143.

- Bacchus, in Limnæ, site, i. 319, n.; feasts at, in his honour, 328.
 ——— Ceres, several at Athens, i. 324, n.
 ——— Diana at Caryæ, ii. 501, n.
 Ephesus, its folding-doors of cypress, i. 356, n.
 ——— Dionysius at Athens, iii. 366, n.
 the Piræus, iii. 364, n.
 ——— the Dioscuri at Corcyra, ii. 135.
 Torone, ii. 372.
 ——— Juno at Argos burnt down, ii. 411.
 the most sacred fane in Corcyra, i. 59. Corcyrean nobles seat
 themselves as suppliants at, 136.
 at Platæa, ii. 125.
 ——— Jupiter at Lycæum, ii. 443, n.
 Capitolinus, roof and walls plated with gold, i. 241, n.
 Olympus at Athens, i. 319.
 Syracuse, iii. 105, n.
 ——— Mars near Megara, ii. 300.
 ——— Mercury, near Mycalessus, iii. 189.
 ——— Minerva at Athens, how polluted, i. 229.
 Lecythus, ii. 378.
 Chalcioæcus, how polluted, i. 229. The most celebrated in
 Sparta, 241, n. Origin of the name, 241, n.
 ——— Neptune at Tænarus, how polluted, i. 229.
 ——— Terra at Athens, i. 319.
 ——— Theseus, Athenians one night slept in arms in, during their fears
 regarding the mysteries and Hermæ, iii. 100.
Temples, the great national banks of Greece, i. 214, n. Of Neptune generally
 on promontories, 239, n. Generally placed on high situations, 239, n.
 Walls sometimes coated with plates of metal, 241, n.
 — Nuclei for towns, ii. 315, n. Slaves went round in procession at Sparta,
 during manumission, 322. Distinction of precincts, 338, n. Law of the
 Greeks regarding the custody of, 351. Asylums within, how constructed,
 443, n. Numerous and magnificent in Phlius, 503, n.
 — Remains of, at Torre delli Pulci, iii. 12, n; and at Girgenti, 15, n. Treasures
 in, regarded as a resource in great emergencies, 17, n.
Teres, king of Odryæ, i. 348, and note. Genealogy of his family, 516, n.
Territory, policy of sparing an enemy's, ii. 259, n.
Tessaracost, its value, iii. 373.
Teutiaplus the Elcian advises Alcidas to sail to Mytilene, ii. 45.
Teuthussa, etymology, iii. 308, n.
Thalamii, the lowest tier of rowers, ii. 250, n.
Thapsus, founded by Lamis, iii. 11. Etymology and site, 11, n. Athenian
 fleet anchors at, 147.
Thasians defeated by the Athenians, i. 179. Surrender on terms, 182.
 — Fortify their city, expecting freedom from the Lacedæmonians, iii. 332.
Thasos, its natural wealth, i. 179, n.
 — A Parian colony, ii. 363.
Thasus, Diotrepes abolishes democracy at, iii. 332.
Thaumacia, its site, ii. 317, n.
Theænetus son of Tolmides, and Eupompidas, suggest the escape from Platæa, ii.
 31.
Thebans, invited by some Platæans, effect an entrance into their city by night, i.
 277. Enter into treaty with them, 279. Are afterwards attacked, 281;
 and many slain, 282. The prisoners butchered, 287.
 — Demolish the wall of the Thespians, ii. 411.
Themistocles, Athenian navy improved at his instance, i. 40. Honours conferred
 on him by the Lacedæmonians, 141, n. Advised the Athenians to send an
 embassy to Lacedæmon, regarding the demolition of their walls, 163.
 Procures himself to be sent, 164. His management there, 164. Speech to
 the Lacedæmonians, 166. Returns home, 167. Athenians persuaded by
 him to build the walls of the Piræus, 167. First advised the Athenians to

- apply to the sea, 170. Accused of Medising by the Lacedæmonians, flies to Corcyra, and thence to Admetus, 246; who sends him to Pydna, 249. Driven by tempest on the Athenian fleet at Naxos, 249. Prevails on the shipmaster, by threats and promises, to proceed to Ephesus, 250. His letter to Artaxerxes, 251. Attains great influence at the Persian court, 254. His extraordinary abilities, 254. Various accounts of his death, 257, n. Buried at Magnesia, 257. His bones said to be deposited in Attica, 258.
- Theopompus*, king of Lacedæmon, question of his wife, i. 136, n.
- Theoroi*, who designated by, ii. 489, n.
- Theramenes* conducts a Sicilian fleet to Astyochus, iii. 294. Too easy regarding the sailors' pay, 297. Delivers the fleet to Astyochus, and departs, 306.
- Theramenes son of Agnon*, zealous for establishing an oligarchy at Athens, iii. 338. A ringleader against the oligarchy at Athens, 357. Opposes the fortifications at Eéteonea, 360—364.
- Therme* taken by the Athenians, i. 117.
- Thermun* sent by Agis to the Corinthian fleet at Piræus, iii. 280.
- Thermopylae*, path over the mountains might be identified from Herodotus, ii. 258, n.
- Theseus* makes Athens the paramount city of Attica, i. 318.
- Athenians one night slept in arms in his temple, during their fears regarding the mysteries and Hermæ, iii. 100.
- Thesmophylaces*, who designated by, ii. 489, n.
- Thespieæ*, unsuccessful revolt of the democratical party at, iii. 144.
- Thespians*, their wall demolished by the Thebans, ii. 411.
- Thesalians* expel the Bœotians from Arne, i. 35.
- Lower orders friendly to the Athenians, ii. 318.
- Thessaly*, of old, frequently changed its inhabitants, i. 6.
- Well wooded, ii. 162, n. Difficult to pass through without a conductor, 318. Its government an oligarchy, 318. Maps of, erroneous, 318, n.
- Thirty years' War*, in Germany, depravity caused by, ii. 151, n.
- Thrace*, well wooded, ii. 162, n.
- Thrace*, *Parts of*, what the term comprehended, i. 116, n.
- Thracians* cut off an Athenian colony at Drabescus, i. 180. Receive rather than give, 523. Avaricious, 524, n.
- Hired as mercenaries, 246, n. Excuse of remnant of Athenian colony destroyed by, at Drabescus, 358.
- A body of the Machærophori sent back from Athens, why, iii. 185. A blood-thirsty nation, 189.
- Thranitzæ*, the highest tier of rowers, ii. 250, n.
- Thrasylbus son of Lycus* chosen a commander by the Athenians at Samos, iii. 345. Joins Thrasyllus at Eresus, 373. Commands the right wing at the battle off Cynos-sema, 377.
- Thrasycles* sent with ships to Chios, iii. 283.
- Thrasyllus the Argive*, with Alciphron, induces Agis to grant a truce, ii. 507. Stoned at the Charadrus, 508. Takes refuge at an altar, 509.
- Chosen a commander by the Athenians at Samos, iii. 345. Joins Thrasybulus at Eresus, 373. Commands the left wing at the battle off Cynos-sema, 377.
- Thronium*, its site, i. 345, n.
- Thucles*, leader of a Chalcidæan colony to Sicily, iii. 9.
- Thuria*, its site, iii. 101.
- Thurians* revolt from the Lacedæmonians, i. 181.
- Thucydides*, host of the *Pharsalians*, endeavours to appease the tumults at the Piræus, iii. 363.
- Thucydides son of Milesius*, a commander of the expedition to Samos, i. 209.
- Thucydides son of Olorus*, his reasons for writing his history, i. 2. Does not profess to give the exact words of the speeches, 52. Narrates those actions only at which he was present, or of which he was informed by those who were, 52. Composed his history for an everlasting possession, 54. The history of Greece after the Median war perfectly written by none of his predecessors, 175. Proof of his having seen the history of Herodotus, 526, n.
- His opinions regarding the formation of pools by earthquakes, ii. 159. His

- delicacy, 195, n. Difficulty in translating, 310, n. Sails to relieve Amphipolis, 363; too late, 365. Saves Eion, 365. Banished for twenty years, 458.
- Thucydides*, one of the very greatest boasts of his country, iii. 33, n. Why so minute in details of religious and civil observances, 111, n. His knowledge of the human heart, 269, n.
- Thyamis*, a river dividing Thesprotia and Cestrina, i. 98.
- Etymology and site, ii. 183, n.
- Thyrea* given to the *Æginetae*, i. 346. Derivation of the name, 346, n.
- Site, ii. 285, n. Sacked by the Athenians, 286.
- Thyssen*, its site, ii. 370, n. Taken by the Dians, ii. 471.
- Tichium*, conjectures regarding, ii. 170, n. Taken by the Athenians, 170.
- Timæus* persuades Andocides to inform respecting the mutilation of the *Mercuries*, iii. 99.
- Timagoras son of Athenagoras* ambassador from Pharnabazus to Lacedæmon, iii. 275. Does not give the money for the Chian expedition, 276.
- Timber for ship-building fetched from Italy and Sicily, by the Peloponnesians, ii. 162, n.
- Time anciently measured by agricultural epochs, ii. 327, n.
- Timocrates the Lacedæmonian*, counsellor to Cnemus, i. 495. Slays himself 511, and note.
- Tyrnithians*, oracle regarding, i. 458, n.
- Tisias son of Tisimachus*, leader of the Melian expedition, ii. 543.
- Tissaphernes* sends an ambassador to the Lacedæmonians, iii. 274; reasons for seeking their alliance, 274. His satrapy, 274, n. Concludes an alliance with the Lacedæmonians, 286. Assists to demolish the wall of Teios, 287. Assists the Milesians, 293. Induces the Sicilian fleet to assist him against Amorges, 296; who is delivered up to him, 296. Garrisons Iasus, 297. Reduces the pay of the Sicilian sailors, 297. Second treaty with the Lacedæmonians, 303. Gives entire confidence to Alcibiades, 315. Third treaty with the Lacedæmonians, 327. Sends an ambassador to Lacedæmon to defend his proceedings, 352. His enmity to Hermocrates, 353. Goes to Aspendus on pretext of fetching the Phœnician fleet, 355; real intent, 356. Sacrifices to Artemis at Ephesus, 380, and note.
- Tobacconists* escaped the plague in London, i. 413, n.
- Tolmides son of Tolmarus* cruises round Peloponnesus, i. 194. Particulars of his cruise, 195, n. Commands the expedition against the Boeotian exiles, 203.
- Tolophon*, its site, ii. 174, n.
- Tombs of the slain at Platæa*, annual rites at, ii. 106, n.
- Tomeus*, probable site, ii. 382, n.
- Torone*, etymology, ii. 371, n. Its site, 417, n. Taken by the Athenians, 418.
- Tortoise*, why stamped on Lacedæmonian coins, i. 131, n.
- Trachinia*, orthography, etymology, and site, ii. 161, n. Well wooded, 162, n.
- Treasury at Athens*, first time exhausted, ii. 28.
- Treaties*, religion most prominent in those of the Greeks, ii. 380, n. Customary to inscribe on pillars, 489, n.
- Treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon* permitted neutral states to join either league, i. 89. The Lacedæmonians vote it broken, 161.
- For a limited period preferred by the ancients, ii. 193, n. Between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, 445; terms of, refused by the confederates, 453; final terms, 455. Between the Athenians and Argives, 485. Between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, its infraction by the Lacedæmonians recorded by the Athenians on the pillar bearing it, 502. Between the Lacedæmonians and Argives, terms of, 532.
- Between the Lacedæmonians and the king of Persia, iii. 286. Second, between — the Lacedæmonians and the king of Persia, 303. Third, between the Lacedæmonians and the king of Persia, 327.
- Trees*, villages in England named from, i. 349, n.
- Triballi*, site of their territory, i. 520, n.
- Trinacria*, a name of Sicily, conjectures regarding, iii. 4. n. Not confined to Sicily, 5, n.

- Triopium*, etymology, iii. 802, n. Six Peloponnesian ships taken off, by the Athenians, 802.
- Tripod* at Delphi, a couplet inscribed on, by Pausanias, i. 236; effaced by the Lacedæmonians, 236, and note; who inscribe on it the names of the allies, 237.
- Tripodiscus*, a village of Megara, ii. 306.
- Tyreme*, number of crew, ii. 203, n.
- Office of captain expensive, iii. 58, n.; thrown, as a burden, on the rich, 58, n. Conjectures regarding ensigns, 58, n.
- Tyremes*, first built at Corinth, i. 38.
- Ten, the naval auxiliary quota of the Mytilenians, ii. 7, n. Their inconvenience, 239, n.
- Conjectures regarding crew and pay of Athenian, iii. 18, n. Sometimes carried two hundred men, iii. 298, n.
- Tritæans*, ii. 175, n.
- Troxen*, its site, ii. 272, n.
- Trojan*, colonists of Sicily, iii. 4.
- Trojan war*, the earliest achievement of the Greeks in common, i. 9. Effects of the return of Greeks from, 35.
- Trophy* only lawfully erected when the army kept the field, iii. 290.
- Troilus* founded by Lamis, iii. 10. Etymology and site, 11, n.
- Troy*, naval armament against, greater than any which had preceded it, i. 30; but inferior to those of the age of Pericles, 30. Why the city held out so long, 33.
- Truce* at Pylus, terms of, ii. 222; oldest document of the kind, 222, n. For burial of dead, to ask implied inferiority, 271, n. For a year, between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, form of, 378; called the peace of Nicias, 588, n.
- Trucebreakers*, who are, and who are not, i. 136.
- Trumpets*, used by the ancients to proclaim silence, iii. 61, n.
- Tumulus* of Ajax still remaining at Rhœteum, ii. 278, n.
- Twelve gods*, altar consecrated to, by Hippias, iii. 93.
- Tyca*, a suburb of Syracuse, etymology, iii. 118, n.
- Tyrannies and kingships*, distinction between, i. 36, n.

U.

- Ὑπερβολαι*, meaning of the term, iii. 58, n.

V.

- Victim* furnished as a quit-rent, ii. 497, n.
- Victims* sacrificed between the skirmishing and main battle, iii. 111.
- Victory in war* depends on counsel and funds, i. 307. When doubtful, each party raised a trophy unimpeded by the other, 336, n.
- Virgins*, annual dance of Lacedæmonian, round the statue of Diana at Caryæ, ii. 501, n.
- Baskets borne by, at Athenian festivals, iii. 94.
- Votes*, when equal, prisoner acquitted, ii. 86, n.
- Vulcan*, his smithy supposed to be at Hiera, ii. 157.

W.

- Waggons*, solitary instance of corn carried off in, iii. 17.
- Walls*, those of circumvallation how formed, i. 121, n. Their thickness expressed by the ancients by carriage-breadths, 168, n. When very thick, filled up with rubble, 169, n. Of Athens forty cubits high, 170, n.
- Height computed by counting the courses of bricks, ii. 31; and stones, 31, n. Drawn round Plataea by the Peloponnesians, how constructed, 32, n. Chians demolish their new-built wall by order of the Athenians, 278. Of Babylon disembattled by order of Darius, 278, n. Long, of Nisæa, conjectures regarding, 304, n.

- War*, cause of, between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, i. 56. Cause of, between the Corinthians and Athenians, 112. Two chief reasons for going to, 137, n. Can only be sustained by superabundance, 266, n.
 — an imperious dictator, ii. 145. Distinguished from *differences*, 291, n.
Warfare, influence of Christianity on, ii. 191, n.
War-lights, ii. 36, n.
Wars, men fancy those they have been engaged in the greatest, i. 50.
Water, amongst the ancients, symbolical of purity, i. 322, n.
 — Procured by digging pits in the soil, ii. 239.
Watercourse diverted by Agis, ii. 515.
Watercourses, diversion of, contrary to Amphictyonic oath, ii. 515, n.
Wealth, horse-keeping esteemed a proof of, iii. 27, n.
Weights, ancients excelled in contrivances for raising, ii. 374, n.
Wheel, spreaders of false reports affecting the state broken on, iii. 71, n.
Wheelbarrows, not used by the ancients, ii. 203, n.
Whips, those of the Corcyreans extremely large, ii. 274, n.
White, the general colour of the primitive shields, ii. 210, n.
Wicker-shields described, ii. 210, n. Still used in the East, 210, n.
Wing, right, of an army, why pushed out, ii. 524.
Wolfe resembled Brasidas in his death, ii. 435, n.
Women, at Plataea, pelt the enemy with tiles from the house-tops, i. 282. A woman facilitates the escape of the Thebans from Plataea, 284. Wail at funerals, 357, and note. Their place in funerals, 357, n. None allowed to attend under sixty years old, 357, n. Their duties during a siege, 480, n.
 — Their daring valour at Corcyra, ii. 133. Artifice of the wives of the Melians to liberate their husbands, 542, n.
 — Pachaships and jaghireships sometimes held by, iii. 327, n.
Words, final syllables of, liable to corruption, ii. 97, n. Faction changes the signification of, 146.

X.

- Xenagi*, what they were, i. 471, n.
Xenares and Cleobulus, their political intrigues, ii. 474.
Xenares son of Cnidis slain, ii. 495.
Xenocides son of Euthycles, commander of the Corinthian expedition against Corcyra, i. 97.
Xenophontidas arrives at Rhodes to solicit aid for Chios, iii. 324.
Xerxes, how obliged by Pausanias, i. 230. Proposal of Pausanias to subject Greece to him, 230; which he accepts, 231.
 — Employed horse-transporters, ii. 263, n.
Ξύμμοροι, conjectures regarding, ii. 344, n.

Y.

- Year*, names of festivals used to denote the times of, ii. 479, n.
Youth, Spartan institutions unfavourable to eminence in, ii. 306, n.

Z.

- Zacynthus*, description of, and etymology, i. 454, n.
Zanchio, a castle of the Venetians, ruins of, at Navarino, ii. 199, n.
Zancle, etymology and colonisation, iii. 14.
Zeno commands the Boeotian auxiliaries sent to the Syracusans, iii. 178.
Zeugitæ, the middle tier of rowers, ii. 250, n.
Zeusis, the statue of Juno at Agrigentum his masterpiece, iii. 13, n.

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